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ABSTRACT  
 
Earle Christmas Grafton Page (1880-1961) – Country Party leader, Treasurer 
and Prime Minister – was the most extraordinary visionary to hold high public 
office in the Australian Parliament during the first several decades of the 
twentieth century.  His incessant activism in regionalism, new states, 
hydroelectricity, economic planning, co-operative federalism and rural 
universities had a distinctively personal dimension.  But he also contributed to 
and led several larger, and in some respects, perennial themes in Australian 
history related to issues summarised in this thesis as developmentalism.  This 
study assesses the relationship between Page and this wider current of debate. 
 
Page’s career as one of Australia’s longest serving senior politicians is 
characterised by his remarkably consistent but pragmatically opportunistic 
efforts to shape the still formative government and society of the Australian 
nation according to his personal vision of its economic and social future.  His 
efforts influenced more conventional government policy, both directly through 
his membership of governments and indirectly through his long-term impact on 
what policy ideas were prominent in public debate.  Page’s successes and also 
his failures elucidate the wider issue of the place of concepts of national 
development in modern Australian history. 
 
This thesis is a biographically-based study of the significance of applied policy 
ideas.  The emphasis is on describing and analysing the most distinctive of 
Page’s policy initiatives, seeking to illuminate his significance in the wider world 
of ideas and politics.  Page has been cast by some historians as merely 
reflective of a Country Party intent on securing resources for rural interests: this 
is greatly to underestimate his originality and significance.  Although he drew 
on specific ideas held by other public figures and civic movements, Page 
uniquely moulded these into a coherent national vision that drew heavily on 
concepts of the desirable spatial disposition of population and the appropriate 
scale of public institutions.  
 
vii 
 
Over decades, Page made telling references to what he called the 
psychological moment.  This marked whenever he judged that he at last had 
the public and political support needed to achieve one of his treasured policy 
goals.  It encapsulates his awareness that his vision of the nation normally sat 
far outside the political mainstream and of the consequent difficulties he faced 
in trying to implement it.  It also suggested, however, a sense that his ideas had 
potential to appeal to an Australian public who were open to fresh ways of 
viewing the national project.   
 
Page broadened existing developmentalist thought through his rare synthesis 
of ideas that both delineated and stretched the Australian political imagination.  
His rich career confirms that Australia has long inspired popular ideals of 
national development, but also that their practical implementation was 
increasingly challenged during the twentieth-century.  Page’s influence and 
experience supports arguments that Australian public life has been rich in 
applied thinkers.  His work shows how assessment of the contribution of an 
engaged individual, their ideas and advocacy, can illuminate a past that is both 
relevant to still unresolved issues in Australian politics and which is also 
suggestive of alternative paths.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The idealism and tireless activism of Earle Page sparked radically differing 
reactions.  H.P. Moss, Commonwealth Electricity Supply Controller, saw him as 
“a dreamer of dreams with a firm hold on mother earth.”1  Former Prime 
Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce recalled that Page as his Treasurer was so 
“bursting with energy” that he routinely had to be advised “my dear Page, for 
God’s sake go away and have your head read.”  But Bruce added that “if you 
had the patience to listen to Page, he’d come up with a helluva good idea now 
and then.”2  Page’s Country Party colleague Arthur Fadden was once heard to 
shout “he’s a dribbling, doddering old halfwit!”3  Much later, political scientist 
Don Aitkin judged Page to be “almost without question the most inventive 
federal politician of the twentieth century”, yet also “the most under-regarded 
politician of the federal arena.”4   
My thesis is that the career of Earle Page as one of Australia’s longest serving 
senior politicians is characterised by his remarkably consistent but 
pragmatically opportunistic efforts to shape the still formative government and 
society of the Australian nation according to his personal vision of its economic 
and social future.  These efforts influenced more conventional policy, both 
directly through his membership of governments and indirectly through his 
long-term impact on what ideas were prominent in public debate.  His 
successes and also his failures elucidate the wider issue of the place of 
concepts of national development in modern Australian history.   
 
This study is therefore a biographically-based examination of how applied ideas 
about national development interacted with Australian politics during the 
twentieth century.  It is focussed on efforts to shape the entire nation, from the 
                                                 
1 Quoted in foreword to Earle Page, Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, Sydney, 
August 1944, no pagination.  
2 Quoted in Cecil Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds, William Heinemann, 
London, 1965, p. 82. 
3 Recalled by publisher Peter Ryan in It Strikes Me: Collected Essays 1994-2010, Quadrant 
Books, Sydney, 2011, p. 266.  The comment was made amidst an evening group drinking 
session when Page briefly absented himself.    
4 Don Aitkin, ‘Page, Earle Christmas Grafton’, in Graeme Davison, John Hirst and Stuart 
Macintyre (eds.),The Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1998, pp. 488-9.  
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early post-Federation years when the role of the newly-created Commonwealth 
government was still an open issue, up to mid-century when Australian politics 
and public policy had assumed a more settled form.  It uses an assessment of 
Page’s place in history as a basis for considering the conduct of a wide range 
of important policy issues in Australia’s past.  His long and varied career 
revolved around leadership of a series of political campaigns to shape the 
nation’s economy, society and polity.  These campaigns tapped broader 
Australian modes of thought concerning the disposition of population and 
industry, the fostering of economic development and structures of government, 
but were enlivened by Page’s clearly defined ideas, particularly about the 
spatial distribution of these elements and the appropriate role and scale of 
public institutions.  
  
My emphasis is on Page’s most distinctive ideas and initiatives concerning 
national development.  Page was one of many important Australian leaders – 
figures as diverse as Ben Chifley, Thomas Playford and John McEwen – who 
assumed that such a vast and formative nation was surely open to the 
aggressive exploitation of natural resources and the fostering of new industries.  
Although Page drew on ideas promoted by other such public figures and by 
civic movements, he uniquely moulded them into his own coherent vision.  This 
synthesis has received little attention from historians, the result of Page often 
being cast as merely reflective of the mainstream of the Country Party and 
hence intent primarily on securing resources for rural interests.  Such a view 
greatly underestimates the originality and significance of his imagining of the 
Australian nation.   
 
Over decades, Page used the telling phrase “now is the psychological 
moment”.  These words (or slight variations) appeared in public statements, 
private correspondence, official documents and his memoirs to mark whenever 
he thought that the stars had at last aligned to provide the public and political 
support needed to achieve one of his treasured policy goals.5  He used this 
                                                 
5 The phrase “the psychological moment” had fairly wide currency before Page: prominent early 
users include Joseph Conrad, Mark Twain and Alexander Wheelock Thayer in his biography of 
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favoured phrase in connection with many different issues, including new states, 
hydroelectricity, economic planning and national insurance.  This phrase was 
much more than just a rhetorical device.  It encapsulated how Page saw his 
vision of the nation as being far ahead of the views held by most of his political 
peers and the wider public.  It also suggested, however, a sense that his ideas 
had potential to appeal to an Australian public who at this early juncture in their 
nation’s history were open to fresh ways of viewing the national project.  It 
simultaneously signalled the power of his vision to capture the inchoate 
interests of others.  It further indicates an awareness of the difficulties he faced 
in trying to implement ideas that sat far outside the political mainstream.  
 
While Page’s policy campaigns used conventional party and parliamentary 
politics as their main base, he also drew on the public campaigns and 
associations, the rural press and business leaders to promote his ideals.  His 
consistency lay in his decades-long pursuit of his vision of a transformed 
Australia.  His pragmatic opportunism emerges from his preparedness to wait 
for years for political circumstances that presented a chance of implementing a 
particular policy passion.  Analysis of these ideas and campaigns ultimately 
leads to broader conclusions on the place in Australian history of proposals to 
shape and invigorate the nation’s economy and society – often described as 
nation-building, but to which I apply the term developmentalism.  For all his 
idiosyncrasies, Page helps us assess what specific issues were current and 
gauge the depth of their support during his years in politics.  Charting Page’s 
growing difficulties in that political career also delineates how wider policy-
making environments changed through the middle decades of the twentieth 
century.   
                                                                                                                                              
Beethoven.  Page’s apparent first reference to the psychological moment was in a 1915 public 
document proposing a new state of northern New South Wales; see chapter 1, p. 61. 
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Who was Earle Page? 
 
Earle Christmas Grafton Page was born on 8 August 1880 in Grafton in north-
eastern New South Wales, 630 kilometres north of Sydney.  He was a rural 
surgeon who helped found the federal Country Party and was its leader from 
1921 until 1939.  His membership of the House of Representatives from 1919 
until his death in 1961 makes Page Australia’s third longest serving federal 
parliamentarian, after William Morris (‘Billy’) Hughes and Philip Ruddock.  He 
was a Cabinet minister for a total of twenty years, and de facto Deputy Prime 
Minister under Stanley Bruce (1923-29) and Joseph Lyons (1934-39).6  He held 
the portfolios of Treasury (1923-29), Commerce (1934-39, 1940-41) and Health 
(1937-38), but spent most of the 1940s on the political outer before resuming 
the Health portfolio (1949-56).  In 1941-42 he was Australian Minister resident 
in London. 
 
Page was even briefly Prime Minister.  This was on a caretaker basis for just 
nineteen days in April 1939 following the death of Lyons, but it still accords him 
recognition he would not otherwise have.  Page is well known for his roles in 
creating the urban-rural conservative coalition that has been a feature of 
Australian national politics since 1923, in resetting the financial relationship 
                                                 
6 The title of Deputy Prime Minister had no formal status at the time. 
 Figure 1: Earle Page in early  
 Canberra.  (Mildenhall Collection,  
 NAA, A3560, 6053, undated). 
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between the Commonwealth and states via the 1927 Financial Agreement, and 
in pioneering a program of publicly subsidised health insurance in the 1950s.  
Accounts of Page often also raise his less successful efforts to create a new 
state in northern New South Wales.  He is also known – too well known, for it is 
but one feature of a long and rich career – for his 1939 attack on the personal 
fitness of Robert Menzies to serve as Prime Minister.    
 
Page died on 20 December 1961.  In five decades of public life he remained 
resolutely faithful to his core strategies for transforming Australia.  These were, 
in summary, the decentralisation of population and industry to the countryside; 
regional governance that encouraged local engagement with social and 
economic development but in accordance with policies set by a strong central 
government; national economic planning of infrastructure and industries; 
electrification of the countryside, especially via hydroelectricity; rural education 
to encourage decentralisation and civic awareness; and a reformed constitution 
to institutionalise Commonwealth-state co-operation.7  While some of these 
causes were very much of Page’s time, others – notably federalism and 
regionalism – have been in a near constant state of flux in Australian political 
debate.8  From both perspectives, Page can serve to illuminate the chronic lack 
of resolution of many important aspects of Australian national development, still 
apparent to-day.  These include the state-Commonwealth power balance, 
tensions between countryside and city over the allocation of public resources, 
and the difficulty of implementing a coherent national economic policy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Although Page’s listings of his favoured policy causes varied from time to time, these were the 
most consistently mentioned.  Sometimes he added a secure banking system; see for example 
‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page, Sydney 22nd June 1956, 
Address by Sir Earle Page’ and ‘Notes for Country Party Complimentary Dinner 22/6/56’, EPP, 
folder 2358.  Others that he mentioned at times included tariff reform and Imperial free trade; 
see Earle Page, Earle Page, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2001, p. 438.  This is a reprint of Page’s 
Truant Surgeon: The Inside Story of Forty Years of Australian Political Life, edited by Ann 
Moyal (Mozley), Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1963.  All page references in this thesis are to 
this widely available Black Inc. reprint, but which is henceforth referred to under the original 
title. 
8 See A.J. Brown and J.A. Bellamy (eds.), Federalism and Regionalism in Australia: New 
Approaches, New Institutions?, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 2007. 
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Why Page?: a biographical approach to the study of ideas  
 
The Country Party is said to be hard to classify using the conventional left-right 
political spectrum: even for a regionally-based party, it is sui generis.9  Page 
himself is at least as problematical.  A cursory survey of his career could lead 
to political biographer David Marr’s comments about “knights on horseback” – 
“attractive bit players” in politics who see the everyday world “not quite as the 
rest of us do”, while “what drives them is always a little opaque.”10  Marr wrote 
with Tony Abbott foremost in mind, but his comments could also be directed at 
more marginal figures such as Frederic Eggleston, Bert Kelly, Barry Jones and 
many others.  Such figures were often thoughtful individuals who challenged 
fundamentals and occasionally nurtured ideas that grew into mainstream 
policy, including Eggleston on private investment in infrastructure, Kelly on free 
trade and Jones on innovation.11  Their mixed fortunes helps define what was 
and was not politically possible at various times in Australia’s past, and 
highlights the creativity that politics could occasionally encompass.  It does not 
decisively matter if, like Page, they did not achieve as much as they wanted – 
they can still be a valuable focus for what they and their policy campaigning 
suggest about Australian history and the historical basis of current conditions 
and debates.   
 
Applying Marr’s very generic label to Page only partially conveys his 
significance.  Far from being opaque, he made very clear what he wanted and 
why.  As a career politician he certainly had a grasp of reality, strained as this 
was at times.  Above all, he was not a bit player.  Self-perceived visionaries are 
hardly rare but Page was different – a long term holder of high office who was 
                                                 
9 See for example comments by John Paul, ‘Albert Dunstan and Victorian Government’, in 
Cameron Hazlehurst (ed.), Australian Conservatism: Essays in Twentieth Century Political 
History, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1979, p. 169; and by Geoff Cockfield 
and Linda Courtenay Botterill, ‘From Country to National to Regional?’, in Botterill and Cockfield 
(eds.), The National Party: Prospects for the Great Survivors, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 
2009, p. 199. 
10 David Marr, The Best Australian Essays 2012: Political Animal: The Making of Tony Abbott, 
Black Inc., Collingwood, 2012, p. 110. 
11 Eggleston is particularly well documented in Warren G. Osmond’s Frederick Eggleston: An 
Intellectual in Australian Politics, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985.  Eggleston was a more 
conventional thinker than Page, committed to Deakinite progressivism and cultural 
conservatism.  Unlike Page, he had only a brief political career of a few unhappy years in the 
Victorian Parliament. 
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in a position to do something about his goal of shaping Australia.  Page was not 
just seeking more resources for the countryside (keen on this as he was): he 
actively promoted the rational application of regionalism, planning and 
technology.  In this, he was a rare combination of the earthly and the dreamer, 
who saw himself as a statesman leading a grand cause that sat far above mere 
party politics.   
 
A central premise of this thesis is that a biographically-based approach is vital 
to understanding and analysing the policy successes and failures of such a 
wide-ranging figure.  Developmentalism helps us understand Page, but just as 
importantly his career casts light on the place of developmentalism in twentieth 
century Australia.  Relating the particular to the general is an important role of 
biographical studies.  As Australian political scientist and biographer Tracey 
Arklay suggests, “biography provides an alternative point of analysis to the 
workings of social groups, situations and events, which is the normal frame of 
reference for historical research.”  It “can broaden, rather than reduce, an 
understanding of who got ‘what, when and how’”.12  In Page’s case, seniority, 
tenacious advocacy and breadth of vision resulted in a life that enlivened many 
major issues.  As one of Australia’s great optimists, he saw the nation as a 
tractable land of possibilities that a visionary like himself, dedicated to a very 
special conception of the greater good, had a public duty to try to realise.  A 
biographical approach that traces his rich policy career and the reactions of 
those around him thus contributes to mapping how the Australian political 
imagination was capable of stretching beyond conventional politics to consider 
how the nation should be shaped in order to realise its potential.  As has 
frequently been noted, visionaries often inadvertently tell us more about what 
they represent in their own present than the future they foresee.13   
 
                                                 
12 Tracey Arklay, ‘Political Biography: Its Contribution to Political Science’, in Tracey Arklay, 
John Nethercote and John Wanna (eds.), Australian Political Lives: Chronicling Political 
Careers and Administrative Histories, ANU E Press, Canberra, 2006, p. 18.  The quote’s last 
phrase alludes to Harold Laswell’s Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Peter Smith, New 
York, 1936.  
13 Such as noted by Ian Turner (ed.) in The Australian Dream: A Collection of Anticipations 
about Australia from Captain Cook to the Present Day, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1968, p. ix.  
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That Page’s various policy triumphs and failures extended across decades is a 
further reason for using his career to assess developmentalism.  His political 
longevity illuminates important changes in the wider policy environment around 
him.  Over time, his own Country Party gravitated towards conceptions of 
national development very different to Page’s own views.  There were also 
major changes in how policy was formulated within government, notably a post-
Depression dominance of economic precepts with which Page lacked empathy. 
While ‘rise and fall’ is too simplistic a way of viewing Page’s life, his career 
signals several significant transitions in the settings and institutions of 
Australian politics.   
 
Analysis of Page’s main policy initiatives will further address his interaction with 
the wider social and political movements he used to help galvanise this 
campaigning.  Such contexts as the early Country Party, new state movements 
and attempts to harness the business world and the engineering profession, 
delineate what wider support (and opposition) his various causes elicited.  
Page’s career embodies an important ongoing tension in Australian history.  On 
the one hand, he can be seen as being in company with ardent 
developmentalists who thought that direct action could readily realise the 
nation’s potential.  On the other, he confronted realists in government and 
business who stressed the limitations of the natural environment and of 
government action.  Competition between such hopeful and more sober 
conceptions of national development was one of the great debates of twentieth-
century Australia, within which Page played the role of an especially tireless 
optimist. 
 
The distinctiveness of Page’s policy vision further enhances his value as a 
basis for wider historical assessment.  It has been said that Australian politics 
has derived many of its animating ideas from European and American 
sources.14  Although Page made enthusiastic use of international exemplars, 
this was highly selective.  Fundamentally, he synthesised home-grown and 
international ideas into his own distinctively broad yet prescriptive 
                                                 
14 Peter Loveday, ‘Australian Political Thought’, in Richard Lucy (ed.), The Pieces of Politics, 
Macmillan, South Melbourne, 2nd edition, 1979 (first published 1975), p. 2. 
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developmentalist vision of the entire nation, with the state setting the right initial 
conditions for development from which local communities and private interests 
would build infrastructure and nurture industries.  The intensity and consistency 
of this vision over decades owed much to powerful personal formative 
experiences.  Despite picturing himself as a rationalist, Page’s commitment 
was essentially deeply emotional.  This can only be fully understood by 
considering the lasting influence of his place of origin, family, religion and how 
early exposure to harsh rural living conditions fostered a resentment of big 
cities.  
 
Page is also a significant example of an applied thinker functioning in a political 
context.  Such figures feature in recent studies which have sought to broaden 
conceptions of the role of ideas in Australian public life.  This includes work by 
James Walter and Tod Moore that touches on Country Party figures, notably 
Page himself, his energetic admirer Ulrich Ellis, and Page’s confidant David 
Drummond.  Moore calls Page an “inventive political strategist” and an 
“intellectual” of the Country Party.15  Walter argues that scholars such as Peter 
Loveday placed too much emphasis on the local absence of canonical figures 
of the stature of Edmund Burke or John Stuart Mill, as against more applied 
thinkers such as L.F. Giblin, Elton Mayo and H.C. (‘Nugget’) Coombs.  He 
notes in this context the concept of the organic intellectual who arises from and 
articulates the interests of a social class, organisation or cultural formation.16  
This concept, which originated with the Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio 
Gramsci, captures Page and many other members of the Australian 
intelligentsia as individuals who typically were applied in intent and deeply 
embedded in the political culture they sought to change.  Such figures can be 
ideologically ambiguous, including Page the anti-socialist who simultaneously 
advocated strong national government.  Studying Page’s ideas contributes to 
understanding of Australia’s applied intellectuals and their historical 
importance. 
                                                 
15 Tod Moore in James Walter with Tod Moore, What Were They Thinking?: The Politics of 
Ideas in Australia, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2010, pp. 155-6.   
16 See also James Walter ‘Intellectuals and the Political Culture’, in Brian Head and James 
Walter (eds.), Intellectual Movements and Australian Society, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1988, pp. 240-1; and Walter with Moore, ibid., pp. 27-8.  Page would however have 
been repelled by the revolutionary context of Gramsci’s thinking. 
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In taking a biographical approach, I seek to remain mindful of qualities listed by 
Jeffrey Meyers in The Biographer’s Art: New Essays.  Firstly, there is the need 
for “original research that casts new light on the subject” – this thesis draws 
heavily on Page’s personal papers and those of his associates, such as Ellis, 
that have only been sporadically used by historians.  Secondly, such work 
should constitute “a complete and accurate synthesis of both public and private 
life” – although I do not dwell on Page’s private life, I consider the how personal 
origins shaped his lifelong outlook.  Thirdly, biography demands “a perceptive 
interpretation of character”.  Outlining Page’s policy campaigns highlights his 
distinctiveness as a personality and thinker.  Fourthly, biographical narratives 
require “a sound dramatic structure that brings the pattern of life into focus” – 
which I seek by providing detailed accounts of Page’s more remarkable political 
initiatives.  Fifthly, Meyers calls for “an evocation of the cultural background”.  
My study explores the political and cultural environments with which Page 
intersected, especially early in his career.  Finally, there is the requirement for 
“an insightful evaluation of the subject’s achievement”, as “the real justification 
of the work”.  I challenge assumptions about Page’s personal agenda and 
creativity, delineate his still relevant legacies in such issues as regionalism and 
federalism, and draw on his policy campaigns to cast light on both his and 
developmentalism’s place in Australian history.17   
 
Page and the significance of Australian developmentalism  
 
Using Page to assess developmentalism also helps to improve understanding 
of the place in the Australian past of this important but little-studied concept.18    
                                                 
17 Jeffrey Meyers (ed.), The Biographer's Art: New Essays, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989, p. 1.  
Meyers also refers to “an elegant yet lively style.”  
18 The term developmentalism is not original to this thesis, but has not been widely used in the 
sense meant here.  Peter Cochrane, for example, used it fleetingly in Industrialisation and 
Dependence: Australia’s Road to Economic Development, University of Queensland Press, St. 
Lucia, 1980, p. 11.  A more fulsome instance is in Jillian Koshin’s 2009 biography of Tasmanian 
Premier and hydroelectricity enthusiast Eric Reece, Electric Eric: The Life and Times of Eric 
Reece, Bokprint, Launceston.  She defines developmentalism as “The set of ideas which, in the 
name of progress, believes in, and promotes the establishment or growth of industry – 
particularly manufacturing and processing plants, power plants, and resource extraction”, p. 4.  
This includes associated infrastructure, government assistance and affirmation of a right to 
exploit natural resources.  Developmentalism is also used by Greg Whitwell in a very broad 
sense in his contribution ‘Economic Policy’ to Scott Prasser, J.R. Nethercote and John 
Warhurst (eds.), The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, Hale & 
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Although developmentalism was not commonly used as a term in Page’s time, 
the sentiments it encompasses predate him.  The economic historian S.J. 
Butlin said that “development has, as it were, always been part of Australian 
religion since Arthur Phillip” and was identified with growth via “geographical 
spread and quantitative increase.”19  John Gascoigne wrote of how Australia 
came under European domination in “an age energised by the possibilities of 
‘improvement’” of the land, industry and of human nature itself.  Australia was 
seen as “a piece of waste land writ large requiring to be brought into productive 
use.”20  Page himself in his first speech on a national stage described his 
central goal as being “The Development of Australia.”21  National development 
was the stated foremost task of the first government in which he held office.  
Prime Minister Bruce proclaimed himself “managing director of the greatest 
company in Australia, the Commonwealth Government, and its duty is to 
develop Australia.”22     
 
Developmentalism also has an important cultural dimension as an expression 
of national identify.  Donald Horne described development as Australia’s 
“secular faith,” amounting to “a kind of patriotism” – “development for its own 
sake”, in fact.23  This faith stretched across the party political divide: shortly 
after Page’s death, Arthur Calwell wrote of development as “a unique 
nationalism” and of the “unanimity that exists on the need for national 
                                                                                                                                              
Iremonger, Sydney, 1995, pp. 169, 179.  Whitwell’s use of the term encompasses less 
interventionist policies such as attracting foreign investment into resource-based industries.  
Quite differently, the term is also applied to economic theory advocating growth in developing 
economies through fostering strong internal markets and imposing high import tariffs.   
19 S.J. Butlin, ‘The Role of Planning in Australian Economic Development’, in Economic Papers 
No 15 – Planned and Unplanned Development, The Economic Society of Australia and New 
Zealand, Sydney, 1962, p. 12.  Other reflections on the prevalence of developmentalism in 
Australia include J.D.B. Miller in Australian Government and Politics: An Introductory Survey, 
Duckworth, London, 1954; “Australian propaganda has traditionally represented it as a land of 
boundless resources, only waiting for people and capital to release its energies”, p. 11. 
20 John Gascoigne (with the assistance of Patricia Curthoys), The Enlightenment and the 
Origins of European Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 70.  
21 Earle Page, A Plea for Unification: The Development of Australia, Grafton, 1917.  This is the 
published text of his speech to the Australasian Provincial Press Association conference of 13 
August 1917. 
22 Bruce speaking in 1928, quoted in Donald Horne, Money Made Us, Penguin Books, 
Ringwood, 1976, p. 134. 
23 Ibid., pp. 133, 134. 
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development.”24  It also extended into the business world and civic movements 
which Page tried to harness to his policy goals, attracting such varied contacts 
of his as industrialist and planner Herbert Gepp, and the Tamworth-based 
journalist and new state enthusiast, Victor (V.C.) Thompson.  
Developmentalism was especially strong in Page’s habitual milieu of rural-
based politics as it was seen as favouring public investment in rural 
infrastructure and services that promoted equality between city and bush.25  
John Hirst, in his riposte to Russel Ward’s The Australian Legend, saw 
Australian nationalism as having a base in a pioneer legend that celebrates 
national development achieved through the harnessing of the land.26  In the 
early twenty-first century the journalist Paul Kelly could still write of nation-
building as “a brand that resonates with Australia’s political culture, where 
everybody thinks nation building equates with motherhood.”27 
 
Yet most overview histories of modern Australia have only fleetingly addressed 
the many and varied developmentalist goals that were so dear to Page and 
many others.  N.G. Butlin, Barnard and Pincus produced a strong survey of the 
twentieth-century Australian economy, but stressed the interaction of the 
private and public sectors rather than ideas about national development.28  Ian 
Turner pointed out in a 1968 anthology that visions of a future Australia had 
been decidedly worldly ones but focused his selection on political radicals and 
nationalists, not developmentalists.29  Histories of Australian economic thought 
address reactions to Keynesianism demand management theory, not such 
overtly applied concepts of national development as the regionalism, 
decentralisation, electrification and planning that attracted Page.30  Geoffrey 
                                                 
24 A.A. Calwell, Labor’s Role in Modern Society, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1963, pp. 16, 
134.  Calwell’s italics, used to draw a contrast with disagreement on methods for promoting 
development. 
25 Geoffrey Stokes, ‘A Rejoinder’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, no. 1, March 
2004, p. 45.  Stokes attributes this point to Judith Brett. 
26 John Hirst, ‘The Pioneer Legend’ in John Carroll (ed.), Intruders in the Bush: The Australian 
Quest for Identity, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, pp. 14-37. 
27 Paul Kelly, ‘Building from the Base’, The Australian, 28 October 2009. 
28 N.G. Butlin, A. Barnard and J.J. Pincus, Government and Capitalism: Public and Private 
Choice in Twentieth Century Australia, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1982.   
29 Turner, op. cit., pp. ix-x. 
30 A good example is Alex Millmow’s otherwise highly informative The Power of Economic 
Ideas: The Origins of Keynesian Macroeconomic Management in Interwar Australia 1929-39, 
ANU E Press, Canberra, 2010.  One exception is Geoffrey Stokes, who sees standard 
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Serle surveyed Australian nationalism and nation-building largely in terms of 
high culture, such as Bernard O’Dowd’s 1912 poem ‘The Bush’ – a prophetic 
spiritual nationalism that is a far cry from the applied developmentalism of Page 
and others.31   
 
Broad as developmentalism is, a pervasive feature within it is that government 
is seen as playing a decisive role by applying policy that would realise a 
remarkable national economic potential.  Bruce, for example, said that 
Australia’s natural resources “if brought to full development would probably 
solve most of the economic problems that face the world today.”32  Another 
common feature is that despite developmentalism’s ideological nature, its 
advocates commonly employed a language of disdain for impractical 
abstraction (regardless of the dubious viability of many projects they proposed).  
Development was often also portrayed as a means of sustaining high rates of 
migration and ultimately a bigger population more capable of defending such a 
large nation: “unless we peopled Australia rapidly and developed our resources 
we should expose ourselves to physical assault” agreed Page.33  At times this 
was linked to imperialist sentiments by being cast as improving capacity to 
absorb population overflow from the Mother Country, notably during the Bruce-
Page era of the 1920s.  The means of planning all such national development 
was often ill-defined.  Commenting a year after Page’s death, S.J. Butlin 
perceived planning in Australia as merely “the general acceptance of a rather 
vaguely defined line of advance…with the ‘planning’ only acquiring definite 
objectives and real content at the level of specific plans, commonly plans of 
limited scope and with limited time horizons.”34   
 
                                                                                                                                              
portrayals of the Deakinite Australian Settlement as tending “to overlook or reduce the 
significance of contesting traditions and political alternatives”, and so argues for the addition of 
components including “state developmentalism” in which the state is accorded a central role in 
economic development; see Geoffrey Stokes, ‘The ‘Australian Settlement’ and Australian 
Political Thought’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, no. 1, March 2004, pp. 6, 14-
5. 
31 Geoffrey Serle, From Deserts the Prophets Come: The Creative Spirit in Australia 1788-
1972, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1972, pp. 69-71. 
32 W.A. Sinclair, ‘Capital Formation’ in C. Forster (ed.), Australian Economic Development in 
the Twentieth Century, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, and Australasian Publishing 
Company, Sydney, 1970, p. 24. 
33 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 187. 
34 S.J. Butlin, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Charting reactions over time to Page’s developmentalist campaigning will test 
the validity of frequent assumptions that the Australian people and their 
governments long had a resolute commitment to nation-building through large, 
visionary projects, and that this trait dwindled only during the late twentieth 
century.  This will also help assess how developmentalist thought changed.  
Early in Page’s public career, the dominant form of developmentalism was that 
centred on rural development and which assumed that a nation as vast as 
Australia could surely exploit hitherto underutilised land.  This encouraged 
assistance for migrants to settle on the land and related plans to harness rivers 
for irrigation – “‘water’ and ‘development’ have been inseparable terms for most 
of the short history of non-Aboriginal settlement in Australia” wrote geographer 
J.M. Powell.35  Page drew from this practice of seeing water resources as a key 
to national development, but differed from most other “water dreamers” by 
stressing ultimate goals of decentralisation and regionalisation enabled more 
by hydroelectricity than by irrigation.36 
 
Finally, a detailed study of Page’s developmentalist campaigning during the 
Bruce-Page years helps assess an emerging perception that this was a period 
of policy innovation.  Until recently, historians did not see these peak years of 
his in such terms.  Serle referred to a “miserable decade” culturally, as part of a 
wider 1900-30 period during which social experimentation stalled.  Stuart 
Macintyre wrote of the Bruce-Page government as having “made little use of 
the new broom” as “the lines of national policy were too firmly established.”37  
More recently, historians such as Frank Bongiorno have begun to identify major 
innovations during this period.38  Intellectual debate on Australian development 
reached a high point in the interwar years, spurred on by concern that the 
                                                 
35 J.M. Powell, Plains of Promise, Rivers of Destiny: Water Management and the Development 
of Queensland 1824-1990, Boolarong, Brisbane, 1991, p. 1. 
36 For an outline history of water dreaming, see Michael Cathcart, The Water Dreamers: The 
Remarkable History of Our Dry Continent, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 2009.  Cathcart does 
not mention Page. 
37 Serle, op. cit., pp. 90-1, 102; Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, 1999, p. 167.   
38 Frank Bongiorno ‘Search for a solution, 1923-39’ in Alison Bashford and Stuart Macintyre 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Australia, volume 2, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 
2013, pp. 65-8.  David Lee in chapter three of his Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian 
Internationalist, Continuum, London, 2010, also provides a largely positive interpretation, 
especially with regard to Commonwealth-state relations. 
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nation was underperforming relative to its potential.  Much of this debate 
revolved around tariffs and dispute over limits to land exploitation.  The most 
widely known developmentalist tract, Edwin Brady’s 1918 Australia Unlimited, 
eponymously saw no such limits.  The controversial geographer Thomas 
Griffith Taylor responded by pointing to environmental constraints in central and 
northern Australia, while foresters warned of continued deforestation.39  Intense 
policy and intellectual discussions on development based on land use, 
regionalism, electrification, planning and federalism continued right through the 
interwar years and beyond, with Page a vigorous participant.   
 
Page the individual: issues and historiography 
 
Page’s political status makes him also of considerable inherent interest.  Why, 
amongst would-be nation-shapers, did he constitute a rare exception who held 
high office for decades as a party leader and minister?  And how was it that he 
nonetheless failed to keep his own Country Party enthused for his ideas, 
especially in the post-World War Two era?  Such issues lead into analysis of 
the historical contexts and political cultures that influenced Page’s effectiveness 
as a policy-maker, including the rise of rural discontent after the Great War, the 
emergence of the Country Party and new state campaigns, and the increasing 
use by governments of economic policy expertise.   
 
Page was involved in some unconventional initiatives that cast light on these 
questions and his modus operandi.  This thesis examines two of the more 
ambitious in detail – the 1931-32 campaign to separate northern New South 
Wales unilaterally from the rest of the state, and Page’s 1938-39 attempt to 
establish powerful machinery for national economic planning.  The latter briefly 
had the attention of the Commonwealth and all state governments, yet is only 
                                                 
39 Edwin J. Brady, Australia Unlimited, G. Robertson, Melbourne, 1918; also Gregory Barton 
and Brett Bennett, ‘The environment’, in Bashford and Macintyre, volume 2, op. cit., pp. 461-2.  
Taylor was so controversial a figure that in 1928 he departed Australia to pursue his career in 
Chicago.  Daisy Bates saw him as slandering British pioneers – “Surely the spirit of the British 
adventurer is not dead; it is only doped in these times with the pabulums administered by 
faddists, jazzists, and other ‘futilities’”; see J.M. Powell, Griffith Taylor and "Australia Unlimited", 
the John Murtagh Macrossan lecture 1992, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, p. 
26. 
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fleetingly mentioned in histories of the period.  It is the prime example of Page’s 
self-belief as a nation-shaper: its failure helps mark the start of his decline.    
 
Looking closely at Page the individual helps provide a nuanced sense of his 
role in history, while remaining cognisant of the limits of his influence.  Aitkin’s 
description of Page as the most under-regarded federal politician remains a 
minority view amongst historians.  This is reflected in the absence prior to this 
thesis of a full-length study other than Page’s memoir, Truant Surgeon.  Most 
assessments – or assumptions, in some cases – are at odds with Page’s 
powerfully idiosyncratic persona and wider significance.  Ross Fitzgerald wrote 
of Page’s “intellectual weaknesses” being exploited when in 1927 he found 
himself confronted on economic policy by the new federal Labor 
parliamentarian E.G. Theodore.40  A.W. Martin described Page as having 
“personified the limitations of a country surgeon and businessman”, and as “a 
plodder at best.”41  In fact, Page transcended his small town background by 
virtue of his quick mind and ambitious policy vision, as is clearly evident in his 
policy campaigns.   
 
Page’s brief tenure as Prime Minister also influences assessments, usually to 
his detriment.  Political scientist Malcolm Mackerras marked Page down in 
prime ministerial ranking on the grounds that unlike another Country Party 
caretaker in the office, John McEwen, he failed to successfully dictate to the 
majority party about his successor.42  He is often summed up as canny – a 
“born intriguer” wrote Barry Jones.43  Historian Fred Alexander saw Hughes 
and Bruce rather than Page as leading promoters of applied science, despite 
Page’s strong interest in this field and his almost certainly being the first senior 
                                                 
40 Ross Fitzgerald, Red Ted: The Life of E.G. Theodore, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1994, p. 200. 
41 A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 1, 1894-1943, Melbourne University Press, 
Parkville, 1993, pp. 123, 279.  
42 Malcolm Mackerras, ‘Menzies the Top Bob Amid the Greats’, The Australian, August 16 
2008.  In 2010 Mackerras rated Page as “low average”; see ‘Ranking Australia’s Prime 
Ministers’, Sydney Morning Herald, June 25 2010.  
43 Barry Jones, ‘Leadership: Ranking our Prime Ministers’, The Weekend Australian, 12-13 
June 1996, p. 25.   
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Commonwealth Cabinet minister with scientific training.44  Even other 
prominent developmentalists have said little of him.  In 1982, the manufacturing 
industrialist Barton Pope called for a National Planning Council, evidently 
without realising that Page tried to create such a body in 1938-39.  Pope listed 
Australia’s great developmental visionaries as including Alfred Deakin, John 
Forrest, Playford, John Curtin and Chifley – but not the less conventional 
Page.45   
 
The failure of histories of the Country Party to delineate Page’s full national 
vision or address what his career implies for Australian history constitutes a 
further gap.  Foremost of these is B.D. Graham’s otherwise outstanding The 
Formation of the Australian Country Parties, published in 1966.  This 
exhaustive study of the labyrinthine steps leading to the party’s emergence as 
a national force addresses the role of rural ideology, but limits its discussion of 
associated policy to accounts of new state movements and primary produce 
marketing schemes.  It misleadingly casts Page in 1929 as one of a crop of 
Country Party leaders “who prided themselves on being good administrators 
and conventional politicians.”46  Ulrich Ellis’s A History of the Australian Country 
Party is valuable as an outline of events, but is more descriptive than 
interpretative.  Its chapter-long profile of Page is highly perceptive as a 
character study yet bears signs of Ellis having been his foremost follower, 
especially in its treatment of new states.47  Paul Davey’s later Country Party 
histories provide invaluably clear overviews of party organisation and political 
                                                 
44 Fred Alexander, Australia Since Federation: A Narrative and Critical Analysis, Thomas 
Nelson, West Melbourne, third edition, 1976, (first published 1967), pp. 65-7, 269.  A check 
using the Australian Dictionary of Biography of members of the Barton ministry, the Reid 
ministry, the Watson ministry, the second Deakin ministry, the third Fisher ministry, the Hughes 
Nationalist ministry and the first Bruce ministry does not reveal any scientists, engineers or 
medical practitioners other than Page.  Some medical practitioners served as federal 
backbench MPs, including Charles Carty Salmon who was Speaker 1909-10. 
45 Barton Pope, ‘Planning for the Next One Hundred Years’, in Barton Pope, Macfarlane Burnet 
and Mark Oliphant, Challenge to Australia, Rigby, Adelaide, 1982, p. 10. 
46 B.D. Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1966, p. 290. 
47 Ulrich Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 
1963. 
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events but are less comprehensive on the ideas held by its members, including 
Page.48     
  
This thesis presents a political life, but not a politician’s whole life.  It does not 
constitute a full biography covering all aspects of Page’s long career in equal 
detail.  It is important that a biographical study not assemble such a mass of 
material as to obscure the significance of its subject.  The focus here is on core 
elements of Page’s prescriptions for the nation and his distinctive role in wider 
national debates – hence the emphasis on regionalism and decentralisation, 
electrification, co-operative federalism, planning and rural education.  There is 
less detail on Page’s engagements with health policy, national insurance, 
central banking and international trade negotiations.  All were fields in which he 
played a prominent but less original role.  National insurance schemes, for 
example, had wide support within coalition governments in which Page served 
(including from Robert Menzies in the late 1930s).  Coverage of Page as 
Treasurer focuses on his contribution to shifting the balance of Commonwealth-
state financial relations.  Health policy is dealt with mainly to the extent that it 
reflected his ideas on co-operative federalism and establishes his place in the 
second Menzies government.     
 
This thesis also does not dwell on aspects of his career already well 
documented in secondary sources.  Early steps towards central banking, with 
which Page had a significant involvement, have been addressed by L.F. Giblin 
and Robin Gollan.49  Page’s central role in establishing subsidised private 
health insurance in the 1950s has been analysed by James A. Gillespie.50  
Page’s 1941-42 service as Australian Minister in London, a colourful (and 
stressful) interlude that involved membership of Churchill’s War Cabinet, is 
                                                 
48 Paul Davy, The Nationals: The Progressive Party, Country and National Party in New South 
Wales 1919 to 2006, The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2006; and Ninety Not Out: The 
Nationals 1920-2010, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2010.  
49 L.F. Giblin, The Growth of a Central Bank: The Development of the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia 1924-1945, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1951; Robin Gollan, The 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia: Origins and Early History, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1968.   
50 James A. Gillespie, The Price of Health: Australian Governments and Medical Politics 1910-
1960, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1991; see especially chapter 11, ‘Private 
Practice, Publicly Funded: the Page Health Scheme’.  
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covered in summary with an emphasis on Page’s proposal for a new 
international trading regime and the implications for his hopes of guiding the 
post-war reconstruction policies of the Curtin and Chifley governments.  
As the main vehicle for Page’s political standing and developmentalist 
ambitions, the Country Party receives considerable attention in this thesis, but 
with an emphasis on its interaction with Page’s policy aims, especially the 
implications of changes in party culture.  Page saw himself as a dedicated party 
man, but not in the tribal sense of unthinking loyalty.  He was more consistently 
faithful to issues that he implored the Country Party to uphold, including 
regionalism and hydroelectricity.  It is significant that at times he tried to work 
with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) leadership, such as on planning.     
 
Sources used 
 
This thesis draws primarily, but far from entirely, on Page’s personal papers in 
the National Library of Australia (NLA), a rich but disorganised collection.  This 
extensive holding includes Cabinet papers, press clippings, speeches, Country 
Party council minutes, published pamphlets, maps and early drafts of Page’s 
memoirs.  They show Page to have been an enthusiastic letter writer, 
especially to personal contacts outside parliament.  Some major policy 
documents, including Cabinet papers, are unattributed, but a distinctively 
intense style and repetition of such characteristic phrases as “it is obvious” 
indicate Page’s authorship.  
 
The Page papers amount to a comprehensive record of his policy campaigns.  
Documents range in significance from Page’s historic agreement with Bruce on 
the first coalition between the Country Party and the Nationalist Party, down to 
hotel receipts.  This massive collection has only recently been re-catalogued, 
long after commencement of work on this thesis.  Prior to this, its poor 
organisation was surely a barrier to considered assessments of the man.  The 
Page papers are somewhat skewed towards the post-World War Two years.  
They are, for example, not especially strong on Page’s part in negotiating the 
1927 Financial Agreement.  A smaller body of Page papers held in the 
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University of New England (UNE) and Regional Archives has a focus on Page’s 
early life and engagement with new statism.   
 
Sources on Page’s associates help impart a broader sense of his campaigning.  
These include the personal papers of such activists as Ellis held at the NLA 
and UNE, and the David Drummond papers at UNE.  Records of wider 
movements of Page’s time have also been drawn upon, notably those at UNE 
concerning new state campaigns and the Country Party’s papers in the NLA.  
Official papers consulted in the National Archives of Australia (NAA) include 
minutes of Premiers’ Conferences, investigations by the Commonwealth 
government’s Development and Migration Commission, records relating to the 
Australian Agricultural Council and other Commonwealth-state co-ordinating 
bodies, and correspondence on post-war reconstruction.  Material and 
comments on Page’s family and early life were very helpfully contributed by his 
granddaughter, Helen Snyders.  
 
Foremost among published primary sources used is Truant Surgeon.  This 
book appeared posthumously in 1963, and remains the most vibrant and 
purposeful of Australian prime ministerial autobiographies.  Page intended it to 
contribute to a personal legacy of policy ideas, but his messages are presented 
amidst a mass of reminiscences.  It is strongest as a source on his formative 
experiences, and later as a young doctor and pioneering Country Party MP.  
Page presents himself as proudly conscious of the influences of family tradition 
and place of origin on his efforts to contribute to community and nation.  He 
relates his political career as a series of struggles to implement his ideas on 
hydroelectricity, new states and federalism, with other passages addressing 
health policy, central banking and wartime service.  The title alludes to Page’s 
portrayal of himself as an apolitical figure who wandered into national politics 
by little more than chance.  Historians have made only fleeting use of Truant 
Surgeon, most often for its account of Page’s early years.51  Graham found it 
                                                 
51 See for example Gavin Souter, Acts of Parliament: A Narrative History of Australia’s Federal 
Legislature, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1988, pp. 184-5; and Robert Murray, The 
Confident Years: Australia in the Twenties, Allen Lane, Ringwood, 1978, pp. 40-1. 
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“most valuable” for insights into Page’s view of his career, despite some lack of 
accuracy.52  
 
Further published primary sources are Ellis’s memoirs, A Pen in Politics; other 
political memoirs including by McEwen; pamphlets and larger monographs 
produced by proponents of developmentalist ideas, such as the proceedings of 
Australian Institute of Political Science summer schools; and a diverse range of 
periodicals that record contemporary debates, including The Land, New State 
Magazine and Australian Quarterly.53  Secondary sources on 
developmentalism are few and limited in scope: those on electrification, for 
example, are mostly histories of individual Australian utilities and accounts of 
electrification in North America and Europe.   
 
Thesis structure  
 
This thesis is primarily organised along chronological lines, focusing on 
changing contexts as political and policy environments evolved during Page’s 
life.  An essentially chronological structure is also compatible with his tactical 
adaptability.  Page pursued different issues at particular times according to 
what was politically opportune, stressing, for example, regionalism in the mid-
1920s when the new state movement peaked.  In the late 1930s, he pursued 
economic planning as preparations for war and the illness of Lyons presented 
him with a rare opportunity.  In the latter 1940s he campaigned to dam the 
Clarence River as a post-war reconstruction initiative.  An additional reason for 
a chronological approach is that Page’s various goals were so intertwined they 
cannot be readily separated out.  Planning was a means of developing rural 
infrastructure, including hydroelectric power schemes, which provided a 
productive basis for regional governance and decentralisation; education could 
help build rural civic cultures supportive of development; and co-operative 
                                                 
52 Graham, op. cit., p. 297.  Graham preferred Ellis’s A History of the Australian Country Party 
as an account of early party history. 
53 Ulrich Ellis, A Pen in Politics, Ginninderra Press, Charnwood, 2007; John McEwen, John 
McEwen: His Story, edited by R.V. Jackson, privately published, place of publication n.a., 1983. 
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federalism was a basis for implementing Page’s policies nationally, such as a 
nationwide transport system.     
 
The structure for this thesis is:  
 
Chapter 1) Page’s formative experiences: the making of a world view.  
Understanding why certain ideas took such firm root in Page’s outlook is a 
basis for better appreciation of his determination to shape Australia and 
difficulty in adjusting to political change.  His 1917 speech to the Australasian 
Provincial Press Association encapsulates what became his longstanding 
vision of the nation.  Page was deeply influenced by his family’s tradition of 
civic engagement and the Clarence River region setting of his upbringing.  The 
personality which emerged from all this had a deeply emotive commitment to a 
very prescriptive policy vision for the entire nation.   
 
Chapter 2) Page’s rise to national prominence.  Page’s entry into federal 
parliament in 1919 and rapid rise to political leadership owed much to such 
policy debates as new statism and to developments in the party system that led 
to the creation of the Country Party and its coalition with the Nationalists.  
Page’s visions of regionalism, decentralisation and co-operative federalism 
were largely compatible with the priorities of the Commonwealth ministry led by 
Stanley Bruce, especially the importance it attached to overhauling federalism.  
The speed with which Page established himself as a power within a still 
formative Country Party placed him in a strong position to pursue his personal 
policy agenda, and to play a major part in making the 1920s a decade of new 
national policies that sought to shape Australian governance, society and the 
economy.   
 
Chapter 3) Treasurer Page pursues his policy vision: hydroelectricity, new 
states and rural roads.  Page used his status as Commonwealth Treasurer to 
pursue personal goals concerning these three fields, making him a major 
influence on what policy ideas were current.  He went well beyond what was 
sought by other rural activists, such as by seeking to create regionalised 
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structures of government across the nation. This chapter assesses the 
effectiveness with which he advanced these commitments. 
 
Chapter 4) Page’s standing in government and party: the basis of his power.  
The priorities and dynamics of the Bruce-Page government and the early 
Country Party during this period of political transition created opportunities for 
Page to pursue his form of developmentalism.  Events in the mid-1920s were 
especially important, when Page decisively defended the coalition and shifted 
policy power in the Country Party towards himself. 
 
Chapter 5) Page’s last years in the Bruce-Page government: challenging the 
nation through planning and federalism.  Page’s policy attention in the latter 
1920s shifted towards planning the economy, encouraged by the creation of 
the Development and Migration Commission.  He also played a major role in 
the Bruce-Page government’s success in reforming fiscal federalism, including 
the creation of the Loan Council that he adopted as an exemplar for co-
operative policy reform.  Despite the comprehensiveness of the government’s 
defeat in 1929, Page’s first experience of office left him with a sense of 
possibilities and a set of ideas concerning planning and federalism that lastingly 
influenced his approach to many different national policy issues.    
 
Chapter 6) The 1930s, Page’s most mixed decade.  During this decade of 
Depression followed by austerity-based recovery, Page’s focus shifted as he 
seized upon a series of different chances to implement dearly-held ideas that 
otherwise sat outside the mainstream of government policy.  In doing so, he 
made important contributions to national political debate and displayed tactical 
flexibility as the leading advocate of fundamental change in a succession of 
fields: regionalism, notably during an unexpected opportunity in 1931-32 to 
create a new state; co-operative federalism, leading to the creation of the 
Australian Agricultural Council; electrification, linked to trade policy and to 
Commonwealth co-operation with New South Wales; rural-based higher 
education, via the campaign to establish a university in New England; and, 
finally, national economic planning, leading to his 1938-39 attempt to create a 
National Council of Commonwealth and state ministers.  The new state and 
24 
 
 
 
planning initiatives are particularly indicative of Page’s ability to lead national 
agendas and of his political modus operandi.  His unsuccessful planning 
initiative may have contributed to his fall from power in 1939. 
 
Chapter 7) Post-war Page: hopes amidst frustrations.  Page’s difficult post-
World War Two experience presents a sharp contrast with his inter-war peak 
years.  In wartime he made ambitious attempts to reform world trade and to 
lead constitutional reform, and developed high expectations of a major role in 
post-war reconstruction.  But under the Chifley government, Page faced the 
frustrating paradox of a political climate that elevated his favoured policy 
themes to national policy amidst a new policy-making and political environment 
within which he struggled for influence.  He was nonetheless able to induce 
governments to react to his persistence, especially his championing of 
harnessing the Clarence River for hydroelectricity.  Page was the most 
outspoken non-Labor advocate of the possibilities of post-war reconstruction.  
 
Chapter 8) Page indefatigable: his last years in public life.  During the 1950s, 
Page tried to exert influence amidst changes in the Country Party and a 
different coalition government from those in which he had (relatively) flourished 
earlier.  Although he envisioned himself as the new Menzies government’s 
foremost developmentalist, he found little in its policies to work with other than 
flirtations with national planning.  But even if he did not exercise influence to the 
extent that he hoped, Page again kept some ideas alive by inciting reactions 
and attracting publicity.  After leaving the ministry in early 1956, he effectively 
became an autonomous MP determined to leave a personal legacy by 
championing constitutional reform and the damming of the Clarence River, 
earning him a public image as the elder statesman of national development.   
 
My Conclusion considers what Page’s story suggests for the role of ideas in 
Australian political culture.  I reflect on Page himself – his influence and 
formidable legacy on issues that include regionalism, co-operative federalism 
and planning; why he struggled to implement his full agenda; and how his 
successes and failures cast light on his strategic place in history.  Page is seen 
as an important example of how assessment of the life of an influential 
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individual and the ideas they upheld can illuminate the wider past and the 
present.     
 
In sum, this thesis presents the life and thought of one of Australia’s most 
remarkable visionaries; argues for his importance both in himself and for what 
he implies for Australian developmentalism; and seeks to contribute to a better 
understanding of the place of ideas about national development in Australian 
politics and history.   
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CHAPTER 1 – PAGE’S FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES: THE MAKING OF A 
WORLD VIEW 
 
Earle Page’s family background and early life fostered an emotional core that 
lastingly influenced his concept of economic and social development.  Studies 
of political thinkers and participants typically stress public careers, not private 
lives.  “None of us can enter into another person’s mind”, wrote Bernard Crick 
in his celebrated life of George Orwell.1  But it is important to consider why 
certain ideas took firm root in a subject’s outlook as a means of better 
understanding how they drove his or her public actions.  In Page’s case, 
unwavering adherence to a highly prescriptive worldview points to powerful 
formative experiences that underlay the tenacity and lack of reflectiveness with 
which he pursued his favoured issues.  He was to uphold these over decades, 
despite changes in the policy environment, the growing indifference of party 
colleagues and his mixed success in having them implemented.   
 
Page consistently attested to early influences as the basis of his ideas: a family 
tradition of community service, particularly in education; his happy upbringing in 
Grafton, which inspired his faith in small communities; rural isolation which bred 
resentment of the big cities; and his exposure to new technologies that 
promised social improvement.  The following exploration of his life up to his 
return from the Great War in 1917 covers each of these major influences on his 
efforts to shape Australia as a nation.  The scene is set by recounting Page’s 
first major policy statement on a national stage. 
 
Alderman Page states his world view: his debut on the national stage 
 
Few senior Australian political figures of the early twentieth century opened 
their public career by stating a comprehensive policy vision for the nation: even 
fewer remained largely faithful to it over decades.  Page announced his vision 
in a speech to a conference of the Australasian Provincial Press Association in 
Brisbane on 13 August 1917.  He participated as delegate of the Grafton-based 
                                                 
1 Bernard Crick, George Orwell: A Life, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1982 (first published 1980), 
p. 30.  
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Daily Examiner, of which he was part-owner.  One hundred and fifty 
proprietors, editors and journalists attended from Queensland, New South 
Wales, Victoria and South Australia.  Page had their attention for ninety 
minutes, well over the half-hour originally allotted.2  In Truant Surgeon he 
recalled his oration as “an embodiment of my thinking on national aspects of 
development, the basic concepts of which I have upheld to this day.”3  The 
speech was a precocious call by a small town alderman to reform the 
governance of the entire nation, and a standout in a conference otherwise 
preoccupied with such issues as wartime paper shortages.  It reflects the depth 
of Page’s attachment to his place of origin and thrusting impatience with 
constraints on Australia’s unrealised potential.4    
 
Page’s foremost premise was that “there is no doubt that the present system of 
government in this land does not make for its development.”5  This arose from 
“centralisation,” described by Page simply as an “evil.”  The concentration of 
government in state capital cities meant that “public money is always expended 
in that corner where the seat of government is constituted.”6  Infrastructure and 
social amenities should instead improve rural living standards and so support 
the redistribution of population and industry into the countryside.   
 
Underpinning decentralisation was regional political control.  This reflected 
Page’s most fundamental belief – the inherent tendency of small-scale 
communities to foster civic co-operation and engagement that would encourage 
social and economic development.  Much of his wider thought was based on 
this premise.  Page would become well known as an advocate of new states, 
but these were but a move in the direction of smaller federal units (as he often 
termed them) that would more thoroughly decentralise political and economic 
control.  These federal units were to be “big enough to attack national schemes 
in a large way, but small enough for every legislator to be thoroughly 
                                                 
2 Earle Page, A Plea for Unification, op. cit., p. 1.   
3 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 66.  
4 The Murray Pioneer and Australian River Record (Renmark, South Australia) of 7 September 
1917, p. 17, gives a full summary of the conference.  Page, incidentally, expressed little interest 
in this speech or in later pronouncements in Aboriginal Australians.   
5 Page, A Plea for Unification, op. cit., p. 1. 
6 Ibid., p. 2.  
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conversant with every portion of the area, and land settlement and proper 
development will naturally follow.”7    
 
Paradoxically, Page simultaneously wanted a strong “Central National 
Government” under which “men will begin to think in terms of the continent of 
Australia as a whole, rather than of their state.”8  State parliaments had a 
“parochial outlook.”  Such a national government could set Australia-wide 
policies but devolve their implementation to his federal units, and would be 
better able to meet international obligations as a member of the British Empire.9  
Although this 1917 speech was entitled ‘A Plea for Unification’, Page recalled in 
his memoirs that at that time unification signified a true federal system with a 
national government strong only in “fields of common significance throughout 
Australia” – land policy, taxation, education, immigration and transport – leaving 
regional authorities to carry out major works locally.10  
 
Page called for a two-stage reform process to realise his mixed regional and 
national vision – unification of the nation under a central government, followed 
by the “consequent subdivision of the whole of this Commonwealth into small 
self-governing areas, with local legislatures of men who know well the needs 
and resources of their respective districts.”11  He linked this national 
regionalisation to the successful settlement of returned soldiers, an appealing 
selling point at that time.  One notable divergence from his later 
pronouncements on regionalism was that in 1917 Page the private citizen was 
willing to strike a militant note in public.  If the existing overlap between state 
and federal governments continued “there must be ultimately civil war.”12   
 
Page’s advocacy drew strongly on his deep personal attachment to the 
Clarence Valley.  He incorporated this into his national outlook by casting his 
home area as a potential model for the entire country.  Page told the 
assembled press that although the Clarence Valley was nearly the size of 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 3.  
8 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
9 Ibid., p. 4, 5.  
10 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 445. 
11 Page, A Plea for Unification, op. cit., p. 3. 
12 Ibid., p. 5.               
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Victoria, with “millions of acres of fertile soil, power possibilities unsurpassed in 
Australia, and mineral wealth untold”, it lacked schools, hospitals and other 
basic services.  Yet in Victoria, “self-government has added everything that 
makes for physical, mental and moral development…cities, universities, well-
equipped hospitals, technical schools and 5,000 miles of railways.”  Properly 
administered, the Clarence region “could easily maintain the whole of the 
present population of Australia” and “no doubt, many other areas in Australia 
could do the same thing under favourable conditions of self-government.”13 
 
Page’s strategy for decentralisation was influenced by his hopes for rural 
electrification using hydroelectricity.  This had been a Page policy passion for 
several years prior to this speech and was linked to his admiration of the 
Clarence River, “the noblest stream flowing to the east coast of Australia” but 
where “unique power waiting for development has been allowed to run to 
waste.”14  Page was to conduct a life-long campaign to dam the Clarence as 
the first of a series of regionally-controlled hydropower schemes across the 
nation.  In this, he was in good company: internationally during the early 
twentieth century, dams came to be seen as the epitome of progress by 
promising “a renewable resource, furnishing power and water indefinitely.”15  
As of 1917, Page’s technological vision also encompassed railways under 
“Federal control, [which] with intelligent provincial advice, will ensure the proper 
linking up of the various provincial railway systems, and promote the opening 
up of all classes of land now absolutely unused.”16  Page’s hopes for better 
rural services also covered education to support decentralisation and civic 
awareness.  He decried the paucity of educational facilities in the Clarence 
region, where “there is scarcely a technical school in the whole 
area…[and]…scarcely a secondary school.”17  In future years, Page was to 
broaden this interest in education to advocate a network of small-scale rural 
universities.    
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 2.  
14 Ibid., p. 3. 
15 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle, Massachusetts, 2010, p. 119. 
16 Page, A Plea for Unification, op. cit., p. 3. 
17 Ibid., p. 2. 
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National economic planning became Page’s main means of initiating 
decentralisation.  He did not advocate a command economy, but instead an 
indicative approach involving planning of infrastructure and incentives for new 
industries that would trigger a self-sustaining “reproductive process” of 
development.  Page only implicitly suggested planning in his 1917 speech by 
calling for a national government with a comprehensive development agenda, 
but made his views clearer over coming years.   
 
Finally, the reform of federalism would enable the Commonwealth and the 
states to co-ordinate national policies associated with all of the above themes.  
Page’s career was peppered with proposals to have these two main levels of 
government work in unison, the next best thing to outright national planning.  In 
1917 he spoke particularly bluntly of an Australian Constitution that imposed 
“such formidable cracks in the national edifice as to threaten its collapse.”  
Page attributed the Constitution’s weakness to its having been drafted in a time 
of peace, whereas those of the United States and of Canada reflected fear of 
war: in Canada, “no doubt was left about the Federal Government alone being 
concerned with the ultimate power.”  Drafting of the Australian Constitution had 
been beset by “petty ambitions of the state politicians”, leading to “a bastard 
Constitution…which has left the National Government continually at the mercy 
of the states.”  Hence “the only thing for Australia to do was to throw the whole 
Constitution into the melting-pot, and re-mould it in the light of the experience 
gained during the past 17 years.”18   
 
His 1917 speech also contains early indications of policies on federalism that 
he later pursued in government.  He anticipated “the Federalising of State 
debts” as a step towards a new federal system, an important feature of the 
1927 Financial Agreement between the Commonwealth and the states that is 
often touted as Page’s finest achievement.19  In a series of press articles a few 
months after this 1917 speech, he observed that unlike other Allied nations and 
Germany, in “Australia alone has no attempt been made at national industrial 
organisation”, due to “the present chaotic system of seven different, 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 4, 5. 
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
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overlapping and conflicting sets of laws and industrial tribunals” – 
foreshadowing the issue that felled the Bruce-Page government twelve years 
later.20   
 
Reactions to this speech would have given the ever-optimistic Page the 
impression of a receptive audience.  The city press paid little attention, but his 
comments were reproduced across rural Australia in such publications as the 
Singleton Argus, the Cairns Post and the New South Wales-wide Farmer and 
Settler.  It was also helpfully distributed in booklet form by Page’s Daily 
Examiner.  The secretary of the Australasian Provincial Press Association and 
owner of the Grafton Argus, T.M. Shakespeare, was moved to advise Page to 
build a network of rural newspapers that would eventually “have a far reaching 
effect upon future policies of the Commonwealth.”21  
 
This speech stands as an early indicator that Page had a very distinct mind 
indeed, and only approximately fitted into emerging rural protest movements.  
Page’s synthesis of ideas is largely consistent with the definition of an ideology 
as “a systematic and all-embracing political doctrine which claims to give a 
complete and universally applicable theory of man and society, and to derive 
therefrom a programme of political action.”22  His concepts of community, 
decentralisation and national leadership had sufficiently wide application to 
reach consistent conclusions on many different political and social issues, and 
also – in their own logics – to be resistant to rebuttal.  This helps explain his 
persistence.  Page was not advocating mere policies with conclusively 
achievable aims, but something that could be applied universally and endlessly.  
He judged most new ideas according to their compatibility with his established 
principles.  Page here provided a major variant of Australia as a social 
laboratory “in which the state was seen not as the enemy of individual 
freedom…but as the enabler of freedom.”23  This concept is usually associated 
                                                 
20 Daily Examiner, 3 November 1917, p. 7. 
21 Thomas Mitchell Shakespeare to Page, 21 August 1917, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, 
A0180, box 7, folder 4, quoted in Sally Collier, ‘Earle Christmas Grafton Page: A Doctor for the 
Nation’, Armidale and District Historical Society Journal, vol. 39, 1996, p. 9.  
22 Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, third edition, 
Palgrave Macmillam, Basingstoke, 2007 (first published 1982), p. 217.  
23 Cathcart, op. cit., p. 214. 
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with Alfred Deakin and the early post-Federation era.  Page had a vision just as 
Deakin did, but one based on a very different world view.   
 
The next seven chapters of this thesis seek to demonstrate how Page sought 
to implement these ideas of 1917 over the following four decades.  Changes in 
his views were more of strategy than of fundamentals as he adopted new 
arguments for old positions to match the shifting political environment.  The 
account of Page’s personal origins that follows below establishes the basis for 
this remarkable persistence 
 
Page’s early life – the influence of family and community 
 
Page hailed from a large and supportive family that attached importance to 
civic engagement with its wider community.  The Grafton of his birth was a rural 
town of about 2,250 inhabitants on the Clarence River.  It was a service centre 
for local farming, increasingly dairy farms that emerged as the region’s staple 
during the 1880s and 1890s.24  Page was the fifth of the eleven children of 
Charles Page and Mary Johanna (Annie) Page, née Cox.  He frequently 
reflected on the influence of family tradition, writing to his wife in 1924 of how 
“we are lucky to have forebears like this” and of “their fibre which is in us.”25   
 
The family’s sense of community service is enshrined in symbolism 
incorporated into the Page Memorial Window installed in 1957 at what is now 
Wesley and St Aidan’s Uniting Church in Canberra.  (The choice of Canberra 
over Grafton appears to signal a foremost commitment to the entire Australian 
nation).  It depicts four scenes from the life of Christ, each marking a particular 
family member.  The one for Earle shows Jesus healing the sick and includes 
the Rod of Asclepius, the classical symbol of medicine, and the coats of arms 
of the University of New England and of the Commonwealth of Australia.  But 
the top panel dominates.  This commemorates Earle’s paternal grandfather 
                                                 
24 Terry Kass, Grafton: Jacaranda City on the Clarence – A History, Clarence Valley City 
Council, Grafton, 2009, p. 141.    
25 Earle Page to Ethel Page, 23 October 1924, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 
9, folder 72.   
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James, the founder of the family in Australia and a powerful unseen influence 
on him.   
 
 
 
James Page had a strong Methodist background, having been Head Teacher 
at the Great Queen Street Wesleyan Day School in London for eleven years 
and then headmaster of Wesleyan Lambeth School.  He was scientifically 
inquisitive, and undertook early studies in industrial chemistry.  His work in 
education brought him into contact with Charles Darwin and T.H. Huxley.  He 
was one of several teachers invited by the New South Wales government to 
implement its adoption of the Irish National System of education: as his oldest 
son suffered from tuberculosis, James gladly accepted.  He arrived in Sydney 
in 1855 and soon shifted to Grafton to open the first National School – a multi-
denominational primary school, which under James also offered adult evening 
classes – north of the Hunter.       
 
James set an impressive precedent for involvement in civic causes.  He 
became Grafton’s first Town Clerk in 1860, was Secretary of the Grafton 
Schools Board from 1866, wrote newspaper leaders and served with other local 
bodies that included the area’s first building societies, the Grafton Hospital and 
Figure 2: Earle Page panel, Page 
Memorial Window, Wesley and St 
Aidan’s Uniting Church, Canberra. 
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the Grafton School of Arts.  James maintained his commitment to Methodism 
by also serving as Treasurer and Senior Trustee of the local Wesleyan Church.  
He died in 1877, three years before the birth of Earle.  Three of James’s sons 
were mayors – Thomas in Grafton for several terms in the 1870s to 1890s, 
Robert in Casino, and Earle’s father Charles in Grafton in 1908.26   
 
Charles Page was born in 1851 and initially worked as an apprentice to a local 
blacksmith, coachmaker and engineer.  He later took over the firm, expanding 
in the early twentieth century into car repair.27  Annie was his employer’s 
daughter, her family having moved from Melbourne to Grafton shortly after her 
birth in 1853.  Her status as eldest child and thus as a co-carer limited her 
educational opportunities, but Earle recalled his mother compensating by being 
an avid reader determined to give her own children university educations.  This 
played a crucial role in sparking the careers of Earle and several of his siblings.   
 
When Charles and Annie married in 1870 they settled at Chatsworth Island, “a 
small and primitive downstream settlement on the Clarence” where they 
endeavoured to bring “the benefits of education and the comforts of religion” to 
fellow settlers.28  This commitment continued after they returned to Grafton, 
including playing an important role in establishing a local secondary school.  
Charles and other members of the Page and Cox clans feature prominently in 
press reports as lay volunteers in the Grafton District Synod.29   
 
For nearly 40 years Charles was superintendent of the Grafton Methodist 
Sunday School.  On his death in March 1919, the local press reported that he 
and Annie’s names were “known in every Methodist household in New South 
                                                 
26 This paragraph draws on Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 17-8, 28; Page family 
documents ‘James Page 1814-1877’, and ‘Charles Page 1851-1919 and Family’, provided by 
Helen Snyders; James Pages’ obituary in the Grafton Argus of 23 May 1877; and J.B. O’Hara, 
‘A Doctor in the House: Earle Page 1915-1920’, Armidale and District Historical Society 
Journal, no. 14, April 1971, pp. 87-99. 
27 Kass, op. cit., pp. 116, 155, 178.    
28 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 20.  The year of marriage is as advised by the Page family; 
Earle Page in Truant Surgeon gives the year variously as 1870 or 1871.  NSW government 
records state 1871. 
29 See for example The Methodist, 5 December 1896, p. 4, and 8 December 1900, p. 12; and 
also the Clarence and Richmond Examiner, 20 March 1897, p. 5.  
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Wales.”30  Family life provided young Earle with great personal security.  He 
bore few lasting grudges, and as an adult looked back fondly on “a very happy 
boyhood and adolescence” amidst his “extraordinary clannish” family.31   
 
Education owes more to family background than does any other aspect of 
Page’s vision for Australia.  High family expectations and the presence of three 
older brothers set him examples to follow.  His mother’s determination resulted 
in five of her children studying at Sydney University, a remarkable outcome for 
the time.32  Page dwelt in his memoirs on the success of his siblings in 
professions that encompassed teaching, medicine, the public service, nursing 
and missionary work.33  Brother Reg held high appointments with the New 
South Wales Department of Education.  Another brother, Will, turned from 
teaching to become a pioneering psychiatrist working with returned soldiers.  
Two of his sisters, Edith and Ella, married teachers.  The Page family was also 
strongly engaged with technology: as well as Earle’s maternal grandfather, his 
brothers Cyril and Maund were also engineers.  Page’s generation continued 
the family’s involvement with local government, with two of his brothers serving 
as councillors.34   
 
Earle’s older siblings were also his mentors.  Page wrote of the particularly 
great influence of James, “a born teacher” whose mathematics coaching 
helped him jump two forms at school.35  In March 1938, prior to heading to 
Britain for trade negotiations, Page wrote a touching farewell letter to the then 
seriously ill James assuring him that “giving bright boys their opportunity to 
reach the highest professional and commercial eminence” was “the divine 
                                                 
30 Daily Examiner, 19 March 1919, p. 4. 
31 Earle Page to James Page, 27 March 1938, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 
3, folder 25. 
32 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 20; and ‘Charles Page 1851-1919 and Family’, op. cit.  
33 Page, ibid., pp. 19, 22-4. 
34 Sesquicentenary Anniversary Committee, Grafton’s Sesquicentenary of Local Government 
1859-2009: The First City on the North Coast, Clarence Valley Council, Grafton,  pp. 30-1; 
Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 19, 22, 25. 
35 Page, ibid., pp. 22. 
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afflatus”.  He attested to James’s “good comradeship, advice and help” as 
having been vital to his own “early precocious scholastic development.”36   
 
Older sister Edith and her teacher husband crucially aided her siblings’ studies 
by boarding them in Sydney.37  In adult life, Page was especially attached to 
his brother Harold, eight years his junior.  One other member of the Page clan 
recalled that “Earle thought more of Harold than himself.”38  Harold later joined 
the Commonwealth Public Service and then the New Guinea administration 
based at Rabaul.  He rose to be deputy administrator, but died as a prisoner of 
the Japanese in 1942.   
 
Page’s awareness of “the search for knowledge and the extension of 
educational facilities…[as]…part of my family inheritance” featured prominently 
in his later writings.  In his memoirs he described his appointment in 1955 as 
first Chancellor of the University of New England as placing “the coping-stone 
of tertiary education on the structure begun by my forebears.”39  Commitment 
to education and community service undoubtedly reflected his family’s 
Methodism.  Although Page’s personal papers and public statements include 
only few references to religious belief, in 1902 he volunteered to become a 
Methodist medical missionary in the Solomon Islands before, at his wife’s 
behest, deciding to continue as a doctor at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in 
Sydney.  (Page’s brother Rodger later won fame as a missionary and adviser to 
the royal family of Tonga.40)   
 
Methodism in the nineteenth-century Anglosphere had a reputation not only for 
commitment to education and commerce, but also for challenging established 
                                                 
36 Earle Page to James Page, 27 March 1938, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 
3, folder 25.  James died late the next year.   
37 ‘Charles Page 1851-1919 and Family’, op. cit.  
38 Jim Page, Great Uncle Harold: Harold Hillis Page 1888-1942, privately published, no date, p. 
1. 
39 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 28. 
40 Re Earle Page and the Solomon Islands; Carl Bridge, 'Page, Sir Earle Christmas (1880-
1961)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National 
University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/page-sir-earle-christmas-7941/text13821; re 
Rodger Page; Carl Bridge, 'Page, Rodger Clarence George (1878–1965)', Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/page-rodger-clarence-george-7943/text13825; both entries 
published first in hardcopy volume 11, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1988.  
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hierarchies.  Australian accounts testify to the fervour of this “high-voltage 
religion” in the second half of the century, and the influence on colonial families 
of its work ethic and social conscience.41  Political theorists such as John Gray 
have written of how Methodists and other dissenters encouraged Christian faith 
in earthly utopias and continuous progress, distinctly reminiscent of Page’s 
ambitions for worldly improvement.42   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Charles and Annie Page with their family, c.1890; back row – Edith (Cissie) and 
James; middle row – Rodger, Charles, Annie, Maund, Earle; front row – Reginald, Harold, 
William, Ella.  Cyril and Daphne were yet to be born.  Note the evident damage to one of 
Annie’s eyes, treatment of which influenced Earle Page’s later decision to study medicine.  
Elder sister Edith supported him during his studies in Sydney.  (Photo courtesy of the Page 
family).   
 
                                                 
41 See for example Graeme Davison, Lost Relations: Fortunes of my Family in Australia’s 
Golden Age, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2015, pp. 165-6, 180-2. 
42John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia, Penguin, London, 
2008 (first published 2007), pp. 30-3; see also Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers: Religion and 
Politics in Europe from the Enlightenment to the Great War, Harper Perennial, London, 2006 
(first published 2005), pp. 123-4.  
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None of this should be taken to imply Page’s family was especially wealthy.  
More impressive is its breadth of engagement with the Grafton community.  In 
addition to serving in local government, Pages sat on the board of trustees of 
the public hospital, managed a canned meat works, ran a cinema, organised 
schools, and established a local newspaper.43  His father included Earle and 
his siblings in an active social life, exposing them to an impressive array of 
future contacts.  Political discussion was “the order of the day.”  Charles was a 
close friend of John See, later Premier of New South Wales 1901-04, who as 
member for Grafton took a strong interest in local development, especially 
transport infrastructure and utilising the Clarence.44  Earle later recognised his 
remarkable family as a political asset.  In his main campaign speech for this 
first run at parliament he spoke of how he had “at his disposal the knowledge 
gained by his family in three generations of public service on the river”, 
especially his grandfather, father and uncle.  This drew applause from his 
audience of Graftonians, who clearly knew the Page family well.45   
 
 
                                                 
43 Kass, op. cit., pp. 91, 115, 101, 194.  Thomas Page and some of his brothers founded the 
Grafton Argus. 
44 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 59, 445. 
45 Daily Examiner, 23 October 1919, p. 3. 
Figure 4: Page’s Clarence Valley 
region as depicted in his 1944 
booklet Clarence River Hydro-
Electric Gorge Scheme, showing 
proposed dam sites. 
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Page’s idealisation of the community in which he spent his childhood was his 
other great formative influence.  This was powerful enough for him to give up a 
burgeoning medical career in the big city to return home.  In his memoirs he 
proclaimed that “the main inspiration…of my political life, and indeed, the 
predominant influence throughout my eighty-one years has been the Clarence 
Valley where I was born.”46  An outside observer described the Grafton district 
at the start of the twentieth century in strikingly similar terms to Page’s August 
1917 speech – “one of the most fertile and interesting in the colony,” with 
“marvellous and extensive resources.”  But the same observer added that the 
town was deprived of a proper water supply, a telephone service, railway links 
and even a bridge across the Clarence.47   
 
Page particularly recalled Grafton’s inclusiveness, “a small and friendly 
community lacking entirely in any sense of class or party” where “the broad 
Clarence…bound us in a fraternity.”48  Even in the midst of the 1890s 
depression “I have never in my recollection seen people so happy or so co-
operative in realms of mutual help.”49  The “loyalty and understanding” of 
school chums provided “the continually renewed inspiration which enabled me 
to persevere in my quest for national balance and a place in the sun for the 
country dweller.”50  Page’s commitment to the role of community overshadowed 
what little sense he displayed of socio-economic distinctions: to him, social 
division was more a matter of the spatial gap between town and country.  There 
is some basis for these fond recollections, as Grafton indeed seems to have 
had a flatter social structure than many other country towns.  Unlike Armidale in 
New England, also well known to Page, the Grafton hinterland was dominated 
by small selectors rather than large pastoralists.51 
 
                                                 
46 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 56.  
47 Australian Town and Country Journal, 30 June 1900, pp. 30, 34.  The author is described 
only as “Beri.”   
48 EPP, folder 1855, pp. 5-6 of untitled draft for memoirs; Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 21, 
has a slightly different text. 
49 EPP, folder 1855, untitled draft for memoirs; Page, ibid., p. 26 has a slightly different text. 
50 ‘Chapter Two – Schools + Student Days’, EPP, folder 1855, pp. 5-6; Page Truant Surgeon, 
p. 33, again provides a slightly different text. 
51 Kass, op. cit., p. 131. 
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Page’s commitment to his community included awareness of the potential of his 
beloved Clarence River, the basis of his great hopes for hydroelectricity.  The 
Clarence is the focus of a watershed that is mainland Australia’s second 
biggest river system south of the Tropic of Capricorn.  (The Murray is larger).  It 
is fed by high rainfall, and in Page’s lifetime supported an unusually wide range 
of primary industries including beef, maize, dairy, sugar and subtropical fruits.  
But it is also prone to flooding.  Page as a boy witnessed major floods in 1887 
and 1890, later recalling the damage to local farming but also his excitement as 
rescue boats plied the flooded town.52   
 
Family history and place of origin also nurtured Page’s lifelong commitment to 
new states and regionalism.  In a speech marking his retirement from the 
Menzies ministry in 1956, his listing  of his lifetime goals began with “to sub-
divide the larger states of Australia in order to get government on the spot and 
to accelerate the development of our natural resources,” and stressed that this 
idea had been firmly planted well before he ever entered parliament.  He 
recalled not only the Grafton area’s paucity of public amenities but also the 
artificiality of the New South Wales-Queensland border to the north.  To Page, 
this “imaginary line” had “caused extraordinary discrimination”, most obviously 
an 18 mile gap between state railway systems.53  This implanted a lasting 
sense that existing state boundaries were too arbitrary to deserve reverence.   
 
Agitation for equality in regional entitlement, the realignment of colonial and 
state boundaries, and the creation of new states were features of the Australian 
political landscape decades before the advent of Earle Page.  Early in the 
development of the colonies there emerged perceptions that the uneven spread 
of population and production had fostered divergent interests and unfair 
imbalances in the distribution of political power.  Three of the first separation 
movements were also the only successful ones, Van Diemen’s Land in 1825, 
Victoria in 1851 and Queensland in 1859.  Queensland was itself prone to 
unsuccessful moves to align political representation more closely with regional 
                                                 
52 ‘A Man and his Valley – Prologue’, document by Ulrich Ellis, 17 November 1952, EPP, folder 
2369; also Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 25.   
53 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit. 
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identities.  Most of what became Queensland was included in the colony of 
North Australia created by the British Colonial Office in 1847 (but soon 
rescinded).  During the 1850s there was an expectation amongst settlers in 
northern and central areas of the future Queensland that they would eventually 
have their own colonies, encouraged by the Presbyterian clergyman and 
indefatigable political activist, John Dunmore Lang.  A Northern Separation 
League was active in Rockhampton in the 1860s.54   
 
Further south, Lang also called for the separation of New South Wales between 
the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers as early as 1856 (at the same time 
coining the name Riverina for this area).55  Other movements of varying 
degrees of longevity developed across the Australia of Page’s youth as far 
away as the Western Australian goldfields and Albany.  There were also early 
British proposals in the 1830s and 1840s for the creation of local governments 
in the Australian colonies that would have been significantly stronger than the 
local councils that eventually appeared.56  These campaigns had limited 
success at the time, but were harbingers of the regionalism which Page 
zealously advocated.   
 
It was the northern New South Wales movement that mattered most to Page.  
Its history stretched back intermittently to the 1840s.  This was partly a matter 
of distance from Sydney, but also reflected the tendency for new statism to 
arise in areas sufficiently prosperous to spawn ambitions of fulfilling a greater 
potential.  New England, adjacent to Page’s coastal northeast, is widely seen 
as having had a particularly “strongly articulated perception of its ‘difference’ 
                                                 
54 R.S. Parker ‘Why New States?’, in R.S. Parker, J. Macdonald Holmes, J.P. Belshaw and  
H.V. Evatt, New States for Australia, Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, 1955, pp. 
1-2.  A fuller account of northern Queensland separatism during the nineteenth century is 
provided in G.C. Bolton, A Thousand Miles Away: A History of North Queensland to 1920, 
Australian National University Press, Canberra, second impression 1970 (first published 1963), 
pp. 12, 142-4, 181-6, and 205-9.    
55 Ulrich Ellis, New Australian States, The Endeavour Press, Sydney, 1933, pp. 71-2. 
56 A.J. Brown, ‘Regional Governance and Regionalism in Australia’, in Robyn Eversole and 
John Martin (eds.), Participation and Governance in Regional Development: Global Trends in 
an Australian Context, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005, pp. 6-8. 
42 
 
 
 
and destiny.”57  By the 1880s the Glen Innes Separation League alone 
reportedly had 1,400 members.58   
 
Page was exposed to new statism from an early age.  He frequently referred to 
it as being in his blood by virtue of campaigning by his grandfather James and 
two uncles.  James variously agitated for the transfer of the Clarence Valley to 
Queensland or the creation of an entirely new colony, and once organised a 
petition to the British Parliament.  In 1948 Earle proudly told a conference on 
new statism that as a Page he stood at the head of “almost a century of fighting 
for our political freedom through self-government and our economic freedom 
through the fullest provision of modern invention and amenities for the outback 
people.”59  He remained impressed by his grandfather’s association with John 
Dunmore Lang, who had “thought all government from a distance was bad 
government.”60  Page was particularly drawn to Lang’s belief that self-
governing territories were sound building blocks for a federated nation-state 
encompassing the entire continent.  Lang had told the people of Port Phillip 
District in 1841 that separation from New South Wales would match the 
subdivision of the United States into the small democratic states that had driven 
that nation’s development.  There is evidence that early Australian colonial 
settlers expected that local separation would eventually lead to a federal nation 
and that such an outcome also influenced British policy towards the Australian 
colonies. 61 
                                                 
57 J.S. Ryan, ‘Prelude – Uplands Always Attract’, in Alan Atkinson, J.S. Ryan, Iain Davidson 
and Andrew Piper (eds.), High, Lean Country: Land, People and Memory in New England, 
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2006, p. 3. 
58 Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., p. 87.  For an account of this and other early agitation 
see E.J. Tapp, ‘The Colonial Origins of the New England New State Movement’, Journal of the 
Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 49, part 3, 1963, pp. 205-21.    
59 ‘History of Decentralisation: Speech by Sir Earle Page’, Decentralisation and New State 
Movement, Armidale Convention, June 1948, Armidale, 1948, pp. 25-6; also ‘Speech by the Rt. 
Hon. Sir Earle Page, MP at Annual Convention of New England New State Movement’, 
Grafton, 23 October 1961, New England New State Movement, UNE Archives, A0547, box 33.   
60 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 18-9; D.W.A. Baker, 'Lang, John Dunmore (1799–1878)', 
Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lang-john-dunmore-
2326/text2953; published first in hardcopy volume 2, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 
1967.     
61 A.J. Brown, ‘Constitutional Schizophrenia Then and Now: Exploring Federalist, Regionalist 
and Unitary Strands in the Australian Political Tradition’, a lecture in the Department of the 
Senate Occasional Lecture Series, 19 March 2004, especially pp. 41-9; also the same author’s 
‘The Constitution We Were Meant to Have: Re-examining the Origins and Strength of 
Australia’s Unitary Political Traditions’, Democratic Experiments, Lectures in the Senate 
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Young Earle and his family would also have been very aware of the dominant 
local issue during his youth of incessant appealing for the Sydney-based state 
government to provide transformative large-scale public infrastructure – 
hydroengineering, railway links and harbour works – which spawned such 
protest groups as the Clarence Railway and Harbour League.62  When he was 
just ten the Clarence and Richmond Examiner editorialised on “the feeling 
which widely prevails outside the Metropolitan area, that the interests of the 
country are made subservient to those of the great metropolis and its 
immediate surroundings.”63   
 
The press of his youth was also full of reportage on the campaign to federate 
the colonies, especially the free trade versus protection debate.64  (The state 
parliamentary seat of Grafton returned the Protectionist See from 1880 until 
1904; the adjoining seat of Clarence returned the same Protectionist and later 
Liberal member for twenty-eight years from 1887, John McFarlane).  The adult 
Page frequently quoted the foremost New South Wales federationist of these 
times, Henry Parkes, as linking new states to national prosperity.65  The early 
drafters of the Australian Constitution readily accepted the need to provide for 
the creation of new states, albeit amidst debate on the precise mechanism for 
doing so.  Queenslanders such as John Murtagh Macrossan and Samuel 
Griffith were particularly outspoken.  These deliberations were an indicator of 
the strength of this concept in the politics of the day and of how the basic shape 
of the then putative Australian nation remained an open issue.  This debate 
was to linger well into the twentieth century, generating the receptive audiences 
that encouraged the young Earle Page.  The drafters of the Constitution 
eventually included section 124 on new states, based on a provision in the 
United States Constitution.66  This enabled the Commonwealth to admit new 
                                                                                                                                              
Occasional Lecture Series 2004-2005, Papers on Parliament No. 44, January 2006, especially 
pp. 54-9.    
62 See for example Clarence and Richmond Examiner, 19 April 1890, p. 4, on a Grafton-Tweed 
railway, and a report in the same issue on a meeting of the Clarence Railway and Harbour 
League, p. 8. 
63 Clarence and Richmond Examiner, 22 April 1890, p. 2. 
64 See for example Clarence and Richmond Examiner, 29 April 1890, p. 2. 
65 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 60. 
66 Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., pp. 114-25 provides an account of various proposals for 
a mechanism for creating new states.  Macrossan was parliamentary leader of the Queensland 
44 
 
 
 
states formed out of an existing state or states, but “only with the consent” of 
their parliaments.   
 
Page’s early life: school, university and the wider times 
 
Page’s professional success and entry into public life were enabled by his 
formal education.  He attributed his youthful determination to “become a doctor 
and give the country people a fair deal” to his mother losing an eye to a steel 
splinter, especially the experience of accompanying her on agonising, costly 
trips to distant Sydney for treatment.67  At a very young age he became aware 
of a Faculty of Medicine at Sydney University in which a fellow townsman – 
Grafton Elliot Smith, later an eminent anatomist – had enrolled after winning the 
only scholarship for medicine then available, the Struth Exhibition.  Page 
organised his studies over the next several years around an ambitious plan to 
secure this lucrative scholarship, awarded only at five yearly intervals on the 
basis of results in first-year Arts.68  
 
The Struth, some lesser academic prizes and the proceeds of coaching other 
students were critically important as Page’s family had suffered major financial 
losses in the 1890s depression.  As a boy visiting Sydney during the May 1893 
bank smash he saw panicked cable car passengers offer to swap pound notes 
for nominally less valuable gold or silver coins, followed by the banks 
foreclosing on properties.  Page recalled that he “knew my father would be 
ruined”.69  He also wrote that this not only made him realise he would have to 
depend on his own resources to secure an education – significantly, he 
                                                                                                                                              
northern separation movement.  Griffith was initially hostile to separation but as Premier 
proposed in 1892 to divide Queensland itself into a federal structure; see Bolton op. cit., pp. 
206-7   
67 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, and ‘Notes for Country 
Party Complimentary Dinner 22/6/56’, op. cit.  A similar comment about his decision to study 
medicine is in Truant Surgeon, ibid., p. 28. 
68 Page, Truant Surgeon, ibid., p. 28.  Completion of a year of Arts was then one of the 
standard means of entry into Medicine; see John Atherton Young, Ann Jervie Sefton and Nina 
Webb (eds.), Centenary Book of the University of Sydney Faculty of Medicine, Sydney 
University Press for the University of Sydney Faculty of Medicine, Sydney, 1984, p. 178.  
69 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit. 
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appreciated this even as a twelve year old – but also that it provided the basis 
of his commitment to establishing central banking.70   
 
At the age of eleven Page won a bursary to Sydney Boys High School, flagship 
of the colony’s public education system, but as his parents considered him too 
young to leave home instead began secondary studies at Grafton Public 
School.  There he prospered under talented mathematics and languages 
masters, and built friendships with future local leaders such as Alf Pollack, later 
a Grafton solicitor and state member for Clarence.  Page switched to Sydney 
Boys High for his final year of school.  The school’s then location in inner city 
Ultimo gave him his first taste of city living.  (The school principal was a fellow 
Methodist, Joseph Coates, who Page made special mention of in his 
memoirs).71  He studied simultaneously for honours in matriculation and the 
first year Sydney University Arts exam and, again with the support of gifted 
teachers, duly secured the Struth Exhibition.  (As his family was unable to 
afford the fees required to sit for both the Senior Examination and the 
Matriculation Examination, he only formally passed the latter: Sydney 
University declined an offer of three tons of potatoes in lieu of the Senior 
Examination fee).72  Page commenced classes at Sydney University medicine 
in early 1896 aged all of 15, an achievement he modestly recalled as the 
culmination of a “series of events which savoured to me of the miraculous” but 
which actually reflected unusually youthful determination and intelligence.73   
 
Page described his first years as a medical student as “inspiring, absorbing and 
happy.”74  This owed much to the 1890s being a decade of great advances in 
medicine, including discovery of the microbial causes of such diseases as 
tuberculosis and plague, new surgical methods for compound fractures, X-rays 
and advances in aseptic surgery that expanded scope for abdominal operations 
                                                 
70 Page, ibid., p. 26.  Page added in his memoirs other factors in the development of his interest 
in central banking, such as the difficulties the early Commonwealth Bank had in coping with 
shortages of foreign exchange and a 1921 international monetary conference at Genoa; see 
ibid., pp. 138-143. 
71 Arch Ferguson (ed.), High: The Centenary History of Sydney High School, Child & Henry, 
Brookvale, 1983, pp. 7-8; Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 29, 32.   
72 Page, ibid., p. 26. 
73 Ibid., p. 28. 
74 Ibid., p. 34.  
46 
 
 
 
(later a Page speciality).75  He wrote in his memoirs of how new treatments 
“exposed former ignorance and current prejudice” that had to be overcome 
“before the fruits of the medical and technical revolution could be obtained.”76  
This was an early manifestation of Page’s lifelong self-image as a courageous 
innovator battling forces of reaction.  Page the student was also excited by 
Federation-era political debate.  He was impressed by such members of the 
University Senate as Edmund Barton and Andrew Garran (father of Robert), 
and by the University Chancellor Normand MacLaurin (also a doctor, and a 
Federation opponent).  Page participated in the Federation debates “to some 
extent myself”, probably his first political  engagement.77 
 
Page’s final year of study was his most difficult.  Despite being yet to graduate, 
he was appointed Superintendent of the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children 
for a month to cover for absent medical residents, a tribute to his burgeoning 
professional reputation.78  He was 21 when he received his degree in 1902, 
equal top of his class of 18 fellow students (albeit in a year when no firsts were 
awarded).  Page attached significance to the fact that the two other honours 
students that year were also from the north coast.79  The eminent surgeon 
Alexander MacCormick offered him a position as his house surgeon at the 
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital.80  Glowing references from professional 
colleagues confirm that he was a fine young surgeon indeed.  Dr Joseph 
Foreman, lecturer in gynaecology, later described Page as “one of the best 
men the Sydney University has turned out – an exceptionally good surgeon and 
sound practitioner.”81   
 
                                                 
75 Carl Bridge, ‘Earle Page: The Politician and the Man’, first lecture in the Earle Page College 
Thirtieth Anniversary Series, 9 March 1993, p. 2.  
76 Such as the all-too typical reluctance of “the older professional men” to accept that 
antidiphtheritic vaccine could save thousands of children; see Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 
35. 
77 Ibid., p. 59.  
78 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
79 Calendar of the University of Sydney for the Year 1902, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1902, p. 228; and ibid., p. 40.  Sydney University also bestowed on Page an honorary Doctor of 
Science degree in 1952.   
80 Bridge, Australian Dictionary of Biography entry on Earle Page, op. cit.  
81 Reference by Dr Joseph Foreman, 3 September 1915, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, 
A0180, box 11, folder 87. 
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Page did not directly write about the sense of city life he gained as a young 
surgeon, but his lasting sense of its failings suggests the impression was 
decidedly negative.  He often expressed this using medical analogies and 
warnings.  As a first term parliamentarian he said that “when a city becomes 
over a certain size it loses its manufacturing value, because workmen have to 
travel too far to work, and departs from its proper functions, involving 
degeneration and ill-health of its population.”82  Despite later maintaining 
residences at suburban Woollahra and Elizabeth Bay, Page’s disdain for big 
cities never waned.  Medical metaphors were to enliven numerous other Page 
pronouncements, such as likening a parliamentary attack by Billy Hughes to 
“the bursting of a long accumulating abscess of jaundice, spite and venom, with 
all the after effects of poison, that had turned into a running sore.”83  
 
The influence on Page of the wider context of his youth is harder to chart.  
Historians have written of the social optimism of late colonial Australia.  Helen 
Irving calls the late 1880s and early 1890s a time of confidence in utopias of 
reason, “where the destructive habits of human society are corrected by good 
design and clear thinking.”84  Stuart Macintyre comments similarly on the sense 
of an “absence of history and a corresponding freedom to invent the future.”85  
There is also abundant contemporary evidence of optimistic developmentalist 
aspirations pervading Page’s early years.  The journalist and historian A.W. 
Jose in the 1909 edition of his widely read History of Australasia called on the 
nation to “take seriously in hand the developing of the country’s natural 
resources”, for which “young Australians cannot serve their country better than 
by preparing themselves with zealous study to take their share in the task 
directly they become men.”86 
 
                                                 
82 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 7 April 1921, p. 7282. 
83 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 215.  Hughes responded to this personal attack of March 
1929 by asking Page for a truce.  
84 Helen Irving, To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia’s Constitution, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 38, 44. 
85 Stuart Macintyre, A Colonial Liberalism: The Lost World of Three Victorian Visionaries, 
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1991, p. 12. 
86 Quoted in Horne, op. cit., p. 133.   
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Did such utopian and developmentalist thought percolate through to provincial 
Grafton to be imbibed by the young Earle Page?  Or was it absorbed when he 
was studying in Sydney?  Some certainly reached Grafton, for his family 
remained very aware of its legacy of contact with that aforementioned great 
optimist, J.D. Lang.  Although Page was widely read, his writings and speeches 
do not appear to mention utopian or likeminded writers active during his 
formative years.  Page instead acknowledged his early attraction to ideas of an 
Imperial Federation.  In London in 1942 he told Lionel Curtis, leading theorist of 
Empire federalism and of world government, that his writings had drawn him 
into politics twenty-five years earlier.87  (Page gave differing accounts of what 
had most motivated him to enter public life). 
 
Less abstract forces transforming rural Australia during Page’s youth might 
have contributed more significantly to his political formation.  Highly visible 
changes in household technology and consumer goods probably encouraged 
his faith in change and progress.88  Perhaps their visibility also added to rural 
fears that industrial manufacturing was surpassing agriculture and that the 
benefits of new technology were not being equally shared out by the big cities.  
These contributed to a late nineteenth-century rural culture seen by B.D. 
Graham as characterised by anti-urbanism, alienation and loss of status.  This 
stress was most obviously reflected in population and economic drift to the 
cities.  The percentage of the national population living in metropolitan areas 
rose steadily from 32 per cent in 1881 to just over 38 per cent in 1911: that of 
primary industry workers out of total breadwinners plummeted from 44 per cent 
in 1871 to just 26 per cent in 1921.89   
 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also saw a rapid rise of small-
scale wheat and dairy farming in regions such as the Mallee, the Riverina and 
                                                 
87 Page’s wartime diary, entry for 15 January 1942, EPP, folder 2787 (iii).  Page wrote here of 
The Empire on the Anvil as being by Curtis, but it is actually by W. Basil Worsfold; he may have 
meant Curtis’s 1916 The Problem of the Commonwealth.   
88 Geoffrey Blainey lists the innovations that spread through colonial Australia during the 
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water, telegrams, new ways of weighing and packaging, paper money, matches and much else; 
see Geoffrey Blainey, Black Kettle and Full Moon: Daily Life in a Vanished Australia, Penguin, 
Camberwell, 2003, pp. 424-5. 
89 Graham, op. cit., p. 133. 
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Page’s north-eastern New South Wales, aided by William Farrer’s new wheat 
cultivars.90  Simultaneously, the Federation Drought and a dwindling supply of 
new viable land constrained population growth and production across rural 
Australia.91  Aitkin links the rise of rural political activity to a growing shortage of 
unoccupied land, the impact of railways on small town industry and the 
increasing difficulty of dividing farms so as to keep children on the land.  The 
protectionism and industrial arbitration central to what became known as the 
Australian Settlement of the early Federation era seemed deliberately designed 
to favour the cities over the country.  But railways and the telegraph also 
connected rural communities and helped spread awareness of their common 
interests.92  Faith in farming as the backbone of the nation remained strong, 
and new regional and sectoral associations aided the formation of political 
country parties during the early twentieth century.93  Graeme Davison and Marc 
Brodie, while noting an overall pattern of rural decline during the twentieth 
century, observe that there were variations between regions and periods, 
sufficient to keep rural hopes and dreams alive.94 
 
These rural anxieties and reactions were so pervasive they must surely have 
made an impression on an alert young man like Earle Page.  In his memoirs he 
wrote of how the recovery of the Clarence Valley from flood, drought and the 
financial insolvency of the 1890s was frustrated by decade-long low prices for 
farm products.  He recalled farmers already struggling to meet transport and 
handling costs sometimes being required to pay for the dumping of unsalable 
produce at sea, and that “practically everyone on the northern rivers lived more 
or less within a barter economy.”95  Such bitter reflections raise the question of 
the extent to which his views were a manifestation of the ‘countrymindedness’ 
that arose during this time of rural hardship.  “Countrymindedness”, says Aitkin, 
is “physiocratic, populist and decentralist.”  It holds that rural traits such as 
                                                 
90 Moore in Walter, op. cit., pp. 154-5.  
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community co-operation bring out the best in individuals, and that country life is 
the ennobling basis of the national economy.  By contrast, urban life is 
parasitical and corrupt.  But as power resides in the cities, there is a need for a 
political party for country people “to articulate the true voice of the nation.”96   
 
Countrymindedness added a strident discordant note to the Australian 
Settlement by stressing the exclusion of an entire sector of the nation.97  It was 
also a highly flexible predisposition that ranged from agrarian romanticism to 
progressive social and economic ideas such as decentralisation, and from 
praising farmers to casting the denizens of small towns as upholders of rural 
values.98  Countrymindedness overlapped with many of Page’s early ideas.  He 
agreed that the nation depended on primary producers, that rural pursuits 
brought out the best in people (though he would have stressed small 
communities more than farming) and that decentralisation was vital.  But Page 
went well beyond the defensiveness of countrymindedness to embrace 
assertive developmentalism for the entire nation.  He did not advocate such 
strands of agrarian romanticism as common ownership of land, the adulation of 
nature or the perceived virtues of the peasant lifestyle.99  (Page had seen 
enough of rural isolation to be more interested in alleviating poverty).  He was 
excited by the opportunities that modernity presented rural Australia and the 
wider nation, such as electrification.  Conventional countrymindedness thus 
provided only a partial foundation for his wider beliefs.  Page bridged 
countrymindedness and developmentalism, with development his priority.   
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Page feasibly also derived inspiration from American agrarian thought.  Debate 
in late nineteenth-century Australia about rural education was heavily 
influenced by accounts of agricultural colleges in the United States.100  Page’s 
longstanding interest in American development led to his undertaking a wartime 
trip there in 1917.  The most prominent American rural improvers of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the famed Country Life 
Movement of scholars and journalists.  This was led by the Cornell professor 
Liberty Hyde Bailey, who advocated environmental conservation, rural 
education, new technology (including electrification) and decentralisation.  
Although this movement had a largely intellectual base, there was a 
commonality of context with more populist Australian concerns about rural 
decline.  Like Page, Bailey thought that urbanisation sapped naturalness and 
spontaneity, and so advocated improving the appeal of rural life such as by 
drawing the educated to the countryside.101  John Wesley Powell, another 
outspoken American, proposed the regional control of watersheds.102  Although 
there appears to be no direct evidence of Page avowedly emulating Bailey or 
Powell, his travels and reading on the United States (such as the writings of 
James Bryce, a famed British interpreter of the US) most likely exposed him to 
their thoughts and reinforced his own ideas.103 
 
Page returns to Grafton: new formative experiences 
 
Page’s early experiences as a medical professional powerfully reinforced and 
refined his ideas about rural development.  In 1903 he returned to Grafton to 
recuperate from a near-fatal infection contracted while conducting a post-
mortem.  He later reflected that this experience left him with a fatalism that 
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removed his fear of death but also made him determined to use each day to the 
full.104  Page elected to stay on by joining a local medical practice as junior 
partner to another GP.  By September 1904 he had raised enough capital to 
open his own small private hospital, Clarence House, in neighbouring South 
Grafton.  This was a somewhat marginalised community of about thirteen 
hundred inhabitants on the southern side of the Clarence that was pointedly 
isolated by the lack of a bridge across the river.  Page recalled in his memoirs 
how he was motivated by the need to extend modern medicine across the 
Clarence Valley region, describing this as an idea he had harboured since his 
student days.105  Working as a rural doctor added a sharp edge to his 
appreciation of the city-country contrast:  
 
A patient 70 or 80 miles away in the bush who was seriously ill had very 
little chance of recovery.  It took 12 to 15 hours to ride for a Doctor and it 
took 12 to 15 hours for the Doctor to ride back – more often than not 
only to find that his patient had died hours before his arrival.106 
 
Page added that the deciding factor in his decision to stay was the need to 
overcome local hostility to new medical practices.  Local doctors denied him 
use of the Grafton Hospital (where he was on the Honorary Staff) to conduct a 
radical hysterectomy using the latest techniques.  So Page instead proceeded 
to do so before their very eyes using a makeshift operating room in his 
mother’s house “as a contribution to their education.”107  He wrote with equal 
satisfaction of inviting members of the Hospital Board to inspect Clarence 
House, with the result that they installed “similar indispensible facilities.”108  
Such triumphs consolidated his self-image as a visionary pitted against 
reaction, but who ultimately had history on his side.  Open contempt for the 
more blinkered elements of his profession was carried over into his political 
career as a persistent disdain for sceptics of his plans to shape the nation.  The 
intensity of young Dr Page led him into some righteous exchanges.  In 
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105 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 
106 ‘Speech by Hon Earle Page MP, Acting Prime Minister, Motor Trades Show Sydney, 14-1-
27’ EPP, folder 1784.   
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November 1905 he publicised a dispute over the resignation of medical officers 
of a local friendly society by placing a long, angry letter in the press that 
rambled through the minutiae of the case.109   
 
Page’s outwardly rationalist, almost deterministic approach to public policy and 
technology owes much to his early successes in introducing innovations into 
his small town practice.  His X-ray machine was the first in New South Wales 
outside Sydney, but had to be modified to use bichromate batteries as the 
Grafton region still lacked an electricity supply.110  He acquired what was said 
to be the first car on the north coast of New South Wales, which his brother 
Maund converted to a prototype ambulance, and also installed a hospital 
telephone.  Both were important acquisitions for a rural practice that stretched 
one hundred miles along the coast and fifty miles inland.111  His hospital’s 
pressing need for reliable electric light helped convince him of the importance 
of electrification:  
 
The problem of securing good lights in our modern hospital to permit 
surgery to be performed at all hours of the day and night ultimately led 
me to one of my life’s objectives.  This was to make electricity available 
in ample quantities at a uniform price in country and city alike and 
especially to secure the harnessing of all our latent water power and the 
conservation of all our waters.112   
 
This was innovative thinking for the time – electricity was first used in the Royal 
Prince Alfred only in 1912 and gas still predominated even in the big cities.113  
Page was to retain a ready faith in the ability of technology to catalyse regional 
equality and liberate the individual. 
 
In September 1906 Page married Ethel Blunt, whom he had met when she was 
a senior staff nurse at the Royal Prince Alfred.  He recalled first encountering 
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her decidedly abruptly by accidently setting her dress afire during a medical 
procedure.  Perhaps Page was also attracted by Ethel’s having topped her 
training year, and later persuaded her to join Clarence House.114  They had five 
children.  Although there is little indication that Ethel played a direct role in 
forming his policy ideas, their private correspondence affirms his description of 
her as his foremost political and personal confidant, who supported the family 
and his medical practice during Page’s frequent absences.115  (The next 
closest was David Drummond, with whom Page shared northern New South 
Wales and Methodist origins).  Ethel joined him in public campaigning and was 
described by her husband as the better public speaker of the two (quite 
plausibly, given testimony by Ellis and audio recordings which suggest that 
Earle was only a competent orator).  She was a founder of the Women’s 
Country Party, and served with the Australian Red Cross Society, the Country 
Women’s Association and the National Council of Women.   
 
Over many years Page sent Ethel a stream of affectionate and discursive 
letters, frequently writing of private goals and stresses.  These include evidence 
that her advice was crucial in Page’s decision not to become a missionary and 
instead devote himself to more earthly pursuits.  In May 1906 he wrote that she 
had helped in “bringing back to me, altered and changed beyond recognition 
my loftier ambitions and desires; different they are from the old ones of four 
years ago; with more thought of my work in this life and my beneficial influence 
on men’s welfare here than on my own salvation and other men’s salvation 
hereafter.”116  Soon after, he assured Ethel that he would “long for your 
sympathy and communion and counsel at every critical time of my life.”117  
Ethel maintained a discernably separate persona from that of her husband.  
She often spoke in public on women’s participation in politics, in which her 
husband showed limited interest.  After a 1925 trip to the United States and 
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Europe, she observed that Australian women “do not seem to be alive to the 
necessity of organisation and the benefit of the effect in political life.”118  
 
Following his marriage, Page began to display a distinct business bent that he 
retained for the rest of his life.  In 1908 he invested £2,100 in land for dairy 
farms and a sawmill in southern Queensland near Kandanga, “a property that is 
sure to grow in value and more than double in a few years”, he told Ethel.119  
By 1912 his combined assets stood at £10,000.120  Page was to develop a wide 
portfolio of interests in farming, timber, the share market and newspapers, as 
well as a faith in the potency of the private sector.  In policy pronouncements 
he invariably portrayed private investment in development projects as 
inherently preferable to public money that was subject to the whims of politics.  
 
Page’s first policy campaigns: hydroelectricity and new states 
 
In November 1952 Ulrich Ellis presented Page with a draft prologue for a 
projected book on water resources.  Even allowing for the drafter’s propensity 
for overwriting, this testifies to the early influence of the Clarence on Page.  
Ellis wrote of Page that “the dull roar of the flooded stream has always stirred 
his blood” and so he had “set himself the task of achieving the marriage of 
electrical power and water as a prime factor for the advancement of the 
Valley.”121   
 
Although Page did not originate the idea of damming the Clarence, he was 
primarily responsible for nurturing the idea.  Page became convinced early in 
his adult life that the Clarence presented immense potential for hydroelectricity.  
It appeared to have the necessary ingredients of reliable water supply, a 
vertical water flow over distance and potential dam sites.  Page was particularly 
interested in a ten kilometre segment known as The Gorge.  This sits about 160 
kilometres inland near where four of the river’s main tributaries unite and pass 
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through a deep rocky gap bounded by mountains, providing a possible basis for 
a dam.122   
 
Page grew up in an era of much-publicised progress globally in the generation 
of electricity that made hydroelectricity commercially practical.  This raised 
hopes for its socially transformative powers, including easing rural poverty.  A 
new electrical generator, the dynamo, was developed in the 1870s to produce 
continuous electrical current in commercial quantities.  From 1891, the use of 
alternating current in the transmission of electricity from the point of generation 
to that of consumption mitigated hydroelectricity’s drawback of usually being 
generated in locations remote from end users.  Dynamite and new air rock drills 
reduced the cost of building hydroelectric power stations, and there were also 
improvements in turbines and penstocks (used to channel water to turbines).123  
The internationally publicised use of the first large hydroelectricity turbines in 
1895 by the Niagara Falls Power Company is generally taken to mark the start 
of modern commercial hydroelectricity.124   
 
Faith in electricity spread worldwide.  In the United States, it was “invoked as 
the panacea for every social ill”, that “promised to lighten the toil of workers and 
housewives, to provide faster and cleaner forms of transport, and to 
revolutionise the farm.”125  Early Australian advocates of hydroelectricity, such 
as the metallurgist James Gillies who proposed its application to zinc refining, 
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were conscious of greater progress overseas.126  Page was probably aware of 
early hydroelectric facilities established in northern New South Wales, at 
Tamworth in 1888, the Gara River near Armidale in 1895 and at the Styx River 
in 1906.127  But when he began campaigning for hydroelectricity in the early 
1910s the only large-scale Australian facility was a private generator installed 
at the Mt Lyell copper mine in Tasmania in 1911.128  Power generation and 
supply in Australia remained in the hands of private companies and local 
councils.129  Cultural images of technological modernity that appealed to 
Page’s penchant for transformative technologies featured in the Grafton press 
of his early adulthood, from a report on how the new apparatus of the 
transformer could render powerful currents “harmless and agreeable,” to an 
account of steps towards installing electric street lighting, a sure sign that 
“Grafton is on the move of progress.”130  
 
Page was particularly aware of historical proposals to harness the Clarence 
system.  Early suggestions focused on port operations and flood control, but in 
1908 the system’s impressively reliable flow attracted mainland Australia’s first 
major hydroelectricity proposal.131  William Corin, Chief Electrical Engineer in 
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the New South Wales Public Works Department, put to local councils a joint 
water supply and power scheme based on the Nymboida River, which flows 
into the Mann River which in turn merges with the Clarence.  Only the water 
supply component was taken up at the time.132  Family tradition again 
contributed: Page recalled that his father as mayor of Grafton in 1908 was “the 
driving force” in providing the town with a permanent water supply from the 
Nymboida.133  The Nymboida was later the focus of Page’s hydroelectric 
campaigning.  Corin was to become hydroelectricity’s most prominent 
supporter within the engineering profession and a pioneering proponent of a 
national electricity grid.134   
 
Page was sufficiently cognisant of international developments to use his first 
overseas trip, to attend the 1910 Australasian Medical Conference in New 
Zealand, as an opportunity to “visit and study new water-power 
developments…especially their progressive improvements in extending 
electricity to country homes and farms in the vicinity of the projects.”  This 
“stimulated my ambition to secure the installation of similar schemes in 
Australia, especially on the Clarence.”135  It also marked the start of a lifelong 
penchant for seeking out overseas exemplars for his policy ideas. 
 
His medical practice well established, Page from about 1910 become 
increasingly involved in local civic movements and politics.  He later credited a 
local mining engineer and surveyor called W.J. Mulligan with first proposing to 
dam the Clarence River itself for power, in 1913.  Page took the idea up as 
combining his attraction to regionalism and new technology, and claimed that it 
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led to his being “induced to enter the local municipal council to sponsor the 
project.”136  His first experience of public office came that same year when he 
was elected to South Grafton Council.137  Alderman Page made a name for 
himself by extolling ambitious civic improvements, ranging from conventional 
schemes for a secure town water supply and public electric lighting, to the more 
transformative damming of the Clarence.138  Page in 1913 also made early 
forays into parliamentary politics by chairing campaign meetings for the local 
candidate for state parliament endorsed by the New South Wales Farmers and 
Settlers’ Association (FSA), the state’s main representative body for primary 
producers.139   
 
In 1914 Page invited Corin to his home and accompanied him to The Gorge, 
accessible only on horseback.  The following year Corin produced the first fully 
professional study of a dam at that location.  This proposed a two mile tunnel to 
supply a power station sited below The Gorge, but the idea was promptly 
pigeonholed for the duration of the First World War.140  Corin lacked Page’s 
propensity for attracting the public and political eye.  Alderman Page wrote 
articles in the Grafton Argus in August-September 1914 – not a good time to be 
trying to capture the public imagination – and included Mulligan in a delegation 
seeking the Labor state Minister of Works’ agreement to have the area properly 
surveyed.141  When the engineer H.G. Carter assessed the Clarence in 1929 
he credited Page, not Corin, as having first “so ably sponsored” the 
hydroelectric harnessing of the Clarence to the wider public.142  Corin, 
undeterred, in December 1918 was to produce a more ambitious proposal 
                                                 
136 Draft for Truant Surgeon, EPP, folder 1855; see also Page, Truant Surgeon, ibid., p. 58.  
137 Grafton Council was created in 1859, but South Grafton split off in 1896.  The two were re-
united in 1957 and incorporated into Clarence Valley Council in 2004. 
138 See for example the later report in the Daily Examiner of 14 February 1918 praising Page’s 
successes in securing electric lighting, p. 4. 
139 J.B. O’Hara, The Entry into Public Life of Sir Earle Christmas Grafton Page (1915-1921), BA 
(Hons.) thesis, University of New England, 1969, p. 6. 
140 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 58, 444; Ulrich Ellis ‘The Story of Nymboida, notes for Sir 
Earle Page’, 12 December 1952, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 3, folder 34.   
141 Page, ibid., p. 444; Ellis, ibid.   
142 H.G. Carter, ‘Report on the Hydro-Electric Development of the Clarence-Mitchell Rivers’, 8 
March 1929, EPP, folder 1046. 
60 
 
 
 
involving four distinct stages of construction, beginning with damming the 
Nymboida and culminating in a 200 foot high dam at The Gorge.143 
 
Page’s early campaigning to dam the Clarence, however heartfelt, gave him 
only a certain amount of publicity and little tangible success.  It was the new 
state movement that contributed most to building his local profile and provided 
a solid base for his entry into politics.  His early engagement with new statism 
is important context for later discussion of the rise of Page and of his lasting 
commitment to decentralisation and regionalisation.   
 
Nationwide, new statism had died away for several years after Federation in 
1901, attributed by Page to an assumption that the new Commonwealth would 
support local projects.144  In 1908 a petition from north Queensland containing 
over 58,000 names was presented to the Commonwealth Parliament.145  Two 
years later, state Labor MP T.J. Ryan, a future Premier, secured the passage 
of a motion through the lower house of state parliament to divide Queensland 
into three.  In 1915 the issue re-emerged in the Riverina and northern New 
South Wales.  Material concerns and a sense of being ignored by Sydney 
underlay the northern revival, but there is disagreement over what constituted 
the precise grievances.  Although the failure of the state government’s 
Decentralisation Commission of 1911 to deliver observable outcomes was one 
factor, Page wrote also of drought and wartime legislation that fixed butter and 
wheat prices at artificially low levels.  Ellis added calls for a bridge linking 
Grafton and South Grafton: studies by J.J. Farrell and J.B. O’Hara later pointed 
to demands for rail links, ferry services across the Clarence and the removal of 
a dangerous reef from the river mouth.146  
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But all these accounts agree that Page led this 1915 resurgence.147  On 7 
January 1915 a public meeting was held at Grafton to discuss a dispute over 
the payment of costs for the Clarence ferry service.  Alderman Page altered the 
meeting’s direction by successfully raising a motion for northern separation, 
either to form a new state or to merge with Queensland.  He proposed that an 
investigative committee confer with communities across the north and in 
southern Queensland in preparing a full report.  Page sat on this eight member 
“Literary Committee”, which in April duly presented a document articulating 
local grievances to a further public meeting.  The document bore characteristic 
Page references to The Gorge’s hydroelectric potential and “the psychological 
moment”, possibly his first public use of this shorthand for a receptive political 
and public mood.148  This and a second April meeting resulted in formation of 
the Northern New South Wales Separation League, with Page prominent on its 
nine member executive.149  Page also emerged as the movement’s leading 
propagandist, such as through articles in the Daily Examiner cast as a debate 
between Page and a new state sceptic dubbed ‘Rocky Mouth’.150   
 
Page had no doubt that it was he who relaunched the movement, and in his 
memoirs detailed how he followed up the January 1915 meeting.  Page began 
by consulting with local lawyers and journalists to draft a case for separation, 
and described the April forum as “one of the most representative meetings ever 
held in Grafton.”  This was all well covered by the Daily Examiner (“twelve and 
a half columns” he recalled).  He travelled with local lawyer Fred McGuren to 
regional centres including Kyogle, Lismore, Casino and Ballina to address 
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public meetings and form new branches of the Separation League.151  This is 
all an early instance of the modus operandi that Page was to employ for 
decades to come – approach selected influential figures for support, follow up 
with appeals to the wider public, and throughout keep proselytising through the 
local press.  Less successfully, Page led a party inland to Tamworth, where he 
was rebuffed by V.C. Thompson who thought that concerted campaigning 
should await the end of the war.  (There was a distinct Tablelands-North Coast 
rivalry).152  In December 1915 Page was one of “a band of keen local 
enthusiasts” who bought the Clarence and Richmond Examiner to recast it as 
the Daily Examiner and appointed McGuren as chairman of directors.153  This 
purchase was overtly strategic: Page told his wife in 1916 that the newspaper 
would be “the medium for having our views carried into effect.”154  Four Daily 
Examiner board members sat on the Literary Committee.155   
 
Pushing for such massive realignment of government was indeed hardly likely 
to gain momentum during a major war.  The northern New South Wales 
movement faded as leaders like Page enlisted and the state government finally 
completed a prominent local project, the Glenreagh to South Grafton railway.156  
Despite this, it had attracted the commitment of figures such as Page, and gave 
him both wide exposure and a network of influential local contacts that he later 
drew upon when seeking to enter national politics.  
 
Page’s war and what he gained from it  
 
In January 1916 Page joined the First Australian Imperial Force’s (AIF) Army 
Medical Corps.  The inquisitive, striving Page approached war service as a 
chance to broaden his skills.  He wrote to his wife from Cairo looking forward to 
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“some distinctly military surgery” after which “I would be content to go home.”157  
Captain Page was initially posted to the 3rd Australian General Hospital and 
remained on active service for just over a year in Egypt, England and France.  
In Egypt he took up his commanding officer’s suggestion to visit the new Aswan 
Low Dam.  In France he spent five months at a casualty clearing station, where 
during heavy fighting over 1916-17 he and his colleagues dealt with as many 
as 900 cases a day.158  Two of his brothers also served – Harold as an infantry 
officer and Will as a medical officer.   
 
From December 1916, Page sought to return to Australia, if necessary by 
arranging a direct swap with Will, then still in Australia.  In March 1917 he was 
finally permitted to return on personal financial grounds and the understanding 
that his remaining partner at Clarence House would enlist in his place.159  Page 
arranged to travel back via North America at his own expense so as “to study 
major hydroelectric developments there.”160  This, he told Ethel, would also fulfil 
an “overpowering desire to see the American states and Canada”, which he 
expected to be unlike “staid and too stiff” Europe where “conditions are bitterly 
unequal.”161  (Page’s taste for overseas travel with a self-improving purpose 
continued after the war and beyond: another early such trip came in 1922 when 
he visited Java, Singapore and Malaya with the entrepreneur and Nationalist 
                                                 
157 Page to Ethel Page, 28 July 1916, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 7, folder 
72. 
158 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 63. 
159 Page’s intention to return before war’s end was quite open and not necessarily untoward.  In 
December 1916 he asked Surgeon-General Neville Howse, who Page had known since his 
student days, about returning and corresponded with the Defence Department accordingly; see 
Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 9, folder 71 (a) and (b), including Earle Page to 
Ethel Page of 24 November 1916.  The official history of Australia in the Great War notes that 
out of a total of 1,242 AIF medical officers, some 300 returned to Australia in line with AIF 
policy of releasing those “due for a rest and employment in Australia.”  Howse himself had a 
declared policy in 1917 of releasing medical officers who felt aggrieved by continued service.  
See A.G. Butler Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume II 
– The Western Front, 1st edition, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1940, pp. 830-3 (the 
foregoing quote is at p. 831).  Page’s early return does not seem to have raised public 
opprobrium: for example, mention of his then former war service to the 1917 Australasian 
Provincial Press conference still elicited applause.  In his memoirs Page fleetingly referred to 
returning due to illness: see Page, ibid., p. 64.  Howse later became a rural Nationalist MP and 
Page’s colleague in the Bruce-Page Cabinet; see Michael B. Tyquin, Neville Howse: Australia's 
First Victoria Cross Winner, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1999. 
160 Page, Truant Surgeon, ibid., p. 64. 
161 Page to Ethel Page, undated but probably late 1916, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, 
A0180, box 9, folder 71.  
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MP H.E. Pratten, and was dismayed by the poor marketing of Australian 
goods.162)   
 
Page had a ‘good war’ – short and personally rewarding, without direct 
involvement in combat.  His exposure as a surgeon to the immediate results of 
battle barely features in correspondence to Ethel or in the short account in his 
memoirs, possibly reflecting a mixture of reticence and wartime censorship.  
His letters are more focussed on the professional benefits of wartime doctoring.  
Even when still in France he reflected on “an experience that one would not 
have missed.”  Page concluded that “the best thing of all is the meeting men 
from every school of medicine in the world finding them with similar ideas and 
measuring oneself by their standards and getting a true comparative estimate 
of his ability + capacity.”163   
 
Foreshortened as it was, Page remained proud of his war service.  In his 1917 
speech to the Australasian Provincial Press Association he did not hesitate to 
use wartime anecdotes, declaring for instance that “unification” so possessed 
him that “during the long nights in France he had thought of little else.”164  
Looking back on his public life much later, he reflected on how wartime 
collaboration “firmly inspired my belief in the ideals and benefits of 
Commonwealth co-operation, which later I was able to carry forward in my 
political career.”165  During his service and trip back to Australia, Page noticed 
that in “the small states of the United States of America and of 
Europe…railways are built to encourage, and not discourage, trade.”  This was 
when he “realised that no true nation could be welded together until there were 
more partners with small enough states to realise their inter-dependence and 
give complete interstate free trade that was the real reason for our federal 
union.”166   
 
 
                                                 
162 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 99.  
163 Page to Ethel Page, undated but probably late 1916, op. cit.    
164 Earle Page, A Plea for Unification, op. cit., p. 5.   
165 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 64. 
166 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit. 
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What sort of person was Page? 
 
The foregoing gives a strong sense of Page as being unusually purposeful and 
energetic.  Considering what sort of individual emerged from these formative 
experiences, which shaped his approach to policy, is an essential part of 
understanding why and how he conducted his political career.  
 
Ulrich Ellis first met Page as a member of the press gallery when Federal 
Parliament sat in Melbourne.  He subsequently worked with him between 1928 
and 1961 variously as a personal secretary, Country Party scribe and tireless 
new state campaigner.  Ellis wrote extensively on Page, most tellingly in his 
history of the Country Party.  He portrayed Page as conducting politics “with 
reckless energy, native cunning and a certain contempt for the orthodox rules 
of the game.”167  Above all, “his main driving force was ideas, and they were 
legion”, such that “singleness of purpose – or purposes – was perhaps his 
predominant characteristic.”  Though rarely ill, “his longest spells in bed were 
the results of occasional accidents precipitated by absent-minded driving while 
haranguing his passengers.”168  A Country Party MP from Queensland, Charles 
Russell, also perceived a “ruthlessness” behind Page’s “generally gay and 
debonair personality”, that he thought typical of Country Party leaders.169  Such 
comments, the 1917 speech and many other public and private statements 
suggest that Page thought of himself as being on a very special mission far 
more important than anything he could achieve as a mere surgeon.   
 
Although Page spoke clearly enough before large audiences, some 
interlocutors noted difficulty with his often gushingly enthusiastic style of 
conversation.  Even as staunch an admirer as Ellis reported that Page’s 
recollections for Truant Surgeon “rarely contained verbs and often no subjects 
and predicates, and…he seldom finished a sentence or a thought.”170  But 
Page could moderate his speech to talk lucidly when required.  The 
                                                 
167 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 324. 
168 Ibid., pp. 322, 323.  
169 Charles W. Russell, Country Crisis, W.R. Smith & Paterson, Brisbane, 1976, p. 83. 
170 Account provided to journalist Cecil Edwards and reported in Edwards’s The Editor Regrets, 
Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1972, p. 182.  
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parliamentary officer Frank Green, not a Page admirer, wrote that this “tough 
individualist” had such a facility with words that “the only way to conduct an 
argument with Page with any hope of success was in writing.”171  As can be 
seen from the many speeches and writings drawn upon in this thesis, he was 
very capable of well-ordered argument, reflected in his indefatigable use of 
mass communications – radio, film, booklets and particularly the rural press.   
 
Ellis also dwelt upon Page’s self-centeredness.  That “the very universe 
revolved around him and his plans” tended to determine his personal 
interactions.  Page “had no reluctance in impressing the services of any person 
from a Prime Minister to a journalist or a humble messenger.”172  Ellis 
generously added that “if he seemed selfish or unduly demanding, he could feel 
that he was obeying the dictates of his destiny which impelled him to push 
forward regardless.”173  It is perhaps telling that Page did not respond to 
humour of which he was the object.174  Arthur Fadden recalled Page as 
“sometimes an irritating and exasperating colleague”, leading to such outbursts 
as that mentioned in the introduction.  But he also remembered Page as being 
“like a father to me from the time I entered the House,” and producing “a 
veritable flood of ideas on every conceivable subject.”175   
 
Page’s intense approach to policy issues greatly coloured how he worked as a 
party leader and minister.  He had a strong desire to leave a lasting legacy that 
reflected his personal sense of mission, which itself derived from a powerful 
mixture of family tradition, desire to replicate the harmonious community of his 
childhood and Methodist commitment to earthly progress.  Ellis touched on 
Page’s fundamentally emotive approach to issues – and inadvertently identified 
his foremost weaknesses – by commenting that “he rarely worked from premise 
to conclusion but proceeded from the original idea to its justification, arguing 
the case in reverse before he allowed it to burst upon the public.”176  
                                                 
171 Frank C. Green, Servant of the House, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1969, pp. 35, 103. 
172 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 323, 326. 
173 Ibid., p. 327. 
174 Ellis quoted in O’Hara thesis, op. cit., p. 6. 
175 A.W. Fadden, They Called Me Arty: The Memoirs of Sir Arthur Fadden, The Jacaranda 
Press, Milton, 1969, pp. 81-2.  
176 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 325. 
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That Page saw himself as working towards a higher purpose was also reflected 
in his being undeterred by failure, to which he responded with a long, patient 
wait before trying again.  When another opportunity arose, he simply 
announced his specific goal and proceeded to push ahead almost regardless of 
barriers he was sure to face, especially when not constrained by a strong Prime 
Minister.  Invariably, he applied his trademark energy and inventiveness but 
also his tendency to see ready solutions to complex problems.  At some crucial 
moments he imprudently dismissed his critics as sadly misguided, such as on 
the inevitability of new states. 
 
Unlike many other self-styled visionaries, Page was a cultural conservative who 
admired the British Empire as a force for international stability.  But reading, 
education and sojourns in Sydney and overseas gave him a broader 
perspective than the typical rural activist.  Page read widely: in July 1935 the 
Parliamentary Librarian recorded him as having borrowed a work on economic 
planning by the English socialist G.D.H. Cole, a biography of Czech President 
Edvard Benes, studies of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and of Japan’s role in 
the Pacific, as well as some unspecified “mystery stories.”177  Yet his 
interpretation was frequently narrow, aided by creative use of selected 
statistics.  He habitually seized upon whatever seemed to justify his existing 
views, such as unqualifiedly interpreting writings by the historian and 
philosopher of urban life Lewis Mumford as confirmation of the inherent evil of 
big cities.  
 
Page’s policy forays invariably reflected faith in the power of political action.  He 
continued to believe, with only minor qualifications, in the ready ability of 
government to create conditions that would develop both economy and society 
along the proper decentralised and regionalised lines.  This faith, however, 
exceeded his confidence in politicians and public servants as individuals, hence 
a consistent preference for utilising outsiders from private industry to help guide 
implementation of his policies.  In this, he conspicuously lacked the early 
Country Party’s distrust of banks and other big business.   
                                                 
177 Parliamentary Librarian to Page, 19 July 1935, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, 
box 1, folder 3.  
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Page had some self-appreciation of his unconventionality in democratic politics.  
Although a highly respected local member, he was not a populist who looked to 
the masses for guidance or sought to use their supposed will as backing for his 
actions.  Contrary to the early Country Party’s egalitarian mores, Page was 
convinced of the prime role of the leader.  As something of a historicist, he 
spoke of natural laws having driven all societies, notably the decisive role of 
bold leaders and the superiority of compact, homogenous states.  In personal 
notes, Page reflected on how the historian Arnold Toynbee “points out 
fundamental basis of successive civilisations been saved and transmitted to 
posterity by virile minority”, no doubt a reflection of how he saw himself.178   
 
Page often felt it necessary to package a rarefied goal with something more 
publicly acceptable, such as linking economic planning to defence 
preparedness.  In private he bemoaned the reluctance of the citizenry to see at 
once the merits of his appeals to action.  In 1921 he told the editor of the Coff’s 
Harbour Advocate that the closure of local public works by the state 
government was due to “the supineness and apathy of the North, in not 
unanimously and enthusiastically getting behind the separation movement,” as 
he had “urged them to do for many years.”179  But as will be seen in following 
chapters, he nonetheless foresaw public opinion as eventually catching up with 
him, particularly if the public had been gradually acclimatised to a well-timed 
initiative and a visionary leader seized the psychological moment.  
 
                                                 
178 Notes for a speech, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 4, folder 41 (a).  Page’s 
own underlining; undated, but from late in his career.  Page referred here to Toynbee’s History 
of Civilisations – he no doubt he actually meant A Study of History, published progressively in 
twelve volumes over 1934-61. 
179 Page to editor of the Coffs Harbour Advocate, 25 January 1921, Earle Page papers, UNE 
Archives, A0180, box 1, folder 1. 
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CHAPTER 2 – PAGE’S RISE TO NATIONAL PROMINENCE  
 
Earle Page had luck, as all politicians need.  He entered national politics at a 
formative time that made possible his rapid emergence into national 
prominence.  This chapter, covering the late 1910s and early 1920s, begins by 
explaining his initial electoral success in his native Grafton and his ensuing 
transformation into a national figure.  His ascendance reflects the rural activism 
that led to the rise of the Country Party, as well as his own dynamism in 
asserting a vision for the nation.  In particular, Page’s strategic leadership of 
the resurgence of new statism helped him build a personal network of rural 
elites associated with this cause, while his closely related advocacy of 
regionalism and decentralisation was his first distinctive contribution to national 
political debate.  
 
This rapid rise culminated in Page in February 1923 assuming a near ideal 
position from which to attempt to influence national policy: he was 
Commonwealth Treasurer, de facto Deputy Prime Minister and leader of a 
party that held almost half the positions in Cabinet.  The Bruce-Page 
government took office during a resurgence of national optimism and 
unhesitatingly accepted responsibility for reinvigorating economic progress.  It 
did not simply resume policies interrupted by the war, but sought to shape 
Australian governance so as to provide a more efficient basis for national 
development.  This helped establish the 1920s as an era of innovative national 
policies, conducive to Page’s personal plans for shaping a still formative nation.  
This chapter concludes with an account of co-operative federalism as a Page 
policy commitment that was also the new government’s first major policy 
initiative.   
 
Page’s return from war and entry into public life, 1917-19   
 
When Page returned to Australia in June 1917, his personal world was 
brimming with promise.  He had undertaken war service, built a career as a 
surgeon and was locally prominent for his political activism.  New statism, 
70 
 
however, was still in a lull in the Grafton area.  The war was continuing, a north 
coast drought had just broken and the state government was showing interest 
in a major new local project, the Nymboida hydroelectric power scheme.1  Yet 
Page soon re-established himself as an energetic figure with a talent for 
publicity.  Throughout the remainder of 1917 he wrote for the Daily Examiner, 
delivered public lectures, lobbied MPs and harried newspaper editors, later 
reflecting in a draft of his memoirs that “policies must be hammered continually 
into the minds of the public.”2  He drew on his travels in North America to 
produce a series of press articles on how hydroelectricity amounted to 
“Lightening the Farmers’ Lot.”3  Page particularly recalled being confronted by 
the parents of children he had delivered years before bemoaning the dearth of 
educational opportunities around Grafton: parliamentarians he accosted 
“seemed to have no thought-out remedy.”4   
 
Immediately the war ended, new statism revived in several regions of Australia.  
This overlapped heavily with the wider rural agitation that became the basis of 
the appearance of the early Country Party.  The strong revival in northern New 
South Wales was attributed by B.D. Graham to the onset of regional drought in 
New England and to the state government’s failure to provide new rail and port 
facilities.5  Proponents shared a sense of rural marginalization: a pamphlet 
issued in 1920 warned that “where political power is combined with commercial 
supremacy the danger will always be that the political power may be used to 
advance the commercial interests of the centre at the expense of the 
remainder.”6  
 
New statism’s local appeal and wide network of contacts amongst rural activists 
made it a strong basis for launching a political career.  Proponents in the north 
included a preponderance of town-based figures drawn from the professions, 
                                                 
1 O’Hara thesis, op. cit., p. 48. 
2 Quoted in Collier, ‘Earle Christmas Grafton Page: A Doctor for the Nation’, Armidale and 
District Historical Society Journal, op. cit., p. 9. 
3 Daily Examiner, 23 June 1917, p. 4. 
4 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit. 
5 Graham, op. cit., p. 154. 
6 From Northern New State Movement, Australian Subdivision, Effect on Development, The 
Case for Northern New South Wales, Glen Innes, 1920 (title page reads Australia Subdivided: 
the First New State), p. 8, quoted in Graham, op. cit., p. 44. 
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business and newspapers, collectively providing a milieu in which Page was at 
home.7  This helped him build a diverse range of personal contacts from 
Chambers of Commerce, local government, farmers’ and graziers’ 
associations, and the rural press. They included the New England-based 
Thompson, Drummond, and P.P. Abbot, a Tamworth lawyer and MHR for New 
England 1913-9.  Page also began to forge ties with like-minded figures from 
further afield such as F.B.S. Falkiner, a prominent sheep-breeder from the 
Riverina who was elected to the House of Representatives in 1913 with the 
help of FSA sponsorship.        
 
Page’s political rise was also greatly aided by rural protest finally starting to 
organise itself into an Australia-wide movement, leading eventually to a 
parliamentary Country Party.  Rural protest already had a long but sporadic 
history of “political experiments”, such as post-gold rush land reform leagues 
and the Victorian-based Kyabram movement’s post-Federation demands for 
smaller government.  These were typified by sudden emergence followed by 
rapid dissipation or merger with urban-based groups.  But during the 1910s 
continuing rural insecurity led to “a cultural reaction to the dominance of the big 
coastal cities on the one hand and the pastoralist establishment on the other” 
that decisively strengthened moves towards the formation of rural-based 
political parties.8   
 
Rural-based protest during 1910-20 was described by Graham as being fuelled 
by such unwelcome government intrusions as compulsory wartime marketing, 
tariffs, arbitration and referenda in 1911, 1913 and 1919 that sought 
unsuccessfully to greatly expand Commonwealth economic powers.  He also 
identified the organisational skills necessary for political parties as being 
fostered by rural community entities, ranging from farmers’ associations to 
                                                 
7 See Grant Harman, ‘New State Agitation in Northern New South Wales, 1920-1929’, Journal 
of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 63, part 1, June 1977, pp. 26-39, for an outline of 
support for new statism in this region.  There is some evidence that new statism in the north 
had a socially narrower and more elite base than in other parts of the state; see Nancy 
Blacklow, ‘’Riverina Roused’: Representative Support for the Riverina New State Movements in 
the 1920s and 1930s’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 80, no. 3-4, 
December 1994, pp. 176-94. 
8 Graham, op. cit., p. 139. 
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annual agricultural shows, co-operative companies and masonic lodges.9  
(Page’s membership of the Grafton Freemasons from late 1917 would have 
added to his range of local contacts).10  Wheat producers were especially 
prominent in providing early political leadership.  This reflected the added 
challenges facing export-focussed producers vulnerable to international price 
fluctuations and who were often based on small holdings in drought-prone 
regions such as Victoria’s Mallee.11  
 
Wheat was also the subject of the first comprehensive wartime regulation of a 
primary industry.  A compulsory wheat pool was instituted from 1915 that 
covered price control and shipping, jointly administered by the Commonwealth 
and the states.12  Regulation was later extended to other primary producers, 
including dairy farmers and graziers.  Producers’ reactions were mixed, ranging 
from resentment of government control to growing comfort in centralised 
purchasing and guaranteed prices.  Over time, their demands came to focus on 
a direct role in managing state-supported regulation and its post-war 
continuation.13  When combined with deeper currents of countrymindedness 
and small producers’ perceptions of exploitation, the broad political outcome 
was to encourage rural pressure groups to directly enter parliamentary politics.   
 
Early manifestations included the appearance in 1912 of a country faction of 
the governing Liberal Party in Victoria that challenged the authority of Premier 
William Watt, and a faltering effort in 1913 by the FSA of New South Wales to 
foster a state country party.  A distinct rural parliamentary party first appeared 
in Western Australia in 1914 when the local FSA and Country Party won ten 
state seats at separate elections that year for the upper and lower houses of 
State Parliament.  In Queensland the following year the Queensland Farmers’ 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 292-4. 
10 Website of the Museum of Freemasonry, http://www.mof.org.au/articles/prime-ministers/86-
prime-minister-earle-page.html 
11 Graham, op. cit, p. 28. 
12 Ibid., pp. 97-8. 
13 Ibid., pp. 99-103, 139.  These marketing arrangements provided for guaranteed sales and 
prices, with the Commonwealth fixing the prices of wheat and butter and operating compulsory 
purchasing pools for wheat and wool.  As wartime schemes they were not ongoing, legislation 
for which would have raised significant constitutional problems necessitating the collaboration 
of the states. 
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Union won five seats.  In 1915 a similar group also appeared in New South 
Wales, based on the FSA and calling itself the Progressive Party.14  Both were 
anti-Labor, but concern to remain independent made them reluctant to accept 
portfolios in Liberal ministries.  This raised a problem of how they could 
otherwise wield influence, later to be decisively addressed by Page.   
 
The Victorian Farmers’ Union (VFU), founded in the Mallee in 1916, rejected 
alignment with established parties in favour of seeking concessions from them: 
these parties would become “putty in the hands of an organisation” said one of 
the VFU leaders.  It sought to reform the wheat pool and also attracted support 
from dairy farmers who resented Commonwealth fixing of butter prices, and 
from Goulburn Valley irrigation settlers seeking the repeal of barriers to 
acquiring the freehold of their leases.15  Page however showed from the outset 
little personal or policy empathy with wheat farming militants.  The VFU later 
became the main power base for several of his parliamentary colleagues and 
rivals, including Percy Stewart, Thomas Paterson, and Albert Dunstan.  
Another important early step towards a federal parliamentary Country Party 
was the formation of the Australian Farmers’ Federal Organisation (AFFO) as a 
national body in 1916.  This was by four major state bodies, the VFU and the 
FSAs of New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia, in response 
to the wartime regulation of primary industry.16  The AFFO’s platform included 
new states, the first time this issue had been adopted by a national 
organisation.   
 
Page’s final stepping stone to parliament was his February 1918 election to the 
mayoralty of South Grafton by his fellow councillors, attributed by Page’s own 
Daily Examiner to the eminence of his family mixed with his advocacy of 
“unification” and of local government.17  He immediately signalled that his 
interests were more national than local by placing a long article in the Daily 
Examiner on the “Case for Unification.”  Mayor Page told his constituents that 
“the early rapid development of the United States was largely due to the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., pp. 82-90, 109-10; Davey, The Nationals, op. cit., p. 5.   
15 Graham, ibid., pp. 110-1, 113.  The quoted VFU leader was Isaac Hart. 
16 Ibid, op. cit., p. 100. 
17 Daily Examiner, 14 February 1918, p. 4.  
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comparatively small size of the subdivisions permitting true local self-
government in the widest sense, giving the people a personal knowledge of 
their public men, and permitting these to have an intimate and intelligent grasp 
of the whole area they were administering.”  He built on his August 1917 
speech by observing that as the Australian states lacked historical tradition and 
respective unifying features they were ripe for “the unification of the whole 
country”, prior to “the localisation of local powers in small, compact 
inexpensively governed provinces.”18  In April 1918 he won statewide attention 
by attacking Premier William Holman’s lack of commitment to the north coast at 
a local dinner in the Premier’s honour, drawing cheers from other diners – the 
district, Page said, needed cheap power, proper harbours and better 
communications with adjacent regions.19  
 
In his memoirs, Page attributed his decision to run for parliament to his 
commitment to the new state cause and local public works, especially “water 
development.”20  He also claimed to be acting on his own initiative, but in a 
1961 speech said that “the leader of the movement” (unnamed, but probably 
Abbott) pressed him to nominate for Federal Parliament on a platform of local 
separation and development.  Regional patriotism was strong, but Page 
recalled that he also wanted to “introduce the fight throughout the whole of 
Australian politics” for national subdivision and development.21  Page 
announced on 11 October 1919 that he would stand as an independent at the 
forthcoming federal election for the north-eastern New South Wales seat of 
Cowper against the Nationalist incumbent John Thomson.   
 
Page’s longstanding support for a new state and local development provided a 
ready basis for a campaign that played to local resentments.  His own Daily 
Examiner offered unabashed support, assuring electors at the outset that Page 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 16 February 1918, p. 3.  An example of his statements on hydroelectricity is in the Glen 
Innes Examiner of 7 July 1919, p. 5.  
19 O’Hara article, op. cit., pp. 90-1. 
20 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 68. 
21 Page speech to the Annual Convention of the New England New State Movement, Grafton, 
23 October 1961, New England New State Movement, UNE Archives, A0547, Box 33; see also 
Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 68.  In his June 1956 speech to the dinner marking his 
retirement from the frontbench Page instead vaguely referred to “a petition from more than half 
of the people” as the trigger for his first run for parliament. 
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had “the ability, means and time to give to his country, and that the interests of 
the electorate would be safe in his hands.”22  The more detached Sydney 
Morning Herald assessed Page as “a very popular resident” who had Thomson 
“caught at a severe disadvantage.”23  Page in campaign mode used his private 
car to traverse the entire electorate twice, usually speaking in public three times 
a day, six days a week.24  Despite his early return from active service, 
campaign advertisements featured him in AIF uniform.25  Page maintained a 
studied independence from established party politics: although 1919 was the 
first national election to use preferential voting, he did not direct his supporters 
on second preferences.26 
 
Page’s keynote speech for the campaign was delivered at Grafton on 22 
October.  It reaffirmed his August 1917 address and was the first prominent 
instance of a personal trademark – trying to marry the immediate interests of a 
local audience with his national vision.  He ranged from local telephone 
services and the hydroelectric potential of the Clarence up to nationwide 
regional self-government, the dangers of state enterprises and the greater good 
of a more ordered national economy.27  The people of Grafton were told that 
their local postal services “were starved in order that the Melbourne Post Office 
might be made the finest in the Southern Hemisphere.”  Page presented as a 
committed fiscal conservative, calling what became known as vertical fiscal 
imbalance (whereby the Commonwealth collected excess revenue that it 
promptly transferred to the states to spend) “one of the prime causes of this 
orgy of extravagance.”  He attacked the fundamentals of Australian governance 
by describing the “whole Federal system [as] made for wastefulness, as almost 
everything was duplicated” and called for a new constitutional convention.  A 
revised Constitution “would enable national affairs to be controlled by a 
National Parliament” and shift regional matters to “local subdivisions of 
Australia that should be made according to community of interests”.  Page 
touched on his still developing interest in planning by proposing the careful use 
                                                 
22 Daily Examiner, 24 September, 1919, p. 4. 
23 Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 1919, p. 6.  
24 O’Hara thesis, op. cit., pp. 79.  O’Hara also provides Page’s full campaign itinerary, p. 110. 
25 Such as in the Daily Examiner of 11 October 1919, p. 6.  
26 O’Hara thesis, op. cit., p. 83. 
27 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 670. 
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of tariffs “to establish secondary industries that the primary industries 
demanded”, and so “make the country self-contained.”  He also proposed 
national insurance, an essentially contributions-based scheme to deal with the 
deprivations of unemployment, sickness and old age.28   
 
There is a significant omission from Page’s 1917 and 1919 speeches.  No 
reference was made to agricultural support schemes of guaranteed prices, 
produce pools, production quotas or export bounties – often collectively dubbed 
orderly marketing.  These were already issues of debate and are widely 
regarded as having been the Country Party’s raison d'être.  Page certainly 
supported such schemes, particularly for the wheat industry.  But unlike many 
of his political colleagues, orderly marketing was not the foremost focus of his 
policy activism.  Part of the reason is that over 1918-21 Australian dairy farmers 
opposed market regulation as having artificially depressed prices.  During the 
1919 campaign Page, seeking to represent a dairy-producing area, declared 
himself against “government interference with the dairying industry, and more 
especially with the price-fixing of primary products.”29  But more fundamentally, 
he had frequent misgivings that the widespread subsidisation of industries 
would include those that were inefficient.  Orderly marketing did become 
important to Page’s conception of how the national economy should be 
managed and to his party’s political strategies – he for example praised a new 
Dairy Produce Control Board when it was created in 1924.30  But it was never 
the dominant feature of a much broader personal world view that saw salvation 
for primary producers as at least as likely to be found in regionalism, 
technology and planning. 
 
Page proceeded to win Cowper with over 52 per cent of the primary vote, a 
strong result for an independent in a diverse electorate that stretched from his 
native Clarence Valley southwards to the Manning River and Taree.  Thomson 
received a mere fifth of the primary vote, behind not only Page but also the 
Labor candidate.  Page topped the poll in fifteen of Cowper’s sixteen major 
                                                 
28 All quotes in this paragraph are from the Daily Examiner, 23 October 1919, p. 3. 
29 See Graham, op. cit., pp. 151-2; Page quote from Daily Examiner, 23 October 1919, p. 3. 
30 On Page and the Dairy Produce Control Board, see the Lismore Northern Star, 23 October 
1924, p. 4. 
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population centres and won nearly 60 per cent of the primary vote in its biggest 
district, Grafton.  The only major centre where he failed to top the primary vote 
was Kempsey in the south, and even there Thomson secured a mere 48 more 
votes more than did Page.31  Why did Page triumph so readily and proceed to 
secure this seat as a local power base he held for the next forty-two years?  
 
Firstly, Page maintained a very broad personal profile in the Grafton region.  
During the 1910s he had made his own additions to his family’s reputation for 
conspicuous public service such as by serving on South Grafton council.  
Although a town-dweller, his medical practice gave him exposure throughout 
Grafton’s extended hinterland.  By contrast, the sitting member was, according 
to Page, rarely sighted in the electorate, a shortcoming not helped by his being 
ill in hospital for much of the 1919 campaign.32  Thomson was used to little 
opposition, having been returned unopposed at the previous two elections.  
Page strengthened his ties to his electorate and credentials as a man on the 
land when in 1923 he was part of a syndicate that purchased Heifer Station on 
the Clarence River, a beef cattle property about 50 kilometres northwest of 
Grafton.  (Page bought out the other owners in 1932.)33  Ellis later described 
this property as Page’s “pride of his personal possessions” where “he returned 
at every opportunity to renew his energies and his inspiration in close contact 
with his beloved river.”34 
 
Secondly, Page had strong ties to the local press.  Newspapers were extremely 
important in rural Australia as means of regular communication across 
dispersed communities and of asserting rural identity.35  In northern New South 
Wales they enthusiastically supported the local political movements and new 
state campaigns with which Page was engaged.  Page and his business 
colleagues positioned the Daily Examiner as an agent for other northern 
papers.  Page wrote of how the Daily Examiner, the Lismore Northern Star, the 
Tamworth Northern Daily Leader and the Tweed River Daily “developed a 
                                                 
31 O’Hara thesis, op. cit., pp. 85-6.  
32 Ibid., p. 76.   
33 See Jim Page, The History of Heifer Station, privately published, no date.  
34 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 323.  
35 Graham, op. cit., p. 142.  See also Blainey, Black Kettle and Full Moon, op. cit., pp.104-9. 
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uniform policy on decentralisation and became the vehicles for our 
campaign.”36  In June 1921, he also became an owner of the Northern Star, 
while fellow new staters controlled other regional publications – Thompson 
edited newspapers in Tamworth from 1911, and E.C. Sommerlad edited the 
Inverell Argus and, from May 1918, owned the Glen Innes Examiner.37    
 
Thirdly, and most fundamentally, Page rode the aforementioned nationwide 
and local rise in rural protest politics.  In October 1918 a North Coast 
Development League was formed to promote local public works, notably 
Page’s scheme to dam the Clarence.  Page was elected League president, and 
the following year led a public road show along the north coast and then inland 
to the Tablelands.  Ellis later commented that Page would have used such 
speaking tours to gauge public support for a run at Federal Parliament.38  In 
April 1919 alone he addressed meetings at Inverell, Glen Innes, Armidale and 
Tamworth.39  (David Drummond was impressed when he heard Page speak at 
Inverell, marking the start of his admiration of Page).40  Northern New South 
Wales was to remain a stronghold of rural protest.  At the state election of 
March 1920, for example, the Progressive Party received its highest share of 
the statewide vote in the northern seats of Northern Tablelands, Oxley and 
Byron.41   
 
Page’s transformation into a national figure, 1919-23 
 
Page the nationally unknown new rural MP – intense, well-educated and more 
‘townie' than farmer – later claimed that he had entered parliament with few 
                                                 
36 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 62. 
37 Farrell, thesis, pp. 161-2; also Australian Dictionary of Biography entries on Thompson, (John 
Atchison, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/thompson-charles-victor-8782/text15397, published 
first in hardcopy volume 12, Melbourne University Press, 1990), and Sommerlad (Rod 
Kirkpatrick,  http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/sommerlad-ernest-christian-8582/text14983, 
published first in hardcopy volume 12, Melbourne University Press, 1990).      
38 O’Hara article, op. cit., p. 95. 
39 Farrell thesis, op. cit., p. 30.    
40 Jim Belshaw, Decentralisation, Development and Decent Government: The Life and Times of 
David Henry Drummond, 1890-1941, Ph.D. thesis, University of New England, submitted but 
subsequently put aside by its author; see 
http://newenglandhistory.blogspot.com.au/2010/06/decentralisation-development-and-
decent.html, chapter 2, ‘Entry into politics 1907-1920’. 
41 Graham, op. cit., pp. 139-41. 
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personal ambitions and subject to just three years’ leave of absence agreed to 
by his medical partners in Grafton.42  In his maiden speech he assured the 
House of Representatives, rather disingenuously, that “it was almost by 
accident that I strayed into the by-paths of politics.”43  Looking back in 1955 he 
added that he entered national politics only as he had been unable to get 
results outside it.44  But there are strong indications that the Page had 
harboured grand ambitions, not least as set out in his August 1917 speech.  His 
obituary in the Medical Journal of Australia reported that during the 1910s 
members of his local community spoke of him as a future Prime Minister and 
that early in 1917 Page told his commanding officer he aspired to that office.45  
Ellis also thought that Page entered parliament with such hopes of high office, 
only to find that lesser ministerial rank was adequate for pursuing the policies 
that were his primary interest.46  Page expanded his engagement with civic 
movements, especially new statism, to build a public profile far exceeding that 
of any other rural-based politician.  A mere sixteen months after being elected, 
he was a national figure, leading the Country Party and issuing demands to a 
formidable Prime Minister.   
 
Page’s rise was helped by a post-war policy debates.  One of these was a 
revival of popular interest in developmentalism.  Proponents saw the young 
nation as now ready to realise its potential, aided by a keen sense of 
entitlement for rural Australia.  The appeal of such optimism was marked by the 
success of Brady’s 1918 Australia Unlimited, a profusely illustrated volume 
produced for the popular market.  Brady asserted that Australia’s farmlands, 
“highly fertile and unlimited in area”, were capable of supporting a population of 
200 million.  Contrary to the obvious, he doubted “if there are a hundred square 
                                                 
42 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 70.  Page added that in doing so his three partners 
“displayed a touching faith in the speed of parliamentary process whereby I would achieve 
constitutional reform, carve out some New States, and inspire the development of water 
conservation and electric power on the Clarence and on other Australian rivers.” 
43 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 March 1920, p. 194. 
44 Page speech on being granted life membership of the Country Party, 24 June 1955, quoted 
in Collier, ‘Earle Christmas Grafton Page: A Doctor for the Nation’, Armidale and District 
Historical Society Journal, op. cit., p. 5. 
45 Obituary by Dr George Bell, Sir Henry Newland, Dr W.F. Simmons and Dr D.A. Cameron, 
The Medical Journal of Australia, May 12 1962, pp. 731-4.  
46 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 328. 
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miles of true desert within the whole area of the Australian continent.”47  
Boosters such as Brady drew forth articulate critics, including the geographer 
Thomas Griffith Taylor, the science administrator David Rivett, and the pioneer 
environmentalist, James Barrett.  (Taylor was particularly outspoken about 
environmental limitations and “could not resist ridiculing every sacred cow.”)48  
Hostile popular and media reactions to such critics reflected how ideas of 
national development had come to overlap with wider Australian patriotism.  
 
Page’s continuing advocacy of unification and new states was aided by his 
entering parliamentary politics at a time of decisive evolution in Australian 
federalism.  Ongoing sparring between the Commonwealth and the states 
helped create an audience for his visions and a debate for him to join.  Many 
basics of governance at the national level in particular were still formative and 
hence highly contestable.  In particular, the Commonwealth was seeking to 
increase its financial and other powers well beyond what the states had agreed 
to in 1901, encouraged by the war having boosted the role of central 
government.  The Commonwealth takeover of customs and excise in 1901 
deprived the former colonies of a quarter to a third of their total revenues.49  As 
the Commonwealth initially collected far more than it spent, section 87 of the 
Constitution – the ‘Braddon clause’ – required it to return three quarters of 
these receipts to the states for the first ten years after Federation.  In 1908 the 
Deakin government’s Surplus Revenue Act provided for the Commonwealth to 
retain remaining surplus funds rather than automatically also grant these to the 
states.  The growth of national responsibilities imposed stress on these early 
fiscal arrangements, and in 1910-11 the Commonwealth fixed its payments to 
the states at 25 shillings per capita.  These were provided on the 
Commonwealth’s terms with no guarantee of longer-term continuation and 
were vulnerable to price inflation.50  In 1915 the Commonwealth’s introduction 
                                                 
47 Brady, op. cit., pp. 37, 57. 
48 J.M. Powell, Griffith Taylor and "Australia Unlimited", the John Murtagh Macrossan lecture 
1992, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, pp. 25, 39-40. 
49 Lee, op. cit., p. 35. 
50 W.G. McMinn, A Constitutional History of Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
1979, p. 132. 
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of estate duties and a progressive income tax brought it into direct competition 
with the states for revenue.51   
 
Increased Commonwealth activity elevated another Page passion to the 
forefront of discussion: state-Commonwealth policy co-operation.  Although the 
constitutional debates of the 1890s assumed a clear division between these 
two main levels of government, it became evident soon after 1901 that they had 
essentially concurrent powers that necessitated close consultation.  The 
earliest formalised mechanisms for co-operation were post-Federation 
Premiers’ Conferences, convened by the states rather than the 
Commonwealth.52  In 1915 complementary legislation enacted by the 
Commonwealth, South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria created the 
first significant inter-governmental agency, the River Murray Commission, 
empowered to regulate use of the river’s waters.53  Despite these early forms of 
co-operation, “tension had begun to develop between the legally restricted 
responsibilities of the federal government, as set out in a specific list of 
transferred powers, and the need for increased activity suggested by the 
Commonwealth’s growing importance in the overall governance of the 
country.”54  This was inevitable in a federation that commenced with a small 
central government but then had to meet the growing needs of a new nation.  
Increasing Commonwealth assertiveness was exemplified by its convening of a 
Premiers’ Conference on post-war reconstruction in September 1919, just three 
months before Page was elected to parliament.  
 
The means of constitutional change was also evolving in a way that contributed 
to shifting the federal-state balance.  By 1919 it was widely recognised that 
High Court judgments generally favouring the Commonwealth were more 
important than referenda to amend the Constitution or the voluntary surrender 
                                                 
51 Nicholas Brown, ‘Government, law and citizenship’, in Bashford and Macintyre, volume 2, op. 
cit., p. 409. 
52 K.N.J. Bennie, ‘The Premiers’ Conferences: An Historical Sketch from the Beginnings to 
1930’, Public Administration, vol. 6, no. 7, September 1947, pp. 411-2.  
53 A.J. Brown, ‘Subsidiarity or Subterfuge?: Resolving the Future of Local Government in the 
Australian Federal System,’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, December 2002, p. 37.  
54 McMinn, op. cit., pp. 134-5, 192. 
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of powers by the states.55  The Court rejected a challenge to Deakin’s Surplus 
Revenue Act, and in 1920 the famed Engineer’s Case largely removed the 
concept of implied immunity of the states from Commonwealth law.  This 
amounted to ushering in “the primacy of the Commonwealth, a primacy which 
was to develop in the next half-century into dominance.”56    
 
Debates on federalism acquired added impetus from high hopes engendered 
by the end of the war and a related widening of perceptions of the potential of 
national government.  Wartime planning of industry and American-sourced 
concepts of industrial management encouraged a swing away from laissez-
faire policies and towards ideas of efficiency in government and the planning of 
the economy.  Duty-focused, collectivist views of society were promulgated by 
such policy thinkers as historian and adult educator G.V. Portus, Frederic 
Eggleston and the industrial psychologist Elton Mayo, as well as by 
organisations such as the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA).57  Page 
read widely in search of ideas and supporting arguments, and by the early 
1920s began to show an interest in concepts of national planning and efficiency 
that became prominent in the Bruce-Page government.  The most directly 
important of these new intellectual figures for Page was F.A. Bland, an 
associate of Portus who became an increasingly outspoken advocate of 
political decentralisation and efficient public administration.  Bland wrote in a 
1923 WEA publication of a shift of emphasis from traditional “negative” 
government functions of external security and internal order towards more 
positive functions “arising out of the social, intellectual, artistic and economic 
conditions of modern times.”  These included education, public health, “public 
utility schemes” and “the fostering and development of economic resources.”58  
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 120. 
56 Ibid., pp. 130, 138. 
57 1915 saw, for example, publication of the proceedings of a wartime conference on industrial 
planning as National Efficiency – A Series of Lectures by the economist R.F. Irvine and others, 
Victorian Railways Institute, Melbourne 1915.  In 1919 Portus produced An Introduction to the 
Study of Industrial Reconstruction, WEA of New South Wales, Sydney, 1919, and The Problem 
of Industry in Politics, WEA of New South Wales, Sydney, c. 1919, that enthusiastically cited 
British exemplars for industrial planning.  See Moore in Walter, op. cit., pp. 137-8, 158. 
58 F.A. Bland, Shadows and Realities of Government: An Introduction to the Study of the 
Organisation of the Administrative Agencies of Government with Special Reference to New 
South Wales, WEA of New South Wales, Sydney, 1923, p. 3. 
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Bland was to become a prominent admirer of many of Page’s ideas, especially 
on planning and related co-operative federalism.  
 
Finally, and most fundamentally for Page, he entered parliament when tension 
and change in the established political parties created openings for the 
emergence of a national Country Party.59  Without this, he might indeed have 
returned to Grafton after just one term.  Continuing internal tensions weakened 
the two major parties and left neither well-placed to respond forcefully to 
growing support for rural candidates.60  The party system had already begun to 
assume a recognisably modern form with the 1909 Fusion of the anti-Labor 
Free Trade and Protectionist Parties to form the first Liberal Party, and the 
continued rise of the ALP to form a majority government in 1910.  The war had 
heightened political tensions generally by sharpening social divisions, such as 
between ex-servicemen and those who stayed at home, Catholics and 
Protestants, and capital and labour.  (Industrial disputes in 1919 accounted for 
a then record 6.3 million man-days).61   
 
In the run-up to the 1919 election and after, the main anti-Labor party was 
beset by continuing difficulties in assimilating discordant elements.  Some of 
this discord arose from the Fusion having brought together two formerly rival 
parties.  But much was attributable to the unexpected need to also 
accommodate ex-ALP leader Hughes.  In November 1916 he and his 
immediate supporters had stormed out of the ALP over the conscription issue.  
They briefly formed a Cabinet of their own before joining the Liberals in 
February 1917 to create the Nationalist Party as the basis of a united ministry.  
The ALP split in every state except Queensland, resulting in the Nationalists 
easily winning the federal election of May 1917.  The end of the war the 
following year released tensions in a government that had been unified 
                                                 
59 The early history of the Country Party is well documented in Graham’s, Aitkin’s and Davey’s 
accounts.  See Graham, op. cit.; both Davey histories, op. cit.; and Don Aitkin, The Colonel: A 
Political Biography of Sir Michael Bruxner, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 
1969.  Note also Brian Costar and Dennis Woodward (eds.), Country to National: Australian 
Rural Politics and Beyond, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985, which has an emphasis on 
the post-World War Two Country Party, including at the state level. 
60 Graham, op. cit., p. 294. 
61 Ian Turner, ‘1914-19’ in Frank Crowley (ed.), A New History of Australia, William Heinemann, 
Melbourne, 1974, pp. 352, 354. 
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primarily by the exigencies of the war effort.  In December 1919 Hughes’s 
instinctive economic interventionism saw him lead his government into an 
unsuccessful referendum (conducted simultaneously with the federal election) 
seeking greatly increased Commonwealth powers over intra-state trade and 
commerce, trusts, combinations, monopolies and industrial affairs.  There was 
further unease over Hughes’s support for state-owned enterprises, such as the 
Commonwealth Shipping Line and ventures into radio and oil refining.62  The 
Prime Minister was also widely distrusted within his own party for his autocratic 
style.  The Hughes problem was to present Page during his first term in 
parliament with a unifying target for his early leadership of the Country Party.  
 
He also gained from perceptions that Hughes was anti-rural.  Although 
Australia’s GDP actually diminished by almost 10 per cent between 1914 and 
1920, many rural industries did well, with pastoralism buoyed by British wartime 
acquisition of wool and prices for most rural products remaining high after 
peace was declared.63  But a strong perception that the Nationalist government 
increasingly favoured urban over rural interests helped give Page and his 
political confreres both purpose and prominence.  All major farmers’ 
organisations other than the VFU had supported the Nationalists for the 
duration of the war.  But this support rapidly dissipated from 1918 as the 
Hughes government signalled its intention to extend regulation and protection.  
Its mid-1918 decision to fix the price of meat sold in metropolitan markets 
outraged graziers.  In March 1919 the Commonwealth’s announcement of 
plans to greatly increase tariffs to shield manufacturers from imports and 
compensate for the small scale of local demand drew hostile reactions from 
farmers’ organisations.  Fears that a federal parliamentary rural party would 
divide the non-Labor vote largely evaporated when the Hughes government 
introduced preferential voting after the May 1918 by-election for the seat of 
Flinders, at which a VFU candidate had threatened to split the vote.  (This 
                                                 
62 Stephen Garton and Peter Stanley, ‘The Great War and its aftermath, 1914-22’, in Bashford 
and Macintyre, volume 2, op. cit., p. 58. 
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candidate’s withdrawal enabled Stanley Bruce to enter politics by winning this 
seat).64  Farmers’ organisations also opposed the December 1919 referendum, 
again with the notable exception of the VFU.65   
 
The main mover in organising such rural unrest into a federal Country Party 
was the AFFO and its constituent state bodies.  Initially, it demanded that the 
Australian Wheat Board, formerly an object of resentment for wartime 
management of the wheat pool, be made a permanent body offering secure 
purchasing.  The state organisations convened a series of joint meetings that 
culminated in the AFFO in August 1919 adopting a broader federal platform 
than its predecessors, in good time for the forthcoming federal election.  This 
document reflected rural producers’ mixed attitudes to government intervention 
by calling for tariff reform, rationalisation of federal and state functions and 
freedom from excessive regulation, but also for producer representation on the 
various boards and commissions regulating their interests. The AFFO platform 
also overlapped with Page’s sentiments, such as on co-ordination between 
levels of government.  But by its falling far short of his full national vision on 
regionalism and electrification, it is also evident that Page differed from the 
emerging mainstream of rural agitation.  Nor did the AFFO yet amount to a 
united nationwide political party: its four member bodies proceeded to issue 
their own manifestos, albeit each based on the AFFO’s platform.66 
 
In October the Graziers’ Association of New South Wales accepted an 
invitation from the FSA to declare its support for the new rural-based 
Progressive Party, helping to broaden it beyond small wheat farmers.67  Good 
showings at by-elections by candidates endorsed by farmers’ organisations led 
them to endorse a total of twenty-seven candidates nationwide at the 1919 
election.  One of these was Page, who gladly accepted the FSA’s apparently 
                                                 
64 Graham comments that “one of the Country Party’s most cherished myths” is that it was 
mainly responsible for the introduction of preferential voting by virtue of rural involvement in the 
Flinders by-election.  He states that the Hughes government was already drafting a bill for this, 
although the electoral tactics of farmers’ organisations probably accelerated its introduction; 
ibid., pp. 128-9.  
65 Ibid., pp. 115-6, 118-9. 
66 Ibid., p. 130;  Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 47-8.  The full text of 
the platform is reproduced in The Land, 29 August 1919, p. 11. 
67 Aitkin, The Colonel, op. cit., pp. 42-3. 
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unsolicited support as it “provided the very machinery I sought and appropriate 
allies should I be elected to parliament,” an indication of his intention to pursue 
a program of change.68  This came so late in the campaign that he undoubtedly 
would still have won without the FSA imprimatur.  Page was already a convert 
to the idea of a Country Party.  He later wrote that his opening campaign 
speech owed much to Falkiner, now running for the Senate, who had called for 
“a solid Country Party that will vote as such.”69 
 
The 1919 election was indicative of the still formative nature of the Australian 
party system, especially the lack of a clear focus for the rural protest vote.  Out 
of a House of 75 members, it returned thirty Nationalists, twenty-six ALP 
members, eight ‘Farmer-Nationals’ endorsed by the Nationalists or farmers’ 
organisations, three Liberals from South Australia, five VFU representatives, 
two members of the Western Australian FSA and one independent 
Nationalist.70  This nonetheless amounted to a breakthrough for rural political 
movements at the national level, with fifteen farmers’ organisation endorsees 
elected.  Page was one of eleven who agreed to a proposal by the MHR for the 
Victorian electorate of Grampians, Edmund Jowett, to caucus together.  They 
unanimously resolved “that this party shall be known as the Australian Country 
Party, and shall act independently of all other political organisations.”71   
 
All of the eleven had gone to the election without the backing of a dedicated 
party structure or platform other than what was provided by the various farmers’ 
organisations.  They had few agreed policies beyond generalities concerning 
support for rural Australia, cutting taxes and opposing socialism.  Yet the press 
reported that the new Country Party expected “to be able to exert a 
considerable influence on the Government’s actions, especially in such matters 
                                                 
68 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 68.  Page in his memoirs mistakenly refers to endorsement 
by the AFFO instead, an error that Graham says Page did not make in a 1956 interview with 
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as the proper exercise of economy in public expenditure.”72  Although six of the 
eleven had some parliamentary experience, Page recalled them as “untried 
cohorts,” who were “fortified by our political innocence and backed by an 
indestructible optimism.”73  His colleagues were three VFU members (W.G. 
Gibson, W.C. Hill and Stewart), a Victorian grazier (Jowett), a Victorian dairy 
farmer (Robert Cook), a Tasmanian newspaper proprietor (William 
McWilliams), a Western Australian parliamentarian (Harry Gregory), a wheat 
farmer and former Mayor of Perth (John Henry Prowse), a Queensland 
pastoralist and parliamentarian (Arnold Wienholt), and a New South Wales 
dairy farmer and pastoralist (Alex Hay).  The only state not represented was 
South Australia: Page had a near fully national parliamentary network to work 
with. 
 
Page was not their first leader.  McWilliams, one of only two with appreciably 
long parliamentary experience, was chosen to lead on a one-year trial basis 
with Jowett as his deputy.  Page became party Secretary and Whip.  At a 
meeting in Melbourne in February 1920 the AFFO formally approved the new 
party styling itself as the Australian Country Party.74  By the end of 1920 
avowedly rural parties had been established in every state except Tasmania, 
and those in Victoria and in New South Wales had been consolidated by good 
showings in state elections.75  AFFO delegates and Country Party federal 
parliamentarians met in Sydney in March 1921 where they adopted a platform 
more reminiscent of Page’s own national agenda.  This provided for 
constitutional reform via a convention, subdivision of the states, 
decentralisation, planned marketing by producers and consumers, and the 
“scientific investigation, complete survey and tabulation of the resources” of the 
nation.76  McWilliams lost the party leadership the following month.  Page 
attributed this to the leader’s “increasing tendency to vote against the majority” 
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and added that his own ascension was entirely at the behest of his 
parliamentary colleagues.  (He even claimed to have been the only caucus 
member not to vote for a Page leadership).77   
 
An important factor in Page’s rise within the Country Party was the fluidity of its 
policies and strategies.  The early rural parties – the Progressive Party in New 
South Wales, the VFU, the federal Country Party and others – were each 
united only by their generalised fear of rural decline.  They attracted and 
accommodated rural interests ranging from small wheat farmers to town-based 
professionals and large-scale graziers, all with differing expectations of the new 
party.  Graham described the rural political movement of 1914-19 as 
characterised by “sudden changes of direction, muddled strategies, and 
confused aims”, with early party doctrine immediately after the 1919 election 
similarly “vague and formless.”78  W.K. Hancock saw the Country Party of the 
twenties as “a coalition of diverse interests.”79  Aitkin assessed the early party 
as being “a coalition of forces, in its case pulling together the separate interests 
of wheatfarmers, dairyfarmers, graziers and townsmen, and providing them 
with an overarching loyalty to the Country and an institutionalised suspicion of 
the City.”80  Supporters espoused causes as varied as new states and soldier 
settlement but were divided on orderly marketing and free trade.   
 
Such a formative new party provided just the sort of inclusive political and 
policy environment that could accommodate “shrewd and determined” 
individuals like Earle Page.81  So singular a figure would not have been nearly 
as successful within a more established party, whether the Nationalists or the 
ALP.  Page also had the advantage, as party leader, of not being identified with 
any one rural class or producer group, an important element in sustaining his 
leadership.  Page was quite distinct from the rural radicals associated with 
small wheat farming (notably the outspoken and inflexible Stewart) and from 
the wealthier pastoralists (such as Jowett).  Page evidently initially softened his 
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opinions when dealing with his peers,  Graham describing him as then being “a 
political novice” and, less accurately, “not a man of strong opinions”, who 
consequently got on well with most of his new colleagues.82  Working day-to-
day as an equal partner in a wider movement was not Page’s instinctive 
preference: this was to become evident in his engagement with fellow new 
staters during the early 1920s. 
 
A string of issues with wide rural appeal helped the Country Party consolidate 
itself under Page’s leadership.  In July 1921 the government finally approved 
the Massy-Greene tariff (named for the Minister for Trade and Customs).  This 
established a broad and high tariff structure as a basis for manufacturing-led 
development, and was consolidated over the next few years by the Tariff 
Board’s responsiveness to appeals by individual manufacturers for protection.83  
Manufacturing accordingly increased its share of GDP from about 13 per cent 
to 18 per cent between 1920 and 1931.84  This marked shift in development 
policy away from rural industries was contested by country interests who saw 
tariffs as imposing costs on such capital equipment as reapers, binders and 
wire, and as affirming the urban bias of the Hughes government.  The new 
tariff, continuing debates over decontrolling wheat, wool and dairy production, 
and demands for rural credit as prices started falling from late 1921 all gave the 
nascent Country Party a firmer sense of purpose.  (Hughes announced in April 
1921 that wheat pooling would end – but, after some complicated political 
manoeuvres, agreed to guarantee voluntary pools formed by the states.85)  
There was also a widely-shared belief that parliament had lost control of 
government expenditure, with the result that high taxation was constricting 
industry.86  The issues that featured in Page’s election policy speech of 
October 1922, his first as party leader, mark the growing breadth of his party’s 
interests.  They included decentralisation, government expenditure (we are “the 
watchdog of the public interest, and a break on waste” said Page), public debt, 
arbitration, tariffs, provision of rural credits to farmers by the Commonwealth 
                                                 
82 Ibid., p. 176. 
83 Butlin, Barnard and Pincus, op. cit., p. 89. 
84 See Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia, op. cit., pp. 14, 179; also 
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Bank, constitutional reform and the future of wartime marketing 
arrangements.87   
 
Another major factor in Page’s success is that turbulent relations with the 
Hughes government earned him national attention.  The early Country Party 
saw itself as honourable and apolitical – quite unlike how it perceived Prime 
Minister Hughes.  It took pride in its undisciplined, slightly chaotic ways.  
Consider the following statement by Page soon after he became party leader: 
 
The Country Party is essentially a party distinct from any other, and 
decides to remain so, because it is suspicious of the influences behind 
the other parties.  It has its own organisation, its own offices, its own 
party rooms; but has not a signed party discipline that compels its 
representatives to vote for principles they disapprove of simply because 
another party or the Government advocates them.  It supports good 
government and good legislation.  It does not seek office, but it will not 
refuse to take the responsibility for its actions if called upon to do so.88    
 
Page as party leader at once launched attacks on Hughes.  Page benefitted 
from the Prime Minister’s instinctive habit of publicly responding to criticism, 
recalling that “within six months his attitude had made me one of the best-
known members of the House and recognised throughout Australia almost as 
readily as himself.”89  Page’s 1922 election speech assailed the Prime Minister 
as a breaker of promises and made veiled references to the ex-Laborite who 
must surely be behind the creeping socialism enveloping the nation.   
 
The political uncertainty of the time made the stance of Page and his party a 
matter of national significance.  Following the 1919 election, the Hughes 
government did not quite hold a secure majority in the House of 
Representatives.  The Country Party’s “search for a strategy” at first appeared 
to be a choice between a coalition with the Nationalists or preserving its 
independence by instead freely bargaining for concessions from either larger 
                                                 
87 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1922, p. 9.  Page explained in his memoirs that rural 
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Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 145-6.   
88 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 20 April 1921, p. 7502; Page was quoted here by 
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party.90  It settled on trying to influence the government without bringing it 
down, Labor being a worse alternative.  But mixed messages that gave the 
strong impression of unpredictability enhanced the Country Party’s influence.  
Page publicly refused to grant Hughes immunity from a no-confidence vote and 
even pointedly declined to provide any guarantees when the Prime Minister 
went abroad on official business.91  Uncertainty was heightened by the Country 
Party’s unpreparedness to vote solidly in the House.  A motion to reduce the 
size of the 1921-22 budget came within a single vote of bringing the 
government down.  The Party’s position was only definitely clear after it 
unambiguously secured the balance of power at the 1922 election and saw an 
opportunity to remove Hughes. 
 
Finally, the hyperactive Page established a widely-recognised persona with a 
special strategic place of his own.  Unpredictable as the new Country Party 
was, most of its MPs’ contributions in parliament were limited to workaday 
issues.  Amidst prosaic debates on returned servicemen, tariffs, expenditure on 
a new capital city and public service salaries, Page had an unusually broad and 
strong sense of direction.  Despite Graham later calling Page’s speeches 
“rambling and disorganised”, they read well in Hansard and helped make him 
the effective leader of debate on many national issues.  His speech to the 
House of 7 April 1921 in response to the Massy-Greene tariff is a good 
example of his pushing discussion in new directions.  He only briefly addressed 
the agricultural marketing and trade issues then preoccupying most of his 
colleagues, saying more about amenities in the countryside that would aid 
decentralisation, targeted tariffs to support selected industries, “thoroughly 
comprehensive power schemes throughout the Continent”, railway freight rates 
that were constricting industry in country towns, the “degeneration and ill-
health” of city dwellers, greater constitutional powers for the Commonwealth 
and “subdividing the present big states.”92  Although cautiously worded by 
Page to match his status as the new leader of his party, this speech is highly 
reminiscent of the expansive national vision of his August 1917 speech.  
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Regionalism and decentralisation: the basis of Page’s vision 
 
Page during this first term in parliament expressed his policy persona 
foremostly through his commitment to regionalism and decentralisation.  The 
shift of industry and population away from big cities, and the related 
regionalisation of government structures, remained his most fundamental policy 
goals after he had been elevated to leadership of the Country Party.  This was 
far more than an incarnation of the yeomanry-closer settlement ideal that 
already had a long history in Australia.  Summarising his case for new states in 
1924, Page said that the “higher civic spirit” arising from giving people 
“complete power of controlling their own local development” would “provide 
opportunities for the mobilisation of the local knowledge of local resources 
which do not exist under the present large states of Australia.”93  He stressed 
that this should not merely be an extension of existing local government, but 
rather the “creation of a new self-governing administration” not beholden to a 
distant capital city.94   
 
In presenting decentralisation and regionalism so ideally, Page was projecting 
his personal memories of the Grafton community onto the entire nation.  On 
new states, as on almost any given issue, Page had broader goals than most of 
his peers.  He treated each proposed new state, including northern New South 
Wales, as a possible step towards a nationwide network of self-governing 
bodies.  Most new staters were reacting to a specific local grievance and so 
sought a simple two-way breakup of their state to form a single new entity, such 
as a New England or a North Queensland.  Page signalled his preference for 
considerably smaller and multiple entities by his pointed use of such terms as 
“federal units”, “local subdivisions”, “provinces” or “small self-governing areas,” 
rather than new states.95  He also laced his statements on regionalism with 
populist references to how these new entities would relieve the “grossest 
                                                 
93 Page’s evidence to the Cohen Royal Commission, The New State in Northern New South 
Wales, Resources, Finance, Government: Statement of the Case, Northern New State 
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94 Ibid., p. 26. 
95 See for example Page’s August 1917 speech, p. 3, his article in the Daily Examiner of 16 
February 1918, p. 3, and his 1919 election speech as reported in the Daily Examiner of 23 
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extravagance both in national and State affairs”, such as through leaner local 
legislatures.96  Page’s regionalist and decentralist vision animated much else 
that he pressed for as a new parliamentarian, including hydroelectricity and 
constitutional reform.   
 
Page was also an early advocate of a link between decentralisation and the 
provision of the social amenities and infrastructure needed to sustain rural 
populations.  He drew on fresh memories of country doctoring in arguing that 
the difficulty of retaining settlers on the land was as much due to lack of basic 
facilities as to the failure to pay a fair price for their produce.  In his first term in 
parliament, he portrayed railways as much as hydroelectricity as the foremost 
means of easing “the monotony and drudgery of country life”, drawing on his 
observations in North America.97  Occasionally his decentralist ponderings slid 
into tantalising dalliances with yet wider concepts of social reorganisation.  
Responding to the left-wing Labor MP Michael Considine in November 1920, 
Page said he would be willing to experiment with agricultural communes “in 
some remote corner of the Commonwealth.”98   
 
Unusually amongst federal parliamentarians of his time, Page welcomed plans 
for Canberra as providing a model for decentralisation based on small cities.99  
Conversely, he saw centralisation in big cities as the root of much evil, and was 
prepared to state this bluntly.  E.C. Mumford, Secretary of the Taxpayers’ 
Association of New South Wales, must have been taken aback by a Page letter 
of February 1921 informing him that “your Association will never get anywhere 
except it starts at the root of the problem, and the fundamental difference which 
has caused Australian development to lead to the possession of a series of 
states in which the capital is practically one-half of the total, is due, in my 
opinion, to the operation, first, of the unwieldy size of the states, which 
contributes most largely to the development of the professional politician, and 
                                                 
96 Daily Examiner of 23 October 1919, p. 3. 
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the embarkation into government enterprises which gives to that politician 
enormous and uncontrolled patronage at his disposal.”100     
 
This all amounted to a remarkable personal vision of Australian governance 
cast in spatial terms to achieve social and economic ends.  There are three 
intertwined specific themes here – decentralisation, the nationwide 
regionalisation of governance and the creation of new states.  Although the first 
two are the more fundamental, with new states essentially Page’s means to 
them, new statism was his second most important political platform during his 
early years in parliament after the Country Party itself.  New statism was also 
vitally helpful to the early Country Party which, lacking its own strong formal 
organisation, drew upon this and related rural-based civic movements.   
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From a twenty-first century perspective, the new state cause may seem 
outlandish.  Yet in the early 1920s, it was a highly emotive issue that drew on a 
mix of intellectual and popular support.  V.C Thompson’s New State Magazine 
ran maps of the nation divided into an array of new states and territories, and 
cartoons portraying each big Australian city as an overweight toff sporting a top 
hat and large cigar (perhaps influenced by Labor Party iconography).101  
Advocates drew on long-standing resentment of the urban concentration of 
public works and social services.  Such resentments have been said to be 
typical of new areas of European settlement that were yet to consolidate a 
political compact between country and city, and in Australia reflected also the 
internal diversity of the larger states.102  The political scientist R.S. Parker saw 
the demand for new states as “practically unique” to Australia due to the 
sharpness of the contrast between a few big cities and a sparsely settled 
countryside.103  Also, Australia’s system of governance has long accorded only 
a minor role to local councils as against that of the metropolitan-based state 
governments.    
 
Since Page saw new states as steps towards Australia-wide regionalism, he 
encouraged advocates to campaign as a united movement working to a 
national agenda – “the new state movement is not a local movement”, he said 
in June 1924.104  Supporters of a national approach were usually policy-
orientated intellectuals such as Bland, and the barrister and constitutional 
lawyer John Latham.  Most accounts of new state movements portray them as 
products of commonplace resentments about government resources, thereby 
underplaying the deeper reasoning of thinkers like Page.  New statism was also 
a major basis of early challenges to the fundamental wisdom of the Constitution 
of the still young Commonwealth.   
 
There was considerable variation in the strength of specific new state 
movements.  When Page entered public life the best organised was that in his 
native northern New South Wales.  It remained so over the next several 
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decades, perhaps not coincidentally given his strategic leadership.  (It was 
often called the New England movement, although it included the north coastal 
region).  Similar movements persisted, to varying degrees, in the Riverina, the 
Monaro, western New South Wales, and central and northern Queensland.  
New statism was weaker in the more compact Victoria and Tasmania: and in 
South Australia and Western Australia it was constrained by the paucity of 
population outside the capital cities.  (Exceptions were short-lived movements 
on the Western Australian goldfields in the 1890s and later in the state’s 
southwest).  
 
Decentralisation, regionalisation and new statism together form a long, complex 
story that waxed and waned throughout Page’s career.  While a true believer, 
he nevertheless was prepared to suspend his new state campaigning 
whenever he saw little hope and needed to instead give priority to the Country 
Party’s coalition with its urban-based partner.  But his personal commitment 
never dissipated, signalled by the alacrity with which he would seize an 
opportunity when success appeared feasible.  In the early 1920s, as the 
Country Party exerted political power for the first time, new states seemed 
likely.  There emerged two main schools of thought on reorganising 
governance to implement regionalism.  One proposed a unitary system under 
which all sovereign power would lie with a national government that delegated 
authority to regional governmental units at its own pleasure.  But new state 
advocates invariably favoured a truly federal system in which sovereign 
regional entities were guaranteed a high degree of autonomy.  They were very 
conscious of the distinction between regionalism that enabled local political 
control, and a nominal regionalisation based on a top-down system that merely 
delegated to regions.  Page agreed that it was critically important that regions 
have sufficient authority to guide their own development, without being 
countermanded by a distant city-based government.  
 
Page welcomed support for his cause from whatever source, including from 
across the party divide.  The ALP rivalled the early Country Party in perceiving 
deficiencies in Australian federalism, but with the fundamental difference of 
proposing a national government fully empowered to implement the ALP’s 
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wider programme.  From 1918 the replacement of state governments with 
regional authorities beholden to the Commonwealth featured at ALP 
conferences.  In 1920 the ALP issued a pamphlet dividing Australia (with 
Papua-New Guinea) into 31 provincial legislatures, all entirely dependent on 
the national government for revenue.105  Labor support was thus of limited use 
to most bona fide new staters.  Yet Page managed both to condemn the ALP 
proposals as supporting unification of the wrong sort and to welcome them as 
an affirmation of his own views.  In a November 1920 letter to the Daily 
Examiner he cast them as indicating “a widespread awakening to the necessity 
shown by our new state propaganda of alterations of the present state 
boundaries.”106   
 
Page’s regionalism and decentralisation raised obvious tensions which 
detracted from his effectiveness as an advocate.  Foremost was his continued 
insistence on a strong central government and consequent difficulty in defining 
a suitable balance with his autonomous federal units.  In his maiden speech to 
parliament in March 1920, Page proposed the Commonwealth’s “complete 
control of all national activities”, only to be queried by a Labor interjector as to 
why he didn’t support outright unification.107  For decades, Page’s stance has 
understandably long puzzled scholars.  In 1950, R.S. Neale miscast him as 
being close to the ALP’s stance on a strong central government that delegated 
to regions.108  In 2005, A.J. Brown commented that the August 1917 speech 
illustrated “the mysterious way in which Earle Page held to both unification and 
new states as a goal.”109  
Characteristically, Page was not overly troubled by this evident contradiction.  A 
strong central government suited his deep-seated wish to impose his own 
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agenda.  Page’s attempts to resolve this were only stated in the broadest of 
terms.  In October 1923 he spoke to a new state convention in Rockhampton of 
a national government that was “able to plan, but will not be able to execute the 
details of the plan”, and by concentrating purely on “high policy” would leave 
“the spade work of development and settlement” to “local self-governing 
authorities.”110  Whether Earle Page – schemer, planner, driver – would in 
practice have sat back in a national government to give local authorities such 
freedom remains moot.   
 
Demands for new states recurred over decades, suggesting a long term 
underpinning of regional and community sentiment that intellectual activists like 
Page, Drummond, Thompson and Ellis could draw on.  Even if new states were 
always improbable, the considerable emotional energy they were capable of 
generating reflected some deep-seated perennials of Australian life – rural 
protest based on a keen sense of equality in entitlement, awareness of the 
burden of geographic isolation, local patriotism, and ready assumptions about a 
nexus between politics and economic development.  This all gave Page a 
receptive platform outside the political mainstream for most of his career.  But 
he was to face a major challenge in his attempts during the 1920s and early 
1930s to unite inherently localised new state activism into a nationwide force 
capable of establishing his federal units across Australia.  Even Page, with his 
unique standing amongst new state activists as a major national figure, would 
remain strongly identified with the northeast of New South Wales.   
 
Page’s national leadership of new statism: his rallying cause 1920-23 
 
The early 1920s were the heyday of new statism, providing Page as a rising 
new MP with a ready rallying point for attempting to instil his spatial concepts of 
regionalism and decentralisation into national policy.  The issue passed through 
two distinct stages: a strong revival in 1920-23 associated with the emergence 
of the Country Party, but then unexpected failure before the 1924-25 Cohen 
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Royal Commission into new states that was convened by the New South Wales 
government.  Against a background of continuing anxiety about accelerating 
urbanisation – the Australian metropolitan population grew by over 37 per cent 
between 1921 and 1933, the rural by 20 per cent and the urban provincial by a 
mere 8 per cent – energetic new proponents vied amongst themselves and with 
Page for attention.111 
 
Page’s home region of northern New South Wales became the nation’s driver 
of new statism.  Although the movement claimed to be non-political, it was 
clearly strongly linked to the upper echelons of the Country Party.  In addition to 
Page, prominent supporters included Drummond (a Progressive and Country 
Party MLA 1920-49, and MHR for New England 1949-63), Michael Bruxner (a 
Progressive and Country Party MLA 1920-62, and party leader 1922-25 and 
1932-58), P.P. Abbott (Country Party MHR for New England 1913-19 and a 
Senator 1925-29), Thompson (Country Party MHR for New England 1922-40) 
and Sommerlad (a Country Party MLC 1932-52).  Thompson’s organisational 
contribution shifted the movement’s hub towards his home town of Tamworth.  
In January 1920 he published a series of newspaper articles on new states that 
later appeared as a booklet with a foreword by Page.112  In March 1920 a New 
State Press League was established at a local newspaper conference 
Thompson organised at Glen Innes.113  Two months later, an estimated over 
5,000 people attended the inauguration of the campaign in Tamworth called by 
the local council.114  At Glen Innes in August, the Tamworth and Inverell New 
State Leagues formed a united Northern New State Movement, with Abbott as 
president and Thompson as General Secretary.115  Thompson took temporary 
leave from editing the Northern Daily Leader to devote himself full time to the 
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cause and personally produced New State Magazine from July 1921 to June 
1923.116  
 
This all proved more durable than the short-lived 1915 Grafton-based 
movement.  New statism now had the dedicated Thompson active on the 
ground and the firm support of the local press, encompassing a larger, more 
viable region.  Perhaps too, it was propelled by the release of aspirations 
bottled up by the immense distraction of war.  Page spoke later of his entering 
parliament at a crucial “psychological moment to get results” when “the First 
World War was just over.”117  As major causes for the early Country Party, new 
statism and decentralisation briefly provided him with a more comfortable fit 
with his party peers than at any other stage of his career.   
 
Page provided new statism with strategic leadership.  New State Magazine, to 
which Page contributed the foreword to the inaugural issue, records how he 
tried to rally the new state faithful across the nation, such as by addressing the 
May 1921 meeting of the Riverina movement and travelling on to Western 
Australia that same year.118  He was not alone in this nationwide proselytising – 
Thompson accompanied him to Queensland, Drummond went to the Riverina 
and Bruxner travelled to Western Australia – but Page held a unique status as 
leader of the federal Country Party.119  New statism also enlivened Page’s 
public jousting with the Prime Minister.  Unable to get the existing states to act, 
Page and other activists turned to trying to amend section 124 of the 
Constitution to shift the decisive say on new states from state parliaments to a 
local referendum.  Over 1920-22 the parliamentary Country Party called 
repeatedly for a constitutional convention as a prelude to a referendum on this 
at the 1922 election.  Page wanted every state divided into four electorates that 
would each provide three convention delegates, thereby producing a northern 
New South Wales delegation.120   
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Prime Minister Hughes promised action, then dallied.  In November 1921 his 
government introduced a bill for the election of convention delegates from 
House of Representatives seats, but withdrew this following strong and varying 
objections from MPs of all three major parties.  During a May 1922 visit to 
Grafton, Hughes flickeringly raised hopes by commenting that “if by a New 
State you mean the opportunity of helping yourselves I am with you to the end.”  
(His visit was cut short when he broke a collar bone riding and became Page’s 
patient).121  But two months later Hughes concluded that the Commonwealth 
could not act ahead of state government support.122  This reversal contributed 
decisively to Page’s determination following the 1922 election to remove 
Hughes from office.  
 
The new state movement benefitted greatly from the growing public reputation 
of the new member for Cowper.  Although Thompson remained prime 
organiser, he never matched Page as a strategist or as the most prominent 
new stater.  This became central to public perceptions of Page.  The Sydney 
Sun in April 1920 dubbed him “the possible future Prime Minister of 
Pacifica.”123  Hancock in 1930 wrote of Page as “the apostle” of the new state 
movement.124  Other major political figures who engaged with new statism were 
dabblers by comparison.  Premier Ted Theodore of Queensland, for example, 
proposed in 1922 the creation of new states but only after unification had been 
achieved, in line with ALP policy.125  (There was a parliamentary consensus in 
Queensland that the state was too big, but less agreement on how to rectify 
this).  A few prominent non-parliamentary figures, such as the Anglican Bishop 
Radford of Goulburn, approached Page’s breadth of vision, but lacked his 
persistence and national profile.126  There are hints of tension over Page’s 
prominence, such as a short but sharp reference in New State Magazine to his 
not being part of the movement’s rank and file.127  Thompson publicly attributed 
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the formation of the Northern New State Movement to the efforts of his 
newspaper, and pointedly referred to Page as instead covering the federal 
parliament.128  Page in any case preferred proselytising and high-level political 
manoeuvring to the tedious detail of organising and fundraising.   
 
Page’s strategic role included an ambitious attempt to organise a national new 
state movement.  This was first seriously signalled at the April 1921 convention 
of the northern New South Wales movement at Armidale, which attracted 
delegates from afar as central Queensland and Albany in Western Australia.129  
Page took a leading role at the important All Australian New States Convention 
of July 1922 held at Albury.  This was the first time that new state enthusiasts 
had met on an expressly national basis and was used by Page to endorse a 
broad strategy.  Delegates came from northern New South Wales, the Riverina, 
Queensland and the Western Australian goldfields.  Organisations present also 
reflected intellectual interest in decentralisation, and included the 
Decentralisation League of Victoria, the Australian Legion (a Melbourne-based 
body that endorsed the Country Party and counted Latham as a member) and 
the Sydney-based Australian New States League.130   
 
Page led the convention’s discussions on strategy.  As a constitutional 
convention was now in doubt, he proposed that all new state organisations 
bring the issue before their respective state parliaments so as to test the 
possibility of success under section 124.  The anticipated negative results 
would clear the way for seeking a referendum to shift the basis of approval to 
local votes.131  But Page was not in full control of proceedings.  His proposal 
that a preliminary convention of “skilled technical advisers” produce tabulated 
data prior to any constitutional convention was defeated, presumably for fear of 
delegates being effectively sidelined.  (A heavy reliance on data was a feature 
of much of Page’s new state proselytising).  The conference appointed Page 
and nine others to the Executive of a new All-Australia New States Movement, 
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with Page as President.132  This body seems to have come to little, but the 
Albury convention did help spark debate that led to the only occasion that the 
New South Wales parliament endorsed a new state.  In September 1922 it 
agreed to a motion moved by Bruxner supporting a northern new state, but only 
after the Nationalist Secretary for Mines and Forests F.A. Chaffey, a new state 
sympathiser from the state’s north, had it amended to shift its focus to the 
federal government and the still hoped-for constitutional convention.133   
 
The wider Northern New South Wales Movement attached greater importance 
than did Page to building what Thompson dubbed “a people’s movement.”134  It 
circulated petitions, organised public meetings and tried to build a hierarchical 
structure around a central executive, district councils and local leagues.135  By 
October 1921, 197 local leagues had been created.136  But popular support 
fluctuated with specific local grievances.  Protest such as over the lack of a 
Tablelands to north coast railway provided too narrow a base to sustain interest 
in an entire new state.137  In 1921 a petition expected to gather about 200,000 
signatures instead managed an estimated 30,000-40,000.138  A 1922 appeal to 
raise £25,000 for a fighting fund generated less than £500.139  The number of 
local leagues had dwindled to 12 by March 1923, evidently as they had long 
since served their immediate purpose of electing delegates to the northern New 
South Wales movement’s 1921 Armidale convention.140   
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Page creates a power base: forging the coalition with the Nationalists  
 
The 1922-23 creation of a coalition between the Country Party and the ruling 
Nationalists raised Page’s hopes of re-ordering the nation and elevated him to 
the forefront of government.  Page played a decisive role in this, which as a 
lasting feature of Australian politics alone secures for him an important place in 
political history.  It also earned him a unique standing within the Country Party 
by identifying him with a political strategy that helped ensure its long-term 
survival.   
 
Page early sensed an opportunity to benefit from Nationalist Party disunity.  He 
signalled to its growing anti-Hughes element the possibility of a mutually 
productive alliance.  In mid-1922 he spoke of how the Nationalists’ “more sober 
element was getting very tired of the thinly disguised socialism and the 
theatrical posturing and extravagance of the Prime Minister,” and that “the 
Country Party must with the assistance of some party whose ideals were 
framed on the same lines, get into power, otherwise the Commonwealth 
Parliament would decay and would not rise to its destiny.”141 
 
Although Page was central to the creation of a coalition at the national level, he 
was more chief proponent than originator of this strategy.  There was a 
precedent at the Commonwealth level in the form of the Reid-McLean Ministry 
of 1904-05 that shared out portfolios between Free Traders and 
Protectionists.142  The Western Australian Country Party joined into an anti-
labour coalition as early as June 1917.  Federally, Hughes suggested a 
coalition in November 1921 in the wake of the parliamentary vote on the budget 
that nearly toppled him, the core of a wider offer that also proposed massive 
cuts to Commonwealth expenditure.143  In September 1922 the President of the 
Western Australian Primary Producers’ Association (formerly the FSA), Alex 
Monger, became the first Country Party leader to propose specific terms for the 
Country Party’s willingness to continue in coalition.  This included demands that 
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Country Party representation in Cabinet be proportional to its numerical 
strength in parliament, and that it hold all portfolios directly affecting primary 
industries.144   
 
Hughes again offered a federal coalition in the run up to the December 1922 
election.  This election resulted in the Country Party winning 14 seats to the 
Nationalists’ 26.  The Nationalists lost their tenuous parliamentary majority and 
the Country Party now clearly held the balance of power.  Page set terms for a 
coalition that insisted on a separate identity for the Country Party and such a 
“distribution of portfolios as will give the Country Party power as great as its 
responsibility.”145  The Nationalists appointed a negotiating team of six that 
included Hughes and Stanley Bruce.  Page was one of three Country Party 
negotiators, but his own account makes clear that the negotiations were largely 
his own show.  Ellis later wrote that Page “regretted” being unable to consult all 
Country Party members.146   
 
Actively assisting the Country Party in these manoeuvrings was John Latham, 
who had just been elected as an Independent Union Liberal MP.  Latham 
attended Country Party caucus meetings, primarily as he could not on personal 
and policy grounds countenance sitting as a Nationalist while Hughes, who he 
had unhappily accompanied at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, still held 
office (a further indicator of the early Country Party’s openness).  Page recalled 
him as “more than an honoured guest for over a year”, who provided “the 
benefit of his practical wisdom and his sage legal advice.”147  Ellis noted in his 
history of the party that its correspondence at this time owed much to “Latham’s 
clarity of style and forceful expression.”148  This included drafting in January 
1923 the party’s terms for a coalition, which insisted on the removal of Hughes 
from the ministry.  Latham only joined the Nationalists in November 1925 and 
became Attorney-General the following month.  He continued to advise on the 
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constitutional dimensions of new states, not to mention serving as Opposition 
leader in 1929-31 and subsequently as Chief Justice of the High Court.  
Page negotiated for a coalition in the face of colleagues’ fears of absorption by 
the Nationalists.  After Hughes conceded his resignation, Page proceeded to 
deal directly with Bruce, the start of a working relationship that became central 
to Page’s career.149  Bruce had only been a minister since December 1921 
when he was unexpectedly appointed Treasurer.  Prior to entering parliament 
he was managing director of a Melbourne importing firm.  As a wounded 
veteran – of the British army at Gallipoli – he made such an impression at 
recruitment meetings that the Nationalists invited him to stand for Flinders.  It 
transpired that one of Bruce’s major strengths was the contrast that his 
measured, stately demeanour presented to Hughes’ intensity and 
abrasiveness.  The broad compatibility of Bruce’s and Page’s views on national 
development was also to be important, as detailed in chapter four. 
 
Over 5-6 February 1923, the two leaders reached agreement on a coalition that 
become known as the Bruce-Page government.  The Country Party caucus 
belatedly met three days later, and Page came under attack for not consulting it 
earlier.  Two members later told the House that they had not wanted a coalition, 
but the parliamentary party satisfied itself with a motion on maintaining its 
identity.150  Party opposition to a coalition reflected fear of suffering a loss of 
autonomy, as had some state parties such as in Queensland.151  Just fourteen 
months earlier, the Progressive Party in New South Wales had split over the 
issue of coalition with the state Nationalists.  But serious protest was mainly 
confined to the resolutely nonaligned VFU.152  Page countered that the terms of 
the coalition clearly provided for a distinct Country Party – indeed, this was their 
first article.  It was clear Page had secured a very good deal indeed, which 
gave the Country Party five out of eleven ministerial positions.  As Graham later 
wrote, “nothing showed his skill in leadership as much as his efforts, in the 
months following the formation of the coalition, to persuade the Country Party 
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movement to accept it.”153  Caucus and its attendant farmers’ organisations 
effectively gave Page a clear hand to run high strategy and policy.  This forging 
of the coalition is further affirmation of Page’s resolve to achieve substantial 
change, not just to lead a marginal protest party.  “We were determined to use 
our opportunities to the full,” he later said.154  As it became clear that the 
coalition constituted a balanced formula for maintaining the Country Party’s 
independence while giving it great political influence, state country parties 
began exploring coalitions of their own, notably the New South Wales 
Progressives.  Victoria remained the exception, where VFU radicals challenged 
the coalition concept for years to come.155  
 
Transition to a Bruce-Page coalition proceeded smoothly.  Page’s choice of 
Treasury for himself probably reflected the priority the party gave to reining in 
public expenditure (and was one of the portfolios he sought for his party when 
Hughes mooted a coalition fifteen months earlier.156)  In his first speech to the 
House as Treasurer, he stressed the need for the government “by its handling 
of the finances and by its general administration…to improve the public credit in 
order to permit of the conversion on the best possible basis for Australia of the 
huge war loans that are to fall due during the ordinary life of this parliament.”157   
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Page’s role over the next six and a half years as Treasurer and de facto Deputy 
Prime Minister gave him a say in most major decisions of the Bruce-Page 
government.  His conventional budgetary responsibilities were among the least 
distinctive of his achievements.  There was little sense of fiscal policy during 
this period.  Governments did not feel that they could readily reduce 
unemployment, and public expectations were correspondingly limited.  Page’s 
budget speeches were “more like a Chairman’s address to the annual meeting 
of a large public company than the nation’s principal document on economic 
policy.”158  John Nethercote has nonetheless noted that Page was the first 
Commonwealth Treasurer to introduce budgets on a regular basis and early in 
the financial year, and also improved the form of budget papers.159  Page 
himself said that previously budget items had been largely lumped together into 
uninformative totals, with the result that “public criticisms tended to be directed 
towards the total amount rather than to the diverse items”, which was “not 
conducive to intelligent public surveillance of government expenditures.”160  
 
Page’s first budgets reflected his oft-stated commitment to smaller government 
and relief from taxes, especially for primary producers.  (In 1921 he had called 
deficit budgeting “a Rake’s Progress”).161  They provided for reductions to land 
and company taxes, a single collecting agency for Commonwealth and state 
income taxes, a higher income tax exemption level, an expanded averaging 
system for income tax on primary producers (helping them manage profit and 
loss fluctuations), widened deductions for farm improvements and pest control, 
reduced postage charges and the establishment of an investment fund to 
finance the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR, created in 
1926 to replace the ineffective Institute of Science and Industry).162  In his first 
budget speech as Treasurer he added the need for a national insurance 
scheme when he described existing welfare as failing to “remove that sense of 
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cruel insecurity which haunts great masses of our people through the whole of 
their life — the fear that accident or temporary sickness may break up their 
home, the continual fear of unemployment due to causes entirely beyond their 
control, and finally the fear of a destitute old age after a life of toil."163  National 
insurance was to feature later in Page’s parliamentary career, at the end of 
both the Bruce-Page and the Lyons governments. 
 
``Page drew on his policy visions to become the first Commonwealth Treasurer 
to explore the wider possibilities of this office.  One important initiative was 
banking reform to work towards creation of a central bank “with power to 
control and save shaky banks and restore them to solvency without destruction 
of their customers”, an echo of Page’s childhood experience of the 1893 bank 
smash.164  In his October 1922 election policy speech he had spoken of 
creating an independent board for the Commonwealth Bank that would reorient 
it towards supporting national development, especially rural projects including 
hydroelectricity and the provision of rural credits to primary producers.165  
Legislation in 1924 placed the Commonwealth Bank under such a board and 
empowered it to fix and publish its discount rate.  This was just a first step 
towards a central bank, especially as it was not made a compulsory depositor 
bank for private institutions.  After a study trip to North America in 1925, Page 
created a rural credits department within the Commonwealth Bank to provide 
low interest loans to primary producers on the security of their produce.166   
Page remained an advocate of an independent Commonwealth Bank, later 
opposing the Labor Treasurer Theodore’s 1931 legislation to assert political 
control over the Bank by selling off its gold reserve to meet government 
debts.167  
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For all the rural development rhetoric that characterised the Bruce-Page years, 
the Country Party from the outset found it politically difficult to cut tariffs that 
increased the costs of manufactures used by farmers.  Various marketing 
crises and a reluctant acceptance that tariffs were here to stay led the Bruce-
Page government to implement an array of subsidies and pricing schemes for 
rural producers.  Despite his reservations about industry support by 
government, Page famously said that primary producers needed to “get into the 
vicious circle themselves” and seek direct protection.  It is less well-known that 
in the 1924 speech in which he appears to have first used this phrase before a 
major audience he also spoke at length about other means of aiding primary 
producers, including better marketing of exports, collaboration to end “suicidal 
competition” on export markets, new power sources and standardising 
manufacturing to reduce costs.168  The political benefits of “protection all 
round”, as it became known, were accepted as a means of reconciling urban 
and rural interests at a time that Country Party support was essential to the 
government’s survival.  Over 1923-24 new legislation provided for dairy 
produce and dried fruit export control boards made up of government nominees 
and growers’ representatives, government-arranged bank advances to dried 
fruit growers, an Australian Meat Council, bounties on beef and cattle exports, 
government guarantee of bank advances to voluntary wheat pools, and for a 
specific advance to the Tasmanian hop growers pool.169   
 
One ALP Senator observed of all this that “having a medical man in the 
ministry, the government is dealing out small doses of socialism – say a half-
teaspoonful every twenty-four hours.”  Country Party members admitted a 
certain parallel, but rationalised such orderly marketing as a regrettable 
necessity that compensated for the tariffs and arbitration that served urban 
interests.  Even Stewart referred to how “we are compelled to accept the 
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results of their system and hop into the ring to secure our share along with the 
rest.”170  But this public-private symbiosis was predicated on private ownership 
of the means of production: Page remained a stalwart opponent of state 
enterprises and the nationalisation of industry.   
 
Beyond his direct responsibilities as Treasurer and involvement in orderly 
marketing, Page used his political status in the coalition to pursue his more 
personal vision of the nation.  How he asserted himself on other such policy 
fronts during the Bruce-Page government forms the focus of the remainder of 
this chapter and of the three that follow it.   
 
The Bruce-Page government signals its intentions: Commonwealth-state 
co-operation 
 
Page took his place in the new Bruce-Page ministry in February 1923 
determined to reform the federal system and the Constitution.  As he wrote in 
an early draft of his memoirs:  
 
In the first decade [after Federation] parliamentary activity was largely 
devoted to the formal initiation of the constitutional provisions by the 
establishment of the practical framework.  In the second ten years 
parliament, dominated by the necessities of war, operated for the most 
significant period under the defence powers of the Constitution in the 
process of which significant weaknesses were revealed by experience.  
It therefore fell to the parliament in the third decade to profit from the 
experience of the previous periods and to apply the lessons learned in 
an effort to make the Constitution work in the manner visualised by the 
architects of the Federal system.171  
 
Bruce and Page were Australia’s first national leaders to grapple 
comprehensively with co-ordinating policy with the states and the related 
correction of unbalanced fiscal relations.  Their efforts reflect the tensions 
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arising from an inelastic constitution that inspires developmentalist policy-
makers to try either to change it or manoeuvre around it.  In doing so, Page 
worked under his Prime Minister’s leadership, but still distinguished himself as 
a determined strategist with a discernible agenda of his own.  He was to learn 
wider lessons from his experience that he applied to many later ventures into 
co-operative federalism and economic planning.  
 
Page, a self-declared “lifelong advocate of constitutional reform,” once claimed 
to have also been “spurred into Federal politics by my interest in the principles 
of Federation”, including his belief that such issues as electrification and 
transport could only be “dealt with on a Federal or interstate level, and by a 
process of constructive national thinking.”172  Federal ideas have deep roots in 
Australia’s past but as scholars of federalism have long observed, the 
Commonwealth-state balance has never been settled.173  Page entered this 
debate as the leading proponent of the view that the federal system and the 
Constitution on which it was based were barriers to national development and 
so needed to be reformed.  This led him as Treasurer to pursue co-operative 
federalism, with the Commonwealth leading the development of national 
policies in collaboration the states, but using its fiscal and other powers to 
remain firmly dominant. 
 
Page considered himself a committed federalist.  He described the classic 
series of American essays on constitutional federalism The Federalist Papers 
as his “constant companion” (and saw it as pointing to a model of a united 
British Empire that drew on federal principles).174  Here he was reflecting a long 
tradition of what Brian Galligan describes as a “compound republic”, which 
“added the natural advantages of largeness to the local advantages of 
smallness.”  The effective dual citizenship that this provides of respective states 
and of the nation helps explain federalism’s strength in Australia.175  That 
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federalism made the Australian nation possible by reconciling local loyalties 
with nationalism makes it a vital concept in Australian history, one that is 
illuminated by Page’s policy campaigns. 
 
Much of the secondary material on the history of Australian federalism consists 
of detailed technical accounts of Commonwealth-state financial relations, with 
only fleeting references to competing ideas and political drivers.  Co-operative 
federalism appears frequently as a broad term encompassing various means 
by which Commonwealth and state governments jointly managed overlapping 
interests.  In 1952 the political scientist S.R. Davis observed that Australia’s 
rich history of such co-operation attracted less scholarly interest than had inter-
governmental conflict.176  This has not greatly changed.  W.G. McMinn added 
that the various co-operative mechanisms that appeared over time became 
important means of effectively limiting the states’ power and increasing that of 
the Commonwealth.  He listed four types of co-operation: use of state or 
Commonwealth bodies to implement the other’s programs; joint agencies such 
as the River Murray Commission; the pooling of legislation, such as to create a 
national aviation regime; and more informal executive co-operation through 
bodies such as the Australian Agricultural Council.177  
 
Staring in the Bruce-Page years, Page was to play a major role in the 
development of such co-operative mechanisms.  The Constitution’s lack of 
provision for collaboration between the two main levels of government left a 
gap that he sought to fill by institutionalising means by which they could 
together develop national policies – effectively forms of nationwide 
planning.  This was also his way of attempting to drive policy fields over which 
the Commonwealth lacked constitutional authority.  An outline of early 
measures to encourage inter-governmental co-operation reads like a roll-call of 
initiatives that he either led or contributed significantly to, most famously the 
Financial Agreement of 1927 that realigned Commonwealth-state financial 
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relations and gave the Loan Council binding status.  Page had a major hand in 
negotiating this arrangement, a career highlight which influenced his wider 
approach to federalism and constitutional reform.  More specialised co-
operative bodies also appeared under the Bruce-Page government and in 
following years, covering fields as diverse as food and drug standards, 
immigration, road construction and primary produce marketing.   
 
An important contextual consideration here is that despite the difficulty of 
amending the Constitution, during Page’s career it was decidedly not a revered 
document.  Throughout his Bruce-Page heyday it still lacked any claim to have 
been especially successful by virtue of longevity.  It attracted strident criticism 
for not preventing vertical fiscal imbalance, which Page saw as working against 
the responsible use of public funds by its separation of revenue-raising from 
expenditure.  He had no qualms about correcting this and other anomalies, 
thereby “making the constitutions of our states and Commonwealth our 
servants and not our masters.”178  To him, the Commonwealth Constitution was 
at once a feckless impediment to progress and a potential basis for enshrining 
his policies.  Either way, he frequently found himself pushing against what was 
already part of the received wisdom of Australian governance – that the 
wording of the Constitution is very hard indeed to change.  
 
Also significant was the strength of what the political scientist Hugh Emy called 
“the federal bargain” – Australia’s “sine qua non of political co-operation and 
even of political integration.”179  This holds that all Australian governments are 
formally equal in status and sovereign in nature, and has proved highly 
resistant to unilateral challenge.  Instances of the Commonwealth and the 
states working together, such as on orderly marketing, were thus necessary 
political accommodations, not the results of preference.180  Page was one of 
the first prominent political figures outside the ALP to challenge openly this 
federal bargain.  Despite his protestations to the contrary, Page was never a 
true federalist who equally respected both tiers of government.  As he had 
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clearly stated in 1917, the national government should be dominant in setting 
policy.  He approached federalism as at best a means of combining nationally 
determined policy settings with local expertise in implementation.  This tension 
between the rational importance he attached to strong central government and 
his emotional attachment to regionalism persisted throughout his long 
engagement with issues of federalism. 
 
Page’s national perspective was made stridently clear in his early public 
statements as Treasurer, no doubt to the unease of his new state confreres.  
Just five months after becoming Treasurer, he told the new state convention in 
Rockhampton that as Federation had failed there was a need for an “intense 
NATIONAL FEELING that will over-ride all parochial considerations, disregard 
the existence of imaginary state boundaries, and prevent the continuation of 
that system of pitting one capital city against another, which has proved so 
detrimental to the BALANCED AND PROPORTIONATE DEVELOPMENT of 
Australia as a whole.”181  Yet most published assessments of Page underplay 
this commitment to strong national government via such means as 
collaboration with the states and instead focus in isolation on his engagement 
with new statism.  Geoffrey Sawer very plausibly suggested that most Country 
Party MPs opposed Page’s proposed constitutional convention as they felt that 
what he really wanted was greater Commonwealth powers.  Sawer and A.J. 
Brown are among the few historians to have concluded that Page was 
essentially a centralist.182   
 
In office, just a few years after his 1917 call to scrap entirely the existing 
constitution, Page found himself advocating co-operation between the states 
and the Commonwealth. The Bruce-Page government tried to pioneer a move 
away from change forced by High Court decision and the Commonwealth’s 
fiscal power by offering a voluntary alternative based on Commonwealth-led 
co-operative federalism.  This broadly matched Page’s developing ideas on 
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unification and national approaches to policy, and was one of the reasons why 
he and Bruce worked well together.   
 
Debate on Commonwealth-state relations during the Bruce-Page years initially 
centred on the fiscal balance.  The Commonwealth’s wartime introduction of its 
own direct taxation resulted in the states’ collective share of all government 
revenue tumbling from 93 per cent in 1901-02 to 55 per cent in 1918-19.183  
Commonwealth expenditure declined after the war, and many federal 
parliamentarians advocated eliminating the heightened vertical fiscal imbalance 
that resulted by ending the per capita grants still being made to the states.  
Bruce and Page both strongly ascribed to the widespread view that such 
imbalance weakened accountability and democratic controls over all 
governments concerned.184  Proposals to reform fiscal relations also included a 
co-operative council that would reduce the cost of loans by co-ordinating 
borrowing by both levels of government.  The Commonwealth had long 
favoured a measure along these lines and made it a condition of related 
proposals that it take over state debts.  At the Premiers’ Conference of April-
May 1908 Deakin had proposed a Finance Council under which the 
Commonwealth would arrange all loans, acquire the states’ debts and establish 
a debt sinking fund – all foreshadowing what Bruce and Page later 
implemented.185  The states were conflicted between being attracted to 
offloading their debts and their (well-founded) suspicion that co-ordinated 
borrowing would increase Commonwealth dominance.186 
 
The case for co-ordinated borrowing grew after the advent of peace in 1918.  
Australian governments resumed competing for loans locally and 
internationally, the Commonwealth sought to convert old loans into new 
obligations as a means of servicing war debt, and the states wanted to finance 
                                                 
183 Nicholas Brown, op. cit., p. 409.  
184 Russell Matthews, Revenue Sharing in Federal Systems, Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1980, p. 11.   
185 R.S. Gilbert, The Australian Loan Council in Federal Fiscal Adjustments, 1890-1965, 
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1973, p. 37.  S.R. Davis records a Loan 
Council as being proposed as early as 1903; see S.R. Davis, ‘A Unique Federal Institution’, 
University of Western Australia Annual Law Review, December 1952, p. 355.  
186 R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal Finance: Intergovernmental Financial Relations in 
Australia since Federation, Thomas Nelson (Australia), Melbourne, 1972, p. 105. 
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soldier settlement and public works.  Australia’s net external debt continued to 
rise, reaching £419 million in mid-1923 and £570 million in mid-1928, with the 
new debt largely related to rural development.187  The states were continually in 
deficit, as the real value of their per capita grants had been eroded by wartime 
inflation.188  The 1920-23 Royal Commission on Taxation recommended ending 
the per capita grants and all income tax being collected by the 
Commonwealth.189  
 
Leadership in intergovernmental co-operation, financial or otherwise, had by 
the early 1920s shifted to the Commonwealth.  This was driven by the 
imperatives of the war and the continuing centralism of Prime Minister Hughes, 
hence for example his government taking the initiative in convening the 1919 
Premiers’ Conference.190  Emphasis was moving from distinguishing between 
levels of government by policy area to a distinction based instead on different 
organisational functions in dealing with shared issues.  The Commonwealth 
began to assume a role as a central planner, especially of economic policy, 
with state governments handling implementation.   
 
The new Bruce-Page government almost at once sought to resolve these 
issues of federal finance and policy co-operation by asserting a leading role for 
the Commonwealth.  Bruce led and Page provided crucially important 
encouragement and support.  These efforts, says A.J. Brown, resulted in 
“Australia’s first real system of co-operative intergovernmental relations.”191  
The 1922 Premiers’ Conference, the last presided over by Hughes, had a 
comparatively limited agenda of proposed co-operation in uniform railway 
gauges (even then a decades-old issue), export promotion, immigration and 
land settlement.  The May 1923 Conference presided over by Bruce and Page 
was very different indeed.   
 
                                                 
187 Yule in Connor, Stanley and Yule, op. cit., p. 75. 
188 Ibid., pp. 102, 105-6; and Lee, op. cit., p. 72. 
189 R.C. Gates, “The Search for a State Growth Tax’, in R.L. Matthews, (ed.), Intergovernmental 
Relations in Australia, Angus and Robertson, Cremorne, 1974, pp. 165-6.   
190 Davis, ‘Co-operative Federalism in Retrospect’, op. cit., p. 221. 
191 Brown, ‘Subsidiarity or Subterfuge?’, op. cit., p. 37.  
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Its “number of proposals to secure national co-operation”, as Page rather 
casually described them in his memoirs, amounted to an attempt to 
comprehensively shape the Australian federation in a way compatible with what 
he had called for in 1917.192  The Premiers were presented with an 
unprecedentedly ambitious agenda for Commonwealth-led policy co-ordination 
in the form of a list of twenty-five major issues and an accompanying paper on 
each.  This included the co-ordination of government borrowing; the application 
of science to industry, notably hydropower; Commonwealth grants to the states 
for main road development; uniform railway gauges for the Port Augusta to Hay 
and Kyogle to Brisbane lines; rationalisation of industrial relations powers; joint 
electoral rolls; co-ordination of the collection of statistics; and (as detailed in 
chapter three) the planning and standardisation of electricity generation.193  
The Commonwealth also proposed an Australia-wide stocktake of economic 
resources to assess the capital and labour needed for “successful 
development.”194  It was clear that this was a very different Commonwealth 
government indeed, one set on enlisting the states in a radical rationalisation of 
the federation in the interests of nationally-managed economic development.  It 
saw no place for intergovernmental duplication and had a strong sense of 
national efficiency as both means and end.   
 
The May 1923 Premiers’ Conference also constituted the first attempt by the 
Bruce-Page government to overhaul Commonwealth-state financial relations.  
Bruce, in opening the Conference, signalled that this was the foremost issue 
and led for the Commonwealth throughout the ensuing conference debate.  He 
described existing duplication between the levels of government and double 
taxation as intolerable, “the gravest inconvenience to taxpayers.”  Page spoke 
late in proceedings, when his grasp of the proposed reforms – thorough and 
confident, despite his lack of ministerial experience – drew him into playing the 
leading role in sparring with the states on important details.195 
                                                 
192 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 176. 
193 A full set of agenda papers for this ‘Conference Between Commonwealth and State 
Ministers’ is at EPP, folder 1730; reports of proceedings are at folder 2663 part II.  See also 
accounts of the conference in the Argus, 24, 28, 29 and 30 May 1923. 
194 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration 1915-1940: A Study of Desperate Hopes, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 49. 
195 Argus, 26 May 1923, pp. 9, 21-2. 
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Negotiations soon became intense and complex.  Bruce and Page proposed to 
limit Commonwealth income tax to incomes of over £2,000 per annum in 
exchange for the abolition of the per capita grants.196  Although the states 
agreed that fiscal relations were out of kilter, they objected to this implied 
focusing of their own taxes on lower income earners.  They countered that the 
Commonwealth should instead withdraw from income tax altogether, and the 
states make compensating grants of their own to the Commonwealth – which 
Bruce and Page promptly declined because of continuing defence obligations.  
The Commonwealth’s final offer, to limit its direct tax to company tax while also 
abolishing the per capita payments, narrowly failed due to rejection by New 
South Wales.  The Premiers (except the Western Australian Premier) accepted 
only the joint collection by the states of Commonwealth and state taxes.197   
 
More significant was that the states agreed at this 1923 Conference to create a 
Loan Council, albeit a voluntary one limited to seeking agreement on the timing 
and terms of loans.  The raising of loans remained with each government, 
including decisions on amounts.198  (New South Wales withdrew from this Loan 
Council when Jack Lang became Premier in 1925, but re-joined in December 
1927 following his defeat).  This was the first practical step towards the 1927 
Financial Agreement and the recasting of the Loan Council as a more powerful 
entity that was to influence lastingly Page’s conception of co-operative 
federalism.   
 
Page’s sudden rise in national politics had drawn upon a matrix of issues: a 
civic element of organised protest via the early Country Party and new statism; 
a spatial element of resentment based on distance from big cities and demand 
for equal entitlement; and a rural element that wanted society decentralised into 
more socially functional communities.  Despite his idiosyncratic and striving 
nature, Page felt a ready sense of ease in the new Bruce-Page government, 
exemplified by his enthusiasm for its early efforts to realign the federation.  He 
                                                 
196 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., p. 119, say this was first proposed by Bruce and Page at a 
Treasurer’s Conference: however, R.S. Gilbert, historian of the Loan Council, and Page himself 
both state it was at this Premiers’ Conference; see Gilbert, op. cit., p. 75, and Page, Truant 
Surgeon, op. cit., p. 157.   
197 Mathews and Jay, ibid., p. 119; Page, ibid., p. 157.  
198 Mathews and Jay, ibid., p. 106.  
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also quickly established himself as a forceful policy leader within a still 
formative parliamentary Country Party made up of colleagues who by contrast 
were only beginning to feel their way on issues.  This all left him in a strong 
position to pursue his more personal policy agenda, the focus of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 – TREASURER PAGE PURSUES HIS POLICY VISION: 
HYDROELECTRICITY, NEW STATES AND RURAL ROADS  
 
Page joined the Bruce-Page government in February 1923 with characteristic 
self-assuredness.  The press quickly sensed a very singular Commonwealth 
minister of state.  Journalists were bemused by his continuing to practice as a 
surgeon: just three months after being sworn in as Treasurer, Page was 
reported to have operated on his brother James.1  Ethel Page also began to 
make a name for herself, telling the Women’s Section of the VFU that “country 
women’s organisations without politics…remind me of those rivers in Central 
Australia which…lose themselves here, there and everywhere in the sands of 
the desert.”2    
 
Page signalled his special sense of purpose by using his status as a senior 
minister to pursue personal visions in three important policy areas – 
hydroelectricity, new states and rural roads.  In each, his pursuit of change well 
beyond what was sought by most other rural-based civic movements and 
advocates, including those in his own Country Party, made him a major 
influence on what policy ideas were current.  The perception that the early 
Country Party was more “a pressure group concerned wholly and solely with 
the wallets of rural producers” than a true political party is an overstatement, 
but nonetheless has a degree of validity: its leader, however, was far broader 
indeed.3     
 
Page’s vision of hydroelectricity 
 
Geoff Page wrote in his poem ‘The River’ of his grandfather Earle “dreaming of 
the Gorge,” including of how “New wires are swooping over the farms/ the sixty 
watt bulb with conical shade/ a kind of enlightenment/ equal to Voltaire’s.”4  
Electrification was the most pronounced manifestation of Earle Page’s faith in 
                                                 
1 Cessnock Eagle and South Maitland Recorder, 11 May 1923, p. 2.  James was then 
headmaster of a public school near Maitland.  
2 Farmers’ Advocate, 28 September 1923, p. 3.  
3 Quote from L.L. Robson, Australia in the Nineteen Twenties: Commentary and Documents, 
Nelson, Melbourne, 1980, p. 70.  
4 Geoff Page, ‘The River’, Collected Lives, Angus & Robertson, North Ryde, 1986, pp. 45-58. 
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technology.  This “potent decentraliser” enlivened his vision of a regionalised 
and decentralised nation.  He championed hydroelectricity above other forms of 
power generation as it could be based on the harnessing of river systems by 
regional authorities.  Hydroelectricity also had an emotional resonance for Page 
as it drew on his devotion to his home region.  Damming The Gorge section of 
the Clarence River was to be the first step in a nationwide harnessing of 
Australia’s rivers.  His inspiration quite literally ran past his own front yard at 
Heifer Station.   
 
Electrification also neatly bookends Page’s career.  It provided a focus for his 
early activism in Grafton and was his foremost cause after he left the federal 
ministry in early 1956.  Page was one of a number of prominent Australians 
who in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries looked overseas for ideas 
about development, especially in the United States.  Most famously, Alfred 
Deakin studied irrigation in California and India: Page’s interest in 
hydroelectricity was heightened by his trips to New Zealand in 1910 and to 
North America in 1917.  He became the foremost Australian manifestation of 
the major technological cultural phenomenon of this time: faith in the socially 
transformative power of electricity, or “electrical triumphalism.”5   
 
Page’s campaign to dam the Clarence is also a good indicator of his thought 
processes: doggedness, commitment to place and a tendency to focus on a 
single developmental trigger from which much else would undoubtedly flow.  
He succeeded against professional doubts and political indifference in having 
hydroelectricity debated from the 1910s up to the late 1950s.  He differed from 
such other Australian hydroelectric enthusiasts as the engineers Corin and 
John Bradfield by his pronounced interest in the social benefits of 
electrification.  Also, Page only rarely used the exultant rhetoric of American 
and European visionaries or their metaphors of a higher cause of conquering 
                                                 
5 The term is used by Bill Luckin in Questions of Power: Electricity and Environment in Inter-
War Britain, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, pp. 1-22. 
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nature.6  He was more focussed on the immediate practical benefits he foresaw 
by using electrification to power his regionalist and decentralist agenda.  
 
Hydroelectricity was linked to many specific elements of Page’s approach to 
economic and social development – local autonomy, transformative 
technologies, planning, co-operative federalism, franchises for foreign investors 
and enshrinement in the Constitution.  His focus on electricity rather than 
irrigation or flood control set him apart from many other Australian 
hydroengineering advocates.  Although these latter applications were not 
unimportant to him, hailing as he did from a flood-prone region, Page’s main 
interest in “water conservation” was hydroelectricity’s economic and social 
potential.  This included but extended well beyond using electrification to ease 
the harshness of rural life, a common policy aspiration in Australia and 
elsewhere.  (One of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s most important New Deal agencies 
was the Rural Electrification Administration).  Page saw electrification as 
crucially important to decentralised national development by enabling 
“reproductive” investment in rural-based industries and supporting social 
amenities.   
 
Electrification and hydroelectricity are also evidence of Page’s persistent habit 
of either ignoring cautious technical advice that deigned to thwart his goals, or 
liberally interpreting it as affirming them.  This again marks him as more an 
instinctive thinker than the consummate rationalist he took himself to be.  
Tracing Page’s electrification campaigns also helps build a picture of how he 
operated at different times.  In the 1910s his appeals to local governments and 
state ministers were heavily influenced by exemplars in North America and 
New Zealand.  But in the 1920s he worked through the Commonwealth 
government of which he was a senior member and, late in the decade, a 
robustly independent Development and Migration Commission that he 
expected to validate his vision of the Clarence Valley.   
 
                                                 
6 Nye called this “an essentially religious feeling” that sought “to reinvest the landscape and the 
works of man with transcendent significance”; Nye, op. cit., p. xiii.  Blackbourn describes how in 
Germany the harnessing of rivers often acquired wider symbolic meaning, including the heroic 
conquest of nature; Blackbourn, op. cit., pp. 14-5, 18. 
124 
 
Assessing Page’s attachment to electrification necessitates a social 
constructivist approach that stresses how he envisaged technology interacting 
with society and politics, not a more limited focus on the initial development of 
new technology.7  Although he first became interested in hydroelectricity in the 
early 1910s, his ideas about its application only reached a settled form a 
decade later, after he had successfully led local governments to establish a 
power station on the Nymboida River.  In an April 1922 article in the Daily 
Examiner entitled ‘Cheap Power – Australia’s Greatest Need’, Page neatly 
summarised his conclusions on the centrality of electrification to development 
and modernity itself: 
 
In the economy of the world today the most marked characteristic is the 
admission of the necessity for cheap power.  It is everywhere recognised 
that progress and development are largely dependent upon a constant 
and adequate supply that will be always available, widely distributed and 
easily applied.  The ideal would be a power available in every home, on 
every farm and in every factory, in the country not less than the town, 
and supplied at a price within the reach of all.   
 
Electricity, he concluded, was the best way to achieve this, as it could be widely 
distributed, stored and “easily applied to everyday use.”  Indeed, electricity 
consumption was a strong indicator of a nation’s “standard of comfort if not of 
civilisation”, by which benchmark “Australia occupies a position with the most 
lowly civilised races.”8  One of the main barriers was centralisation.  In 1925 he 
complained that the “excessive centralisation of industry” was largely due to 
state government control of power production and neglect of water power.  
State governments had been “like the wolf in the fable of the wolf and the lamb 
– they have neither used the water nor allowed others [to] use it for power 
development.”9  Page’s vision was to use electricity as a “potent decentraliser” 
                                                 
7 Bijker, Hughes and Pinch aptly refer to the “seamless web” of society and technology; see 
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (eds.), The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Direction in the Sociology and History of Technology, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1987, p. 3. 
8 Daily Examiner 14 April 1922, p. 3. 
9 ‘Power Production’, 1925, EPP, folder 2088; unsigned but its format and characteristic 
references to the Clarence River, North American exemplars and the “excessive centralisation” 
of industry indicate that it was prepared by Page and apparently meant for Cabinet.  Undated, 
but refers to the World Power Conference of 1924 as held “last year.” 
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to help create a more productive and united Australia that was decentralised 
yet efficient, ordered yet egalitarian.10   
 
The Nymboida and Jackadgery: Page and regional hydroelectricity  
 
During his 1917 travels in North America, Page was greatly impressed by how 
electrification was managed in Ontario and British Columbia.11  The 1919 
booklet he produced through the North Coast Development League, entitled 
The Clarence Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme, presented the Ontario Hydro-
Electric Power Commission as a model for regional control of power 
production.  The Commission, Page reported, was successfully managed by 
local governments, made good use of private contractors by issuing debentures 
backed by the provincial government, and encouraged electricity use by 
keeping charges to manufacturers and farmers low.12  These became features 
of his later hydroelectric proselytizing and lifelong admiration of Canada.   
 
Page particularly seized upon the Ontario Commission as evidence of the 
transformative power of regionalism.  He claimed that it had “secured intelligent 
and harmonious co-operation among local bodies” and “developed a national 
outlook throughout the whole area, thus bound together by the ties of common 
interest.”13  Page felt “a pang when one contrasts the more favourable 
conditions of our climate” with “our entire failure to manufacture our own 
necessities, quite apart from providing munitions or manufactures and the lack 
of the comforts of life that prevails here.”14 
 
Once home, Page continued to seek lessons from overseas.  He studied 
closely, for example, a January 1918 article in the New Zealand Journal of 
Science and Technology on the economics of electrification, heavily underlining 
passages on how widely distributed power could help establish new 
                                                 
10 Notes for speech ‘Electrical Standards’, no date but c. 1925, EPP, folder 1053.  
11 Ellis, ‘The Story of Nymboida, notes for Sir Earle Page,’ op. cit.  
12 The Clarence Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme: Harnessing 100,000 Horse-Power, op. cit., pp. 
35-43.   
13 Ibid., p. 54. 
14 Ibid., p. 58. 
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industries.15  His interest was reinforced by very visible rapid development in 
the use of electricity in Australia.  The decade after 1919 saw a fourfold 
increase in Australian electricity consumption, faster than most other countries 
(but similar to Canada).  By 1927, Australia’s electricity consumption of about 
300 kWh per head was half as big again as Britain’s.16  In 1921 the State 
Electricity Commission (SEC) of Victoria became mainland Australia’s first 
statewide electricity public utility.  Following a vociferous technical debate over 
the relative merits of brown coal and hydroelectricity, it proceeded to 
aggressively exploit Gippsland’s brown coal reserves.17  There was also a jump 
in the local manufacture of electrical goods, albeit mostly consumer items 
produced by foreign subsidiaries while more complex manufactures were 
usually imported.  But electrification remained heavily orientated to meeting 
urban rather than rural demand, much of which was made possible by British 
loans to state governments.18   
 
Page in the early 1920s drew on the status of office, his local prestige as the 
Clarence River region’s most famed citizen and the results of his travels to 
promote three closely related strategies for electrification – the harnessing of 
the Clarence River system as the first of a series of regional initiatives across 
the entire nation; the nationwide planning of power utilisation by a national 
commission that would begin its task by surveying Australia’s water resources; 
and the related standardisation of the means of electricity production and 
distribution.  His first attempt at harnessing the Clarence system, the Nymboida 
River project of 1923, was also his foremost success in implementing a 
hydroelectric power initiative.  Widely considered a triumph at the time, Page 
saw it as just an encouraging first step for the wider Clarence and the nation.   
 
                                                 
15 E. Parry, ‘The Economics of Electric-Power Distribution’, New Zealand Journal of Science 
and Technology, January 1918, pp. 49-55.  Page’s copy is at EPP, folder 1762. 
16 There is some contemporary evidence that Australia lagged behind the US and Canada in 
the production and industrial use of electricity, but the picture becomes more mixed if European 
nations are also considered.  See H.R. Harper’s presidential address of February 1934 to The 
Institution of Engineers, Australia, EPP, folder 1059. 
17 See Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1982, 
pp. 436-8.  
18 Colin Forster Industrial Development in Australia 1920-30, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1964, pp. 103-4;  Cochrane, op. cit., pp. 37-9. 
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Page’s efforts on the Nymboida drew on the regional control and the low 
charges that had so impressed him in Canada.  Grafton and South Grafton 
councils had first formally supported harnessing The Gorge in November 1915 
following a second report produced by William Corin that same year.19  After 
the war, Page as Mayor of South Grafton lobbied councils in the Clarence and 
Richmond regions, including by convening a meeting early in 1919 to promote 
Corin’s more ambitious plan of December 1918.  In August 1921 councils 
meeting at Grafton formed a committee to press for the creation of a County 
Council, to which they could assign powers over electricity production 
approximating those held by the Ontario Commission.  The following May the 
New South Wales local government minister duly proclaimed the Clarence 
River County Council (CRCC).20   
 
This became Page’s template for regional electrification in Australia.21  With the 
assistance of the Country Party MLA Alf Pollack, Page and the South Grafton 
Council focussed on pushing for the Nymboida proposal.22  Page later claimed 
in notes for his memoirs that the state government passed the necessary 
legislation then tarried for two years, relenting only after he publicised the 
delays.23  A contract was finally let in early 1923 for a power station of 4,800 
kW capacity.  This was funded under the Migration Agreement with Britain, 
which provided for joint British-Australian funding of rural development projects 
that supported emigration from Britain: another idea, as we will see in chapter 
five, keenly supported by Page.  Publicly recognised as the main progenitor of 
this Nymboida scheme, Treasurer Page was featured on the cover of the 
                                                 
19 The Clarence Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme: Harnessing 100,000 Horse-Power, op. cit., p. 
16. 
20 Ellis, ‘The Story of Nymboida, notes for Sir Earle Page’, op. cit.  Elsewhere Page claimed that 
the creation of the County Council was the responsibility of his Country Party colleagues and 
state parliamentarians Roy Vincent and Alf Pollack; see the document outlining the history of 
Page’s interaction with the Clarence in EPP, folder 1855, p. 23; undated, but evidently prepared 
for the drafting of Truant Surgeon.   
21 The CRCC and the Richmond River County Council amalgamated in 1952 to form the 
Northern Rivers County Council, which was later described as occupying “pride of place in rural 
electrical enterprise” in the state; see Allbut, op. cit., p. 28.  
22 Ellis, ‘The Story of Nymboida, notes for Sir Earle Page’, op. cit.  Pollack was Page’s most 
valued local lieutenant, and General Secretary of the Northern New South Wales Separation 
League and of the Joint Electricity Committee of Northern Municipalities and Shires.   
23 EPP, folder 1855; also Ellis, ‘The Story of Nymboida, notes for Sir Earle Page,’ ibid. 
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printed program for the “switching on” ceremony of 26 November 1924 as “The 
Father of the Scheme.”24   
 
The Nymboida project embodied much of Page’s vision for an electrified nation, 
especially local management.  He often recalled how he and Pollack had 
“induced nearly sixty Councils to combine for the gradual harnessing of the 
Clarence waters for power”, providing a “shining example of what can be done 
with electricity.”25  One of the most important issues in electricity use is price 
setting and the impact this has on consumption.  Fundamental to electrification, 
Page-style, was a common flat rate subsidised by the taxpayer (contrary to 
most tenets of commercial sustainability) to encourage the uptake of electricity 
in the countryside – as he later said, “our experience of the flat rate at 
Nymboida has been that the consequent rapid expansion of rural demand 
makes power cheaper for every user and unthought of use and advantages are 
continually turning up.”26  Even before generation commenced, Page 
announced his hope that the Nymbodia scheme “might prove a turning point in 
the history of Australia.”27  On the day of switching on, he assured a conference 
in Grafton of local governments that “the psychological moment had arrived for 
the people of the North.”  The conference minutes recorded that “while in 
America he had been struck with the fact that government had been from the 
bottom up”, it was the case that “the very opposite prevailed in Australia, where 
government was from an unwieldy top which bore down and crushed the lower 
controlling bodies.”28  Page even called his Sydney home Nymboida.29 
 
                                                 
24 Booklet commemorating the switching-on of the Nymboida, dated 26 November 1924, in 
EPP, folder 1046.  There was a small council-run hydroelectric scheme at Dorrigo shortly 
before the Nymboida scheme; see the Daily Examiner, 25 November 1924, pp. 4, 5, cutting at 
EPP, folder 1044. 
25 Typed summary of facts and figures on the Clarence, no date but appears to be late 1950s, 
EPP, folder 2333; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 14 September 1944, p. 838.  In 
1944 the Nymboida was still the largest hydroelectric facility on the Australian mainland. 
26 ‘Dr. Earle Page’s Prescription for National Health and Development’, February 1946, EPP, 
folder 2295.  
27 Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 1923, p. 8. 
28 This and the preceding quote are from ‘Minutes of the Proceedings of the Conference, with 
other Papers and Information Relative to the Proposed Jackadgery Hydro-Electric Scheme’ at 
Grafton of ‘The Electricity Committee of Northern Municipalities and Shires’, 26 November 
1924,  pp. 21, 26, EPP, folder 1046. 
29 Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, Box 7, folder 62.  
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For all Page’s pride, the Nymboida scheme only serviced adjacent shires.  He 
at once sought to expand regionally-based hydroelectricity, starting with a 
power station at Jackadgery on the Mann River.  This briefly had state 
government support.  Two days before the Nymboida commencement, Page 
led a delegation of local councillors and MPs to Premier George Fuller, who 
agreed to pay part of the interest bill for Jackadgery and to seek support under 
the Migration Agreement.30  Page set out to create a yet larger local 
government structure as the basis for the regional management of Jackadgery.  
He exhorted councils to form a North Coast and Tablelands County Council 
that could manage so big a facility by encompassing Casino, Inverell, Grafton, 
Byron, Tweed and other local governments.   
 
Page’s Daily Examiner duly reported that although the total area was 
enormous, the compactness of settlement within each component district made 
the proposal “of especial advantage in connection with a scheme for the 
distribution of electricity” and a distinct prospect for Migration Agreement 
funding.31  A much more ambitious project than the Nymboida, Jackadgery 
soon fell foul of changes of state government in June 1925 from Fuller’s 
Nationalists to Labor under Jack Lang and in October 1927 to T.R. Bavin’s 
Nationalists.32  Page had great power at the local and Commonwealth levels, 
but dealing with state governments was a very different matter.   
 
Planning the electrification of the nation 
 
Page also sought to build on the Nymboida success by directing the Bruce-
Page government towards planning the electrification of all Australia.  The 
ambitious agenda for national policy co-ordination they presented to the May 
1923 Premiers Conference included a plan for national electrification, the first 
of a long series of Page-inspired overtures to the states to work with the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., p. 4. 
31 Letter by Page to local councils 4 December 1924, EPP folder 2083; note also his speech at 
Glen Innes of 15 February 1924 on an enlarged County Council, folder 1050; Daily Examiner, 5 
September 1925, cutting in Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, Box 6, folder 57. 
32 See for example a letter on this from The Port of the Clarence Advisory Board to Premier 
Bavin 16 February 1928, in NAA, CP 211/2, 34/13, Investigations – New South Wales – Hydro 
Electric Scheme (Clarence River): 1928.  
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Commonwealth in shaping the economic and social landscape.  But Australia’s 
small population, distances between population centres, and interstate rivalries 
worked against nationally planned electrification and in favour of the absence of 
ultimate purpose that Page abhorred.     
 
National organisation and related standardisation were widely recognised as 
important for electrification.  Electrical standardisation was a major issue for the 
United States electrical industry throughout the 1910s and 1920s as part of a 
wider standardisation movement across industry.  In Britain, it was known that 
the division of generation between local governments hampered nationwide 
electrification.33  In Australia, Page attempted to take the political lead by using 
his status in the Bruce-Page government as a powerful platform for appeals to 
the Australian public and state governments, quite unlike his earlier efforts as 
an alderman.  He saw standardisation as leading to lower costs, more reliable 
services and a national grid that could carry surplus power between local 
production systems.34 
 
Since the Commonwealth lacked a direct constitutional role in power 
generation, Page added to the Bruce-Page government’s wider advocacy of 
co-operative federalism the Commonwealth-led co-ordination of a national 
power grid implemented by the states.  At the May 1923 Premiers’ Conference 
he exhorted state power ministers to accept this national approach, telling them 
that the absence of a body akin to the US Federal Power Commission helped 
explain Australia’s backwardness in power production.  He proposed a Federal-
State Commission that would “determine prospective power needs in Australia 
over a period of twenty years” and put all electricity production on a planned 
“co-operative Commonwealth-State basis.”35  The new Commission would lay 
down common standards for equipment and transmission, and survey the 
nation’s power resources before issuing “a comprehensive power-scheme for 
the whole of Australia” that identified sites for new power stations.  The 
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stridency of the language employed in the agenda paper strongly suggests that 
it was drafted by Page himself: it provocatively concluded that “the only 
advantage in Australia’s backwardness is that practically a virgin field lies 
before us for development on the right lines.”36   
 
Page during the conference debate at first tried to be tactful, carefully 
presenting the Clarence as merely one of several potential power centres.  But 
state ministers reacted with hostility to what they saw as an unwarranted 
intrusion by the Commonwealth.  The Victorian minister, Arthur Robinson, 
quoted his state’s Electricity Commissioners as describing the Commonwealth 
proposal as “utopian and certainly not within the legitimate range of Federal co-
operation for at least another generation”, especially given Australia’s 
population distribution.37  Page was nonplussed by such an “ostrich-like” 
attitude: “future generations will rue our short-sightedness” he decried.  He for 
one “did not look forward to the six capital cities of Australia simply continuing 
to grow larger and larger without the institution of large civic centres 
elsewhere”, enabled by the better distribution of power.38  
 
A major gap between Page and the state ministers was his conviction that 
industrial development would surely follow the provision of electrical power.  He 
rhetorically challenged them on “whether power follows population and 
industries, or whether it is not the other way about,” and then supplied the 
answer himself – that “the history of development throughout the world is that 
where the power is you also have population and industries.”  Hence zinc was 
mined at Broken Hill but sent to Risdon in Tasmania where hydroelectricity was 
used in producing zinc ingots.  The electrification of Australia “will induce other 
industries to come here, and so the whole thing will proceed in a beneficial 
circle, enabling us to grow up, not only a contented people, but also in sufficient 
numbers to hold this continent for the Empire.”  Yet in the end the assembled 
ministers reluctantly agreed merely to submit information on their state’s 
                                                 
36 Agenda paper, ‘Standardisation of Electrical Power Schemes’, p. 71, EPP, folder 1045.   
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respective power resources to an advisory board (or boards) on 
standardisation.39   
 
This was a prominent early instance of Page seriously misreading state 
governments, and a formative encounter with their sensitivity to any 
redistribution of authority to the Commonwealth.  On this occasion it was the 
Commonwealth’s presumption that they resented more than the idea of efficient 
electrification.  (The Victorian minister pointed out that the states were already 
working towards standardisation of production and transmission).  Page was 
only ever to get his way with the states by bluntly applying the 
Commonwealth’s growing fiscal power in a federal system that he openly 
disdained.   
 
The Bruce-Page government was very receptive to policy advice from industry 
leaders, including in electricity.  The year after this Premiers’ Conference, it 
readily agreed when the Australian Commonwealth Engineering Standards 
Association, a semi-private body that included Commonwealth and state 
government representatives, proposed using its existing work on 
standardisation as the basis for being entrusted with some of what Page had 
intended for his Federal-State Commission.40  The Commonwealth provided 
financial support for the Association’s “complete survey of the Power 
Resources of Australia, with a view to their development and more economical 
and efficient use.”41  Although Page in his memoirs duly held this up as an 
outstanding example of industry-led national co-ordination, it never provided 
effective national planning of electrification.42   
 
Page continued to press for the planning and standardisation of national 
electrification by other means.  This was typical Page – simultaneously 
pursuing whatever paths to his goals seemed to be available, with means never 
being as important as his grand ends.  On planning, he attempted to revive the 
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concept of a national electricity body in a 1925 proposal to Cabinet entitled 
‘Power Production.’43  On standardisation, Page in July that year directly 
contacted the SEC to propose that if the state government legislated on 
standards for voltage and frequency, the Commonwealth would use customs 
legislation to ban the importation of non-compliant equipment.  The SEC’s 
Chief Engineer responded that all this would be costly and should be limited to 
new projects only, with the Commonwealth merely promulgating standards for 
which it invited the states to legislate.44   
 
New states: Page seizes the opportunity of the Cohen Royal Commission  
 
Page’s engagement with the new state issue when serving in the Bruce-Page 
government was very different from his efforts on federalism and 
hydroelectricity.  He played a much more individual role, with little support from 
his Prime Minister.  His elevation to national office in 1923 had raised the 
hopes of his new state followers.  In fact, membership of federal Cabinet 
restricted Page to a more selective engagement with the cause, conducted 
mainly on his own terms as a senior minister whose first loyalty was to his 
government.  He became more cautious in his public statements, curbing his 
allegations of urban-based conspiracies of greed.  But when in 1924 the New 
South Wales government convened the Cohen Royal Commission to inquire 
into new states, Page seized the opportunity to assert himself as national 
leader of the new state movement with a gusto that was to help ensure its 
survival.   
 
Although Bruce agreed in principle that new states were desirable, his new 
government signalled caution by affirming Hughes’s constitutionally correct line 
that new states needed to be initiated by existing state governments.  Bruxner’s 
successful 1922 resolution in the New South Wales Parliament later elicited the 
very proper response from the Prime Minister that he would not act until the 
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state government came up with a solid proposal – a factor in the subsequent 
appointment of the Cohen Royal Commission.45  
 
Page at first largely toed the Hughes-Bruce line on new states.  He opened the 
second Armidale convention of the Northern New State Movement in June 
1923 by announcing that it was up to state governments to make the first 
move.46  Other parliamentary new staters were less restrained.  V.C. 
Thompson, a backbencher, became the most ardent parliamentary agitator.  In 
1923 he formed a Federal Parliamentary New State League of 21 members, 
presided over by the unrelated W.G. Thompson, a Nationalist senator from the 
Queensland new state stronghold of Rockhampton.  Latham sat on its 
executive.  It was Thompson who led a delegation to Bruce in July 1923 to 
propose amending the Constitution to replace initiation by state parliaments 
with a less onerous process based on a petition of at least 20 per cent of local 
electors triggering a local referendum.47  In 1924 and again in 1925 Thompson 
introduced private member’s motions on a referendum to amend section 124: 
neither was put to the parliamentary vote.48   
 
High ministerial office inhibited Page because of the tension new states raised 
with his coalition partners.  There is little documentation of difficulties between 
Bruce and Page personally over new states, but there are occasional telling 
references to a wide gap between their parties.  Ellis, a member of the 
parliamentary press gallery in those years, later wrote of the Bruce-Page 
Cabinet having in 1925 examined various options for amending section 124, 
including a constitutional session of parliament and a Royal Commission, 
before its eventual proposal to conduct a referendum was blocked by 
Nationalist MPs.49  As his foremost means of implementing a pressing agenda 
to improve rural living standards, Page needed to make the coalition work.  He 
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had limited opportunity, especially at first, for the luxury of focusing on a 
personally favoured issue like new states.  Promotion of such basic rural 
amenities as phone services and roads permeated his speeches.  Speaking in 
December 1923 on the introduction of radio to the bush he reflected, with 
atypical eloquence, on his hope that “that word ‘lonely’ will be eliminated from 
Australian life.”50  
 
So Page made a strategic judgment that the time was not ripe for his new 
state-regionalist agenda and elected to wait instead.  His caution drew criticism, 
such as in parliament in July 1926 from Frank Forde (a Queensland Labor new 
stater) and Hughes (still with a personal score to settle).51  But Page was 
prepared to momentarily re-enter the new state fray when a singularly 
promising opportunity suddenly opened up at the state government level.  This 
was the 1924-25 Cohen Royal Commission, the most comprehensive of three 
formal inquiries into new states conducted during the inter-war period.  Far from 
staying focused on federally-initiated constitutional reform, as suggested by 
Farrell, Page and the other new staters put enormous effort into trying to win 
over Cohen and, by extension, the government of New South Wales.  In this 
sense they saw action at the state level as crucial in itself and not merely as a 
clearing of the way for federal-led change.  As a willing witness before Cohen, 
Treasurer Page resumed his persona as an unconventional nation-shaper to 
produce the fullest case for new states yet seen. 
 
A Royal Commission was first proposed at the June 1923 Armidale convention.  
Four months later, the Fuller state government decided against constructing a 
Northern Tablelands to north coast railway.  This led to such protests from the 
True Blue Progressives – who had split from the Progressive Party in protest 
against coalition with the Nationalists, but whose support in parliament now 
kept them in office – that in December Fuller agreed to review this decision.  
Late in 1923 he acceded to Bruxner’s request for a Royal Commission into new 
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states as part of a deal to maintain support for his government.  The Royal 
Commissioner, Judge John Cohen, was a Grafton native, presumably 
coincidentally: perhaps less coincidental was that he was a former Nationalist 
state MP.52  The Cohen Royal Commission had a very wide brief.  Crucially, it 
was to assess the fundamental question of whether new states in New South 
Wales were “practical and desirable”, including whether the ends they would 
supposedly achieve could be more readily secured by restructuring local 
government. 
 
Cohen and his fellow commissioners deliberated for over a year, from April 
1924 to May 1925.  This included four lengthy tours of the state’s north to 
gather evidence from over 200 witnesses (including a minority hostile to new 
states), encompassing professionals, business figures, aldermen, farmers and 
state government officials.  Page was the new state movement’s star witness, 
the foremost national supporter of the allied concepts of new states, 
regionalism and decentralisation.  Page was not queried when he described 
himself to the Royal Commission as “leader of the general movement for 
Australian subdivision.”53  His evidence was typically confident and wide-
ranging, but the sceptical, clinical dissection that followed was not a happy 
experience for him.  By casting his evidence as the starting point for a strategy 
to regionalise the entire nation, Page also highlighted how he differed from 
most of the new state movement.   
 
Page gave evidence to the Royal Commission in two long sessions, the first on 
19 May 1924.  As something of a historicist, he asserted that throughout world 
history, compact, homogenous entities were the form of government “which 
lends itself most readily to good government and intensive development.”54  In 
Australia, this would solve problems of defence, population and public finance, 
a typical Page conflation of disparate issues.  By drawing on “a higher civic 
spirit” to marshal their resources and develop efficient transport, self-governing 
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regions could encourage manufacturing far more effectively than would tariff 
protection.55  Responding to probing by counsel for the Royal Commission, 
Page added that any 100,000 square mile area with natural resources and a 
population of at least 70,000 had potential to be successfully self-governing.56  
In attempting to persuade that beyond a certain point there was an inverse 
relationship between the size of a state and its production per square mile, he 
quoted figures comparing the relatively compact Victoria with Western 
Australia, ignoring differences in basic geography.57  (He frequently held up 
Victoria as being a good size, particularly when berating New South Wales 
audiences).  
 
As ever, Page dwelt on possibilities, not foreseeable limitations.  Conscious as 
he was of the paucity of connections between existing state rail systems, he 
still argued that regional control of railways would result in local networks 
eventually adding up to an effective national system.58  Nor did Page have in 
mind the simple replication of the existing form of state governance on a 
smaller geographic scale.  He instead proposed to restrain government 
expenditure by a model based on diminutive legislatures (dubbed councils, not 
parliaments), unpaid MPs and a mere four ministers each.  He pointedly added 
that “I would like to see the States called ‘Provinces’ and not ‘States’, because 
that would properly indicate to the public the fact that they are to deal with the 
local problems of the local development of their areas and not to encroach on 
the domain of national policy.”59   
 
Naturally, Page focused his evidence on northern New South Wales.  This 
region, he said, had the population, the natural resources and the overall ability 
to finance itself.  It boasted an “exceptionally fertile” coastal belt “where drought 
– that spectre that haunts the balance of Australia – is practically unknown.”  
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Unalienated land was plentiful and on the Clarence River alone “100,000 HP is 
possible” if a hydroelectric scheme was built.  Inland, hydropower and wool 
could together support a textiles industry on the fertile New England 
Tablelands.60  But when Page confidently predicted an annual revenue surplus 
for the new state of £416,064, state Treasury officials responded with their own 
calculation of a deficit of over £1.3 million.61  In his second bout with Cohen, 
over 19-21 November 1924, Page replied to Treasury’s item-by-item dissection 
of his cost and revenue estimates by disputing the assumption that the new 
state would spend public funds at the same rate as when it was a component of 
New South Wales.62  Treasury’s estimate reflected the “unnecessary 
circumlocution and consequent grave overstaffing” that characterized the 
existing New South Wales public service, not the slimmer apparatus Page 
envisaged.63   
 
Ellis described Page as having presented an “advanced text-book of 
Constitutional reform.”64  He attracted press attention in both city and rural 
newspapers, and some other witnesses referenced his evidence when 
presenting theirs.65  Yet Page and his fellow advocates made a poor 
impression on the Royal Commission.  The Commissioners looked carefully 
and critically at the case presented by the new staters to reach their central 
conclusion that proposals to carve three new states out of New South Wales – 
the north, the Riverina and the Monaro – were “neither practical nor 
desirable.”66  They were not at all persuaded by data supposedly 
demonstrating that new states stimulated population growth: new state 
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witnesses had for example pointed to the rapid growth of the American state of 
Iowa without realising that much of this actually predated its statehood.67   
 
Cohen found that new states would actually increase the cost of government 
and that the alleged benefits of decentralisation could be obtained by far easier 
means.  Treasury figures contradicted assertions that the regions proposed as 
new states made net contributions to revenue.  The port of Sydney had such 
spare capacity that there was little need for new regional ports.  The state rail 
system was not, as alleged, designed to favour the metropolis over the 
countryside.  Above all, population movement to cities was a worldwide 
phenomenon likely to continue in new states.  Cohen added that it was beyond 
his terms of reference to consider whether a referendum on new states should 
be held, but the implication was clear.68  Page and the wider new state 
movement also failed to address convincingly the immense practical difficulty of 
creating a new state, the constitutional formula being far simpler in principle 
than in practice.  As Hughes had opined, creation of a new state required 
threshold issues such as the drafting of a widely acceptable new constitution 
and the division of assets with the parent state to have “assumed a very 
concrete shape” before substantive action could be taken.69 
 
Cohen’s findings fell well short of affirming Page’s fundamental belief that 
smaller political units would foster civic engagement which stimulated social 
and economic development.  They instead dampened new state agitation until 
another trigger arose when the economy deteriorated in the late 1920s.  
Although the Cohen experience demonstrated that new statism had not gained 
broad traction amongst opinion-makers beyond provincial elites and their circle 
of activists, it nonetheless suggested a wider acceptance of the allied concept 
of decentralisation.  The Royal Commission recommended the decentralisation 
of administration and the strengthening of local government to address what it 
concluded to be the actual problem facing rural New South Wales – the 
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centralisation of public works and social programmes.70  The need for regional 
teachers’ colleges and better public health services was especially pressing.  It 
proposed that shires and municipalities elect District Councils to plan and 
manage health services, education, land settlement and public works (other 
than railways and large-scale irrigation).71  Cohen also recommended that the 
state government resolve some specific grievances, notably the Northern 
Tablelands-north coast railway. 
 
Page’s criticisms of Cohen’s findings reflected his nationwide perspective.  He 
complained of an “absence of the consideration of the larger view which 
ultimately connects the new state issue with the urgent problem facing 
Australia, that of the National Development and Effective Occupation of the 
Continent.”72  Page cast Cohen as having adopted a provincial New South 
Wales outlook, reflected in such findings as that unified nationwide railway 
gauges would disadvantage Sydney.73  Even at this still early stage of his 
political career, Page saw himself as habitually battling blinkered outlooks.  He 
may not have won Cohen over, but the attention he attracted from the Royal 
Commission and beyond had enhanced the status of the new state movement 
– a Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer had lent it his authority as a national 
issue.  The publication of his evidence as a book (by his own Northern New 
State Movement) depicted Page on the cover as “Treasurer of the 
Commonwealth.”74  Page’s effort to impress Cohen significantly qualifies 
Graham’s portrayal of the new state cause as one of several that the Country 
Party largely shelved during the Bruce-Page years.75      
 
Page also contrived to interpret Cohen’s support for the localisation of 
administration as amounting to acceptance of his fundamental ideas.  With 
some justification, he saw the recommended District Councils as an admission 
of the validity of his argument that the entirety of New South Wales could not 
be effectively administered from Sydney.  Indeed, the creation of these 
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Councils could lead to their spread across the nation, and serve as a step 
towards the formation of new states.  History remained on his side – “the 
present New South Wales Parliament seems to be doomed”, he said, for surely 
the existing state would eventually be superseded.76   
 
After Cohen, however, Page reverted to a watchful passivity on new states, 
consistent with his habitual preparedness to wait for a fresh opportunity.  His 
Country Party policy speech for the 1925 election made but the briefest of 
references to new states and planned development.77  The advent of the Bavin-
Buttenshaw Nationalist-Country Party state government in October 1927 
weakened the new state movement yet further.  This was the first long-term 
urban-rural coalition in New South Wales and included David Drummond as 
Education Minister.  It commenced new public works in the north, notably the 
Armidale Teachers’ College and the Guyra-Dorrigo railway.78  The 
effectiveness with which these very visible projects deflated new state agitation 
says much about the shallowness of public support for the cause.  
 
Farrell’s assessment of the northern New South Wales movement in the 1920s 
refers to “an unresolved tension in Page.”  He raises whether he was “a true 
believer or merely a pragmatic opportunist who saw the political advantages of 
running with the New State issue?”  Farrell seems to conclude that Page was 
the latter in the short term, for whom the issue was useful politically while he 
awaited the time when the new staters had the numbers.79  There were indeed 
unresolved tensions in Page’s ideas, notably between regionalism and strong 
national government.  But the consistency of his personal commitment to 
regionalism and decentralisation, as embodied in new states, was never in 
doubt.  It is more that having built up high expectations, Page reacted to the 
very different political circumstance of the advent of the coalition with the 
Nationalists by reassessing his priorities.  Unlike other new staters, he now 
faced such a range of pressing goals that he had to make pragmatic judgments 
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about their relative priority.  He at least used Cohen to uphold publicly the new 
state concept when it could have faded for good in the face of the Royal 
Commission’s withering criticisms.  His lifelong commitment to new states 
resurfaced resoundingly when circumstances turned again in 1931-32.   
 
Page’s commitment is also evident in his enthusiastic engagement with some 
fleeting new state initiatives by his own government.  The Bruce-Page 
government twice attempted to create new states in northern and central 
Australia, even in the 1920s long a focal point for hopes and assumptions 
about Australian development.  The government was willing to pursue new 
states when this did not risk a major confrontation with its own Nationalist MPs 
or the existing states with whom it had much else to negotiate.   
 
In 1926 the Commonwealth responded to recommendations of the 1925 Royal 
Commission on Western Australian Disabilities Under Federation by proposing 
to annex the state’s territory north of the 26th parallel.80  The state government 
would be relieved of all liability from loan monies spent on the north and the 
Commonwealth would spend £5 million on the region’s development annually 
for ten years, from which a new state could be created.81  Page later 
commented that at that this time his immediate interest in this region was the 
“balanced representation in the federal parliament” of the western half of the 
nation, and only eventually a new state.  The plan foundered over the 
conditions of the proposed federal expenditure: Page refused to guarantee this 
allocation until there had been a full assessment of the region’s needs.82  The 
following year the Bruce-Page government divided the Commonwealth-
administered Northern Territory into North Australia and Central Australia.  
During debate on the legislation Bruce referred to their eventually becoming 
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“States of the Commonwealth.”83  Each was endowed with a Government 
Resident and an Advisory Council, and a North Australia Commission was 
created to oversee the development of both regions.  Neither survived the fall 
of the Bruce-Page government and a united Northern Territory was re-
established in 1931.  
 
Tied grants for rural roads: Page helps alter the federation 
 
Page had more practical success in furthering his national vision via the 
narrower but more widely acceptable field of tied Commonwealth grants for 
rural roads.  As a fiscal conservative, he professed to be affronted by vertical 
fiscal imbalance.  But his national development agenda, especially for rural 
Australia, and his impatience with state governments, were more immediately 
important to him.  This order of priorities is exemplified by his role in imposing 
these grants on the states.      
 
Page was motivated by his regionalist vision and longstanding commitment to 
improved rural roads.  In his memoirs he wrote vividly of how as a young doctor 
he was “no stranger to the primitive and gruelling transport system which 
served most parts of Australia” and the results of this for critically ill patients.84  
Commonwealth tied grants for roads did not start with Page.  In 1922 the 
Commonwealth distributed £250,000 between the states on a per capita basis 
that it insisted be directed to rural roads which improved market access by 
soldier settlers.  This was a historic step in Commonwealth-state financial 
relations, yet the parliamentary debate on the legislation – a wide-ranging Act 
on the expenditure of Commonwealth loans – barely addressed these inter alia 
grants.85  They are not mentioned in Page’s memoirs.     
 
Page became the first federal Minister to systematically use section 96 of the 
Constitution to make tied Commonwealth grants to the states.  In 1923 the 
                                                 
83 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 10 February 1926, p. 824. 
84 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 176.    
85 Bureau of Transport Economics, Road Grants Legislation in Australia: Commonwealth 
Government Involvement, 1900-1981, Bureau of Transport Economics Occasional Paper No. 8, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981, p. 5.  The legislation was the Loan 
Act 1922.  
144 
 
Royal Commission on Taxation briefly noted that this Commonwealth power to 
“grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as 
Parliament thinks fit” would include specifying end uses.86  The introduction of 
such grants for road construction over three years from 1923 marked the 
effective start of what constituted the main form of tied grants for the next thirty 
years.  This “interesting exception to the general philosophy of the 
Commonwealth concerning grants to the states” was an important early 
instance of the Constitution being interpreted according to its literal wording to 
get the desired result instead of honouring the intentions of its drafters.  Over 
succeeding decades tied grants gradually became central to Commonwealth-
state financial relations.87  As such, this constitutes an important part of Page’s 
legacy.   
These grants were first mooted at the Premiers’ Conference of May 1923, 
leading to the 1923 Main Roads Development Act.  The Commonwealth 
directed £500,000 to the states to construct rural main roads, to be matched 
pound for pound by each state up to their prescribed share of the total (based 
on a mixture of population and geographic size).  Proposals for specific projects 
had to be approved by the Commonwealth Minister for Works and Railways 
(then Percy Stewart).88  Similar arrangements were repeated in 1924, and 
again in 1925 when funding was greatly increased.  The Commonwealth was 
clearly signalling a lack of trust in state willingness to pursue national 
development vigorously, a characteristic Page concern.  
That the Commonwealth’s concurrent negotiations with the states over wider 
federal financial relations never seem to have jeopardised these tied grants is a 
measure of their importance to Page.  His action as the initial scheme 
approached expiration at the end of 1925-26 is a fine example of his 
commitment and rationalism.  Returning from his 1925 trip to the United States 
and Canada during which he had studied federal and local government road 
policies, he proposed the creation of a new Federal Highways Commission of 
                                                 
86 Gates, op. cit., p. 166. 
87 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., pp. 98-9.  Page’s ADB entry states that he acquired the idea of 
tied grants from the Royal Commission on Taxation.   
88 Draft agenda paper ‘Proposed National Main Road Development’, in NAA, CP103/11 818, 
Notes on Various Subjects to be Raised at Premiers’ Conference 1923.  
145 
 
senior Commonwealth and state engineers to plan out a national road network, 
and to be empowered to apportion monies for works accordingly.89  Following 
its re-election in November 1925, the Bruce-Page government moved to fund 
its increased road grants by higher customs duties on petrol.  Page said that 
this would protect locally-owned refiners (then essentially the Commonwealth-
owned Commonwealth Oil Refineries) and make up for tax avoidance by larger 
foreign-owned oil companies.90  The Commonwealth also argued that using 
petrol duties to generate the revenue required was equitable in that the cost 
was borne by road users.91   
 
The result was the Federal Aid Roads Act of 1926.  This was widely recognised 
as having quite different implications for federal-state relations than previous 
legislation, by allocating £2 million annually to the states for an unprecedented 
ten-year period and imposing a far greater degree of Commonwealth control.  
Despite Page’s pleas that “good roads, and an efficient transport system, are 
an essential part of our machinery of national development”, the legislation met 
with objections ranging from the threat road transport posed to railways to 
denunciations of the petrol duty.92  It was opposed not only by oil companies 
but was also the subject of unsuccessful legal challenges by Victoria and South 
Australia that reached the Privy Council.93  Its importance to Page is reflected 
in his vitriolic ripostes to the oil companies, calling them “monopolistic foreign 
importing interests” bent on “the scotching of any development whatever in the 
Commonwealth that will tend to make us more independent of them.”94  The 
government’s justification remained simple.  The Minister for Works and 
                                                 
89 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 177; see also ‘Roads’, an undated memo reporting on the 
US and Canadian systems of road funding that recommended an Australian Federal Highways 
Commission, EPP, folder 1775.  
90 See Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 178; see also draft of this part of Truant Surgeon, 
‘National Transport System’, at EPP, folder 1857.  
91 Road Grants Legislation in Australia: Commonwealth Government Involvement, 1900-1981, 
op. cit., p. 4.  
92 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 6 August 1926, pp. 5030. 
93 A young Robert Menzies appeared as a counsel for Victoria.  He argued that section 96 
referred only to the strictly financial terms of Commonwealth assistance to the states and was 
not intended to effectively broaden Commonwealth powers.  His client lost, although the High 
Court did rule that states had the right to refuse a tied grant.  Menzies did not mention Page in 
his published account of the origins of tied grants; see his Central Power in the Australian 
Commonwealth: An Examination of the Growth of Commonwealth Power in the Australian 
Federation, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1967, pp. 76-7. 
94 Draft speech by Page, undated, c. 1926, EPP, folder 417.  
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Railways (now W.C. Hill) spoke of roads as “a problem of national importance, 
and of too great magnitude for the various State Governments to handle 
without the aid of the National Government.”95     
 
The 1926 Act’s funding was mostly for rural roads, including “main roads which 
open up and develop new country.”96  Following the American example, the 
Commonwealth imposed detailed specifications for road construction.97  The 
states had to submit proposals covering a five-year period for approval by the 
Commonwealth Minister, and add 15 shillings for every pound they received 
(equating to 75 per cent of the Commonwealth grant).  All roads built using 
these grants were to be maintained by the states out of other funds and to the 
satisfaction of the Commonwealth, or else grants could be suspended.98  
Page’s powerful Federal Highways Commission was not established, but a 
Federal Aid Roads Board served as a consultative body of ministers and 
engineers.  This 1926 model survived until just 1931, when the Scullin 
government gave the states much more autonomy in the use of the grants.99  
 
Over a decade later, Page looked back on the 1926 Act as having 
“revolutionised in many respects the whole of the roads problem of 
Australia.”100  In his 1956 evidence to a New South Wales inquiry into local 
government boundaries, he spoke proudly of having been personally 
responsible for this scheme, “the main defence against shire bankruptcy, under 
which the road user pays his fair share of road construction and upkeep in 
addition to the contributions of the local residents and ratepayers.”101  Despite 
the challenges from the states, Page did not see himself as using the roads 
                                                 
95 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 27 July 1926, p. 4590. 
96 s5 of the Federal Aid Roads Act 1926. 
97 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., p. 128. 
98 ‘Memorandum on Federal Aid Roads’, an undated history of road funding prepared by or for 
Page, c. 1947, EPP, folder 2577.  
99 States no longer had to provide matching funds and could now use the grants for 
maintenance and repair; see James A. Maxwell, Commonwealth-State Financial Relations in 
Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1967, p. 49.  Scullin even spoke of the 
Commonwealth withdrawing to effectively act as a mere agent of the states by collecting the 
petrol tax on their behalf; see Bureau of Transport Economics, op. cit., pp. 16, 18. 
100 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 30 June 1937, p. 753. 
101 ‘Local Government Enquiry Commencing at Grafton on 10th September 1956 on Proposed 
Redivision of Local Government Boundaries – Evidence of Sir Earle Page, MP’, EPP, folder 
1798. 
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scheme to impose unreasonable control.  When the Chifley government 
tightened road funding arrangements in 1947, Page complained of the 
Commonwealth becoming “the controller instead of the partner.”102   
 
There is support for Page’s claims about his decisive personal role in these 
early tied grants for roads.  In 1950 the Australian Automobile Association 
attributed the 1923 legislation to “crusading countrymen” in the federal 
parliament.  It added that the 1926 legislation, “derived from American and 
Canadian practice”, had “exerted a revolutionary influence on road patterns, 
construction, administration and finance.”103  In a 1952 speech Sir John Kemp, 
chairman of the Queensland Main Roads Board and delegate to a 1926 
national conference of roads ministers and engineers, credited Page with 
creating the roads grants and having “inaugurated what until recently was the 
greatest scheme of public works Australia had yet seen.”104   
 
Further tied grants to the states were legislated for in 1927 to help farmers 
purchase rabbit-proof fencing.105  Tied grants eventually become a staple of 
Commonwealth-state financial relations that enabled the Commonwealth to use 
its growing fiscal power to impose control and reap kudos.  They were most 
famously used in the post-war era and beyond as the main basis for 
Commonwealth funding of higher education.  Page’s contribution to 
institutionalising tied grants alone gives him a significant place in the evolution 
of the Australian federation.  He later became an advocate of all 
Commonwealth grants to the states being tied to a specific purpose, particularly 
for hydroengineering.  In a speech of May 1956 Page told parliament that “it is 
absurd that we in this parliament should be raising enormous sums of money, 
and making ourselves most unpopular throughout Australia, simply to hand the 
                                                 
102 ‘Memorandum on Federal Aid Roads’, op. cit. 
103 Australian Automobile Association, A National Roads Policy for Australia, issued as a 
submission to the Commonwealth government, Wynyard, c. 1950, pp. 8-9, copy at EPP, folder 
1238.  
104 Sir John Kemp speech, ‘Some Aspects of Modern Transport and their Relation to Road 
Construction,’ 20 March 1952, EPP, folder 1238; see also Kay Cohen, 'Kemp, Sir John Robert 
(1883-1955)', Australian Dictionary of Biography,  http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/kemp-sir-
john-robert-10717/text18987, published first in hardcopy volume 15, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton, 2000.  The Bruce Highway in Queensland is, incidentally, named not for Stanley 
Bruce but for one Henry Adam Bruce, a Labor state and federal parliamentarian.  
105 This was the Wire and Wire Netting Act 1927.  
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money to the states without any tag on it at all; without any suggestion that 
there should be co-ordination.”  With no small degree of overstatement, he said 
that the Commonwealth should re-establish how “in the 1920s there was a 
most cordial co-operation with all the states.”106  Page was more successful 
with roads than he was with national railway unification: a notable exception 
was the unification of the Sydney-Brisbane line that included construction of a 
bridge over the Clarence at Grafton.107  (Page used Commonwealth funding to 
do much for his electorate, such as legislation in 1924 for the Grafton-to-
Brisbane rail line, sealing of the road from Grafton to the coast and assistance 
to the dairy industry).   
 
Page never saw himself as being absolutely bound by obligations to the 
governments in which he served.  Bruce’s allowing him latitude to pursue some 
of his personal goals was perhaps due to the Prime Minister privately reasoning 
that this was part of the price of a successful partnership.  Page accepted many 
of the inevitable strictures of high office, but remained alert to how his status as 
a senior government minister presented him with opportunities to pursue his 
personal policy vision, always his ultimate interest.  As Commonwealth 
Treasurer he demonstrated this in the fields of hydroelectricity, new states and 
tied grants. 
                                                 
106 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 22 May 1956, pp. 2321, 2322.  
107 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 180-2.  The bridge was completed in 1930, after the 
Bruce-Page government had lost office. 
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CHAPTER 4 – PAGE’S STANDING IN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY: THE 
BASIS OF HIS POWER  
 
This chapter builds on the preceding narrative-based assessment of Page’s 
policy campaigns by considering how his position as the second most senior 
minister in the Bruce-Page government and leader of the Country Party 
contributed to his ability to pursue these initiatives.  Although Page the 
personality was a singular holder of high office, the dynamics and priorities of 
both government and party provided him with the confidence and opportunity to 
pursue his developmentalist vision.  Page’s policy influence was based on his 
compatibility with Stanley Bruce’s and his government’s commitment to national 
development; the maintenance of the Country Party-Nationalist coalition; and 
on the effective consolidation of policy authority within the Country Party with 
the leader of the federal parliamentary party.  Events in the mid-1920s were 
especially important, when Page decisively defended the coalition from internal 
challenges and shifted the locus of power in his party away from farmers’ 
organisations and towards himself.  
 
Treasurer Page in office 
 
Page was a confident Treasurer and party leader, imbued with a striving sense 
of personal purpose.  He was consciously different from other politicians, not 
least through his continuing to live up to the truant surgeon tag by, as Ellis put 
it, being willing to “as cheerfully minister to a violent opponent as to a firm 
political friend.”1  Recollections of peers and adversaries alike give a strong 
impression of an assertive minister who ranged far beyond his portfolio 
responsibilities in pursuing his national vision.  Jack Lang recalled how as a 
newly elected Premier of New South Wales in 1925 he received a visitation 
from the Commonwealth Treasurer: Page “bustled in, full of energy and 
assurance”, and “seemed to think that…my agreement was only a matter of 
form.”  Lang felt that Page “was lecturing me as if I was a young medical 
                                                 
1 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 326. 
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student.”2  Page’s high standing in the Bruce-Page government lent him an 
expectation of a say in almost every major decision and a vantage point from 
which to survey the direction of the entire nation.      
 
As Treasurer, Page’s agreement in principle with the need to restrict 
government expenditure was never allowed to obstruct his developmentalist 
agenda.  He took little interest in a Commonwealth public service that was then 
“strong on process but often weak on specific qualifications for the tasks at 
hand”, and hence “dominated by accounting principles.”3  His personal papers 
and official records in the National Archives of Australia contain scant evidence 
of reliance on his own Department for support of any sort.  His memoirs make 
only passing reference to just one of the two Secretaries of the Treasury who 
worked under him (James Collins, for his assistance in 1924 with legislation on 
central banking).4  At the day-to-day level, Page “brought despair to 
secretaries, public servants and fellow ministers bearing neat files of papers 
and impeccable records” by dismembering the files in question.  Exchanges 
with senior officials gave the superficial illusion that he lacked purpose as 
conversation leapt from topic to topic and was at risk of termination by a 
sudden Page decision to break for a game of tennis or a nap on his office 
couch.5  Frank Green noted with distaste Page’s habit of assuming that a 
partner in conversation agreed with him and concluding the matter under 
discussion by simply moving on to another issue.6   
 
Yet even if the public service had been strong on policy advising, Page would 
not have let it intrude on this agenda.  He habitually sought outside experts to 
help him pursue his goals.  Page conspicuously did not conform to the early 
Country Party’s suspicion of big business and so sought the counsel of such 
figures as Herbert Gepp, general manager of the Electrolytic Zinc Company, 
                                                 
2 Jack Lang, I Remember: Autobiography, McNamara's Books, Katoomba, 1980 (first published 
1956), p. 239. 
3 First quote, Nicholas Brown, op. cit., p. 408; second quote, Greg Whitwell, The Treasury Line, 
Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1986, pp. 4-5.  
4 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 142.  The other was James Heathershaw.  Both were 
career officers of Treasury.  
5 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 326-7. 
6 Green, op. cit., p. 103. 
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and F.B. (Tim) Clapp, Chairman of Australian General Electric.  Page the 
incorrigible optimist assumed that a policy case presented clearly and logically 
to people of influence would be bound to win their support, a belief that was to 
survive repeated disappointments which would have discouraged a less 
persistent man.  By contrast, Page made few attempts to reach out to 
organised labour. 
 
His attraction to robust business leaders was leavened by ongoing dealings 
with progressive intellectual figures such as Griffith Taylor and the pioneering 
sociologist C.H. Northcott.  His sporadic dalliances with these figures were 
conducted through correspondence, perusal of their publications and 
occasional meetings.  The emphasis was more on validation of his ideas than 
openness to new concepts.  Northcott, for example, (who also hailed from the 
Clarence River region), corresponded with Page on shared interest in 
population distribution and a proposed expert commission to assess new 
legislation.7  Page drew on whatever written authorities and exemplars seemed 
to offer support.  One of his favourite sources was a 1922 study of the 
economic history of the United States by the British trade diplomat John Joyce 
Broderick.  He interpreted this authoritative text very liberally over decades, 
such as its comments on the significance of electrification.  Page found 
Broderick especially handy for making the case that new states would of 
themselves spark development.8  
 
What influence such progressive thinkers had on Page was to the not 
inconsiderable extent that during the 1920s he became an advocate of national 
efficiency.  This very broad concept was in practice “synonymous with whatever 
was virtuous in progressive eyes”, but was taken by Page to mean government 
structures that could further his national vision through such means as 
                                                 
7 Clarence H. Northcott, Australian Social Development, Columbia University, New York, 1918, 
pp. 291-5; see also Northcott’s farewell letter to Page, 5 September 1928, as he returned to 
England, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, Box 10, folder 80.   
8 Report on the Economic, Financial and Industrial Conditions of the United States of America 
in 1922 by Sir John Joyce Broderick, Department of Overseas Trade, HMSO, London, 1923.  
The copy at EPP folder 2723 bears Page’s personal highlighting of such passages as those on 
assistance to farmers and hydroelectricity.  This report was still being referenced by Page in his 
12 April 1957 speech to the Country Party Annual Conference; see EPP folder 2607. 
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economic planning, co-ordination between levels of government and the 
selective nurturing of industries – not efficiency as imposed by rule of the free 
market. 9  In 1926 the Adelaide Register dismissed a characteristic Page 
speech as being of “prodigious length, disarmingly egotistical and generously 
studded with references to national development, orderly marketing, improved 
distribution and all else that may be summed up in the blessed words National 
Efficiency.”10 
 
In private, Page occasionally complained of the pressures of political life and 
contrasted the ugliness of party politics with his own higher values.  In August 
1922, amidst his harrying of the Hughes government, he shared with his wife 
his despair that politics brought out “the lowest in human nature.”  Amidst the 
“fighting with tooth and claw,” both “H & M.G.” (Hughes and Massy-Greene) 
were “unscrupulous to a degree”, as against the “clear thinking and straight 
acting” that Page saw himself upholding.  Page feared that he was “just too soft 
for this work.”11  Such dark reflections were to re-appear in the late 1930s.  
Page kept his personal fears to himself and to his wife; others rarely sensed 
any doubts.  Late in 1924, he proceeded on what was publicly described as a 
“health trip” to North America as “Dr Page’s health has for some time been 
unsatisfactory, due largely to the strenuous time he had last year.”12  Yet even 
on this trip Page immersed himself in United States and Canadian development 
policy and returned home brimming with ideas on roads and much else.   
 
Page and Bruce: not so odd a couple  
  
The Bruce-Page government almost immediately established itself as 
Australia’s most self-consciously developmentalist administration since 
Federation, providing Page with a sound platform that he both benefitted from 
and contributed to.  Although the 1920s was a decade of widespread optimism 
                                                 
9 Quote from Michael Roe Nine Australian Progressives: Vitalism in Bourgeois Social Thought 
1890-1960, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1984, p. 11. 
10 Editorial in the Adelaide Register of 22 June 1926, p. 8. 
11 Page to Ethel Page, 13 August 1922, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, Box 9, 
folder 71. 
12 Daily Examiner, 27 December 1924, p. 3.  The term “health trip” is used for example in the 
Perth Daily News, 15 December 1924, p. 7.  
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about Australian development, the shared determination of Bruce and Page 
was needed to translate this into policy.  They did not move as stealthily as has 
sometimes been claimed.13   From the outset they tried to alter fundamentals, 
strongly signalled by the comprehensive co-ordination with the states that they 
proposed at the 1923 Premiers’ Conference, just three months after coming to 
office.  Staley and Nethercote in their overview of Australian liberalism 
considered that Bruce and Page had headed a government of “active 
interventionism.”14  They did more than any of their predecessors and most of 
their successors to define and consolidate the role of the Commonwealth in 
promoting national development.  This was by asserting its leadership of policy 
fields where it shared responsibilities with the states, by overhauling federal 
financial relations and, later in the decade, by promoting economic planning.  
These two inexperienced party leaders thus took charge of debate about the 
fundamentals of the Australian federation, with Page making important 
contributions in co-operative federalism, planning and tied grants.  Page’s later 
view of the 1920s as a creative period when the coalition with the Nationalists 
“permitted enormous strides to be made in Australian progress” testifies to the 
alacrity with which he and Bruce sought to reorganise the nation to 
developmentalist ends.15   
 
The rapid forging of the coalition by Bruce and Page and the largely effective 
collaboration that followed was made possible by their being closer in broad 
policy outlook than is often realised.  At the personal level, Page seemed 
scattergun alongside the stately, measured Bruce, but this was more stylistic 
than substantive.  They shared a national outlook underpinned by faith in 
efficient, rational governance firmly under Commonwealth leadership: unusually 
for party leaders of their time, neither had served in a state or colonial 
parliament.  Ellis wrote as a witness of “a unique partnership between these 
two complementary personalities imbued with similar broad objectives.”16  Page 
                                                 
13 Robert Murray thought that the Bruce-Page government proceeded at a “steady, measured 
pace” compared, for example, to the Whitlam government; see Murray, op. cit., p. 128. 
14 A.A. Staley and J.R. Nethercote, ‘Liberalism and the Australian Federation’ in Nethercote, op. 
cit.,  p. 8; see also in this source Nethercote, ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and Coalition 1910-29’, 
especially pp. 128-33.   
15 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit. 
16 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 100. 
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thought that his working relationship with Bruce was “from the outset…intimate 
and cordial”, and so he had “few qualms about walking down the passage to 
see him, with or without knocking on the door.”17  He recalled that at the outset 
“Bruce and I had no difficulty in agreeing on the principle that a Government 
and the members of the Government should always express one opinion, and 
one voice only, on matters of government policy”, and that it was rare for the 
Bruce-Page Cabinet to resort to a vote.18   
 
Fundamental to their ability to work well together was the broad compatibility of 
the two men’s respective visions of economic development.  Bruce’s was less 
fully defined than that of Page, and so remains open to wider interpretation.  
The Prime Minister’s approach emphasised increasing the scale of the 
economy via immigration based on the more extensive and intensive use of 
rural land.  He told an Imperial Conference in 1924 that “Australia’s aim above 
everything else is to populate her country and advance from her position of a 
very small people occupying a very vast territory.”19  This goal was closely 
linked to a larger vision for the economic development of the Empire, with 
Britain supplying manufactures and finance to Dominions which in return 
provided foodstuffs, raw materials and outlets for excess population.  Page 
recalled having also long seen a bigger population as essential for the nation’s 
ability to “save enough to provide the amenities and developments for future 
generations” and “to defend it against outside foes.”20  The very mixed 
economic circumstances of the 1920s also helped Page, in that the Bruce-
Page government felt it had a duty to enliven a generally sluggish economy.  
This “deeply disturbed course of economic activity” included a slight recession 
in the early 1920s and a dip in economic activity from 1925-6 that heralded the 
Great Depression.21 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 129. 
18 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 126. 
19 Quoted in W.H. Richmond, ‘S.M. Bruce and Australian Economic Policy 1923-9’, Australian 
Economic History Review, vol. 23, no. 2, 1983, p. 239.  Richmond does not discuss Page’s 
views.  
20 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit.  
21 Butlin, Barnard and Pincus, op. cit., pp. 77-80.  
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Like Page, Bruce saw natural resources as key to the nation’s future: the 
economic historian W.H. Richmond classified him as a “rural optimist.”  Bruce 
did not advocate a fully laissez-faire economy, and accepted arbitration and 
tariffs as important, though not central.22  He accepted also that rural industries 
needed government assistance to secure better access to British markets, 
notably through Imperial preference and marketing support.  But he greatly 
preferred that primary producers improve their international competitiveness by 
more efficient management and promotion rather than reliance on continued 
government support.  Like Page, Bruce was more interested in improving 
efficiency than in protecting rural producers through orderly marketing.23  He 
agreed with Page that protection should favour efficient industries so as not to 
unduly handicap those rural producers who had to compete internationally.  But 
he struggled to find a logical basis for determining tariff levels and for 
identifying which industries should be protected.  A major gap between the two 
was that Bruce remained only a tepid advocate of new states and regionalism, 
as Thompson’s 1923 delegation discovered.  Like Hughes, Bruce put much of 
the onus for new states back onto state governments.24    
 
Both men thought of themselves as essentially apolitical.  As one of the few 
Australian national political leaders with a personal background in commerce 
rather than party politics, Bruce claimed that “we were guided not by ideological 
motives, but by strict business principles.”25  He and Page shared a lack of faith 
in the capacity of established government departments to implement 
developmentalist strategy.  They instead tried to institutionalise rationalism and 
efficiency through a string of boards and commissions led by forceful, 
technocratic business leaders such as Gepp, their epitome of a modern 
manager.26  This included the 1926 creation of the CSIR, Australia’s first 
effective national science agency and which had a strong emphasis on rural 
                                                 
22 Richmond, op. cit., pp. 238-40, 256. 
23 Ibid., pp. 244-6.  
24 Farrell thesis, op. cit., p. 86; Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., pp. 168-9. 
25 Quoted in Judith Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class: From Alfred Deakin to 
John Howard, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 80. 
26 See Roger Wettenhall, ‘Federal Labor and the Statutory Corporation under Matthew 
Charlton’, in Public Enterprise and National Development: Selected Essays, Royal Australian 
Institute of Public Administration (A.C.T. Division) in association with the National Council, 
Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, Canberra, 1987, p. 35. 
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research.  Bruce described it as a “really effective instrument for the promotion 
of greater efficiency in Australia, and to ensure the investigation of some of 
those great problems which we must overcome if we are not to be handicapped 
in our national development.”27  Page attributed his own strong support for the 
CSIR to “my country background and scientific training.”28  The Bruce-Page 
government also established at about the same time the Development and 
Migration Commission as a planning and advisory body to reinforce efficiency 
and population growth by guiding the placement of the greatest number of 
migrants on the land at the lowest cost.29  (This Commission is described in 
more detail in the following chapter).  Guiding principles of national efficiency 
under Commonwealth leadership did not readily appeal to state governments 
wary of Commonwealth intrusions, with the result that at Premiers’ 
Conferences Bruce considered it necessary to exhort the states to place 
national duty above politics.               
 
Page also largely matched his Prime Minister on the wider public issues that 
defined the party divide with the ALP.  He often spoke of the deep divisions 
between the government and a Labor Opposition that was both highly 
protectionist and opposed to large-scale migration.  Page strongly favoured 
private control of the main means of production, declaring himself during the 
1922 election campaign in favour of “the strictest limitation of Government 
enterprise to developmental works and public utilities.”30  He preferred 
voluntary commissions to compulsory arbitration, and producer-led voluntary 
co-operative pools over compulsory government-managed pools.  Page agreed 
to the sale of public enterprises such as the Commonwealth Harness Factory, 
the Williamstown Dockyards, the Commonwealth Woollen Mills and the 
Commonwealth Shipping Line and also supported the termination of 
Commonwealth control of the sale of sugar.31  Yet, as Page saw himself as 
                                                 
27 Bruce speaking to the House of Representatives in 1926 on legislation to create the CSIR, 
quoted in Sir George Currie and John Graham, The Origins of CSIRO: Science and the 
Commonwealth Government 1901-1926, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation, Melbourne, 1966, p. 136.  
28 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 167. 
29 Richmond, op. cit., p. 247.  The Bruce-Page government just before its fall also legislated for 
a Bureau of Economic Research. 
30 Argus, 27 October 1922, p. 10. 
31 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 135-7. 
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more practical than ideological, he had few qualms about supporting creation of 
a publicly-owned central bank.  Page also fully backed (but did not lead) 
Bruce’s and the Nationalists' reactions to industrial turmoil.  He recalled of the 
shipping strike of 1925 that the government had gone to the election of that 
year “on the issue of a mandate to enforce constitutional law against mob rules 
[sic] and strikes”, and that the government’s whole record “depended on a 
united resistance to Labour [sic] doctrine and industrial anarchy.”  He saw no 
prospect of a rapprochement with the ALP on these matters.32  
 
The priority that Page attached to maintaining the coalition meant that he was 
usually at pains to work well with Bruce.  But Page appears to have 
overestimated the depth of their relationship and at times inadvertently tested 
the Prime Minister’s tolerance.  Bruce’s comments to his first biographer, Cecil 
Edwards, imply that he saw their closeness as more political than personal.  
Although it was “a more or less happy combination,” Bruce’s recollections of 
Page’s daily “new brainwaves” that “were nearly always half-baked” indicate 
wariness on his part.33  Bruce’s attitude to Page remained necessarily different 
from that towards other ministers, as their ability to work together was essential 
to the government’s survival.  The Prime Minister’s tolerant (if patrician) nature 
helped.  Edwards recalled Bruce as being “kind and helpful” to him when a 
novice member of the press gallery in the early 1920s, and invariably 
“courteous and dependable” thereafter.34  Bruce’s appreciation of Page’s 
strengths and weaknesses was the basis of his ability to productively channel 
his deputy’s enthusiasms.  He recognised Page’s creativity but doubted his 
ability to persuade – “Page could have the most brilliant idea on earth, but he 
couldn’t put it over.”35  Hence Bruce’s practice of opening Premiers’ 
Conferences himself with long statements of intent that left Page with a 
subsidiary role in subsequent debate.   
 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 204. 
33 Quoted in Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, op. cit., p. 82.  See Martin, op. cit., p. 279 for similar 
private comments made by Bruce in 1939.  
34 Edwards, The Editor Regrets, op. cit., p. 35. 
35 Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, op. cit., p. 82.  
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Most historians correctly picture the Bruce-Page government as a genuine 
partnership, but one led by Bruce.36  They were not equals in government.  
Page often initiated proposals, but Bruce retained final say.  As their ministerial 
colleague George Pearce observed, Bruce ultimately ran his own 
administration and frequently saw advantage in letting Page think he was in 
charge.37  Page’s own recollections are broadly consistent with this image of 
Page initiating but with the Prime Minister having authority to veto.  He recalled 
that Bruce “would cross-examine me for hours on every phrase; ruminate on 
the problem for a day or two, expound its details with the greatest clarity, and 
often suggest modifications or amendments which would strengthen its 
foundations.”38  One of the most detailed studies to touch on the policy 
interaction of the two concerns Australia’s support for a British return to the 
gold standard: it is evident that Bruce had retained first say and issued 
guidance to his Treasurer accordingly.39  Similarly, when Bruce departed 
overseas in 1926, he presented Page with detailed written instructions on how 
he wanted outstanding business managed in his absence, ranging from War 
Service Homes to an offer from Sidney Myer to act as an Australian trade 
representative, hardly the act of a Prime Minister not in full charge.40     
 
In recording the achievements of the Bruce-Page government, Ellis implied that 
most had been driven by Page alone.  His history of the Country Party, for 
example, lists initiatives that Page proposed in a flurry of memoranda prepared 
after returning from his travels in North America and Britain during 1925 – the 
creation of a federal Department of Agriculture (initially the Department of 
Markets), rural credits, a National Health Council, and tied grants for water and 
                                                 
36 Robert Murray is an exception, having written that “It is still open to question who was the 
boss in this amazingly smooth partnership”; Murray, op. cit., p. 115.  
37 Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton, 1965, pp. 92, 94.  Bruce commented that Truant Surgeon seemed to suggest 
that “all our best ideas originated with him” but claimed to be “not frightfully concerned which of 
the things we did originated with him or with me”; see Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, op. cit., p. 
82. 
38 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 130. 
39 Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘The Australian Role in Britain’s Return to the Gold Standard’, Economic 
History Review, vol. 47, no. 1, February 1994; see especially p. 134. 
40 See Bruce to Page, 5 September 1926, EPP, folder 2368.  Bruce’s skill in managing Page 
raises a point made much later by a British political scientist that “good leadership…should 
never be confused with the overmighty power of overweening individuals”; see Archie Brown, 
The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age,  p. xii, Vintage Books, 
London, 2015 (first published 2014).   
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sewage in country towns (subsequently thwarted by the states) and for roads.41  
This is an impressive list and a testament to Page’s creativity.  If he did not lead 
the government, Page nonetheless marked himself as a more original thinker 
than Bruce by adding a regionalist dimension to national policy and by linking 
different policy fields to a wider purpose of shaping the nation accordingly.  The 
rural bias of the Bruce-Page government was not just crude pork-barrelling but 
also reflected Page’s commitment to spatially-based development.   
 
Against this, Ellis’s list consists mainly of matters of interest specifically to the 
Country Party.  It does not include several Bruce-Page initiatives of this time 
that had broader national significance, such as the Financial Agreement, which 
have a mixed provenance Page must share with Bruce.  Nor did Ellis dwell on 
outcomes Page was largely unable to achieve, notably decentralisation, 
hydroelectricity, new states and related constitutional change.  Bruce remained 
far less interested in these than did Page.  It is significant that where Page 
failed in an objective he lacked Bruce’s wholehearted support.  To achieve 
major change, the Bruce-Page government needed the full engagement of both 
party leaders, particularly in the united application of Commonwealth fiscal 
power to overcome opposition from state governments.   
 
Page upholds the coalition  
 
The foremost means by which Page enhanced his standing in government and 
party was his consolidation of the coalition with the Nationalists.  The 
agreement that he and Bruce forged in 1922-23 faced periodic challenges from 
within both participating parties.  Page withstood these by intervening in 
potentially divisive internal Country Party debates on strategy.    
 
Following a series of instances of Nationalist and Country Party candidates 
contesting the same seats at state elections, Bruce and Page in 1924 sought to 
reaffirm the coalition by devising a further pact.  Its central feature was an 
                                                 
41 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 102-4.  The Bruce-Page 
government‘s attempt to introduce tried grants for sewerage schemes in rural towns is also 
addressed in Truant Surgeon, ibid., p. 189. 
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immunity clause discouraging such contests at the forthcoming 1925 federal 
election.  This provided for each party to refrain from running a candidate in an 
electorate where there was already an incumbent from the other, and that in 
Labor-held seats the candidate should come from whichever party was 
strongest locally.  If for some reason a seat still elicited candidates from both 
non-Labor parties, they were to exchange preferences.  In effect, the Country 
Party was agreeing to limit its expansion to what seats it could win from the 
ALP.  Both Page and Bruce threatened to resign from their respective party 
leaderships rather than drop the new pact.  Serious opposition still came from 
within the AFFO and its membership of farmers’ organisations, especially the 
radical faction of the VFU and associations in South Australia and Western 
Australia.  One of the main complaints was that by upholding the coalition, 
Page was endangering the separate identity of the Country Party and 
committing it to an anti-Labor role.42  The agreement was therefore amended to 
make exceptions for individual seats, but this did not prevent the disputatious 
Stewart from angrily resigning from Cabinet in August 1924 on the grounds that 
the pact restricted voters’ choice by protecting sitting MPs.  Page – a little 
ironically – was to later describe Stewart as “a brilliant man” who “possessed 
the defect of being too egotistical for protracted teamwork.”43  
 
The attacks on Page over the 1924 pact were the most serious test that he had 
faced as party leader.  This opposition was attributable in no small part to his 
having engineered the pact personally with Bruce and then proceeding to insist 
that the party accept it without change, just as he had the 1923 agreement.  
Page as an autocratic party leader was determined to fight for the coalition as a 
basis for pursuing his goals.  In his defence, Page could decisively point to 
tangible gains that the Country Party had been able to deliver in coalition, such 
as abolition of federal land tax on Crown leaseholds, protection of rural 
industries, rural telephone services, the tied grants for roads and the 
Commonwealth Bank’s Rural Credits Department.44  Page told a party 
conference in Adelaide that it was no coincidence that Labor was in power in 
                                                 
42 Graham, op. cit., pp. 223-6. 
43 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 206. 
44 Graham, op. cit., pp. 227-8. 
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states which lacked a coalition.45  His ability to see off challenges to his 
authority benefitted fortuitously from sizeable budget surpluses in 1922-23 to 
1924-25 arising from higher than anticipated customs and excise revenue 
during a rare inter-war period of buoyancy.46    
 
That the coalition survived such challenges is remarkable given the 
fractiousness of the early Country Party.  The still formative federal party lacked 
a solid institutional basis for constraining a strong parliamentary leader, leaving 
Page to manage the relationship with the Nationalists.  (The state country 
parties were often more tightly organised).  This may help explain Page’s 
power: opponents such as Stewart kept splitting away rather than having the 
option of organising opposition through an established party decision-making 
mechanism.  Page flourished also because he successfully balanced his 
grander visions with concern to maintain the coalition, hence his caution about 
promoting new states and calculated acceptance of tariffs.  The success of this 
first rural-urban federal coalition had a lasting impact on Australian politics and 
became a major factor in Page’s long-term standing in the party.  
The scale of the government’s win at the 1925 election helped Page 
consolidate his position as party leader and upholder of the coalition.  The 
Nationalists won 11 extra seats and the Country Party one more.  Page 
resisted lingering calls to end the coalition, and did not object when the 
Nationalists took two more seats in an expanded Cabinet.  He successfully 
maintained the federal coalition right up to 1929, despite splits over Country 
Party autonomy in the Victorian and South Australian parties in 1926 and 1928 
respectively.47  The main point of contention that still could have ended the 
coalition, tariff policy, remained largely unaddressed.  
 
Page also benefited in the eyes of the wider Country Party from the Bruce-
Page government’s identification with orderly marketing programs.  The 
protection this provided to primary producers included tariffs on some food 
imports (such as maize, hops and sugar); subsidies on exports of high cost 
                                                 
45 Port Pirie Recorder, 10 September 1924, p. 1.  
46 Customs and excise constituted 61 per cent of total Commonwealth revenue in 1922-23 and 
over 70 per cent in 1924-5; Graham, ibid., p. 230. 
47 Davey, Ninety Not Out, op. cit., pp. 37-9.    
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industries (such as dried and canned fruits); and Australian domestic parity 
prices for exports (notably dairy products).  As Graham noted, some of these 
programs originated with the Hughes government, including subsidies for beef 
exports and the embargo on sugar imports, or were the result of concessions 
reluctantly made to pressure groups, such as subsidisation of canned fruit 
exports.48  By early 1928, the Commonwealth Department of Markets was 
administering 15 federal Acts and nine producer boards and similar 
organisations.49  The sole major agricultural industry not receiving 
governmental support was wool, which by commanding a strong position in 
international markets did not need further bolstering.  The inter-war period was 
to see the creation of a complex web of Commonwealth and state support 
schemes for farm industries, operating mainly through high domestic prices and 
with only the strongly export-oriented wool and wheat industries generally 
receiving less effective assistance.50   
 
Page’s ambivalence about orderly marketing schemes made him a less 
consistent originator and advocate of these arrangements than were other 
senior Country Party figures.  Especially prominent was his future deputy 
leader Thomas Paterson, who in 1925-26 originated the earliest significant 
such program, the eponymous Paterson voluntary dairy scheme.  Page could 
be economical in crediting others, but in his memoirs paid full tribute to 
Paterson for this initiative.51  Page’s ambivalence was the basis of his 1924 
agreement with Bruce that industry-led co-operative marketing schemes should 
pay their own way, leading to the government’s refusal to sponsor a 
compulsory wheat pool.  Although the Rural Credits Department that Page had 
                                                 
48 Graham, op. cit., pp. 228, 231.  
49 ‘The Marketing of Primary Products: Statement from the Commonwealth Minister of Markets 
and Migration, Hon. T. Paterson’, in Supplement to The Economic Record, February 1928, pp. 
124-5. 
50 A.G. Lloyd, ‘Agricultural Price Policy’ in D.B. Williams (ed.), Agriculture in the Australian 
Economy, Sydney University Press, Sydney, second edition 1982 (first published 1967), pp. 
359-60. 
51 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 132.  The Paterson Scheme was voluntary in nature.  It 
centred on dairy factories paying a levy on all butter they produced, generating funds that were 
then paid back as a bounty on the approximately one third of output that was exported.  As the 
local market price was set during the export season at export parity, the scheme resulted in a 
rise in local consumer prices i.e. the other two thirds of sales, leading to a net gain for 
producers.  See Lloyd, ‘Agricultural Price Policy’, in Williams, ibid., p. 367.  On Bruce’s attitude 
to orderly marketing, see Richmond, op. cit., p. 245. 
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established in 1925 extended grants to various voluntary co-operative pools, he 
personally rejected a system of compulsory pools co-ordinated by a federal 
authority, pointing to the strictures imposed by section 92 of the Constitution 
guaranteeing free trade between the states.  This may have also reflected 
Nationalist Party reluctance to keep indulging its junior coalition partner: if so, it 
again illustrates that maintaining the coalition took priority for Page over the 
demands of the Country Party’s more radical elements.52  
 
Page and the Country Party: shifting policy authority   
 
In addition to successfully defending the coalition, Page consolidated his 
central role in policy formulation within the Country Party through changes to its 
national organisation.  Bruce and Page’s largely shared views on development 
made them politically closer to each other than to their respective parties.  The 
stress in Page’s memoirs on how well they worked together contrasts with the 
paucity of references to major policy being initiated by his own party 
colleagues.  Both leaders formulated policy with only as much regard for their 
respective party rooms as was necessary.  Page appears to have been 
frustrated by what he saw as the narrower visions of his colleagues, such as on 
new states and electrification.  He was not especially close to his party deputy, 
W.G. Gibson, other than sharing an interest in rural communication and radio 
services.  Drummond, who sat in the New South Wales legislature, remained 
his only real parliamentary confidant.  
 
Yet Graham observed of Page that “no other person in the party was as widely 
known and respected, and he demanded – and obtained – that unquestioning 
loyalty which Australian farmers are accustomed to give their leaders.”53  Page 
used this status to play a decisive role in encouraging the state organisations to 
shift policy-making from the party’s nascent national organisation to the federal 
parliamentary party.  Page thereby became a great shaper of the Country 
Party, creating policy space for himself in the process.  He had long held that 
major decisions on policy and strategy should be left to MPs, not the party 
                                                 
52 Graham, op. cit., pp. 228, 244. 
53 Ibid., p. 287. 
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organisation and outrider bodies.  In 1924 he declared to the VFU that “a leader 
must give a lead” and “should not be expected to run to the rank and file for 
every little thing.”54     
 
The main change that embedded Page’s policy authority was the replacement 
of the AFFO as the Party’s foremost national body by the creation of the 
Australian Country Party Association (ACPA) at a national conference of the 
Country Party and its allied organisations in Melbourne on 23 March 1926.  
Although the unity of all political parties was often tenuous in the 1920s – even 
an issue as seemingly innocuous as construction of a Sydney to Brisbane 
uniform gauge railway line led nine ALP parliamentarians and nine Nationalists 
to cross the floor of Federal Parliament in opposite directions – the Country 
Party was at first especially loosely organised.55  AFFO support for any 
particular position, such as the 1925 electoral pact, was not decisive as it was 
essentially a confederation that formulated recommendations for approval by 
state bodies, which were themselves bound by respective constitutions.   
 
As federal parliamentary party leader, Page did not have power over the AFFO, 
let alone the state organisations.  In March 1925, for example, the AFFO 
demanded that the parliamentary party try to abolish high tariffs on agricultural 
machinery and introduce a compulsory wheat pool.56  Page favoured a full 
reorganisation of the party and so at the March 1926 conference proposed an 
“amended organisation of the Australian Country Party so as to form a political 
organisation to which all electors whose sympathies are with the policy of the 
organisation may belong” (thereby also seeking to widen the party to include 
rural-based secondary industry).57  At the time, Page was quoted as declaring 
that it was “essential to separate the industrial from the political activities of the 
Country Party.”58  Page told Graham in an interview conducted in 1956 that one 
of his goals in creating the ACPA was a clearer institutional division between 
the party organisation and the federal parliamentary party, which would place 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 248. 
55 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 181.  There was also a split over the 1926 tied road grants 
legislation, which was opposed by some Nationalists and only passed with Labor support. 
56 Graham, op. cit., pp. 284-5. 
57 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 142. 
58 The Land, 26 March 1926, p. 13. 
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formulation of policy and parliamentary strategy firmly with the latter.59  In his 
memoirs, Page recalled that a stronger party organisation based on a federal 
structure would “give balance to the Party’s parliamentary policy”, but added 
the more immediate motivation of managing the rural radicals on the coalition 
issue, especially Stewart who in March 1926 formed a breakaway Country 
Party Progressive Group.60     
 
Officials of state organisations had constituted the majority at AFFO 
conferences, but the constitution of the ACPA effectively institutionalised the 
dominance of the parliamentary party, especially in its provisions for the ACPA 
Central Council.  These were drafted in 1926 and approved the following year, 
creating a Central Council consisting of the federal parliamentary leader, two 
other federal representatives and fourteen members elected from affiliated 
organisations.  The role of federal parliamentarians was decisively enhanced 
by most of the organisations habitually appointing federal members as their 
representatives.  Only eight delegates were needed to constitute a quorum, 
and the Central Council could appoint a smaller executive committee that 
needed only a quorum of three.  The Council was obliged to frame policy based 
on the Party’s platform in consultation with the federal parliamentary party.  The 
ACPA met on average only annually in its first few years of existence, leaving 
the energetic Page a free hand to continue to build his extensive network of 
personal contacts and defend the coalition strategy.61  Further, Page was 
appointed ACPA chair in 1927 and held this position until his death. 
 
The growing dominance of Page and the parliamentary party was reflected in 
the federal Country Party’s continued resistance to pressure from its supporting 
organisations and state bodies over tariffs.  At a party meeting in February 
1926 a motion on tariffs was put aside in favour of one calling for an inquiry into 
                                                 
59 Graham, op. cit., p. 285.  
60 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 206-7.  Page refers to this resignation being in July; most 
other sources, including Ellis and the Australian Dictionary of Biography entry on Stewart, state 
March; K. M. Haig-Muir, 'Stewart, Percy Gerald (1885–1931)', Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/stewart-percy-gerald-8669/text15161, published first in 
hardcopy 1990, volume 12, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1990. 
61 Graham, op. cit., pp. 285-7. 
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their effects, which Page was obliged to pass to the Prime Minister.  (This led to 
the Brigden inquiry into tariffs, described in the next chapter).62  Similarly, in 
June 1927 the ACPA rejected a Western Australian motion for reduction of 
duties in favour of one calling for “all-round protection” as advocated by Page.63   
 
Page thus effectively made his own rules in the Country Party while it was still 
malleable.  This was not to last, with the bulk of the party over the next two 
decades developing and consolidating its own priorities.  There is one other 
concluding point in considering Page’s role in government and party during the 
Bruce-Page years.  After the government’s fall in October 1929, it was Page 
and not Bruce (who departed parliamentary politics in 1933) who maintained 
the principal developmentalist ideas that their government had upheld – 
Commonwealth-led co-ordination, an expressly national conception of 
development and planning, and the hope that development could be placed 
above party politics.  An important aspect of Page’s significance in Australian 
history is that he drew on his largely happy experience of the Bruce-Page 
government to continue efforts to apply its precepts into the future. 
 
                                                 
62 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 119-20. 
63 Graham, op. cit., p. 246. 
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CHAPTER 5 – PAGE’S LAST YEARS IN THE BRUCE-PAGE 
GOVERNMENT: CHALLENGING THE NATION THROUGH PLANNING AND 
FEDERALISM  
 
During the latter 1920s and in the wake of the Cohen Royal Commission, Page 
shifted his attention from new states to trying to transform the nation through 
economic planning and the reform of federalism.  His engagement with these 
was enlivened by the Bruce-Page government’s creation of the Development 
and Migration Commission (DMC) and determination to finally resolve fiscal 
relations with the states.  Historians widely recognise that Page played a major 
role in negotiating the Financial Agreement of 1927.  Less well widely 
appreciated is that it was a time of consolidation of his own broader ideas about 
planning and federalism.  
 
Page’s commitment to national planning developed later than his other 
passions of regionalism, hydroelectricity and constitutional reform.  He first 
expressed interest during the early 1920s, when as a thoughtful new 
parliamentarian he pondered ways to pursue the major themes of his August 
1917 speech of decentralisation and the realisation of national potential.  This 
nascent interest only gelled when the Bruce-Page government embarked on an 
institutionalised approach to planning by establishing the DMC in 1926.  The 
principal task of this statutory authority was to appraise new development 
projects, but it also had a remarkably wide brief to investigate and attempt to 
guide the entire economy.  Page upheld it as a working example of an expert 
agency that elevated development policy above party politics and used 
business leaders as advisers.  Shortly after, Bruce and Page eliminated the 
vertical fiscal imbalance still dogging Australian federalism by using the 
Commonwealth’s fiscal power to force the states to accept the Financial 
Agreement.  They followed this success with a last concerted effort to have the 
states agree to the national co-ordination of policies relating to electricity, 
transport, health and much else.  
 
Page brought to each of these initiatives his characteristic energy and capacity 
for synthesis.  For all his support for new states, he simultaneously advocated 
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both national and regional scales of policy action.  National economic planning, 
in particular, became one of his main means of trying to establish efficient new 
industries based on primary goods and of locating these to vitalise rural 
communities.  This chapter, covering the final years of the Bruce-Page 
government, explains his attraction to the DMC and planning amid related 
national debates over tariff policy, culminating in his attempt to have the DMC 
realise his hopes for regional development in the Clarence Valley.  It also 
analyses his important tactical role in the overhaul of Commonwealth-state 
fiscal relations and in less successful efforts towards national policy co-
ordination.        
 
Page champions planned national development and the DMC 
 
The Country Party dabbled in planning as early as 1921 when it considered a 
“complete survey and calculation of the resources of the Commonwealth”, an 
idea that Page retained as the proper starting point for well-informed planning.1  
The following year he began the Country Party election policy speech with a 
declaration that “Australia has reached the period in her history when her 
greatest need is sound government on an organised plan, recognising the stern 
necessity for economy without crippling the development of our primary and 
secondary industries.”2  As Treasurer, planning became a frequent feature of 
his early speeches, such as when he told the citizens of Dalby in southern 
Queensland in February 1924 of the need for a “national plan” for the 
development of “power, roads, borrowing and finance.”3  These initial calls for 
planning were vaguely articulated – a sign that he was still developing his 
thoughts, for Page was not one to hold back once he had an idea fully formed 
to his own satisfaction.  He was from 1925 speaking ringingly of the “supreme 
importance” of Commonwealth-state co-operation in developing “a national 
                                                 
1 Handwritten draft statement of Country Party policy (undated, but associated documents 
suggest 1921), Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, Box 1, folder 1. 
2 Speech published in The Land, 27 October 1922, p. 4, copy in EPP, folder 2623.  
3 Speech by Page 30 February 1924, EPP, folder 1624.  
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plan of development” covering transport, water use and much else.4  He 
needed a working model, and so his interest settled on the DMC.   
 
Page’s thinking on planning was almost certainly stimulated by Cabinet 
deliberations over February to May 1926 on the creation of the DMC.  Although 
this unprecedented agency became involved in attempts to shape the domestic 
economy, it originated with Australia’s need to be seen to be better managing 
its participation in the Empire-wide strategy by which Britain responded to post-
war unemployment and loss of overseas markets through promoting the export 
of capital and population to the Dominions.  Australia’s receptiveness to British 
investment and migration was encouraged during these post-war years by 
urbanisation, industrialisation and ambitions for rural development.5  Prior to 
the First World War, Australian immigration was largely the responsibility of the 
states.  Following the 1921 Imperial Conference on Immigration, the British 
government‘s Empire Settlement Act 1922 established cost-sharing migration 
arrangements with the Dominions.  In Australia, the Premiers’ Conference of 
the following year agreed that Bruce should approach the British to negotiate a 
nationwide assisted migration scheme, which he duly raised at the 1923 
Imperial Conference.  The resultant “£34 million” Migration Agreement signed 
with Britain in April 1925 aimed for 450,000 assisted British settlers within ten 
years.6    
 
In its ambition, the Migration Agreement exceeded previous arrangements 
involving the Australian states or the Commonwealth government.  It centred 
on provision of cheap loans to fund development and migration linked to land 
settlement schemes.  The Australian government raised the loans, and shared 
interest costs with Britain and the states.  Specific development projects 
proposed by a state – defined broadly to include public works, land purchases 
and subsidisation of farmers – required the approval of all three governments 
concerned before funding would be made available.  This gave the 
                                                 
4 Page’s 1925 election Country Party policy speech, copy in Ellis papers, UNE Archives, 
A0811, Box 12, pp. 13, 15. 
5 Cochrane, op. cit., pp. 11-2. 
6 Murray, op. cit., pp. 137-8. 
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Commonwealth effective control over hitherto state-led migration and more 
firmly linked migration to national development policy.7   
 
The DMC served as the means by which Australia fulfilled its Agreement 
obligations.  Its approval was an essential condition of the Commonwealth’s 
preparedness to fund a project.  This met the concerns of British lenders that 
the funds they provided on often generous terms would be well used and not 
lead to over-borrowing.  Page later wrote of how “never in the history of Empire 
relationships were more liberal [financial] terms offered to the Australian 
people”, which he was determined to honour and thereby maintain.8  DMC 
tutelage improved the likelihood of the Migration Agreement being extended by 
encouraging the better informed use of land and public funds that expanded 
capacity to absorb migrants.  In doing so it also provided a model for planning 
based on the rigorous assessment of economic viability, use of advisors 
external to government and co-operation between levels of government.   
 
The DMC was not Page’s creation.  It owed more to Bruce, supported by 
suggestions from the newspaper proprietor Sir Hugh Denison and also from 
Australia’s representative in the British Foreign Office, Richard Casey, who in 
turn referenced the British Committee of Civil Research.9  Introducing the DMC 
Bill into parliament, the Prime Minister said that Australia had failed to face the 
problem of development, having “never had a stocktaking of our resources with 
a view to determining the industries that, having regard to our natural 
advantages, should be promoted.”  Hence now “there must be a thorough and 
impartial examination of every scheme before it is approved.”10  To such ends, 
the DMC had a near limitless brief to report on the Australian economy.  It 
                                                 
7 The Agreement’s complex origins are surveyed in Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration 1915-
1940, op. cit., pp. 48-57; see also Eric Richards, Destination Australia: Migration to Australia 
Since 1901, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2008, p. 92; and Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 188.  
For a fuller summary of the provisions of the Migration Agreement, see Roe, pp. 57-8. 
8 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 188.  There may also have been a concern to formally 
distance immigration from party politics, especially as there were indications that support for 
high levels of intake risked being held against the government; see Roe, ibid., pp. 64-8, on the 
motivations for establishment of the DMC. 
9 Roe, ibid., pp. 64-5. 
10 Development and Migration Commission, First Annual Report for Period Ending 30 June 
1927, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 1927, pp. 5-6, EPP, folder 2322; and Roe, ibid., 
p. 67. 
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could investigate the establishment of new primary and secondary industries 
and conduct negotiations for the development of existing ones.  It even had 
legislated provision for “such other powers and functions as are prescribed,” 
that classic catchall.11  (Page no doubt approved.  His sense of urgency 
invariably blunted his appreciation of checks and balances). 
 
The DMC sat apart from the mainstream of the Commonwealth public service 
as a legislated body corporate.  It made extensive use of expert advisers from 
the business world.  Herbert Gepp was appointed DMC Chair and C.S. Nathan 
Vice-Chair, both business leaders with strong reputations for innovation and 
vision.  Balance and wider acceptability was provided by the other two 
commissioners, former South Australian Labor Premier John Gunn and New 
South Wales public servant E.P. Fleming.12  The DMC worked closely with 
Australia’s newly emergent coterie of academic economists such as D.B. 
Copland, despite their tendency to be sceptical of migration and Australia’s 
development potential.13  Page’s habitual hope that expert opinion would 
validate his plans led him to initially welcome the DMC’s use of policy experts.  
He was to be disappointed when their rigour was applied to his plans for the 
Clarence Valley. 
 
The DMC stressed efficiency, especially the more productive use of land 
through improved technology and management, but not Page’s regionalism or 
electrification.  Although it required ministerial approval to investigate broad 
development issues (while being free to initiate inquiries into specific projects), 
its Chair proclaimed an expansive interpretation of its role.  Shortly after his 
appointment, the blunt, assertive Gepp declared the DMC “the national clearing 
house for all ideas and schemes bearing upon economic development”, with a 
responsibility to “co-ordinate the whole of the developmental activities of 
                                                 
11 Development and Migration Act 1926, Section 13 (1) (a) (vi). 
12 Gepp was an energetic, if enigmatic, figure whose wide-ranging engagement with public 
policy included a central role in establishing the CSIR; see Roe, Australia, Britain, and 
Migration 1915-1940, op. cit., pp. 69-71.  
13 Ibid., pp. 91, 112.  
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Australia.”14  He shared the Bruce-Page stress on national efficiency.  Late in 
his tenure he told a University of Melbourne audience that “problems of 
organisation lie at the root of Australia’s economic difficulties” and that “the 
Commission plays its part by ascertaining and stating the facts” in “the 
application of science to industry and the consequent increase in efficiency.”15   
 
Page’s own approach to planning owed much to a simple but strongly held 
model.  In brief, he considered that as the secondary and primary sectors were 
interdependent, each should be managed so as to generate incomes that 
maintained demand for the other’s output.  The prices of secondary and 
primary products needed to be brought into an alignment that maintained this 
mutually supportive demand and so kept the whole economy in balance.  Farm 
prices and profitability were critical to determining demand for secondary 
goods, placing primary industries at the crucial centre of the economy.  There 
was also an important place for competitive manufacturing based on Australia’s 
natural advantage in raw materials.  Efficient secondary industry would also 
help support primary production by supplying capital equipment cheaply.  This 
all owed much to Page’s sense of economic and social orderliness, with 
everything playing its proper and reinforcing role.  Making the best use of 
factors of production of capital, labour and management was to Page 
reminiscent of the brain, heart, stomach and hands of the human body all 
“performing different functions and yet vital to the efficient work of the whole.”16    
 
Page’s fullest statement of such views was his speech to the Chamber of 
Manufactures of New South Wales on 21 June 1926, just one month after the 
creation of the DMC.  Published as Australian Industries – The 
Interdependence of ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’, it set out the implications of 
Page’s model for development policy and planning.  Page thought the economy 
                                                 
14 Memo by Gepp on the DMC, 17 November 1926, NAA, CP211/2, 57/7, D & M Commission – 
Its Constitution and Functions – Memorandum by Mr Gepp.  This file contains professionally 
printed copies of this memo, clearly meant for wide distribution.  
15 From an address to the Public Questions Society, University of Melbourne, April 1929, 
reproduced in Herbert Gepp, Democracy’s Danger: Addresses on Various Occasions, Angus & 
Robertson, Sydney, 1939, pp. 34-5. 
16 Earle Page, Australian Industries – The Interdependence of ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’, 
Simmons Ltd, Sydney, 1926, copy at EPP, folder 2331, p. 7.   
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could be neatly driven by a few vital sectoral linkages to remain in perpetual 
motion, and tied together planning, decentralisation, electrification and 
industrial standardisation.17  He opened this talk by summarising how the 
economy’s component sectors could support each other:   
 
Manufacturers are interested in the primary producers as the suppliers 
of their raw material and as the purchasers of their finished goods.  The 
more efficiently the manufacturers fulfil their function of supplying the 
tools specially adapted for the producer’s work and articles for the 
producer’s use, the more readily and cheaply can be supplied the raw 
materials for manufacturing processes.  The more profit there is in 
agricultural industries, the more readily can manufactured goods be 
bought.18   
 
A sound home market was the basis for an industry to become internationally 
competitive, especially manufacturing.  Use of abundant raw materials to 
manufacture competitive goods would lead to an even split in total exports 
between manufactures and “raw products”, so that primary industry would not 
be left disproportionately supporting the nation’s standard of living.19  Here lay 
the role of planning.  Government failure to “lay down a definite plan of 
development” along these lines was handicapping industry.  Planning should 
start with transport and power production “conceived on a national scale”, and 
support decentralisation by enabling the disposition of factories at strategic 
points.  Page gave vent here to his impatience with federalism – Australians 
must stop “blindly worshipping the fetish of State rights.”  “It is idle” he said 
loftily, “for those who profess to believe that such action infringes State rights to 
try and put the hands of the clock back.”20 
 
Page’s brief coverage here of the orderly marketing of rural produce portrayed 
it as a means of maintaining demand for manufactures.  It would help “create a 
continuous purchasing power of finished goods in the hands of the producer”, 
so that “both primary and secondary industries thus tend to be stabilised and a 
                                                 
17 Ibid.  See also ‘Speech Given by Dr. Earle Page at the Constitutional Association 15/2/32 on 
the Tariff’, EPP, folder 384, and his speech to the House of 17 July 1930, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, pp. 4248-63. 
18 Page, Australian Industries, ibid., p. 1. 
19 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
20 Ibid., pp. 5, 9, 10-11, 12, 19. 
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beneficial circle of regular employment in all callings is created.”21  To Page, 
orderly marketing did not constitute an absolute end in itself, but was a 
subsidiary policy tool with a place in his wider conception of the economy. 
 
One wonders what Page’s audience of manufacturing executives thought as 
they were exhorted to ponder this very big picture of “well-balanced national 
progress.”22  They probably saw more relevance in his comments about 
standardising industrial capital equipment to aid mass production.  Page also 
expressed some of his Prime Minister’s concern about the consequences of 
high wages for international competiveness, but hastened to add that greater 
efficiency could overcome this problem and also lead to increased real wages.  
There should also be a rationalisation of parallel state and national arbitration 
into a single Commonwealth-led system – the very issue that was to fell the 
Bruce-Page government in 1929.23   
 
Capital, transport, power, standardisation, tariffs, marketing, finance and 
regulation – “a well-conceived plan of efficiency must consider the place of all 
these in the national economy.”  Page did not specify in this 1926 speech how 
such planning would be conducted.  But he made clear his confidence that he 
could work with business leaders “to create the public opinion that would assist 
these desirable policies.”  Manufacturers should even be trusted to nominate 
what assistance they needed to obtain the best capital machinery.24  Press 
coverage of the speech was mostly supportive, but focussed on Page’s 
comments on federalism.  One report saw it as indicative of “the orderly soul of 
Dr Page” and particularly noted his comment that in the distant past problems 
of government had been left to “mediocrities” but that now, he had declared, 
“the time has come for the best minds to take a hand in governmental 
operations.”25   
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 21. 
22 Ibid., p. 4. 
23 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
24 Ibid., pp. 8, 9, 12. 
25 Editorial in the Adelaide Register of 22 June 1926, p. 8.  The Register described the 
audience of manufacturers as having listened “dutifully.”  Some later Page initiatives on efficient 
manufacturing fell foul of opposition from manufacturers fearing exposure to international 
competition; see chapter six for a description of Page’s abortive Anglo-Australian electrification 
initiative of 1936.  The Register’s main objection was that Page’s comments about efficiency 
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Tariffs occupied an especially important place in how Page saw the economy 
being planned: his views on this drew him into the main economic policy debate 
of the 1920s.  Free traders foresaw a primary industry-orientated Australia that 
was robustly competitive on world markets.  Protectionists envisaged a more 
self-contained nation that developed on its own social and economic terms, 
including by fostering a large (albeit costly) manufacturing sector.   
 
Historians have frequently commented on Page’s encouragement of primary 
producers to accept tariff increases on manufactures in the name of the 
broader economic and political benefits of “all-round protection.”26  What is less 
widely appreciated is that as an advocate of planning, he kept a foot in each of 
the free trade and protectionist camps by generally being critical of tariffs but 
also supporting their planned use to nurture carefully chosen industries in 
decentralised locations – ‘picking winners’, in latter-day parlance.  He was 
neither free trader nor ardent protectionist.  Page considered “natural and 
essential” industries in which Australia was internationally competitive worthy of 
nurturing – mostly resource-based industries and related manufacturing such 
as of agricultural machinery, but also some orientated to mass consumption.27  
Tariffs could be powerful tools if used in a “scientific” way that reflected a 
comprehensive review of “the whole national position and national 
resources.”28   
 
                                                                                                                                              
were an attack on the rights of states.  Coverage in other newspapers was more favourable, 
such as the Perth Daily News of 22 June 1926, p. 4 and the Adelaide Advertiser of 22 June 
1926, p. 12.  
26 Ibid., pp. 231, 246-7.  The average tariff rate rose from about 10 per cent in 1918 to about 27 
per cent in 1927; see William Oliver Coleman, Selwyn Cornish and Alfred Hagger, Giblin's 
Platoon: The Trials and Triumph of the Economist in Australian Public Life, ANU E Press, 
Canberra, 2006, p. 66.   
27 Earle Page, Australian Industries, op. cit., p. 17; see also ‘Speech Given by Dr. Earle Page at 
the Constitutional Association 15/2/32 on the Tariff’, op. cit.   
28 Page, Australian Industries, ibid, p. 17.  The term scientific tariffs was not unique to Bruce 
and Page, but was widely used by economists of the time; see Joanne Pemberton, 'The Middle 
Way: The Discourse of Planning in Britain, Australia and at the League in the Interwar Years', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 52, no.1, 2006, p. 57.  Similarly, the Australian 
trade adviser in Britain, F.L. McDougall, and George Julius, Chair of CSIR, both also advocated 
a selective tariff policy that enabled free entry for manufactures which could not be efficiently 
made in Australia, such as electrical goods; see W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way (eds.), Letters 
From A Secret Service Agent: F.L. McDougall to S.M. Bruce 1924-1929, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, pp. 361-5. 
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The burden that tariffs imposed on primary industries remained a major, if 
inconsistently pursued, concern of the Country Party.  The early federal 
parliamentary Country Party and state party associations were not united on 
the tariff issue: V.C. Thompson, for example, was a protectionist.29  In his 
memoirs Page makes clear that the Country Party was opposed to the levels of 
protection imposed by the Massy Green tariff but was willing to countenance 
duties recommended by the Tariff Board for “any worthwhile industry which 
could satisfy local needs and ultimately enter expert markets.”  Failure to 
reduce the Massy Green tariff was a factor in the orderly marketing schemes 
supported by the Bruce-Page government, “to enable the survival of primary 
industries, to provide them with reasonable conditions, and to assist the 
expansion of export markets.”30 
 
Page’s only very selective opposition to tariffs raised tension with some of his 
political allies.  H.P. Williams, manager of the influential New South Wales-wide 
rural newspaper The Land, berated him in March 1923 for countenancing tariffs 
to support sugar manufacturing.31  In a 1924 letter to the Sydney-based 
manufacturer George Hoskins, Page vented his disgust at “the idiocy of 
protecting a lot of fourth rate industries instead of making sure that the 
essential and basic ones that we can properly develop and get a market for 
were thoroughly protected to begin with.”  This left him disdainful of the 
Commonwealth Tariff Board for lacking a strong sense of which industries 
should be nurtured.32   
 
Statements by Page such as his speech to the New South Wales 
manufacturers made him a participant in the growing policy debate over the 
tariff that extended through the decade.  Amongst Australia’s increasingly vocal 
band of policy-minded academic economists, Copland and E.O. Shann were 
                                                 
29 Graham, op. cit., pp. 153-4, 229-31.  Graham speculates that lower tariffs could have 
reduced federal revenue and pushed Page as Treasurer towards the unpalatable alternative of 
raising taxes.  
30 Page, Truant Surgeon. op. cit., p. 87. 
31 H.P. Williams to Page, 6 March 1923, EPP, folder 1151 (part ii).  Williams wanted the sugar 
industry to first establish a voluntary pool.  
32 Page to George Hoskins, undated but in reply to a letter of 17 May 1924, Earle Page papers, 
UNE Archives, A0180, Box 10, folder 80. 
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free traders: L.F. Giblin was more accepting of protection.  Bruce was aware of 
this debate and broadly agreed with Page that a moderate tariff should be 
applied cautiously according to scientific precepts.  To this end, he 
commissioned the celebrated 1929 enquiry into tariffs headed by the 
Tasmanian-based economist James Brigden that became the most 
comprehensive analysis of Australian protectionism to date.   
 
The Brigden Enquiry arrived at a politically cautious conclusion that the level of 
tariff assistance stood at an optimal level, a compromise between committee 
members who advocated free trade and those favouring protectionism.  
Brigden himself became the foremost proponent of tariffs as improving the 
overall standard of living by their promotion of employment in manufacturing at 
acceptable wage levels and by supporting population growth.  Like Page, 
Brigden considered tariffs in the context of the interaction of primary and 
secondary industries, but from a far more scholarly and theoretical perspective 
than did the avowedly practical Country Party leader.33  Yet despite Page’s 
disinterest in theory, it was still highly unusual then or later for a politician to 
view the tariff question in terms of such a full model of the economy and vision 
of the entire country.  Page did not argue the pros and cons of tariffs wholly in 
terms that much later became standard – he made no reference, for example, 
to tariffs effectively imposing flat taxes on consumers.  As an early and 
relatively sophisticated tariff critic, Page went well beyond mainstream Country 
Party concerns about the added costs of capital equipment to arrive at a 
carefully nuanced vision of their place in the nation’s development.  By 
considering what implications tariffs posed for national efficiency, he challenged 
his colleagues to consider the wider impact of protectionism and helped 
presage future nation-changing debates on industry restructuring.   
 
Page was also ahead of his time from the mid-1920s by making private 
investment a major element of his thinking on implementing major public works, 
especially for electrification.  (One of the few other prominent advocates was 
                                                 
33 The Brigden Enquiry was formally titled The Australian Tariff: An Economic Enquiry.  For a 
fuller account, see Coleman, Cornish and Hagger, op. cit., chapter four; see also Millmow, op. 
cit., pp. 58-9, and Moore in Walter, op. cit., pp. 162-3.   
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Frederic Eggleston in his 1932 State Socialism in Victoria, but for different 
reasons).34  For most of Page’s career, important infrastructure was almost 
entirely built and operated by state governments, especially after the Great 
War.  He advocated private investment as more likely to take a longer 
perspective than would typically characterise the choices of short-lived 
governments.  Private investors could construct dams and power stations in 
return for charters and franchise arrangements that guaranteed their rights to 
operate these facilities for a set long-term period.  Page wanted “a uniform 
continent-wide policy that will keep in mind the requirements of national 
development while at the same time provide every means and facility for 
private enterprise to carry out this work.”35  He does not seem to have ever 
reconciled his proposal to charge all electricity consumers the same flat rate 
with attracting private operators.36   
 
Page and planned development: attempting to transform the Clarence 
 
Soon after its creation, the DMC optimistically foresaw itself as a “detached 
body,” free to enter into “full co-operation” with state governments.  It would be 
their adviser as they worked together to populate the continent, and urged the 
states to appoint counterpart Development Commissioners.37  In practice, the 
states tended to view the DMC as a menace to their favoured proposals.  It 
became especially suspicious of ambitious irrigation projects: Queensland 
proceeded with the Dawson Valley Irrigation Scheme alone, with unhappy 
                                                 
34 Frederic Eggleston, State Socialism in Victoria, P.S. King & Son, London, 1932, pp. 13-4, 
304-5. Eggleston drew on his unhappy personal experience in Victorian state politics in 
concluding that publicly owned essential services were inefficient.     
35 ‘Federal Power Commission’, EPP, folders 1625 and 2088; no date, but wording and the 
inclusion of a copy amongst papers prepared for the May 1929 Premiers Conference suggest it 
was prepared for this conference.   
36 Page frequently called for stronger constitutional guarantees of private property rights so as 
to encourage private investment in infrastructure.  Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution gives the 
Commonwealth power to make laws on "the acquisition of property on just terms from any 
State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make 
laws."  High Court interpretation of “acquisition” and of “just terms” has limited this protection of 
property rights; and the requirement concerning a "purpose in respect of which the Parliament 
has power to make laws" is taken to mean that legislation based on 51 (xxxi) must be 
supported by at least one additional constitutional power.  
37 Development and Migration Commission, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 6; A.J. Davies, 
‘Australian Federalism and National Development’, The Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol. 14, no. 1, April 1968, p. 41. 
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results.38  The DMC did not directly enter into the fierce debates of the Bruce-
Page years over union power and arbitration, but its association with high 
migration and calls for greater efficiency to overcome rising production costs 
drew criticism from organised labour.  The federal opposition leader Matthew 
Charlton attacked it in parliament and spoke of migrants as “largely 
responsible” for unemployment.39   
 
The DMC nonetheless operated widely and confidently, undertaking studies 
ranging from the dried fruit and tobacco industries to transport costs, national 
employment and “the present position of Tasmania.”  It proudly reported that 
most of its recommendations on project funding were taken up by the 
Commonwealth.40  Yet the DMC never entirely fulfilled a national economic 
planning role, the Commonwealth lacking the necessary constitutional powers 
and the Bruce-Page government not wanting to dictate to private industry.  The 
closest it came to a comprehensive stocktake of the economy was a listing in 
its 1928 annual report of Australia’s main imports, intended as a first step 
towards identifying new industries for development.  The DMC was in practice 
more productive in assessing promising new targets for assistance on a 
project-by-project basis.41 
 
Bruce and Page’s enthusiasm for the DMC suggests they were aware of the 
need to manage such constraints to growth as shortages of good land and 
dubious irrigation schemes.  Soon after the DMC’s creation, Page became an 
advocate of its permanent enshrinement in national policy.  He encouraged his 
own party to endorse planning, and invited state Country Party leaders to an 
ACPA meeting in June 1927 where he lectured them on state co-operation in 
“the initiation of a national plan of efficiency in production and marketing that 
will ensure balanced development”.  He credited the DMC and the CSIR with 
                                                 
38 Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration 1915-1940, op. cit., pp. 97, 112-3. 
39 Charlton, 23 February 1928, quoted in Roe, ibid., p. 119.  
40 Development and Migration Commission, First Annual Report, op. cit., p. 35. 
41 Development and Migration Commission, Second Annual Report for Period Ending 31st 
December 1928, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1929, pp.11-2, EPP, folder 2322; for a 
summary of the DMC’s research see Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration 1915-1940, op. cit., 
pp. 91-3. The rationale for identifying imports was that a high level of importation was 
considered suggestive of a solid local demand.   
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furthering state-federal co-ordination but “the work is only just begun.”  
Tellingly, he failed to offer a convincing rationale of how to implement all of this 
beyond offering old ideas about national power and port development, uniform 
rail charges and flat electricity rates.42   
 
Page’s confidence in the DMC culminated in his attempt to use it to realise 
regional development and electrification in the Clarence Valley.  The DMC 
agreed to his request to look closely at the Clarence region as a candidate for 
Migration Agreement funding of an entire package of linked projects – 
hydroelectricity at The Gorge and Jackadgery, and related flood prevention, 
road, rail, port, timber and mining initiatives.  The detailed account preserved in 
the National Archives of Australia of the resultant probing of Page’s faith that 
electrification would create its own demand demonstrates that the DMC was 
every bit as rigorous as he otherwise wanted it to be.   
 
Following the defeat of the first Lang Government, which had stood out of the 
Migration Agreement, Page’s home state of New South Wales finally signed on 
in March 1928.  That month he approached Gepp about his comprehensive 
plan to develop the Clarence Valley.  The DMC Chair responded that if 
preliminary investigations were favourable, the Commission could work with the 
state government on what “would be just the sort of scheme that he [Gepp] 
knew the British government would view favourably, as it would lead to large 
development and increased population.”43  Page followed up by sending Gepp 
a copy of his 1919 booklet The Clarence Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme, which 
a DMC economist cautioned the Chair had clearly “not been prepared by 
technical men.”44  Pressure also came from The Port of the Clarence Advisory 
Board, a local lobby group chaired by Page’s Country Party colleague Alf 
Pollack.45   
 
                                                 
42 Speech reproduced in The Primary Producer of 9 June 1927, p. 1, copy in EPP, folder 2666. 
43 Memo by C. Tye (Under-Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Public Works), 8 
March 1928, NAA, CP211/2, 34/13, Investigations – New South Wales – Hydro Electric 
Scheme (Clarence River): 1928.  Tye was reporting on Page’s approach to Gepp.  
44 Memo E.N. Robinson to Gepp, 30 March 1928, ibid. 
45 Letter from The Port of the Clarence Advisory Board to Premier Bavin, 16 February 1928, 
ibid. 
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The DMC duly dispatched its new Deputy Chair, W.P. Devereux, a former 
pastoral industry executive, on appraisal tours of the region in July and August 
1928.  Page telegrammed Devereux that although the various projects 
proposed for the region “must be regarded as a whole”, if there had to be a 
choice hydroelectricity should take priority.46  Page, with Pollack and others, 
insisted on accompanying Devereux for part of his second tour, including a visit 
on horseback to The Gorge.  Devereux’s detailed on-the-road reports to Gepp 
show him to have been a cautious observer, well capable of resisting Page’s 
pressure.  He concluded that a power project at Jackadgery had some merit 
provided the state government was supportive, but that The Gorge would 
produce far more power than was needed locally and inundate too much good 
land.47  The Bavin-Buttenshaw state government accepted at this time a 
Commonwealth proposal that it should also investigate The Gorge, resulting in 
similar findings by its Chief Electrical Engineer, H.G. Carter.48   
 
Premier Bavin soon agreed with Devereux that The Gorge project should not 
proceed.49  In March 1929 the state government added that Jackadgery was 
also too costly, and elected instead to explore more modest proposals such as 
extending the Nymboida facility.50  Page made similarly fruitless inquiries with 
potential British investors.  A contact of his reported back in December 1929 
that they thought the thin distribution of the Australian population made new 
hydroelectric installations commercially unviable, and would only consider 
projects securely backed by Australian governments.51  The DMC meanwhile 
continued to assess the wider development of the Clarence Valley, but had not 
reached any final conclusion by the time of its abolition in 1930.52    
 
                                                 
46 Page telegram to Devereux, 10 July 1928, ibid.  
47 Devereux memo to Gepp, 23 July 1928, ibid.  
48 Earle Page, Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, The Bulletin Newspaper Co. Ltd., 
Sydney, undated but printer’s invoices in the EPP, folder 1078 part (ii), show that it appeared in 
August 1944, pp. 17-8.  Carter thought that that the project was too large for immediate 
development but had longer term potential. 
49 Devereux memo to Gepp, 23 July 1928, op. cit. 
50 ‘Extract from Summary Report No 12, Dated 28th March 1929’, NAA, A786, R22/1, 
Development NSW Clarence Valley. 
51 Fred Sandman (?, signature unclear) to Page, 1 December 1928, EPP, folder 2083.  
52 ‘Clarence Gorge Development – History of Investigations and Offers of Assistance from 
Three Federal Governments and Seven State Governments’, c.1954, EPP, folder 1798. 
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This episode was an early instance not only of technical advice constraining 
Page but also of the caution of state governments that would actually have rime 
responsibility for his various schemes.  It was an early indicator of the direction 
in which policy advising on development projects was shifting.  Even in this 
decade of developmentalist optimism, there was a countervailing awareness of 
the limitations imposed by Australia’s settlement patterns and natural 
environment that gestured towards concerns most clearly articulated by Griffith 
Taylor.  As the foremost historian of assisted migration between the wars has 
concluded, the DMC’s “dominant message had been that by capitalism’s own 
standards, Australia offered little scope for productive development.”53   
 
Page also came under pressure via the equally dispassionate scrutiny of the 
engineering profession.  Australian engineers in the early 1920s had been 
divided over the potential of hydroelectricity, with Corin, the hydroengineer who 
had surveyed the Nymboida and The Gorge, being its main protagonist.  In a 
1920 study he declared that the water resources of New South Wales were 
grossly underutilized, and that the growth of Tasmanian manufacturing showed 
what was possible if hydroelectricity was applied intelligently.54  But as the 
decade progressed, a majority opinion emerged amongst engineers and 
economists that hydroelectricity was of marginal significance on the mainland.   
 
This conclusion drew on recent debates such as that in Victoria over brown 
coal versus hydroelectricity.  John Monash stated in 1924 that “water power” 
was not necessarily cheaper than thermal generation and that Australian 
stream flows were unreliable.55  W.H. Myers, Chief Electrical Engineer for New 
South Wales Railways and Tramways, made a thinly veiled attack on Page and 
Corin at the March 1929 conference of the Institution of Engineers.  He 
assailed “wild deductions” by “recently-returned travellers from abroad…that 
the salvation of the country depends upon the development of ‘hydroelectricity’ 
or of ‘super-power’ schemes”, and of how “even electrical engineers, including 
                                                 
53 Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration 1915-1940, op. cit., p. 137. 
54 ‘Report of the Chief Electrical Engineer, Department of Public Works’, 1920, EPP, folder 
1046.  (This report is extracted from the 1919-20 Annual Report of the New South Wales 
Department of Public Works).  
55 Monash, Presidential Address to the Australasian Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Adelaide, 25 August 1924, op. cit. 
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some of standing, occasionally are not immune from the same habit.”  Myers 
deflated simplistic comparisons with the United States by pointing out that 
Australia’s potential hydroelectricity sources were remote from population 
centres and that population dispersal inhibited the interlinking of power 
systems.56  A September 1929 report to the Australian government by 
consulting engineer Alex J. Gibson was particularly telling, for Gibson was a 
decentralist who considered agriculture “the ultimate wealth of any community.”  
He challenged assumptions that hydroelectricity was inexpensive and that 
power availability alone would create new manufacturing or serve as “the 
panacea for all the ills from which the [agricultural] industry suffers”, especially 
given the dispersal of farms.  Gibson predicted, largely accurately, that 
Australia’s future power development would be predominantly coal-based.57   
 
None of these critiques altered Page’s faith in hydroelectricity nor his hopes for 
his home region.  He so habitually contrived to interpret expert findings 
positively that he took the DMC’s and Carter’s cautious conclusions to imply 
that inadequate local demand could be solved at a stroke by linking The Gorge 
to a Newcastle-Brisbane transmission system.  Corin died in 1929, leaving 
Page alone as Australia’s most prominent advocate of hydroelectricity and the 
main agent by which the concept lingered as a policy issue prior to its 
resurgence via the Snowy Scheme.  
 
Page and co-operative federalism: the success of the Financial 
Agreement  
 
As the 1920s progressed, changes in external financial conditions strengthened 
the case for a stronger Loan Council than the existing voluntary arrangement.  
Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925 created obstacles to lending 
abroad and raised interest rates: unease about public debt included a growing 
                                                 
56 Quoted in Alexander J. Gibson, Report on Power Development in Australia, Government 
Printer, Canberra, September 1929, p. 33; all the following quotes are from pp. 3, 33-40.  See 
also Walter Harold Myers, The Supply of Electricity in Bulk, Institution of Engineers Australia, 
Sydney, 1929.  Myers had been a school colleague of Page at Sydney Boys High; see Truant 
Surgeon, op. cit., p. 33. 
57 Gibson, ibid, pp. 35, 37, 39.  EPP folder 1049 contains a synopsis by Gibson of this report.  
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suspicion in international circles that Australia was an unreliable borrower.58  
Conversion activity and the ongoing quest for new loans meant that an 
Australian government was almost always active in the international loan 
market.59  More fundamentally, Bruce and Page continued to see vertical fiscal 
imbalance and the duplication of functions between Commonwealth and states 
as affronts to their sense of efficiency.  As both were conscious of the failure of 
referenda as means of change, their strategy remained one of negotiating co-
operative agreements with the states.60   
This resumed with a new offer to the states at the May 1926 Premiers’ 
Conference.  Bruce and Page proposed that the Commonwealth withdraw from 
all forms of direct taxation and discontinue the per capita grants, in return for 
which it would take over state debts.  As in 1923, Bruce led for the 
Commonwealth in debate, with Page supporting by answering the assembled 
Premiers’ numerous doubts about details.  Page denied that he and Bruce 
were out to impose unification.  Their aim was a rationalisation of 
intergovernmental finance that would be in everyone’s interest, “to secure 
federation to [sic] the Australian states for all time, and to insist that there shall 
be a proper Federal basis which will assuredly be brought about if there be a 
distinct separation of their finances.”61  Yet the states again rejected the 
Commonwealth’s proposal, being reluctant to levy unpopular direct taxes alone 
and foreseeing that a future Labor government could restore Commonwealth 
taxation.62    
In June, Page with Bruce’s support issued a final demand to the states that “the 
vicious principle of one authority raising taxation for another authority to spend” 
                                                 
58 C.G. Headford, ‘The Australian Loan Council – Its Origin, Operation and Significance in the 
Federal Structure’, in W. Prest and R.L. Mathews (eds.), The Development of Australian Fiscal 
Federalism: Selected Readings, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1980, pp. 165-
6, (article first published 1954).   
59 Radi, op. cit., p. 386. 
60 Lee, op. cit., p. 35.  When they took office in 1923, only two of thirteen referendum questions 
put to the voters so far had been approved.  The Bruce-Page government held two 
referendums, one in September 1926 on corporations and industrial relations powers that 
included giving the Commonwealth authority to deal with interruptions to essential services; and 
that of November 1928 on the Financial Agreement.   
61 ‘Conference of the Commonwealth and State Ministers Held at Federal Parliament House 
Melbourne, May 1926 to Consider the Financial Relations Between the States and the 
Commonwealth – Report of Debates’, EPP, folder 2663, part iii.  
62 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., p. 120. 
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must cease.63  Page added a more personal argument that the remission of 
direct taxation to the states would prevent them from being financially strangled 
by the Commonwealth and so at risk of de facto unification.64  Legislation was 
enacted to reduce (but not quite eliminate) Commonwealth direct taxes and to 
abolish the per capita grants in favour of distributing only any remaining 
Commonwealth surplus on a per capita basis.  The States Grants Act 1927 was 
effectively an ultimatum that the states had one year to agree to a mutually 
acceptable formula or else have the Commonwealth impose its own 
resolution.65  Bruce acceded to state appeals to delay implementation, and a 
draft of what became the Financial Agreement was negotiated at further 
Premiers’ Conferences before an agreed text was signed by all governments 
on 12 December 1927.  The subsequent referendum of November 1928 
approved the insertion of section 105A into the Constitution to enable the 
Commonwealth to implement the Agreement.66  Despite a ‘yes’ result in every 
state, the Labor Party, Percy Stewart and one Nationalist (E.A. Mann) voted in 
parliament against the enabling bill.67  
The Financial Agreement in its final form abolished per capita payments to the 
states in return for the Commonwealth taking over existing and future state 
debts, but with the states joining it in contributing to debt servicing.  The 
Commonwealth withdrew from most direct taxation and the Loan Council was 
accorded binding authority over borrowing by both levels of government.68  The 
                                                 
63 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 June 1926, p. 2682. 
64 Ibid., p. 2680. 
65 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., p. 120.  
66 The vote was an almost unprecedented 74 per cent in favour, evidently as the voting public 
was opposed to more government debt; see Mathews and Jay, ibid., p. 109.  But note at 
chapter eight, footnote 108, of this thesis Page’s later reflections on the basis for this vote.   
67 And two Country Party MPs indicated they voted for it only in deference to the referendum 
results; Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 160-1.  
68 The full Financial Agreement was a very complex document.  In addition to taking over formal 
responsibility for the existing and future public debt of the states, the Commonwealth also 
agreed to make grants to the states for 58 years from 1927 of fixed amounts equal to the per 
capita grants to each state in 1926-27, but with the proviso that these were to be contributions 
to interest charges on the then existing public debt of the states.  The Commonwealth would 
also make annual contributions to the National Debt Sinking Fund in respect of state debt.  
These contributions consisted of the equivalent of 0.125 per cent of existing debt as of 30 June 
1927 for a period of 58 years; and 0.25 per cent of the face value of loans raised subsequently 
for 53 years from the date the debt was incurred (other than loans raised to meet revenue 
deficits).  The states were also required to make contributions to meeting their debts, but at 
different rates (and somewhat different again for New South Wales).  See Mathews and Jay, 
op. cit., pp. 108, 121, and the Financial Agreement Act 1928. 
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states’ assessment that their new borrowings would increase more than their 
populations had led them to conclude that Commonwealth contributions under 
such a repayment-based arrangement would exceed the old per capita 
grants.69 
 
The most lasting reform, and that which Page took most to heart, was the 
change in status of the Loan Council.  Page played a significant tactical role in 
the machinations that led to its elevation to a binding decision-making body 
dominated by the Commonwealth, marking a decisive shift in the locus of fiscal 
power.  The Council would henceforth control all new public borrowing by 
determining annually the total proposed loan programs of the Commonwealth 
and the states, and judging whether these could be met at reasonable terms 
and conditions.  This total would be divided up between governments by 
unanimous agreement.  The Commonwealth would arrange all borrowing 
including conversions, redemptions and debt consolidation.  Crucially, the 
Council’s voting formula gave the Commonwealth a dominant say – it had two 
votes and a casting vote, as against each state’s single vote.70  Lacking a 
secretariat, its deliberations were conducted in secret by heads of government, 
treasurers and officials.   
 
The Financial Agreement was the most comprehensive reform of federalism to 
that date, and a testament to Bruce and Page’s determination to rectify a gross 
inefficiency.  In one move, they had addressed three major concerns – co-
ordination of public borrowing, debt reduction and vertical fiscal imbalance.71  
Looking back in 1957, Page accurately described the Agreement as still “the 
single major substantial alteration in the Constitution.”72  W.K. Hancock, writing 
four decades after 1927, called it “an important landmark of policy” amidst what 
                                                 
69 Gilbert, op. cit., p. 96.  This was indeed the case until 1944-45.  The states in the interim still 
found themselves exposed to the budgetary impact of the Great Depression; see Mathews and 
Jay, op. cit., p. 121, and R.C. Gates, “The Search for a State Growth Tax’, in Matthews, 
Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 160. 
70 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., pp. 112-4.  In the absence of unanimity on the division of amounts 
between governments, a formula would be applied of up to one fifth to the Commonwealth and 
the rest to be divided between the states in proportion to their net loan expenditures during the 
previous five years. 
71 Ibid., p. 108. 
72 ‘Submission to Federal Parliamentary Constitutional Committee of Amendments Proposed by 
Sir Earle Page’, January 1957, EPP, folder 1659. 
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he called the “easy-going mediocrity” that pervaded Australian society in the 
1920s.73   
 
The Loan Council, in particular, was a major success in institutionalizing 
Commonwealth-state co-operation.  The contemporary economist R.C. Mills, 
not otherwise an admirer of the Financial Agreement, considered the Council 
“an eminently desirable feature of Australia public finance” that would secure 
better terms for loans and curb unnecessary borrowing.74  (Mills was one of a 
minority of prominent economists untroubled by vertical fiscal imbalance: 
Giblin, Mills and Leslie Melville all felt that the per capita grants had promoted 
equity between the states).75  Australian National University law professor J.E. 
Richardson in 1974 declared that the Agreement still stood as Australia’s most 
renowned example of legislated co-operation between the two main levels of 
government.76  Although during the Depression of the 1930s the Loan Council 
briefly served as an economic council of governments, it did not constitute a 
planning body that controlled the ends to which loan monies would be directed.  
Page was to become determined to rectify this. 
 
Some contemporary observers saw Page as the sole or at least main 
progenitor of the Financial Agreement.  One was F.A. Bland, by now Australia’s 
most prominent political scientist, writing in a December 1935 article on Page 
and co-operative federalism.77  Lang as a major player in the negotiations 
recalled Page as “the real architect” of the Financial Agreement.78  In fact, 
Page was neither the originator of the Agreement nor its sole driver in the 
Bruce-Page government.  Bruce’s statements soon after he took office clearly 
indicate that he did not rely on Page in reaching conclusions about the need to 
                                                 
73 W.K. Hancock ‘Then and Now’, IPA Review, vol. 22, no. 4, 1968, p. 92. 
74 R.C. Mills, ‘The Financial Relations of the Commonwealth and the States’, The Economic 
Record, May 1928, p. 11.  
75 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., pp. 122-3.  Vertical fiscal imbalance re-merged with the 
introduction of uniform income taxation in 1942. 
76 J.E. Richardson, ‘Patterns of Australian Federalism’, in Mathews, Intergovernmental 
Relations in Australia, op. cit., p. 17.  
77 F.A. Bland, ‘Inventing Constitutional Machinery – a Study of Dr. Earle Page’s Proposals for 
National Councils’, Australian Quarterly, December 1935, p. 16. 
78 Jack Lang, The Great Bust: The Depression of the Thirties, McNamara's Books, Katoomba, 
1980 (first published 1962), p. 65.    
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reform federalism.  The Prime Minister was more publicly prominent in debates 
at the 1923, 1926 and 1927 Premiers’ Conferences.79      
 
But Page, under Bruce’s ultimate direction, did contribute significantly to the 
crucial detailed negotiations that enabled the creation of the Loan Council.  His 
assertive advocacy and tactical contribution in the final negotiations gave him a 
lasting political and public association with the Council.  Mathews and Jay 
reflected that the slow, complex steps towards the signing of the Financial 
Agreement, which involved finding ways around fears of Commonwealth 
domination, state reluctance to assume responsibility for unpopular forms of 
taxation and the hostility of Jack Lang, “owed a great deal to the negotiating 
skill of the Commonwealth Treasurer.”80  Geoffrey Sawer wrote of Page’s 
“ability to modify his own ideas as the opinion of his parliament and 
negotiations with the states required; the final agreement was a triumph both 
for himself and for the long-term non-Labor policy of putting this matter on a 
stable basis.”81  
 
Lang’s memoir, The Great Bust, contains first-hand, if eclectic, recollections of 
Page as Treasurer.  He portrayed him as an arch conservative in “one of the 
most determined anti-Labor governments this country has had”, not least as it 
handed the Commonwealth Bank over to “big business.”82  Lang wrote at 
length of his state’s opposition to the Loan Council, and called Bruce and Page 
unificationists who sought “deliberately to wreck the sovereignty of the 
states.”83  More specifically, and rather closer to the reality, Lang readily 
conceded that Page was “very inventive”:          
 
He was full of plans.  He had a formula for every occasion.  He was 
ready to dash them off like prescriptions.  His political enemies had no 
                                                 
79 See for example the assessment of the 1923 Conference in The Argus of 30 May 1923, pp. 
10-1.   
80 Mathews and Jay, op. cit., p. 110. 
81 Sawer, op. cit., p. 284.  
82 Lang, op. cit., pp. 33, 35-6.  Lang was presumably referring to 1924 legislation that placed 
the Bank under an independent Board of Directors; see Gollan, op. cit., pp. 162-4. 
83 Lang, ibid., pp. 61, 62. 
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chance of catching up with him, because before they could he had 
already started on a new path.84  
 
He also praised Page as “a tough politician” who could both absorb and hand 
out criticism, with “much the better political brain” than Robert Menzies.85   
 
Lang was not alone in casting Page as an inveterate centraliser.  The Financial 
Agreement was one of several aspects of Page’s advocacy in the late 1920s 
that led other senior figures to perceive him as a centralist.  According to Lang, 
Premiers during the campaign on the 1926 referenda on corporations and 
industrial relations powers thought he was plotting to impoverish them and 
centralise power.86  Such suspicions came to the fore again over a decade later 
when Page tried to persuade the states to support his National Council 
planning initiative.  Page thought of himself quite differently, but there is much 
in what the states sensed.  He showed little empathy with the fundamental 
understanding that the Commonwealth and the states are formally equal in 
status and sovereign in nature, which Emy later described as having made the 
federation possible.  Yet Page would remain immensely proud of the reform of 
the nation’s financial machinery through the Loan Council and the Financial 
Agreement, even arguing that they helped the raising of funds for Australia’s 
defence in the Second World War.87   
 
Unfinished business: the Bruce-Page government’s final efforts to 
overhaul federalism 
 
So strong was the Bruce-Page commitment to efficient governance that even 
after this major triumph of the Financial Agreement, it continued with ambitious 
attempts to reform the federation.  These involved three quite different 
strategies, with Page playing a significant role in each.  The May 1929 
Premiers’ Conference effectively repeated the 1923 effort to have the states 
agree to national co-ordination of policy.  The Peden Royal Commission into 
                                                 
84 Ibid., pp. 35-6, 65.  
85 Ibid., p. 71. 
86 Aaron Wildavsky, ‘The 1926 Referendum’, in Aaron Wildavsky and Dagmar Carboch (eds.), 
Studies in Australian Politics, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1958, p. 33. 
87 Page in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 14 September 1944, p. 830.   
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the Constitution, handed down in September 1929, provided the most 
comprehensive stocktake of the federation to date.  But more novel – and 
lasting – were attempts to create a series of Commonwealth-state co-ordinating 
bodies, in which Page had the major hand.  All three strategies were pursued 
with an urgency born of a growing sense that the economy was deteriorating 
and could not afford the burden of an ill-functioning federation.  The breadth of 
Page’s involvement consolidated and lastingly shaped his commitment to co-
operative federalism. 
 
The prosperity that had enabled such measures earlier in the decade as tied 
road grants and the creation of the CSIR did not last.  By 1927 the 
Commonwealth budget had fallen into deficit, leading to the sobriquet for Page 
of “the most tragic Treasurer Australia has ever known”.88  As unemployment 
jumped during 1927 from under 6 per cent to 10 per cent, Bruce began publicly 
to ponder the reasons for slower economic growth.89  Falling international 
wheat and wool prices were clearly contributing, but he became increasingly 
concerned by tariffs and the arbitration system.  He feared that tariffs had gone 
beyond protecting only efficient and essential industries, thereby placing an 
unjustified burden on exporters.  Bruce did not oppose arbitration per se but 
remained concerned that the overlapping Commonwealth and state systems 
caused confusion and conflict.90  Misgivings about tariff strategy spread within 
the Bruce-Page government during its last year in office, reflecting questioning 
by Brigden, comments by a 1929 British Economic Commission to Australia 
and the deteriorating economy.  By September that year, Bruce doubted that 
tariffs should increase any further.91   
 
The Bruce-Page government therefore approached the May 1929 Premiers’ 
Conference with a special sense of urgency.  In his opening address, Bruce 
lectured the Premiers on past failures and “an obligation on the shoulders of 
                                                 
88 John Hawkins, ‘Sir Earle Page: An Active Treasurer’, Economic Round-up, Commonwealth 
Department of the Treasury, no. 4, 2009, p. 6.  The “tragic Treasurer” tag was applied by 
Nationalist MP, H.S. Gullett.   
89 On unemployment data, see Radi, op. cit., p. 406 and Sinclair, The Process of Economic 
Development in Australia, op. cit., p. 194. 
90 Richmond, op. cit., p. 252. 
91 Graham, op. cit., p. 247. 
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every one of us to state our views with the utmost frankness, forgetful of all 
political considerations, and mindful only of the duty we owe to the people of 
Australia.”  He was convinced that “the basic cause of all the economic troubles 
of Australia is the high cost of production”, the result of exorbitant labour costs 
and tariffs.  Part of the solution lay in more efficient government.92   
 
As in 1923, Bruce and Page proposed rationalisation across an array of fields 
that collectively amounted to an overhaul of federalism.  Page’s favoured 
subjects of electricity and transport were prominent, but the Commonwealth 
also put forward health, workers’ compensation, observance of Anzac Day, 
Aboriginal reserves, voting procedures, registration of doctors, national 
insurance, child endowment and industrial legislation.  The latter was presented 
as being especially important in eliminating costly duplication by either the 
states transferring full powers to the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth 
entirely withdrawing from arbitration.  Page’s national power commission was 
again raised, to which end each state was called on to establish its own 
“authoritative body” to manage power development.93  The conference also 
considered Gibson’s findings on national power resources but could only 
vaguely agree in principle on co-ordination and standardisation, for which the 
states would “give full consideration” to creating power authorities.94  This 
Premiers’ Conference, the last presided over by the Bruce-Page government, 
was frustrated – as always, from Page’s perspective – by the resistance of the 
states.   
 
The Bruce-Page government’s other late attempt to comprehensively reform 
federalism was the Peden Royal Commission.  In 1927, following the new state 
movement’s failure to achieve change via a constitutional convention or 
parliamentary inquiry, the Commonwealth instead appointed a wide-ranging 
Royal Commission on constitutional reform.  Latham had raised this idea as 
early as 1923 as an alternative to a convention, and later suggested Sir John 
                                                 
92 Bruce’s opening speech to the ‘Conference Between Commonwealth and States’, Canberra, 
28 May 1929, EPP, folder 1625.  This folder contains a full set of agenda papers.  
93 Conference memo on power, EPP, folder 416; see also speech by Page ‘Federal Power 
Commission’, op. cit.   
94 Report of conference results, copies at EPP folders 1781 and 2577.  
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Peden of Sydney University as chair.95  The Royal Commission’s report was 
submitted only the month before the Bruce-Page government was defeated.  
Peden found that most witnesses “expressed satisfaction” with existing 
Commonwealth-state co-operation, albeit amidst grumbles about the 
Commonwealth assuming too many responsibilities.  Its majority findings noted 
with approval advances in co-operative federalism.  Most were Bruce-Page 
initiatives – foremostly the Loan Council, but also including the Federal Aid 
Roads Board, the Federal Health Council, the new Federal Transport Council, 
the DMC and the CSIR.96  Peden also showed that new states had survived 
Cohen as an issue (if not as an immediate likelihood) by recommending a 
liberalised process for their creation based on a petition from local electors 
followed by a referendum of the whole existing state.97  Unlike Cohen, Peden 
only concerned itself with procedure for creating new states, not their 
desirability.  No attempt was made by the Scullin government to implement the 
Peden recommendations, which were compromised by wide differences 
between the commissioners.98  This was another disappointment for Page, and 
would not have restored his confidence in formal inquiries.   
 
Page played a bigger personal role in promoting machinery for 
intergovernmental co-operation in specific policy fields.  He saw such bodies as 
ideally not just co-ordinating the Commonwealth and the states, but also being 
accorded constitutional authority to exercise executive power.  In the late 
1920s, Page pursued this particular co-operative concept across two very 
different policy fields dear to him and to the Country Party, health and transport.  
The results were very different.  
 
On health, Page was centrally involved in creating the first enduring inter-
governmental entity for policy co-ordination.  At the Premiers’ Conference of 
May 1923 the Commonwealth had failed to secure agreement from the states 
                                                 
95 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 109; also Page, Truant Surgeon, 
op. cit., pp. 238-9.  
96 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, Government Printer, Canberra, 1929, 
copy at EPP, folder 2712.  This copy bears some highlighting by Page himself.  
97 Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., pp. 200-1.  
98 Four commissioners favoured continuation of a federal system, but the other three produced 
a minority report calling for full power to the Commonwealth. 
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to a Royal Commission on the division of administrative responsibility for health 
between national, state and local tiers of government.  This instead led to a 
special conference on national health and only then to the 1925-26 Royal 
Commission on Health, which recommended a Federal Health Council of the 
Commonwealth and the states.  This was finally established in November 1926 
as a body of respective chief health officers, not ministers, as Page had hoped.  
In 1936 it became a statutory agency, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council, which still functions today as the Commonwealth’s manager 
of medical research funding and advisor on health issues.99       
 
Page was at least as determined to institutionalise the co-ordination of another 
policy priority, national transport, a far more difficult proposition that readily 
raised state hackles about Commonwealth intrusion.  Transport had long 
elicited earnest affirmations from all Australian governments of the need to 
work together, notably to unify railway gauges.  It featured prominently in 
Page’s 1917 speech to the Australasian Provincial Press Conference, but so 
little progress was made that in January 1927 he found himself reminding the 
Constitutional Club in Brisbane of the basic case for a “definite, continuous and 
comprehensive policy of transport development.”  All three tiers of government 
needed to work towards “a sane, continuous and well-directed plan.”  As 
always, Page thought that the Commonwealth must play the catalysing role, as 
“states are quite unable to raise the funds necessary for so vast an undertaking 
and their necessarily local outlook makes them ill-suited to plan.”100  
 
Transport received its most significant airing under the Bruce-Page government 
when the May 1929 Premiers’ Conference considered a report by the 
Commonwealth Transport Committee chaired by Major John Northcott, Director 
of Army Stores and Transport.  Its very broad findings on national co-ordination 
supported Page by calling for a Federal Transport Council of ministers and a 
Commonwealth Transportation Authority with power for “taking executive action 
                                                 
99 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 428-9; also transcript of Page’s evidence to the Joint 
Committee on Constitutional Review, 15 January 1957, Sydney, p. 52, EPP, folder 1660.   
100 Page speech to Constitutional Club, Brisbane, 6 January 1927, EPP, folder 417.  
194 
 
necessary to carry out policy decided by the Transport Council.”101  The 
establishment of this Council was one of the few significant outcomes of this 
Premiers’ Conference, but it was an advisory body that met just once under the 
Bruce-Page government, in August 1929.102  Scullin also made attempts to 
build Commonwealth-led co-operation, proposing at the February 1931 
Premiers’ Conference a breadth of topics comparable to what Bruce and Page 
had raised, including transport.103  Growing financial pressures on state 
transport systems were to draw Page back into this field during the early Lyons 
government.  
 
The demise of the Bruce-Page government  
 
The climax that industrial conflict reached in the late 1920s contributed 
decisively to the fall of the Bruce-Page government in October 1929, although 
for reasons that had much to do with its own political misjudgements.  In 1929 
some 4.4 million working days were lost through strikes, approximately four 
times the annual average during the decade of the 1920s.104  Over 1928-29 
there were major and acrimonious strikes on the wharves, in the timber industry 
and on the New South Wales coalfields, all concerning issues of wages and 
conditions as the economy stalled.  These drew robust responses from the 
Bruce-Page government.  In September 1928 it legislated to open up the 
nation’s wharves to non-union labour and require waterfront workers to submit 
to a licencing system that gave the government power to cancel their 
employment.  The government lost nine seats at the November 1928 election, 
leaving it vulnerable to defeat in the House at the hands of what Page called 
“an irregular Opposition” of dissident Nationalists and rural independents.105   
 
                                                 
101 Commonwealth Transport Committee (Chairman Major John Northcott), Summary Report 
on the Co-ordination of Transport in Australia by the Commonwealth Transport Committee, 
Canberra, 1929, EPP, folder 1625.  Northcott served as Governor of New South Wales 1946-
57. 
102 See NAA, A1 1932/8838, Ministerial Transport Council – Minutes of First Meeting – 2nd 
August 1929.  
103 ‘Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers’, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 25 and 26 February 
1931, EPP, folder 1105.  This conference also addressed finance, banking, electoral 
administration and a “three year plan.”   
104 Murray, op. cit., p. 216. 
105 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 214. 
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Page’s last major legislative initiative was to introduce a National Insurance Bill 
into parliament in September 1928, in fulfilment of the goal he had announced 
back in his 1922 election policy speech.  The bill followed the recommendations 
of a long-running Royal Commission on national insurance, and proposed 
sickness, old age, disability and maternity benefits paid for by compulsory 
contributions, along with smaller payments to parents of children under 16 and 
to orphans.  This scheme had been strongly promoted during the 1928 
campaign but was so hampered by opposition from within the government’s 
own ranks that the bill had still not been passed when the government was 
defeated the following year, partly due to its transgression of state 
responsibilities such as workers’ compensation.  “We missed the psychological 
moment for its passage in an attempt to make the legislation all-embracing”, 
reflected Page in his memoirs.106 
 
The May 1929 Premiers’ Conference triggered the sequence of events leading 
to the defeat of the government.  When the states rejected the proposed 
transfer of state industrial arbitration to the Commonwealth, Bruce declared that 
instead his government would withdraw from arbitration in most industries.  In 
August 1929 he introduced into parliament the Maritime Industries Bill that 
sought to establish a new industrial tribunal to cover workers in inter-state and 
overseas maritime transport, but also to leave most other federal industrial 
jurisdiction to the states alone.  Unions representing the 700,000 workers 
subject to federal awards opposed any such shift to state coverage.  The bill 
was defeated on the floor of the House on 10 September 1929 by a single vote 
at the hands of Nationalist dissidents Hughes, Mann, W.M. Marks and G.A. 
Maxwell, along with erstwhile Country Party members Stewart and William 
McWilliams.107   
 
                                                 
106 Ibid., pp. 305-6; see also Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 107. 
107 The vital shift in Marks’s vote arose from his objection to Bruce failing to consult 
parliamentary colleagues when he declared that a motion by Hughes to postpone the Bill until a 
referendum or an election amounted to a motion of no confidence in the government; see 
Page, ibid., pp. 216-7, and Ellis, ibid., pp. 159-60.  Also contributing to the government’s defeat 
in the House was the refusal of the Speaker to vote and the failure of the Country Party’s 
chosen candidate for the Victorian seat of Indi at the 1928 election to lodge his deposit in time, 
resulting in its being won by the ALP.   
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Bruce was resoundingly defeated at the ensuing 12 October election, losing 18 
government seats, including his own seat of Flinders and three held by the 
Country Party.  Popular fear that a re-cast arbitration system would degrade 
living standards easily overrode ideals of co-operative federalism and national 
efficiency.  Writing in his memoirs, Page reflected on other, less immediate, 
factors in the fall of the Bruce-Page government: the coalminers strike, for 
which he largely blamed the employer, John Brown; the government’s decision 
not to proceed with prosecution of the same employer over a breach of federal 
law, seen as unfairly discriminating against organised labour; and his own 
1929-30 budget which responded to a fall in customs revenue with increases in 
income and entertainment taxes, increased customs duties including on spirits 
and beer, and an especially unpopular new duty on foreign films.  Page 
admitted that the stress of continued opposition from both outside and within 
the government had made it a relief to lose.108 
 
One of the first major policy moves of the new Scullin government was to act 
on the longstanding ALP hostility to the Migration Agreement.  In early 
November 1929 it announced the cessation of most assisted migration, citing 
rising unemployment and falling commodity prices, and followed this the next 
year with the abolition of the DMC.109  Page’s angry speech to the House 
seven months later on the repeal of the DMC legislation shows how centrally it 
had lodged in his thinking.  The DMC had used “some of the best brains in the 
country” and was able to tackle “the main factor in Australia’s present economic 
sickness [which] is the lack of co-ordination in all those activities of government 
which have to do with the development of this country.”110  The government 
responded on the plainer grounds of a need to economise and the lack of jobs 
for immigrants, as well as concerns over government control of development 
policy.111  Page’s anger was sharpened by his no doubt seeing the demise of 
the DMC as extinguishing – for the time being – his hopes for The Gorge 
project.  Bruce commented many years later that the Scullin government’s 
                                                 
108 Page, Truant Surgeon, ibid., pp. 216-8; see also see Dagmar Carboch, ‘The Fall of the 
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abolition of “my” DMC denied the nation “a clear-cut picture of the development 
of Australia” with “no colour of politics.”  (Indeed, he considered this “his 
deepest regret” after leaving office).112  This heavily qualifies later suggestions 
that the Bruce-Page government had operated in an “atmosphere not 
conducive to the careful estimation of costs and benefits.”113   
 
The DMC was extinguished as an organisation but the ideas it had embodied 
were to linger, mainly due to Page.  The DMC model of co-opting business 
leaders, formalised co-ordination with the states, expert assessment of projects 
and the institutionalisation of national development above party politics was, 
along with the Loan Council, the inspiration for Page’s proposed National 
Council of 1938-9 and a string of later planning proposals.  They helped inspire 
his efforts to keep ideas of planning and co-operative federalism on the national 
political agenda for over three decades beyond the demise of the Bruce-Page 
government.  Yet despite Page’s admiration for the DMC, both it and the 
Brigden Enquiry marked the start of increasing reliance on economic expertise 
in public policy.  Brigden in particular was “an enduring landmark in Australian 
economic history” by marking “economists’ first prominent step on the stage of 
public life in Australia.”114  This shift was in future years to prove increasingly 
problematic for Page. 
 
Scepticism concerning Page’s developmentalist ambitions was clearly 
discernable even in the optimistic 1920s.  He had not dominated the Bruce-
Page government, but was its most fecund generator of new policies.  Page 
and the Country Party had habitually steered the government towards their 
various favoured policy initiatives but were constrained by Bruce’s caution, the 
resistance of the states, and the misgivings of experts in the DMC and the 
engineering profession.  Despite this, and the comprehensiveness of the 
government’s eventual defeat, the Bruce-Page experience gave Page a lasting 
sense of possibilities.  Service as Treasurer confirmed him as a major national 
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figure and provided a stable platform for combining his official and more 
personal goals.  He routinely alluded to these years when talking of what 
governments could and should do, the Bruce-Page government being his 
benchmark for a sound developmentalist-oriented administration.    
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CHAPTER 6 – THE 1930s, PAGE’S MOST MIXED DECADE  
 
Page was out of ministerial office until November 1934 when the Country Party 
belatedly again formed a coalition with the urban-based conservatives, now 
recast as the United Australia Party (UAP).  Although as a minister over 1934-
39 he successfully advocated fewer new policies than he had in the 1920s, 
Page was as ambitious a visionary as ever and was not restrained – but nor, 
for that matter, enabled – by a strong Prime Minister.   
 
The early 1930s was an unusually febrile time in Australian party politics.  
Under the stress of the Great Depression, most national and state governments 
were defeated at the polls.  The ALP underwent splits involving both its right 
and left wings, and the new UAP absorbed elements of the Labor right.  The 
Country Party sat on the crossbenches in parliament, but under an expectation 
that the coalition would be reinstituted once the Scullin government had been 
defeated.  The strident rhetoric of Premier Lang and the perception that his 
government had rendered itself illegitimate by repudiating interest payments to 
British bondholders inspired a counter movement of loyalist, middle class-
based organisations such as the All for Australia League.   
 
Much of this tension over Lang was lanced by the success of the UAP led by 
Joseph Lyons at the national election of December 1931 and the Premier’s 
sudden removal from office by the state governor the following May.  Lyons had 
been a senior minister in the Scullin government, but emerged as the leader of 
party dissidents who rejected Treasurer Theodore’s proposal to expand credit 
as a response to the Depression.  Lyons broke with the ALP in March 1931 
when he supported a motion of no confidence in the government.  His electoral 
appeal of restraint and personal modesty encouraged a coterie of Melbourne 
business and political figures to entice him into becoming the UAP’s first leader.   
 
The UAP united the Nationalists, former ALP members who favoured stricter 
economic austerity than was palatable to most of their onetime colleagues and 
some more populist movements including the All for Australia League.  The 
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new party emerged from an economic and political crisis unprecedented in the 
short history of the Australian Commonwealth – “cobbled together out of 
political expediency, it was a party of action without elaborate party rules or 
even a mission statement.”1  Lyons was a very different personage from Page.  
His instinct was “to delegate and to manage rather than command.”2  As Prime 
Minister, Lyons kept the UAP sufficiently united to reassure the public that 
stable government had been restored.  It is a tribute to his ability to handle 
colleagues that despite limited policy ambitions of his own, he eventually won 
Page’s support and even admiration.   
   
Page shared the expectation of forming a coalition immediately after Scullin’s 
defeat.  A joint party conference and policy statement for the 1931 election 
campaign even raised some prospect of the Country Party amalgamating with 
the UAP.  Immediately after the election, Lyons offered the Country Party three 
portfolios (despite the UAP having won a parliamentary majority) but with the 
unacceptable proviso that he alone would select ministers.  Page said privately 
he did not want to expose the Country Party to the “big Melbourne 
manufacturers and stockbrokers” who had had John Latham (Lyons’s 
predecessor as Opposition leader) “buried alive.”3   
 
Once in office, Lyons’s reluctance to accede to Country Party demands for tariff 
cuts kept the two parties apart.4  The coalition was only restored after the UAP 
lost its majority at the election of September 1934 and failed in an attempt to 
continue governing alone.  Lyons provided an assurance that decisions on 
tariffs would be acceptable to the Country Party.5  Although the Country Party 
scored a success when the new coalition cut tariffs on machinery, its overall 
status was weaker than in the Bruce-Page government.  It held four positions in 
                                                 
1 Anne Henderson, Joseph Lyons: The People’s Prime Minister, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney, 
2011, p. 319. 
2 Ibid., p. 315. 
3 Page to A.G. Cameron, 29 April 1931, EPP folder 810, quoted in P.R. Hart, ‘Lyons: Labor 
Minister – Leader of the UAP’, in The Great Depression in Australia, Labour History, Number 
17, p. 49.  
4 Davey, Ninety Not Out, op. cit., pp. 50-2.  Lyons did however cut many tariffs in early 1933 
following advice from the Tariff Board; see Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. 
cit., pp. 197-8. 
5 Kosmas Tsokhas, Markets, Money and Empire: The Political Economy of the Australian Wool 
Industry, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1990, pp. 81-2.  
201 
 
a ministry of fourteen, two of which were without portfolio.  Page was again de 
facto Deputy Prime Minister, but held the lesser portfolio of Commerce. 
 
During the 1930s policy priority shifted from the national and rural development 
that had suited Page in the 1920s to recovery from the Depression.  Lyons 
sought to restore business confidence by balancing budgets and lowering 
costs.  He maintained the deflationary policies of the Premiers’ Plan agreed 
between Scullin and the states in June 1931 that imposed a shared sacrifice 
through higher taxes, less public spending and reduced interest payments to 
local bond holders.  Accordingly, the Lyons government proceeded to cut public 
service salaries and social service benefits.  Some emergency Depression 
taxes were also cut, while Stanley Bruce, back in parliament and now Assistant 
Treasurer, negotiated for reduced interest payments to British holders of 
Australian bonds.  A five-year period of recovery began in mid-1932.  Cheaper 
currency assisted export sales and the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Economic 
Conference gave farmers greater access to British markets in return for lower 
tariffs on manufactures from Britain.  Rural industries, particularly pastoralism, 
began a slow revival.  Manufacturing recovered more strongly to become a 
mass employer, aided by the high tariffs imposed by Scullin and a devalued 
currency that made imports dearer.  From 1933 unemployment began to fall but 
took until 1938 to reach 8 per cent, a middling rate for the previous decade.6  
 
Rural policy was narrower than in the 1920s, offering Page less opportunity to 
add his own vision to mainstream initiatives.  The focus was on wheat and 
dried fruits, each driven by different pressures.  The wheat industry was 
afflicted by low prices and debt acquired from over-expansion in the 1920s.  
Although during 1930-36 growers received bounties and relief payments from 
the Commonwealth, it was only following a fall in wheat prices that in 1938 a 
home consumption price was introduced, financed by a flour tax.7  Policy on 
                                                 
6 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, op. cit., p. 180; and J.R. Robertson, ‘1930-39’, in 
Crowley, op. cit., pp. 435-6, 438.  
7 See briefing note on orderly marketing schemes prepared for the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission, typed copy in EPP folder 2630, p. 20; also Lloyd, ‘Agricultural Price Policy’ in D.B. 
Williams, op. cit., p. 359.  A 1934-36 Royal Commission on the Wheat, Flour and Bread 
Industries had advised against a home consumption price as the net cost disadvantage of 
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dried fruit was driven by constitutional challenges to the regulation of interstate 
trade which occupied much of Page’s time in the latter years of the decade.  
More positively for Page, the 1930s offered richer intellectual debate on policy 
than had the 1920s.  The journals Australian Quarterly and Public 
Administration first appeared in 1929 and 1937 respectively, and the Australian 
Institute of Political Science (AIPS) was established in 1932.  Widened debate 
elicited reflections on Page’s policy visions, especially planning and co-
operative federalism.  Economic thought began in the mid-1930s to turn to 
averting future depressions, hence such publications as Economic Planning 
(proceedings of a 1934 AIPS conference) and F.A. Bland’s Planning the 
Modern State (also 1934).  The suffering and political cleavages of those years 
convinced many policy intellectuals of a need for more than just minor reform, 
hence an openness to planning, welfarism and, eventually, Keynesianism.8  
Although such ponderings had an urban basis well removed from Page’s rural 
orientation, they encouraged him to resume his interest in planning.     
 
But the overall trend for Page during this decade was one of growing difficulty 
in anchoring his initiatives in the mainstream politics in which he operated.  Not 
only did the policy priorities of the Commonwealth government narrow, but the 
Country Party itself was to offer Page progressively less basis for pursuing his 
vision.  There were also further signs that policy making was building on the 
DMC and the Brigden Enquiry of the previous decade by continuing to shift 
towards greater reliance on economic expertise.  This trend was to become 
especially apparent in the post-war policy environment, a focus of the next 
chapter.   
 
Page therefore found himself during the 1930s searching for opportunities to 
pursue his developmentalist agenda.  This chapter explains how his focus 
shifted as different such opportunities arose, making him the leading national 
advocate of change in five related elements of his national vision in sequence.  
                                                                                                                                              
tariffs to the industry had declined, but conceded it could be justified as a strictly temporary 
relief measure. 
8 Moore in Walter, op. cit., pp. 162, 165, 168, 173.  The 1937 Royal Commission on Monetary 
and Banking Systems for example recommended that the Commonwealth Bank work to reduce 
fluctuations in the economy. 
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Each arose from very different circumstances.  Regionalism and new statism 
were revived by events in New South Wales, particularly Lang’s interest 
payment repudiation in 1931-32.  From 1934 Page became directly involved in 
the campaign to establish a university in New England, led by new state 
advocates and providing a focus for his longstanding interest in rural-based 
education.  His renewed engagement with co-operative federalism via 
Commonwealth-state policy councils was driven by the need to respond to 
challenges to Australia’s trade interests and orderly marketing, leading to the 
creation of the Australian Agricultural Council in 1934.  In 1936, electrification 
arose briefly via Page’s alertness to opportunities linked to trade policy and to 
collaboration with New South Wales.  Finally, Page became the main political 
proponent of national planning, aided by the threat of war and leading to his 
1938-9 attempt to create a National Council of Commonwealth and state 
ministers.  This remarkable policy venture encompassed all the objectives of 
Page’s preceding policy campaigns on decentralisation, electrification, rural 
services and Commonwealth-state co-operation.  The chapter ends with an 
account of Page’s dramatic fall from political power in 1939, including how his 
unsuccessful planning initiative might have contributed. 
 
Page’s freedoms as a private member, 1929-34: the revival of new statism  
 
The defeat of the Bruce-Page government restored the federal Country Party’s 
sense of freedom.  Page described the five years that followed as a period 
which “sharpened our wits and enabled us to prepare public opinion for the 
policies we hoped to implement when the next opportunity came.”9  
Characteristically, it was Page who took greatest advantage of this release 
from ministerial office and coalition to become more outspoken on issues dear 
to him.   
 
An early example arose from Scullin’s use of trade barriers to try to ameliorate 
the Depression.  This was a cue for Country Party MPs to resume public 
attacks on tariffs and for Page to revive his more finely balanced ideas on how 
                                                 
9 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 264.   
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tariffs should be applied.  In July 1930 he spoke of the nation as “tariff mad,” 
especially given barriers to the importation of electrical equipment that retarded 
electrification across the economy.  Page delighted in bold international 
comparisons and cast such misapplied protection as a reason why Australia 
was developing more slowly than Canada.  He also made clear his willingness 
to protect Australian manufacturing, provided this concentrated on 
internationally competitive products that used primary inputs such as wool and 
flour.  Lack of such targeting resulted in Australia having “built up many exotic 
industries that are non-essential and unsuited for the natural environment of the 
country.”10 
 
But the issue Page pursued most energetically was new statism, for the first 
time since Cohen.  In the wake of the Bruce-Page government’s defeat, Page’s 
erstwhile friend Percy Stewart accurately predicted to Hughes that “no doubt 
Page will bring out his New State hobby horse and mount him again.”11  New 
statism demonstrated its capacity to flare up as a focus for rural resentment by 
broadening markedly in the late 1920s and early 1930s, encouraged by Page.  
He rapidly became the central figure in this revival, including a largely 
successful move to unite the various New South Wales new state movements.  
The main underlying cause was the impact of the Depression on rural Australia, 
but Lang’s first repudiation in March 1931 provided a galvanising issue that 
Page and his new state followers seized upon to call for the unilateral 
separation of the state’s north.  To them, Lang’s actions justified dispensing 
with constitutional formalities in favour of open rebellion against a government 
they considered to have rendered itself illegitimate, in doing so casting 
themselves as upholders of the federal constitution.  The defeat of the Bavin-
Buttenshaw state government in October 1930 released Country Party leaders 
of the calibre of Bruxner and Drummond to join this campaign.12   
 
New state agitation strengthened in three ways.  Firstly, there was a marked 
geographic widening of campaigning beyond northern New South Wales.  The 
                                                 
10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 17 July 1930, pp. 4252-4, 4260. 
11 Graham, op. cit., p. 284. 
12 Aitkin, The Colonel, op. cit. p. 137. 
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movement from 1931 acquired a strong base in the Riverina, drawing on the 
precedent of the Riverina New State League that had been active in the early 
1920s.  Agitation briefly matched that in the state’s north, invigorated by the 
charismatic leadership of the Wagga Wagga timber merchant Charles Hardy.13  
The course of events in this region was to have considerable implications for 
Page.  There were also lesser revivals in the west and southeast of New South 
Wales, and in northern Queensland. 
 
Secondly, new intellectual proponents and political movements added non-rural 
strands to new statism and decentralisation.  New states became a beacon for 
agitation for constitutional change and creative responses to the Depression 
that overlapped with the more parochial agendas of older school new staters.  
This included movements that proffered themselves as avowedly anti-political 
alternatives to conventional party politicking.  The outspoken decentralist 
engineer Alex Gibson, for example, was prime mover in the All for Australia 
League.14   
 
Page dallied with these more rarefied advocates in the early 1930s and later 
during the post-war era.  Some responded by recognising him as the 
preeminent political advocate of new states and decentralisation.  Bland, 
increasingly outspoken from his base at the University of Sydney on a myriad 
of issues, often wrote in support of Page initiatives.  In the early 1930s, Bland 
was an advocate of decentralisation and regionalism but not of the new states 
that had been so far proposed, which he thought would still be so large as to 
pose problems of remoteness.  He dismissed northern New South Wales 
agitation as merely seeking a bigger share of public expenditure, and proposed 
amalgamating local councils into larger District Councils, akin to Cohen’s 
recommendation.15  Also prominent was the geographer J. Macdonald Holmes, 
who thought it opportune to create new states now that the geographic limits for 
agriculture were being reached, helping delineate natural boundaries for 
                                                 
13 Blacklow, op. cit., p. 176.  
14 Trevor Matthews, ‘The All For Australia League’, Labour History No. 17, The Great 
Depression in Australia, 1970, pp. 136-47. 
15 F.A. Bland, ‘The Abolition of States and the Increase of Local Government Bodies’, reprinted 
from The Shire and Municipal Record, November 1932, copy in Ulrich Ellis papers, NLA, MS 
1006, box 15, folder 55.   
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settlement.16  More marginal but still outspoken figures included Dr Norman 
Pern, a Sydney GP who in his 1932 booklet Australia Speaking – is Earle Page 
Right? wrongly asserted that Page was interested only in splitting up New 
South Wales.17  A few new state advocates tried making use of broader interest 
in constitutional reform.  In April 1933 Ulrich Ellis established (apparently at his 
own behest) a Constitution League in Canberra, a short-lived discussion group 
which attracted Solicitor-General Fred Whitlam and Labor-leaning journalist 
Warren Denning.18  
 
Thirdly, the wider regional base and engagement of articulate intellectuals 
encouraged an expressly national approach to new states reminiscent of what 
Page had advocated at the Albury convention of July 1922.  As the seasoned 
campaigner V.C. Thompson later recalled, there was an “enlarging of the 
movement’s sphere of political interest on the national plane.”19  The northern 
New South Wales movement’s 1929 convention at Armidale unanimously 
adopted a resolution calling for “a national movement for a new Federal system 
with a new distribution of powers and a new distribution of territory.”20  Another 
national convention was held in Canberra in May 1930 against the background 
of the Scullin government’s attempt to liberalise mechanisms for constitutional 
amendment, and called for adoption of the Peden formula for new states.21  
Page became directly involved in the two main groups to emerge from this 
revival, bolstering his claim to national leadership of the new state movement – 
the Sydney-based Federal Reconstruction Movement (FRM), and the United 
Country Movement (UCM) which was to merge with the Country Party in 1931.   
 
The FRM arose from the preference intellectual supporters of new states and 
decentralisation had for broader bodies than individual regional movements.  It 
                                                 
16 J. Macdonald Holmes, The "New States" Idea and its Geographic Background, New Century 
Press, Sydney, 1933.   
17 Ulrich Ellis collection, UNE Archives, A0811, box 13, contains copies of Pern’s publications.  
Pern’s own vision was of a “United Federation of Australia” based on self-governing regions 
united by a national railway system. 
18 See Ellis’s account of the League’s meeting of 11 April 1933, Ulrich Ellis papers, NLA, MS 
1006, box 22, series 7B, folder 97. 
19 From an account of the new state movement written by Thompson for Page (untitled), 
January 29 1958, p.1, EPP, folder 2146.  
20 Ibid., p. 1.   
21 The Canberra Times, 20 May 1930, p. 2, and 21 May 1930, p.5. 
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was formed in July 1932 with Stanley Kingsbury as first honorary secretary, a 
professional publicist who Page had once engaged to advise the new state 
cause.22  It proposed replacing the states with smaller federal units and shared 
Page’s interest in transferring many state powers to a strong national 
government.23  The FRM’s other leading lights included Bland, the 
educationalist and state public servant H.L. Harris, and the Sydney barrister 
Richard Windeyer.   
 
But the UCM was the most important organisation to arise from the 1931-32 
spike in activity and the closest the new state movement ever came to a united 
structure.  The UCM was also the main basis for Page’s resumption of active 
leadership of the movement.  It formed out of a chain of events that began with 
the rise of the United Australia Association, led by Hardy to promote the 
Riverina cause.  Hardy at his peak portrayed himself as offering a full 
alternative to the Country Party.24  His impassioned calls for direct action to 
free the Riverina from the grip of Lang’s Sydney led to his being cast as that 
rarest of species in the Australian political pantheon, the demagogue.  (Robert 
Clyde Packer – Frank’s father – dubbed him the “Cromwell of the Riverina.”)  
Hardy’s speeches included oblique references to a secret paramilitary force 
supposedly at his disposal.  His threats of unilateral secession attracted the 
attention of the New South Wales Police and the Commonwealth Investigation 
Branch.25  Hardy envisaged the secession of the Riverina as ushering in a 
regime of local authorities that would, rather incongruously, be led by a strong 
                                                 
22 See Kingsbury to Page, 13 June 1932, EPP, folder 1020.  Kingsbury advised that the new 
state campaign should form a Sydney Reform League to build urban-based support in 
anticipation of a statewide referendum.  
23 See Ulrich Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., p. 224; and ‘Report to Annual Meeting by the 
Provisional Executive Committee’ of the FRM by R. Windeyer and Stanley Kingsbury, 28 
September 1932, David Henry Drummond Papers, UNE Archives, A0248, V3010, folder 6. 
24 Ulrich Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 171; Aitkin, The Colonel, op. 
cit., pp. 136-7. 
25 Andrew Moore, ‘Hardy, Charles Downey’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, op. cit., 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hardy-charles-downey-6561/text11283, published first in 
hardcopy volume 9, Melbourne University Press, 1983.  Moore elsewhere concluded that right-
wing paramilitary movements of the early 1930s, especially the Old Guard, had a distinct rural 
element and that some members were prominent in the Country Party and new statism, notably 
C.L.A. Abbott, member for the federal seat of Gwydir 1925-29 and 1931-37.  They shared a 
preparedness to assume control should there be a breakdown of the Lang government.  See 
Andrew Moore The Secret Army and the Premier: Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in 
New South Wales 1930-32, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1989, pp. 93-9 
and 103-6.   
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national parliament.26  Hardy was Page’s only serious rival as the new state 
movement’s most prominent public figure.  He was even suspected of having 
designs on the national leadership of the Country Party.  In May 1931, Hardy 
challenged Page accordingly: 
 
If Earle Page refuses to co-operate with the Riverina and Western 
Movements, our intention is to go to the north coast to test whether the 
people want Dr Page or the Riverina Movement.  Watch out, Dr Page, 
that you do not get out of step with the country people.27   
 
Page wrote in his memoirs of the Riverina movement’s attempt, backed by 
unspecified “influential Sydney personalities”, to take the place of the state 
Country Party.  He drolly called all these pressures “diverse undercurrents,” 
which were successfully neutralised by the creation of the UCM.28  The 
“Sydney personalities” may have been an oblique reference to the city-based 
All for Australia League, which had strong ties to the protectionist Chamber of 
Manufactures of New South Wales and made overtures to Hardy.  (Some 
Country Party figures suspected the League of plotting to eventually absorb all 
non-Labor parties.)29  But Hardy presented only a passing challenge.  As a 
longstanding party leader with a good prospect of shortly returning to 
government, Page in 1931 was a firmly established national figure.  Hardy soon 
displayed the typical limitations of the demagogue by outstripping his capacity 
for substantive action.  He did not have a firm platform beyond the Riverina 
movement and lacked grounding in practical politics.  His contempt for 
established politicians and suspected interest in the party leadership drew the 
disdain of established rural leaders such as Bruxner.30 
 
During 1931 Hardy slowly entered into alliances with other new staters and the 
Country Party.  Over March to August he attended a series of four conventions 
of New South Wales new state movements.31  By June he had publicly 
                                                 
26 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 174. 
27 Ibid, p. 178.  
28 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 242-3.   
29 Matthews op. cit. p. 138; Davey, The Nationals, op. cit., p. 59; and Ellis, A History of the 
Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 171. 
30 Aitkin, The Colonel, op. cit., p. 137. 
31 Ellis, A Pen in Politics, op. cit., p. 183. 
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reclassed Page, Bruxner and Drummond as colleagues to be thanked for 
having “helped the new movements over the hurdles of constitutional 
difficulties.”32  At the August convention Hardy called for all four regional 
movements in New South Wales to be moulded into one organisation, leading 
to the creation of the UCM chaired by him.  In October he led a Riverina 
delegation to the Prime Minister, only to find that Scullin not only opposed new 
states but favoured an all-powerful federal parliament that delegated powers to 
provinces and could amend the Constitution effectively at will.  This prospect so 
unnerved Hardy that he switched to favouring more fully sovereign new states, 
bringing him yet closer to Page.33  Hardy fully entered the Country Party fold 
when elected a senator in December 1931.34  He became representative of the 
malleability of so much new state agitation and its tendency to lack sustainable 
strategies.  The UCM was soon effectively absorbed within the Country Party 
by being given a place on the Central Council of the redubbed United Country 
Party (UCP) of New South Wales.  The new UCP supported the division of New 
South Wales along the lines of the state’s new state movements – the Riverina, 
the north, the west, and the Monaro-south coastal-metropolitan region.35  
Hardy’s earlier calls for expanded local authorities had aroused such 
suspicions he was a mere unificationist that the UCM-UCP union was only 
consummated after he underwent searching questioning by Drummond.36   
 
Although Page declined an offer to lead the UCM, he became its main driver.  
He had the public status and political skills to tie it to his own northern wing of 
the movement, and soon outshone Hardy.  He supported the UCM’s de facto 
union with the Country Party and successfully proposed that it broaden its 
platform to encompass continued future subdivision into “new federal units”, a 
shift of selected powers from the states to the Commonwealth and a national 
transport authority.37  Almost uniquely amongst new state organisations, the 
                                                 
32 Aitkin, The Colonel, op. cit., p. 138. 
33 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 180-1; and Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 October 1931, p. 9.  
34 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 243. 
35 Davey, The Nationals, op. cit., p. 65.  
36 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 179. 
37 Minutes of joint meeting of the New England, Riverina, Monaro-South Coast and Western 
movements, 13 August 1931, Ulrich Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 14, folder 45. 
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UCM proclaimed criteria for delineating the boundaries of new states, albeit 
broad ones – political and economic balance, “community of interest”, facility of 
communications, diversity of production and natural outlets for trade.38  Page 
was also central to the UCM’s entering into an alliance with the FRM.  Soon 
after the UCM was formed, he and other UCM figures met with the FRM 
leadership, including Bland.  The FRM was reassured to conclude from this that 
“no difference exists between the objectives as we understand them of the 
Federal Reconstruction Movement and the ultimate objectives of the United 
Country Movement” (including the transfer of transport and industrial powers to 
the Commonwealth prior to the subdivision of New South Wales), so much so 
that Page and Drummond were elected as FRM vice-presidents.39   
 
A nominally united new state movement with multiple geographic and sectoral 
bases was always at risk from regional rivalries and conflicting motivations.  
Northern New South Wales disagreed with other movements over the 
configuration of its proposed new state, such as the siting of its deep sea 
port.  At the August 1931 convention western New South Wales objected to 
being bracketed with Sydney.  (It was felt by Drummond and Holmes that the 
metropolis needed a hinterland).40  Drummond remained uneasy over the FRM 
and warned Page in November 1933 that Bland’s plan for non-sovereign 
provinces “somewhat along the lines of the English County Council” was bound 
to fail given “the centralising influence which is bred in the bone of the people of 
this state”.41  The importance that leaders of the Riverina and New England 
movements attached to simpler and cheaper governments must have sowed 
unease amongst many grass roots supporters hoping for more public 
resources.42  But the revival over 1929-32 did show that new statism and an 
elite-led sense of rural grievance had not only maintained a place in Australian 
political culture, but had acquired urban-based adherents.  Page played a 
                                                 
38 Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., p. 227. 
39 Letter to the Secretary of the FRM from Bland, H.L. Harris and R.W.G. MacKay, undated but 
internal evidence suggests August 1932, David Henry Drummond Papers, UNE Archives, 
A0248, V3010, folder 6; the Armidale Express of 18 November 1932, p. 3, reported on the 
UCM conference in Armidale and the election of FRM vice-presidents.  
40 R.G. Neale, ‘New States Movement’, Australian Quarterly, September 1950, p. 16. 
41 Drummond to Page, 29 November 1935, David Henry Drummond Papers, UNE Archives 
A0248, V3010, folder 8, part 5. 
42 See Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., p. 213, on proposed smaller government. 
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central strategic role in this, not least by successfully resisting Hardy’s short-
lived attempt to become national leader.  
 
Page militant: leading the attempted secession of New England 
 
1931-32 was a uniquely militant phase in Page’s campaigning for new states.  
He led the most remarkable of all new state campaigns, premised on 
condemnation of the government of New South Wales as illegitimate.  Page 
and his followers proposed responding to this sentiment and a feared 
breakdown of government altogether with a call for the unilateral separation of 
the state’s north.  Although the attempted secession evaporated immediately 
Premier Lang was removed from office, the episode reveals much about the 
broader climate of ideas and Page’s capacity to lead the new state movement.   
 
Condemnation of Lang’s government drew upon some basic mores of rural 
community culture – thrift and the belief that paying one’s debts is an important 
matter of personal honour.  Michael Cathcart wrote of a rural dimension to the 
agitation against Lang which drew on a commitment to meeting debts that 
outweighed resentment of the large banks.  This reflected a sense of a “moral 
economy” as essential to the nation’s financial stability.43  Such attitudes had 
“deep psychological roots” and made financial repudiation by a government 
highly suggestive of unfitness to rule.44  This moral reinforcement of calls to 
separate northern New South Wales was to feature strongly in Page’s public 
campaigning.  
 
On 9 February 1931 Lang announced his intention to repudiate the payment of 
interest due to foreign bond holders.45  Page at once proposed to his “closest 
colleagues” a strategy based on the north declaring separation from New South 
Wales, now seen by him as an outlaw state.  He raised this with legal advisers 
and state Country Party MPs Bruxner and Roy Vincent, then arranged for the 
                                                 
43 Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop: Australia’s Secret Intrigue of 1931, 
McPhee Gribble/Penguin, Fitzroy, 1988, p. 22.  
44 Brett, op. cit., pp. 108-9.  
45 Schedvin, op. cit., p. 233.  Lang defaulted on overseas interest payments in March 1931 and 
again in January-February 1932.   
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journalists Thompson and Sommerlad to work on the northern press.46  Page 
went public just eight days after Lang’s announcement in a speech he delivered 
at Glenreagh on the state’s north coast.  Default “must automatically place New 
South Wales out of the Federal Union” and so “the people of the North seem to 
have no other course but to cut adrift from New South Wales.”47  Otherwise 
“they become repudiators also and suffer the penalties of repudiation – no 
capital for development in the next generation; withdrawal of capital by all who 
can because once a government has repudiated in one direction it cannot be 
trusted not to in others.”48   
 
Page’s leadership of this campaign demonstrated his readiness to seize 
opportunities aggressively.  It was he who summoned northern delegates to an 
Annual New States convention at Armidale on 28 February to endorse his 
proposals to form a provisional executive and submit a draft constitution to 
Federal Parliament.49  He told delegates that “now is the psychological moment 
when the whole of Australia is stirred, and when our requests for admission are 
unanswerable,” and called for petitions to the Commonwealth and British 
governments seeking recognition.50  Page blamed Scullin’s fiscal policies and 
the Lang left of the ALP for threatening the Financial Agreement, the state and 
indeed the entire nation.  The new state’s constitution would impose limits on 
taxes and borrowing to protect rural Australia from such urban profligacy.  
(Page the fiscal conservative was always loath to concede that any of his own 
plans could impose on the public purse).  A self-governing, frugal New England 
would attract investors and set an example to be copied across the nation.  
Privately, he told Ellis that northern MPs should leave state parliament at once 
and establish a government based at Armidale.51   
 
                                                 
46 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 239. 
47 Quoted in Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., pp. 205-6. 
48 Page to R. Jones of Canowindra, 7 March 1931, Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 14, folder 
44.  
49 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 240. 
50 Speech by Page to New States Convention 28 February 1931, New England New State 
Movement, UNE Archives, A0001, box 14. 
51 Ellis, A Pen in Politics, op. cit., p. 174. 
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This was all a typical Page sequence of activity – grasping an opportunity to 
implement a long-held aim that would normally lack wider support; lining up 
important contacts; issuing ringing public calls for immediate action; and then 
trying to push through the necessary formalities.  Page also rallied the New 
England New State Movement at a pivotal convention in Maitland in April 1931, 
which endorsed the constitution and working with other new state movements.  
Page exhorted his fellow new state militants to see themselves not as rebels 
but as loyalists intent on returning their territory to the national fold by rejecting 
Lang’s effective withdrawal of New South Wales from the federation.52   
 
Lang’s threats were also important in the convening of the meetings that had 
brought Page and Hardy together in the UCM and where Page assumed 
ascendancy.  At a rally at Wagga on 28 February 1931, Hardy issued an 
ultimatum to the state government to meet local demands by the end of the 
following month.  Page recounted that soon afterwards Hardy privately 
confessed that he had no idea what to do if Lang stood firm (which the Premier 
indeed did).  Follow the lead of the New Englanders, advised Page, by now 
clearly the movement’s leader.53  Like Drummond, he was troubled by Hardy’s 
preference for weak local councils rather than the sovereign entities of the bona 
fide new stater.  Page also hoped to keep open the option of a properly 
constitutional route to new states.  In parliament in April he called on Scullin to 
recognise New England and the Riverina, either by a referendum to adopt the 
Peden formula for new states or by persuading the British Parliament to 
intervene.54  
 
Page was not merely “flirting briefly and somewhat reluctantly with right-wing 
revolutionary politics.”55  The primary documentation, such as the diary and 
memoirs of his chronicler Ellis, indicate that Page was determined in his 
leadership of the secession movement and its response to what he saw as an 
                                                 
52 Speech of 7 April 1931, in Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 12, series 6A, folder 33.  For 
details of the Maitland conference, see Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., pp. 210-3 and 256-
9. 
53 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 241. 
54 Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., pp. 213-4; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 16 
April 1931, pp. 924-8. 
55 Bridge, Australian Dictionary of Biography entry on Page, op. cit. 
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unprecedented challenge to the fundamentals of governance.  Nor was he one 
to turn up a rare opportunity to implement an important element of his personal 
vision.  Ellis recalled in his history of new statism published soon after these 
events that whenever the movement seemed divided over the wisdom of such 
militancy, it was Page who rallied them.  He pointed to Page’s strident speech 
at Glenreagh invoking the West Virginians’ self-declared secession from their 
mother state of Virginia at the onset of the American Civil War in 1861, “when 
the Constitution was infringed, so their honour might be unsmirched, their 
reputation untarnished, their obligations fulfilled and their progress and 
development as an integral part of the Federal Union assured.”56  (Dedicated 
new staters frequently drew a parallel with West Virginia, despite the vastly 
different historical circumstances).  Ellis’s detailed diary of the lead-up to the 
Maitland convention provides further evidence of Page’s commitment.  Page is 
quoted as confiding that achievement of a new state would rank alongside the 
Nymboida power scheme and the Financial Agreement as his lifetime 
achievements.57   
 
Ellis also captured Page’s confident sense of being ahead of all others in 
thought and action.  On 22 March 1931 Page convened an all-day meeting at 
Parliament House Sydney with state and federal MPs in an attempt to secure 
their support for secession, only to be disappointed by their caution.  Hardy is 
shown as again looking to Page and the northerners for a lead, such as by 
proposing that Riverina adopt the New England constitution.58  Ellis recorded a 
telling comment from Bruxner that Page had not only started the campaign in 
1915 but ever since “his continual activity had kept it alive”.59  Page also wrote 
to Drummond on his consultations with MPs who could form the “Governing 
Body” of the new state using terms that affirm the depth of his determination.  
He reiterated that “this is the psychological moment and possibly our only ever 
chance of ever getting away with it.”  If it failed, then “so far as I am concerned I 
                                                 
56 Page quoted in Ellis, New Australian States, op. cit., p. 206 
57 Typed text of diary in Ulrich Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 12, series 6A, folder 33, entry 
for 24 February 1931.  This diary was quoted at length in Ellis’s posthumously published 
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very minor details; see MS 1006, box 14, series 6, folder 44. 
58 Ellis, A Pen in Politics, op. cit., p.179; also Ellis diary, 28 and 30 March 1931, ibid.  
59 Ellis diary, 28 March 1931, ibid. 
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am finished with politics completely and will devote myself to my professional 
work and leave it to another generation to gather the results of the seed we 
have sown.”60 
 
Nearly a year later, in April 1932 when Lang was threatening further 
repudiations in defiance of Commonwealth legislation, the UCM executive 
sought the support of the new Prime Minister by telegramming him to demand 
a referendum on “the immediate reconstruction of the state of New South 
Wales into smaller federal units.”61  Lyons opposed separation.  Ellis penned 
an extraordinary letter to a contact in Brisbane in which he used personal 
euphemisms to describe how Page – dubbed by Ellis the President – had just 
approached federal Cabinet seeking support for his proposed breakaway state.  
Lyons was similarly labelled by Ellis the Chairman of Directors, Assistant 
Treasurer Bruce was the Cashier, and Attorney-General Latham was cast as 
the Lawyer.  Bruce was described as commenting that “he thought the 
Chairman of Directors would have to fight our branch [i.e. the new state 
movement] if we adopted the attitude outlined by the President.”  But he added 
that “there are other people in the world he wants to fight more and with more 
reason.”62  (Although Ellis had a well-developed sense of the dramatic, his use 
of this subterfuge is not entirely outlandish.  The political tensions of these 
months raised fear of conflict between the security forces of the 
Commonwealth and those of New South Wales).63     
 
The UCM leadership met on 17 April 1932 at Page’s Wollstonecraft residence 
in Sydney, followed the next day by a meeting of the UCM at which its 
Executive revealed the intended plan for secession.  This would begin with all 
“loyal state members” being called together “for the purpose of subdividing New 
South Wales into four units.”64  Local conventions were to be held at Armidale, 
                                                 
60 Page to Drummond 18 March 1931, Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 14, folder 44. 
61 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, op. cit., p. 176.   
62 Ellis to Jack Ridler, 7 March 1932, Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 14, folder 45.  Ridler’s 
identity is unclear; he is not in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, Page’s memoirs or any of 
Ellis’s histories.  Page provides a brief account of this meeting in Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 
246.  
63 See Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, op. cit., pp. 170, 200-1. 
64 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 245.  Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. 
cit., provides a similar description of the action proposed, pp. 188-9, but gives a different date 
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Wagga, Dubbo and Sydney to appoint provisional governments, which would 
then each proceed to seek Commonwealth recognition followed by a 
referendum to ratify a new state constitution.  Finally, the constitution and 
boundaries would be submitted to the Commonwealth Parliament with a 
request to recognise the new states.   
 
But delegates raised doubts immediately, especially over timing.  Although 
Page as leader had a strong personal network throughout the movement, he 
was not in complete control of the conspiracy, which had become increasingly 
diverse with the addition of Hardy and others.  Page wanted to set a definite 
date for action, but Hardy (no longer an antipodean Cromwell) managed to 
persuade them all to wait for one more “overt act” by Lang.  Page described 
Hardy as having been “theatrical” at this meeting: the leader of the Western 
Movement, E.J. Body, was “timid.”  The most Page could elicit was agreement 
on a coded telegram from the Executive to the various movements as the 
signal to implement the plan when the time finally came.65  In public, Page 
broadcast by radio that if the Commonwealth government did not act to 
“reconstruct New South Wales and remove its rebel government”, then “the 
country men will be forced to take the lead themselves by creating their own 
governments who will obey the Federal law and Constitution, protect the 
people, develop resources, and defy the rebel elements in the community.”66  
 
On 12 May Lang refused to comply with federal legislation enabling the 
Commonwealth to reclaim from New South Wales monies it had spent to meet 
the state’s debts, whereupon the state governor dismissed him.  The 
immediacy with which this took the wind out of militant new statism implies 
much about its limited capacity to sustain Page’s ultimate national goals.  There 
is no indication anywhere that resentment of Lang, intense as it was in rural 
New South Wales, amounted to a popular groundswell favouring unilateral 
independence of the north, the Riverina or anywhere else.  Over a year earlier 
Sommerlad had informed Page that he “was rather surprised to find during my 
                                                                                                                                              
for what appears to be the same meeting, 8 April 1932 – and in his memoirs states 9 April 
1932, A Pen in Politics, op. cit., p. 184.  
65 Page, ibid., pp. 245-6. 
66 Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate, 21 April 1932, p. 8. 
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stay in the North that the secession idea is by no means as popular as we 
fondly imagined” and that “if a referendum were taken on the question of the 
new state, it would have no chance of being carried so far as the Tableland is 
concerned.”67  Nor does it appear that the movement’s supporters had 
sufficient presence within local governments, police, essential services and 
other vital points to have been able to assert control.  Ellis had noted in his 
diary the paucity of support from state MPs.68  In his memoirs he also observed 
a decline in Riverina interest in a new state, which he attributed to the 
expectation that all would now be well once Lang was removed.69  Page’s 
advocacy of rebellion had been all the more daring for being led by a militant 
few rather than by public demand. 
 
The Lang dismissal, therefore, suddenly removed a shared focus from a narrow 
group of rebellious rural political, newspaper and business leaders.  Page 
worked to a different dynamic than most new state sympathisers, who were 
reacting to short-term considerations of the condition of the rural economy and 
fear of Langism.  These years provided him with an apparent opportunity to 
redesign the federal system that he promptly seized with little concern about its 
unorthodoxy.  Page had greater ability than any of the other new state leaders 
to provide continuity and to attract wider attention (if not necessarily actual 
support), including through his dealings with more intellectual supporters such 
as Bland.  He also had superior capacity to cope with day-to-day events and to 
propose strategy in response than did passing rivals like Hardy. 
 
For over six years following Lang’s demise, Page again let new states and 
decentralisation drift as he, Bruxner and Drummond re-entered government 
and the Depression receded.  His immediate focus from 1934 shifted to 
building a successful coalition with the UAP.  Although Page found Lyons more 
pliable than Bruce had been, the Prime Minister’s engagement with new states 
remained inconsistent.  Lyons in 1931-32 took some interest in a constitutional 
convention when it seemed likely that the Country Party would partner the UAP 
                                                 
67 Sommerlad to Page, 17 March 1931, Ellis papers, NLA, MS 1006, box 14, folder 51. 
68 Ellis diary, 27 February 1931, op. cit.  
69 Ellis, A Pen in Politics, op. cit., pp.182-3.  
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in coalition.  The shared policy program that he and Page produced in October 
1931 included the elimination of overlapping federal-state powers, “new self-
governing Federal units” and referenda on the division of New South Wales.70  
Soon after, Lyons drew on Peden’s findings of 1929 to propose clarification of 
the Constitution’s provisions on new states and in June 1933, as Prime 
Minister, tried unsuccessfully to interest the states in a constitutional 
convention.71  
 
New statism gained one other proponent in the political mainstream during this 
decade – Bertram Stevens, Lang’s successor as Premier.  Stevens showed 
distinct signs of taking cues from the Country Party, having a relationship with 
his coalition partner Bruxner that appeared closer than that with his UAP 
colleagues.  Stevens came to office on a joint platform with the United Country 
Party that provided for a referendum on new states.72  In March 1932 he used 
strikingly Page-like references when speaking on constitutional change, such 
as subdivision into new federal units and safeguards to prevent these putative 
entities from ever repudiating debt.73  In February 1934 he succeeded in 
convening a conference of the state Premiers to discuss constitutional reform, 
only to have proceedings (according to Ellis) overshadowed by Western 
Australia’s announcement of intended secession.74   
 
Stevens’s main contribution to the cause was the 1933-35 Nicholas Royal 
Commission, widely called the Boundaries Commission as it was restricted to 
delineating proposed new states.  It defined two suitable areas: a northern state 
that included Newcastle, and a large central, western and southern region 
                                                 
70 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 244, 249-50; the full text of the policy program is at p. 
467. 
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encompassing the Riverina, Wollongong and the south coast.  Page wrote 
supportively, but Nicholas for the time being came to nothing.  Most of the New 
South Wales UAP saw no pressing need for new states and Bruxner rejected a 
referendum in the north as likely to be defeated by a strong no vote from the 
Newcastle area.75  In 1938-39 Stevens would be the only Premier to support 
Page’s National Council planning initiative.  Along with Richard Casey, he was 
the senior political figure most in tune with Page’s developmentalist vision.  
Stevens later recalled that “over the years, I have felt that the name and entity 
of the Country Party correspond to something deep down in the consciousness 
of many thoughtful people, by no means confined to the rural areas.”76  
Stevens and Casey encouraged Page, but over time both became so marginal 
in their own parliamentary parties that they could not provide the decisive 
support he needed.   
 
Yet more than anyone, Page in these inter-war years reignited and upheld the 
idea of a new state in northern New South Wales.  Although he could not 
maintain direct control of the wider new state movement as it diversified, he 
remained its most visible figurehead.  Looking back on this period, Thompson 
implicitly criticized Page by opining that the movement’s decisive failure was 
the lack of a clear lead from the Commonwealth government, such as by its not 
declaring a new state in Australia’s far north.77  Farrell has described Page, 
“the acknowledged leader of the New State movement”, as a weak strategist.78  
These assessments are harsh.  Few contemporary observers thought Page a 
poor political practitioner of day-to-day political arts.  (Hughes did briefly, but 
soon learnt better).   
 
Page’s intermittent ambiguity regarding new states was not because he used 
the issue primarily for local advantage but had more to do with his obligations 
                                                 
75 See Ellis A Pen in Politics, op. cit., pp. 197, 200; Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 438; also 
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to the Bruce-Page and Lyons governments.  His very different political standing 
from other advocates produced a special tension that he managed by 
assuming the role of national spokesman only when compatible with his status 
in parliament.  Page’s vision of an entire nation restructured along regional 
lines further distinguished him from the bulk of the movement and made him an 
important link to the wider regionalism that later evolved from new statism.  Ellis 
and Thompson were among his few consistent allies as he outgrew northern 
New South Wales and put himself to the even harder task of the wider 
reorganization of all Australia into his federal units.   
 
Rural higher education: Page’s “spirit of Oxford or Cambridge” 
 
Involvement in the new state movement between the wars fortuitously drew 
Page to an important related issue.  New state advocates had long contrasted 
educational facilities in rural areas, especially for higher education, with what 
was available in the cities.  Most of the leading proponents of a new university 
to be located in Armidale, such as Drummond, were also ardent new staters.  
Their long campaign led to an appeal to Page to lend his support as the north’s 
most prominent public figure.  His subsequent involvement helped make him 
one of Australia’s few political advocates of higher education as a valued end in 
itself.   
 
When Page began his public career in the 1910s, mass primary education was 
already well-established.  But public secondary education had barely begun, 
tertiary education on an appreciable scale was still decades away and the 
management of state education was centralized in capital cities.79  
Campaigning by the Country Party and its antecedents for better educational 
opportunities in rural areas dated back to the 1890s and mainly concerned 
primary, technical and agricultural schooling.80  Between the wars, this was 
particularly strong in New South Wales and acquired a focus on tertiary 
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education.81  Cohen recommended that all new teachers colleges in the state 
be based in the countryside, that local government have a role in education and 
that consideration be given to a university for rural-based students.82  These 
goals all received Drummond’s support as state Education Minister 1927-30 
and 1932-41, and led to the establishment of the Armidale Teachers’ College in 
1928.83  Despite his longstanding commitment to education, Page was not 
especially prominent in early campaigning to establish rural tertiary institutions 
other than as an aspect of his engagement with new statism.  Although he 
raised the absence of a university in the north in his evidence to Cohen, new 
state advocates such as Colin Sinclair and the indefatigable Thompson were 
more focussed on this.84   
 
Page was asked to join the New England University cause just as it was 
becoming more organised a decade later.  In July 1934 the secretary of the 
Provisional Council raising funds for a university college invited him both to join 
the Council and to lead a delegation to Drummond.85  In November 1938, Page 
became Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Council for the newly-established New 
England University College, responsible to the University of Sydney as the 
College’s parent body.  This was alongside a solidly rural elite membership of 
local graziers, town representatives and Country Party figures that included the 
fellow new staters Phillip Wright and Bruxner.86  Once fully on board, his 
political rank and familiar energy soon made him prominent.  Drummond later 
wrote of Page’s “great and widespread influence” as comparable to that of 
eminent Chancellors of Sydney University, Percival Halse Rogers and Charles 
Blackburn.87   
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Campaigning for a fully-fledged University of New England led Page towards a 
personal conception of tertiary education that drew on his broader philosophy 
of rural community and of the appropriate scale of social institutions.  He came 
to see rural-based universities not just as important local amenities, but also as 
means of community-building and shaping.  Page told Drummond in late 1938 
of how he saw the new institution in Armidale as having “an extraordinary 
influence ultimately on the development and concentration of rural thought in 
Australia.”88  He added that: 
 
It is by having in the centre of these northern districts an institution of 
this sort, with teachers able to make personal contact with the boys and 
girls that the full advantage of university life may be realised.  Within 
universities such as this, there may be something of the spirit of Oxford 
or Cambridge, rather than London, for in big cities the commercial over-
rides the cultural life.89    
 
This comment is significant not only as an early statement of his concept of an 
ideal university – small, rural and teaching-focused – but also as a fundamental 
statement of Page’s distaste for cities and commercialism.    
 
Although there was little reaction to these views in the 1930s, they were the 
starting point of Page’s more developed contributions to the vigorous national 
debate on higher education of the 1940s and 1950s.  The breadth of his vision 
of rural education based on scale and community went well beyond anything 
proposed by Drummond, the most prominent Country Party advocate of 
education during the inter-war years.  Although always personally close to 
Page, Drummond was more conventionally orientated towards vocational 
education that met the immediate needs of particular regions and industries.90  
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Transport and the Australian Agricultural Council: Page champions 
institutionalised co-operative federalism 
 
The 1930s proved more important for co-operative federalism than for new 
states or rural higher education, and provided Page with his foremost 
achievement of the decade.  This did not start well, however, as Page began by 
trying to re-establish institutionalised co-operation in the fraught field of national 
transport.  This mainly served to illustrate the difficulties involved, but did affirm 
him as Australia’s prime advocate of co-operative federalism. 
 
Page resumed his engagement with transport even before the Country Party 
re-joined the coalition by pushing the new Lyons government to revive the 
Federal Transport Council.  In a 1932 booklet The Case for Australia, Page’s 
admirer Ellis called for re-establishment of the Council so as to “view the whole 
transport system from the national aspect, regardless of state boundaries” by 
standardising railways, linking different transport modes and eliminating 
perceived distortions in rail rates caused by the focusing of routes on capital 
cities.91  The Governor-General’s speech at the opening of the new 
government’s first parliament in February 1932 mentioned this Council, and 
Page in his address-in-reply called for its revival.92  Public service advice to the 
Minister for the Interior in August 1932 acknowledged Page’s pressure by 
warning that “apart altogether from the urgency of the problem, it is clear from 
recent press statements that the transport question will be made a live one by 
the Country Party immediately the House meets.”93   
 
Political receptiveness to a national transport body was improving.  State 
governments in the early 1930s were increasingly concerned by financial 
losses inflicted on their rail systems by road transport, and raised this at a 
series of ministerial meetings.  In September 1932, Lyons proposed the re-
establishment of a ministerial council for transport.  A June 1933 conference of 
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transport ministers duly discussed creation of a new Federal Transport Council 
with a brief to promote national uniformity and conduct investigations, but 
served to illustrate the fragility of co-operative federalism by promptly falling 
foul of state suspicions that the Commonwealth intended to take over all 
railways.94  Page almost alone continued to promote the institutionalised co-
ordination of transport.  In his policy speech for the 1934 election he proposed 
that a central purchasing authority set railway fares and uniform rates for the 
entire nation.95  He later took time out from 1936 trade talks in London to cable 
Lyons about engaging Northcott, the chair of the 1929 Commonwealth 
Transport Committee, to conduct a study of overseas transport policy.96   
 
To work, federal-led co-ordination needed either the imposition of the 
Commonwealth’s fiscal power or a common self-interest in a clearly pressing 
national issue.  Page harnessed the latter to promote the co-ordination of 
agricultural policy via the Australian Agricultural Council (AAC).  As early as 
1925 he had proposed a Commonwealth Department of Agriculture to co-
ordinate the production and marketing of agricultural exports.97  Creation of a 
Commonwealth-state entity took a decade longer and only after British trade 
policy provided a casus belli.  Like most of his initiatives in this decade, it had 
its origins in Page’s talent for turning an unexpected problem into an 
opportunity.  
 
Early in 1933 the Lyons government received a proposal from the British 
government to cut imports of Australian dairy produce.  Cabinet – still without 
Country Party members – reacted surprisingly favourably, reasoning that a 
smaller local industry would recover more quickly from the Depression.  Page 
was temporarily absent from parliament at the time following the sudden death 
of his eldest son, Earle Jnr., killed by lightning in January 1933 when driving 
cattle to Heifer Station.  Earle senior’s detailed account in Truant Surgeon tells 
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of his receipt of vague news at the homestead of a bad accident followed by his 
rushing forth to the site of the tragedy to confirm the worst.  He took nine 
months leave from active politics, an unprecedented period of absence for this 
otherwise tireless campaigner.  Page came close to retiring from public life 
permanently: Drummond feared that if he did so the federal party would shrivel.  
Ethel Page suffered a stroke, but still continued her role in family and public 
life.98 
 
This absence did not change Page’s policy outlook nor, ultimately, his 
determination.  He was aghast when he heard about Cabinet’s reaction to the 
British proposal, not least as Grafton was a dairy producing area.99  The major 
trade issue facing Australia at this time was trade diversification by Britain that 
restricted Australian exports, and so he riposted that the British should instead 
cut dairy imports from non-Empire nations.  This led to his successfully 
proposing in a series of speeches over the following year the establishment of 
the AAC “on the lines of the Australian Loan Council”, to “elevate agriculture to 
its proper place in our national life and make Australia realize its value and 
importance.”100  Page was drawing on his established ideas about co-ordinated 
national action to fight for the sector of the economy that mattered most directly 
to him.   
 
Although the AAC had a partial forerunner in CSIR’s research-oriented 
Standing Committee on Agriculture created in 1927, it is widely accepted Page 
was the main mover behind its establishment as a more powerful ministerial 
body.  The Rural Reconstruction Commission, for example, later matter-of-
factly described him as such.101  Page assured the Graziers’ Federal Council in 
                                                 
98 Drummond to Harold F. White, 31 January 1934, David Henry Drummond Papers, UNE 
Archives, A0248, V3010, folder B, part 4; see also Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 225-6, 
263.  
99 Page, ibid., pp. 268-9.  
100 Speech by Page at Bellingen, 21 March 1933, quoted in Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 269; 
also his 1934 election policy speech, referred to in Ellis, A History of the Australian Country 
Party, op. cit., p. 213. 
101 Rural Reconstruction Commission, Tenth Report, Commercial Policy in Relation to 
Agriculture, The Commission, Canberra, 1946, p. 197.  On the early history of the Standing 
Committee on Agriculture, see George Currie and John Graham, ‘The Origins of the Standing 
Committee on Agriculture’, Public Administration, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1968, pp. 23-38.  The 
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December 1934 that the AAC was “purely a consultative and advisory body.”102  
But his other statements were more expansive.  Ellis wrote of Page in October 
1933 envisaging the AAC as determining general policy without imposing 
production controls, but still eliminating wasteful competition by determining 
which regions would focus on what crops.103  In his 1934 election policy 
speech, Page called the AAC “a board of directors for Australian agriculture” 
that would “eliminate needless waste of public and private capital” and 
“counteract restriction policies.”104  In a November 1934 Cabinet submission he 
made clear that although the British trade proposal was the immediate 
motivation for creating the AAC, the split of agricultural policy between the 
Commonwealth (exports) and the states (domestic production) necessitated a 
mechanism for their working together.  Page foresaw “an intimate form of 
consultation between Commonwealth and states on the whole question of 
agricultural policy similar to the existing form of consultation in financial policy 
through the Loan Council.”105  Privately, he wrote to his wife in March 1935 
indicating that he dearly wanted a powerful planning body:  
 
I think I have a chance to do for agriculture in Australia what I have 
already done for finance – only agriculture must be organised as well in 
its different industries in addition to having a national policy laid down 
and that takes a tremendous amount of time and knowledge to find out 
just what are the right lines and what is the right method to follow.  But I 
feel that with the extraordinary capable head of the Department I have 
picked up in Murphy – who has a forward constructive courageous mind 
something like my own backed by an immense amount of knowledge he 
has acquired since the B/P [Bruce-Page] Govt established the 
Development Commission, that I will be able not merely to create an 
organisation but to breathe the breath of life into it so that it will grow into 
one of the fundamental factors [of] our national scheme of government 
and of progress.106    
 
                                                                                                                                              
committee was originally focussed on co-operation between the Commonwealth and states on 
research, and was created under the aegis of the CSIR.  
102 Page to Graziers’ Federal Council, 5 December 1934, EPP, folder 183, part ii.  
103 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 213. 
104 Speech reproduced in The Australian Country Party Monthly Journal, 1 September 1934, p. 
7. 
105 Cabinet paper ‘Australian Agricultural Council’, signed by Page, 20 November 1934, EPP, 
folder 182.  
106 Page letter to Ethel Page 10 March 1935, copy provided by Helen Snyders. 
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“Murphy” is J.F. (Frank) Murphy, Secretary of the Department of Commerce 
1934-45, and one of the few public servants Page spoke of effusively.   
 
The AAC was formally created at a December 1934 conference of agriculture 
and marketing ministers.  It consisted primarily of agriculture ministers but with 
other ministers attending when necessary: the May 1935 inaugural meeting 
included Premiers and acting Premiers from all six states, plus two state 
attorneys-general.  Supporting the ministers was the Standing Committee on 
Agriculture, comprised mainly of public service heads of agricultural agencies 
and CSIR’s executive leadership.  Page himself agreed that agendas were to 
be prepared from submissions put forward by the states, plus (undefined) 
“subjects which directly affect the Commonwealth.”107  Unlike the Loan Council, 
the AAC remained a voluntary organisation rather than a statutory body.  
Despite its origins in the need for a united response to a pressing trade issue, it 
was in practice more heavily engaged with domestic policy.  The inaugural 
meeting worked its way through a long agenda that reads like a stocktake of 
issues, from the organisation of the dairy industry, to debt relief for farmers, the 
powers of marketing boards, soil erosion, wire netting, food preservation, the 
wheat Royal Commission and the grasshopper problem.  The expansiveness 
evident here is suggestive of Page’s influence.   
 
Although the AAC was never as powerful or planning-orientated as Page 
wanted, it quickly become central to agricultural policy and an important 
example of how co-ordinating machinery could smooth a complex, still 
unresolved federation.  Transcripts of meetings record its cast of ministers and 
their most senior officials engaging in fulsome debate before agreeing on 
decisions.  Victoria’s Agriculture Minister Edmund Hogan and his Queensland 
counterpart Frank Bulcock were especially vocal.  From the start, the AAC 
promoted voluntary co-operative federalism by resolving that the states pass 
                                                 
107 Proceedings and Decisions of Council, Australian Agricultural Council, First Meeting, 28, 29, 
30 May 1935’, p. 63, EPP, folder 2630. 
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nationally consistent legislation, such as a proposal at its first meeting to set 
restrictive terms for the marketing of margarine.108   
 
The AAC succeeded largely as it was based on co-operation amongst equals, 
rather than the Page-led arrangement he had fondly imagined.  Page was often 
the initiator, but his state counterparts did not hesitate to query his judgment.  
The biggest single issue facing the early AAC was the implications for orderly 
marketing legislation of section 92 of the Constitution prohibiting restriction on 
free trade between the states, specifically whether it invalidated 
Commonwealth orderly marketing legislation to the extent that this sought to 
regulate inter-state trade.  At the inaugural meeting there were very mixed 
responses to Page’s warning that “chaos will prevail” should the courts decide 
that section 92 did indeed apply to the Commonwealth, and his proposal for a 
referendum to alter this section.  Victoria’s Premier Albert Dunstan and Hogan 
bluntly warned of a failed referendum creating further problems; South Australia 
opposed compulsory schemes led by the Commonwealth; and Western 
Australia only reluctantly offered support.  Proceedings ended in indecision by 
merely referring the issue to a committee of all Attorneys-General.109  
 
The versatility of the AAC is reflected in Page using it to develop a national 
response to the 1934-36 Royal Commission on the Wheat, Flour and Bread 
Industries.  This had been chaired by Herbert Gepp and was convened to 
inquire into costs of production and the wider conditions of the industry.  The 
agreed response to its findings involved a home consumption price, 
compulsory marketing and the licensing of flour millers and warehouses, all to 
be organised jointly by the Commonwealth and the states.110  Criticisms of the 
AAC only emerged a decade later: in 1946 the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission said it had “not realized the high hopes of its founder” due to 
                                                 
108 Ibid., pp. 27-8, EPP, folder 2630; and NAA, A11702 3, Agenda Items of the First Meeting of 
the Australian Agricultural Council, 28 May 1935.  These terms concerned the colour of 
margarine so as to clearly differentiate it from butter. 
109 ‘Proceedings and Decisions of Council, Australian Agricultural Council, First Meeting, 28, 
29, 30 May 1935’, ibid., pp. 14, 23. 
110 See text on wheat marketing policy, briefing note on orderly marketing schemes prepared 
for the Rural Reconstruction Commission, op. cit., pp. 22-4; also Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., 
pp. 274-5.  
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political considerations leading to the “absence of a really national outlook.”111  
The prominent agricultural scientist Samuel Wadham disparaged the Standing 
Committee as having proposed schemes “frequently difficult to administer or 
inequitable in their effects”, as some of its member Commonwealth officials 
“were not fully versed” in agricultural industries.112    
 
The AAC was nonetheless much more successful than its transport 
counterpart.  It was built on co-operation between governments in orderly 
marketing that dated back to the 1920s; government action was supported by 
producers; much agriculture competed internationally rather than nationally, 
easing interstate rivalry; industries that produce homogenous products tend to 
experience common problems; and the British trade issue provided a strong 
initial impetus.  The AAC was to be the main single means by which Page 
consolidated co-operative federalism in policy formulation.113   
 
Page was encouraged by the early success of the AAC.  Typical of his 
optimism and ambition, in the Australian Country Party Monthly Journal of July 
1935 he called for an array of voluntary co-ordinating councils to act as “a 
parliament of governments” that would serve as “a kind of super-Senate” 
across agriculture, transport, health and social services without the need to 
amend the Constitution.114  Praise for Page’s efforts on co-operative federalism 
came from a prominent and familiar source, F.A. Bland.  Speaking in 1935 on 
his efforts to revive the Federal Transport Council, Bland called for the 
                                                 
111 Rural Reconstruction Commission, Tenth Report, Commercial Policy in Relation to 
Agriculture, The Commission, Canberra, 1946, p. 197.  The RRC concluded that although such 
a ministerial body was essential, to work well it needed to be backed by an industry-led 
hierarchy of local, state and national bodies dawn from farming industry representation and 
focused on the responsibilities of farmers rather than their perceived rights; see Tenth Report, 
p. 201. 
112 L.R. Humphries, Wadham: Scientist for Land and People, Melbourne University Press, 
Parkville, 2000, p. 138.  The AAC had post-war defenders such as public servant F.O. Grogan, 
who said it was “perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest it is the most successful example of 
such co-operation in Australian Commonwealth-State relationships”; see Grogan’s ‘The 
Australian Agricultural Council: A Successful Experiment in Commonwealth-State Relations’, in 
Public Administration, vol. 17, 1958, p. 12; and also J.G. Crawford, Australian Agricultural 
Policy, The Joseph Fisher Lecture in Commerce, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 1952, 
pp. 47-8.  
113 The AAC operated by its original name up to 1992.  Its current equivalent is the Agriculture 
Ministers' Forum.   
114 ‘Dr Page’s New Plan – National Co-ordination Councils – Parliament of Governments’, The 
Australia Country Party Journal, 1 July 1935, p. 3. 
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“elimination of political control” by using statutory policy commissions as 
advocated by Page.115  He also praised Page in Australian Quarterly, then 
Australia’s main current affairs journal, for his roles in creating the Loan Council 
and the AAC, and how he had been “at considerable pains to popularize his 
ideas” by proposing similar new councils.  Bland concluded that “these 
proposals of Dr Earle Page not only prelude an eventful chapter in working the 
Federal system, but offer unlimited possibilities for inventiveness in the arts of 
public administration.”116  In a draft letter a few years later to Casey, then 
Treasurer, Page again mooted new bodies for co-ordination in transport and 
communications, so that the Commonwealth would “be able to call a national 
tune with some real harmony in it.”117  
 
Page used the AAC to respond nationally to the most serious inter-war 
challenge to orderly marketing.  The result showed the limitations of co-
operative federalism and marked a change in his approach to constitutional 
reform.  A South Australian dried fruit grower, Frederick James, so strongly 
objected to state and Commonwealth authorities seizing his shipments to 
enforce orderly marketing legislation regulating interstate trade that he pursued 
a long series of legal challenges right up to the Privy Council.  In July 1936 the 
Council declared that section 92 of the Constitution applied to the 
Commonwealth, thereby striking down its legislation concerning the marketing 
of primary products.  This decision, which came when Page was already 
struggling in trade talks with Britain over beef, validated his warnings.  What 
followed gave him a focus for his determination to change the Australian 
Constitution, and drew forth a string of Page pronouncements that made him its 
leading public critic.118 
                                                 
115 F.A. Bland, An Administrative Approach to Australian Transport Problems, lecture to the 
New South Wales Centre of the Institute of Transport, Sydney, copy in EPP, folder 489.  
116 F.A. Bland, ‘Inventing Constitutional Machinery – a Study of Dr Earle Page’s Proposals for 
National Councils’, Australian Quarterly, December 1935, pp. 19, 21.   
117 Page to Casey, EPP, folder 407; undated draft, but evidently from 1938-39. 
118 Essentially, the orderly marketing schemes impacted by the James case had elevated 
domestic prices to compensate for low export prices, and imposed production quotas set by the 
states and export quotas set by the Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth legislation also 
regulated interstate marketing, the focus of the Privy Council’s ruling.  Henderson, op. cit., pp. 
370-7, provides a summary of the international trade difficulties facing the Lyons government at 
this time, which included the beef trade with Britain, and pursuit of new markets in the United 
States and Japan.  
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The James case led the AAC to finally accept Page’s calls for a constitutional 
amendment.  The resultant March 1937 referendum proposed enabling the 
Commonwealth to make laws on marketing without being inhibited by section 
92, with a concurrent referendum to give it powers over air navigation and 
aircraft.  Page in campaigning mode showed no reverence for the Constitution.  
He spoke of its “faulty wording” thwarting Commonwealth action and of how “no 
real democracy” would accept such restraints.  The referendum was “a straight-
out fight for the maintenance of Australian living standards.”119  Similarly, “it is 
obvious” that aviation was a continental rather than a local matter, despite 
which the states had failed to collectively legislate and the High Court had 
invalidated Commonwealth regulations.  Page cast these referenda as 
harbingers of a “general Constitutional referendum” to fully revamp this 
troublesome document.120   
 
Yet there turned out to be little public appetite for change.  The question on 
marketing was rejected in all six states and the aviation referendum also failed, 
albeit less comprehensively.  The strength of the ‘no’ votes was met with 
widespread bafflement.  The Sydney Morning Herald postulated that it was 
simply a generalised protest against the Lyons government.  Page concluded 
that in future the only way to educate the public and win approval for change 
was through a constitutional convention.121  He had been supported by other 
ministers only to the extent of protecting orderly marketing: few echoed his 
wider doubts about the Constitution.  Page had led a major revival of co-
operative federalism but needed a specific and material issue to do so and 
could not extend this to broader constitutional reform.  Following the failure of 
this referendum, the AAC spent 1938 successfully reformulating a coherent 
strategy for wheat based on complementary legislation by the Commonwealth 
and the states.  
 
                                                 
119 ‘Statement by the Minister for Commerce (Dr Earle Page) 2nd March 1937’, EPP, folder 
934.  
120 Document titled ‘Referendum Campaign’, no author or date but wording and internal 
references clearly suggest Page 1937, EPP, folder 2140. 
121 Both comments from the Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 1937, p. 8. 
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It is again evident from Page’s calls to protect orderly marketing that although 
such schemes were significant to him, he still treated them as a component of 
his wider view of the nation’s workings.  During the referendum campaign he 
linked orderly marketing to his long-standing concept of balancing the entire 
economy.  The Commonwealth needed to regulate interstate trade so as to 
give primary producers protection comparable to that provided to 
manufacturers.  Without farmers being able to afford to buy factory produce, 
manufacturing and ultimately the whole economy would falter: indeed, he 
considered this the cause of “the late Depression.”  Legislation had protected 
dried fruit and dairy producers since the 1920s by manipulating production and 
prices but had only lately been extended to wheat, hence the latter’s persistent 
need to be subsidised.122  Page maintained a wider policy vision than nearly all 
his Country Party colleagues, who at the time of the referendum were 
otherwise preoccupied with a home consumption price for wheat, the 
recommendations of a recent Royal Commission on Banking concerning rural 
loans, and yet another Victoria-based party rift over coalitions. 
 
In the March 1935 letter to his wife, Page reflected on his work in creating the 
AAC as part of his higher calling.  It was a fine example of a policy “which has 
an infinitely greater and more far reaching effect on the happiness and welfare 
of the people of Australia than any work I could do in my profession or running 
my own place.”  After dwelling briefly on the pressures he had faced in public 
life, he exulted in “the pleasure and the joy in altruistic constructive work that 
will lift the standards of living and comfort of us all and specially of the country 
people for ever and make certain that my spirit lives after I am gone.”  He 
concluded that “my spirit would rest better if I felt that the torch I have lighted 
and borne would still flame through the world perhaps to illume it fully.”123  
Page clearly retained the driving sense of special purpose that imbued his 1917 
speech, viewing even the AAC as an inspiring opportunity to leave a legacy.  
Three years later, he was to attempt to implement a yet grander policy creation, 
the National Council. 
 
                                                 
122 Document titled ‘Referendum Campaign’, op. cit.   
123 Page to Ethel Page, 10 March 1935, op. cit.    
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Electrification reappears, late 1930s   
 
During the early to mid-1930s, Page’s preoccupation successively with the 
northern new state, building a stable coalition with the UAP and establishing 
the AAC resulted in his standing back from the Clarence and electrification.  He 
still saw electrification as an essential part of his vision, but was inhibited by a 
low level of wider political engagement with developmentalism and an absence 
of professional interest in hydroelectricity.  When the Depression receded in the 
latter 1930s, Page resumed his pursuit of electrification as a key to national 
development.  As with new states, he seized unexpected opportunities, briefly 
restoring him as Australia’s foremost advocate of hydroelectricity.  
 
The two initiatives he pursued involved very different approaches.  One sought 
to exploit Imperial ties to gain access to technology and investment.  The other 
involved working with Bertram Stevens and his New South Wales government 
to use state-owned railways as a basis for electrification.  Both failed in ways 
suggesting that Page struggled to secure support from urban-based interests, a 
severe constraint on his nationwide ambitions.  They also suggest that despite 
economic recovery in the late 1930s, there was less of a corresponding revival 
of the developmentalism that had characterised the 1920s.  Ambitious 
development proposals wilted in the face of contrary vested interests: 
Australian optimism was to take several more years to recover.    
 
During the 1930s, Australian policy on trade, migration and overseas 
investment remained cast in an Imperial context.  In 1936 Australia adopted a 
trade diversion policy of discrimination against Japanese and US exporters in 
favour of British suppliers, the aim being to secure better access to the British 
market by offering tariff concessions on British manufactures.124  Page went 
along with this strategy, challenging it only at the margins such as by 
occasionally proposing migration and tourism from the United States and 
continental Europe.125  But while in Britain in 1936 for trade talks on meat, he 
                                                 
124 Bongiorno in Bashford and Macintyre, volume 2, op. cit., p. 84. 
125 See for example his 1929 exchange of letters with Leslie H. Perdrian of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, on how to promote Australia as a tourist destination; Earle Page papers, UNE 
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digressed into proposing a trade and investment agreement more directly 
geared to his idea of Australian development.  He pursued via the Board of 
Trade what even he called an ambitious scheme for electrification based on 
British technology, finance and migration.  
 
Page had long seen the Imperial connection as a powerful platform for 
Australian development.  As long ago as September 1920, he and Corin had 
corresponded on working with the Canadians to convene an Imperial 
conference “on the question of water power in the Empire.”126  Page now 
sought to harness British interest in direct overseas investment in 
manufacturing and in co-ordinating industrial development within the Empire, 
both responses to the Depression-related breakdown of multilateral trade.127  
Although based on the Imperial connection, Page’s strategy is broadly 
consistent with A.T. Ross’s interpretation of Australian trade policy of the time 
as being driven more by national development policy than by Imperial 
sentiment.128  
 
Page and the Board of Trade tentatively agreed on the tariff-free entry of 
advanced heavy capital equipment into Australia for at least ten years, the 
resumption of large-scale British migration, and either the British Electrical 
Association or the British government itself arranging a long-term loan to 
extend “electrical reticulation” throughout Australia.129  “The heads of electrical 
manufacturing concerns,” Page later recalled, offered to “bring out 58,000 
migrants drawn from all classes and make available £30 million to enable 
governments to increase their electricity supplies and expand reticulation if they 
received certain concessions concerning the admission of major and very 
specialised electrical equipment”.130  This proposal had a strong precedent 
                                                                                                                                              
Archives, A0180, Box 10, folder 78.  On attracting migrants from the United States, see a report 
from the Australian National Travel Association representative in Los Angeles, August 31 1938, 
EPP, folder 2121. 
126 Corin to Page, 17 September 1920, EPP, folder 400. 
127 Cochrane, op. cit., p. 13. 
128 See A.T. Ross, ‘Australian Overseas Trade and National Development Policy 1932-1939: A 
Story of Colonial Larrikins or Australian Statesmen?’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
vol. 36, no. 2, 1990, pp. 184-204. 
129 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 282. 
130 Speech 28 July 1958, Perth, National Party papers, NLA, MS 7507, series 1, box 1.  
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dating from the 1920s when British legislation guaranteed finance for power 
development overseas that used British-produced plant.131  Now Page was 
taking it upon himself to revive singlehandedly the Migration Agreement.  
 
Page claimed to have secured the support of British industry and of all but one 
of Australia’s state manufacturing associations.  He fully expected them to 
proceed to resolve amongst themselves such details as the technical 
definitions of specific goods.132  He was mortified to instead find his ambitious 
plan “blocked by certain Australian manufacturing interests.”133  He publicly 
blamed the engineer and UAP state parliamentarian F.P. Kneeshaw, long a 
public critic of the Ottawa Agreement’s concessions to Britain and president of 
the only state association opposed to Page’s proposal, the New South Wales 
Chamber of Manufactures.134  In a speech of July 1958 to the Country Party 
Federal Executive recounting his long engagement with electrification, Page 
attributed this failure more fundamentally to lack of national ambition: “Australia 
failed to take up the offer, which typifies what still could be done if the will 
exists.”135  
 
Page’s only significant domestic ally on electrification during the late 1930s was 
Stevens.  Page accordingly explored what he could achieve via the government 
of New South Wales.  In his policy speech for the 1935 state election, Stevens 
declared an intention to create a statewide grid based on coal and 
hydroelectricity, including the Nymboida facility and new hydroelectric plants on 
the Shoalhaven and other rivers.136  The Premier’s convergent agenda 
encouraged Page to resume a longstanding interest in using New South Wales 
railways as a basis for rural electrification, something he first explored during 
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132 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 282. 
133 Note of 30 January 1950 on the new Department of National Development, EPP, folder 
2072. 
134 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 283.  Kosmas Tsokhas provides an account of Page’s 
negotiations in 1936 on electricity imports that focuses on the reciprocal link to Australian 
primary product exports, but does not address in any detail Page’s electrification and 
developmentalist goals.  See Markets, Money and Empire, op. cit., pp. 12, 100-1. 
135 Speech 28 July 1958, op. cit.  
136 Wigmore, Struggle for the Snowy: The Background of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, op. 
cit., p. 93. 
236 
 
the 1920s.137  The New South Wales Railways and Tramways Department had 
played a central role in electrification during the early twentieth century, partially 
acting as a statewide electricity authority by using its generators to supply 
power in bulk to local government distribution authorities.138  In the late 1930s 
New South Wales had no less than six different electricity providers, including 
one focussed on hydroelectricity.139   
 
In November 1936, Page sought an opinion on rural electrification from Tim 
Clapp, a favoured Page sounding board in the business world.  Clapp’s advice 
was that the only practical strategy was through “electrification of part of the 
main lines of the New South Wales Government Railways.”  But he added that 
the load was too small to enable electricity to be supplied at low cost: as ever, 
sparse population and distance were fundamental constraints.140  Yet just two 
months later, Stevens submitted an ambitious plan to his Cabinet that drew on 
discussions with Page and his own recent visits to Sweden and Britain.  This 
proposed rural electrification using “tapering subsidies”, flagged a new Central 
Power Authority empowered to raise its own funds and reported that the state’s 
Electricity Advisory Committee was preparing a long-term strategy to link major 
power stations.141   
 
Page’s political colleagues showed little interest in such ambitions.  An April 
1939 conference in Sydney of Commonwealth and state ministers on water 
conservation and irrigation called for Commonwealth funding and a nationwide 
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survey of water resources but barely mentioned hydroelectricity.142  Page, 
caretaker Prime Minister at the time, did not attend.  Stevens was removed 
from the Premiership by opponents within his own party in August 1939, partly 
in consequence of his being considered too close to the Country Party.143  
 
The National Council planning initiative, 1938-39: Page sets out to shape 
the nation 
 
Page’s last major policy initiative of the 1930s also arose from an unexpected 
opportunity, this time mounting defence concerns.  The National Council 
planning proposal of 1938-39 was a determined effort to recreate the DMC in a 
more powerful form.  It was his most ambitious attempt to embed his vision of 
Australia’s development by changing the very fundamentals of policymaking.  
He concentrated his formidable energy onto this effort, only to find its failure 
commensurately dismaying.  The whole episode is well documented, including 
a full transcript of the October 1938 conference with the Premiers at which 
Page first sought their commitment. 
 
The National Council initiative briefly held the attention of the Commonwealth 
and all state governments.  It helped to make economic planning an issue that 
lingered intermittently for the next two and half decades.  Yet it is mentioned 
only in a few histories of the period.  Most accept without question that it was 
driven by defence considerations.  Even the most detailed account, that by 
Paul Hasluck, does not fully recognise Page’s dominant role and 
developmentalist aims, which were partially obscured by overlapping 
machinations concerning defence preparedness.144  An appreciation of Page’s 
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wider thinking and of the course of events makes it very evident that the 
foremost driver was his planning-based decentralist agenda.  His asserting 
himself over his Prime Minister to call two conferences of state Premiers on this 
issue was the high water mark of Page’s political influence in the 1930s but 
also marks the start of his decline.  This singular episode is also an illuminating 
case study of Page’s modus operandi, notably his blunt attempts to win over 
political colleagues and the states, and his misplaced optimism that business 
leaders would empathise with his developmentalist goals.     
 
A new planning body had been proposed by Opposition Leader John Latham in 
late 1930 as a non-party “economic council” that could take charge during the 
crisis of the Depression, to be made up of federal and state political leaders, 
including Page, and of bankers.  The then acting Treasurer Joseph Lyons 
raised the idea with the Labor Caucus, which was reported to have reacted with 
derision, possibly as members suspected collusion with the Opposition.145  The 
Loan Council and Premiers’ Conferences acted as an economic council during 
the Depression, but Page later publicly dismissed the deflationary Premiers’ 
Plan of 1931 as “an accountant’s plan, not a statesman’s plan” that misguidedly 
tried to “tax people into prosperity.”146  Revival of a DMC-like agency as a more 
powerful tool of developmentalism was one of his first proposals after the 
demise of the Scullin government.  In February 1932 he told the Constitutional 
Association of New South Wales that because of unplanned and unbalanced 
development, “we had peacocked industry as we had peacocked 
settlement.”147   
 
Over the following two years, Page repeatedly called for a powerful Federal 
Export Council of federal and state ministers as a statutory authority “formed on 
the lines of the Loan Council, and given status and powers in the same way so 
far as the exporting industries are concerned” to “rationalise their 
activities...[and]…direct our marginal producers into more profitable and stable 
                                                 
145 Cochrane, op. cit., p. 126; see the Examiner (Launceston), 11 December 1930, p. 7, for a 
detailed account of the reaction of Caucus.  
146 Quoted in a profile of Page in the Daily Telegraph, 14 August 1948, pp. 10-1.  On the Loan 
Council and Premiers’ Conferences, see McMinn. op. cit., p. 175. 
147 Speech by Page of 15 February 1932 to the Constitutional Association, EPP, folder 384. 
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lines of activity.”  It would market their produce and “ensure for a definite term a 
payable Australian price”, which would later come down as lower tariffs 
reduced costs.  This would be quite unlike “the hopeless policy [of] giving 
bounties year after year to the wheat industry.”  Typically for a Page initiative, 
he based the Federal Export Council on a more topical issue, tariff reform.  He 
tied the lowering of tariffs not just to “harmony between the prices of the farm 
and the factory goods” but also to the restoration of world trade as “lowered 
tariffs will enable investment by creditor nations of their capital in equipment of 
debtor nations, and the debtor countries will be able to pay their interest again 
in the form of goods.”148   
 
The Federal Export Council idea and planning generally attracted little political 
reaction in the early 1930s.  Governments were more preoccupied with fiscal 
restraint.  Later in the decade, rearmament and intellectual interest in planning 
gave Page a firmer basis for his National Council initiative.  In brief, Page in 
1938-39 sought to enlist ministers and experts from business and government 
with knowledge of manufacturing, agriculture, defence and engineering to direct 
industry, trade, transport and energy policy across a timespan of several years.  
The resultant planning body would “ignore state boundaries” in guiding the 
location of industries and the prioritisation of public works as it mounted an 
“attack [on] the causes of excessive population in the vulnerable centres.”149  
Although bracketing development with defence was not a new idea in Australia, 
this was usually stated in simpler terms of the size and distribution of the 
nation’s population, particularly in the sparsely populated north.  Page’s 
distinctive approach was to use growing security concerns as the basis for 
seeking to plan the entire economy.   
 
Tentative moves to ready the nation for war began in 1935 when the Australian 
government consulted the states and industry on the content of the 
                                                 
148 ‘Federal Export Council Proposed by Dr Earle Page for Continuous Australian Policy’, 
speech by Page of 20 November, 1933 to the Triennial Convention of the Australian Country 
Party Association, David Henry Drummond Papers, UNE Archives, A0248, V3010, folder 2(c).  
See also ‘Speech by the Rt. Hon. Dr Earle Page MP, P.C., at the Western Divisional 
Conference of the United Country Party at Orange on Thursday February 22 1934’, EPP, folder 
1101. 
149 ‘Memorandum to Cabinet’, 18 October 1938, EPP, folder 1114.  
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Commonwealth War Book.  This was a detailed set of procedures to be 
followed upon the outbreak of war, such as air raid preparedness and guarding 
essential industries.  By the time Page proposed the National Council in 
September 1938, preparations had already spawned an array of expert 
planning committees of officials, economists and business leaders.  An 
Advisory Committee on Financial and Economic Policy included the leading 
economists L.F. Giblin, Roland Wilson and Leslie Melville, and mobilisation of 
secondary industry sat with an advisory panel chaired by BHP’s general 
manager Essington Lewis.  Page would have been encouraged by increases in 
defence expenditure initiated by Lyons and Casey in 1937, a marked shift from 
the austerity of the previous few years as unemployment fell to ten per cent.  
This included a December 1937 Cabinet direction to the Department of Works 
to give priority to defence projects.150  Total defence expenditure climbed from 
5.5 per cent of annual expenditure in 1933-34 to 9.4 per cent in 1936-37 and 
14.9 per cent by 1938-39.151  
 
Page also drew on the growing intellectual interest in planning that arose from 
the search for responses to the Depression, bringing him into a rare alliance 
with economists.  Planning was the focus of the Australian Institute of Political 
Science’s second summer school, held in Canberra in January 1934.  Page 
was not amongst the event’s diverse cast of public policy intellectuals that 
included G.V. Portus, W. Macmahon Ball, Lloyd Ross, E.O.G. Shann, Leslie 
Melville, The Reverend E.H. Burgmann, Alan Watt, Bland, Wilson and Giblin.  
Discussion ranged from doubt about the very concept of economic planning to 
admiration for the USSR, but there was broad support for some limited form of 
planning on grounds of efficiency and equity.152  (Bland was one of the few 
sceptics).153  Two participants, Wilson and Giblin, were later important players 
                                                 
150 A.T. Ross, Armed and Ready: The Industrial Development & Defence of Australia 1900-
1945, Turton & Armstrong, Sydney, 1995, pp. 113-5, 118.  Geoffrey Sawer in Australian 
Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1956, p. 86, 
summarises how economic indicators improved in 1936-37. 
151 Henderson, op. cit., p. 398.  
152 Proceedings were published in W.G.K. Duncan (ed.), National Economic Planning, Angus 
and Robertson in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, 1934.  
153 See F.A. Bland, Planning the Modern State, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, second edition 
1945 (first published 1934).  Despite its title, this book was mainly about improving the quality 
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in Page’s National Council proposal.  In November 1938 Giblin prepared a 
short paper for the Prime Minister supporting a “general plan for national 
reorganisation” of the Commonwealth and the states as essential in this “new 
era, in which concentrated and planned effort will have to be made by the 
people of all the democracies if they are to have a chance to survive.”154  Page 
was also aware of ideas about planning circulating in British intellectual circles.  
He borrowed G.D.H. Cole’s 1935 Principles of Economic Planning from the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, of which he was an enthusiastic 
patron.155  (Cole called for the full public ownership of industry, something Page 
found abhorrent).  In Britain the typical proposed goal of economic planning 
was to stave off crisis by rescuing capitalism from itself: in Australia, Page 
wanted to engineer the nation at last to fulfil its potential.156 
 
A more immediately important factor in the National Council proposal was 
Page’s political ascendancy.  The late 1930s was a Page purple patch.  By 
1938 he had built a strong personal relationship with Lyons.  Enid Lyons 
recalled that Page was so close to her husband that it was rumoured to be the 
only known instance of Page being completely loyal to anyone else.157  His 
determined efforts to promote the National Council proposal to colleagues and 
industry confirm the impression given in Truant Surgeon that he was only too 
willing to fill the vacuum created by Lyons’s political and physical decline that 
eventually led to early death from coronary occlusion.158   
 
Page in his memoirs recalled returning from trade talks in Britain in 1938 
convinced war was inevitable.  He at once “began exploring means of co-
ordinating Federal and State capital expenditure on defence and development 
                                                                                                                                              
of public administration.  Bland remained critical of centralised planning as “incompatible with 
the enjoyment of popular liberties”; see for example pp. 67-8. 
154 L.F. Giblin, ‘The National Need’, November 1938 (no specific date), EPP, folder 2082; see 
also Hasluck, op. cit., p. 130.  Australian interest in planning drew on British interest; see 
Pemberton, 'The Middle Way…’, op. cit. 
155 Parliamentary Librarian to Page, 10 July 1935, Earle Page papers, UNE Archives, A0180, 
Box 1, folder 3.    
156 For accounts of British conceptions of planning see Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain 
Between the Wars, Allen Lane, London, 2009, pp. 77-86; and Pemberton, 'The Middle Way…’, 
op. cit.     
157 Enid Lyons, Among the Carrion Crows, Rigby, Adelaide, 1972, p. 75.   
158 See Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 301. 
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and of allocating priorities to indispensable projects.”159  Although this started 
with a proposal for agreement with the states to prioritise public works 
according to their defence value, the documentation that Page generated 
dwells far more on his decentralist and developmentalist goals.  There is no 
indication that he corresponded similarly with defence experts.  Page’s 
proposal also closely matched his DMC-inspired model for planning, including 
use of business leaders as advisers and formal machinery for co-ordination 
between levels of government.  What followed is a fine example of Earle Page 
in full flight, utterly determined to seize an opportunity he had hoped for since 
the glory days of the Bruce-Page government. 
 
In October 1938 Page forcefully told the Lyons Cabinet of the need to prepare 
for war by proposing that “the Federal Government gives a lead and secures 
the complete co-operation of the other governments and the industrial leaders.”  
To this end, he produced what is arguably his magnum opus, a memo that was 
a concentrated statement of self-belief devoid of any consideration of 
alternatives or foreseeable barriers.160  Australia’s security necessitated not just 
the wise use of funds for defence procurement: Page also wanted “industrial 
development in the widest national sense” to mobilise national resources and 
attract millions of new settlers.  As funding through loans was limited, “the 
height of wisdom is to plan the spending in the best possible way” by carefully 
identifying industries for expansion and planning their location at the least 
vulnerable points, with “the best distribution of population.”161   
 
                                                 
159 Ibid., p. 301. 
160 This confidential memo, evidently prepared for Cabinet, is entitled ‘Financial Problems of 
Australian Defence and Development.’  It is the earliest of the key documents generated by 
Page’s National Council proposal.  It was clearly written by Page himself (or at least under his 
close supervision), containing as it does characteristic such phraseology as “reproductive 
purposes” and “it is obvious”.  He proposes what was formally put to state Premiers on 21 
October 1938.  An opening reference to “the lessons of the last fortnight” reflects its preparation 
just after the Munich Agreement of September 1938.  See EPP, folder 2121; copies marked 
October 1938 and bearing Page’s signature are at folder 1877 (i).  Page’s statement to the 
House outlining his plans drew heavily on this document; see Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, 19 October 1938, pp. 903-5.  Page also produced a memo to Cabinet dated 18 
October 1938 that provides furthers details of his intentions, EPP, folder 1114.  The quote is 
from ‘Financial Problems of Australian Defence and Development’, p. 1. 
161 ‘Financial Problems of Australian Defence and Development’, ibid., pp. 1, 2.       
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All this would require state co-operation to plan jointly the “next seven or ten 
years” across all sectors of the economy.162  New secondary industries would 
be sited at sources of raw materials, especially near seaports: Page thought it 
fortunate that many potential Australian ports were close to power sources, 
such as the Clarence River.  A national electricity system would charge flat 
rates as a “prime necessity for the decentralisation of industry.”163  Planning 
would apply such tools as uniform railway gauges, tax privileges, new ports and 
manufacturing distribution centres, guided by “experts who have the confidence 
of all Australia.”164  As the international political environment darkened, “now is 
the psychological moment for a definite call to national service, a national 
outlook, and a national programme.”165  Reviewing the whole economy would 
also be consistent with agreement at the 1938 trade talks with Britain to assess 
Australia’s lines of development of secondary industry so as to help frame trade 
policies.166  As Page hoped to enshrine national development above party 
politics, he gave Opposition leader John Curtin an advance copy of his 
statement to parliament on all this.  Curtin noted the lack of detail but approved 
sufficiently to claim credit for the ALP in first proposing machinery for 
collaboration with the states on public works.167 
 
Page was indeed initially vague on how exactly this planning would be 
organised.  It shortly become evident he had in mind appointment by the Loan 
Council of a powerful joint advisory committee of Commonwealth and state 
officials and of business leaders.168  This would undertake a “survey of the lines 
which Australian industrial development should follow from now on.”169  It would 
then submit recommendations to the Loan Council on the prioritisation of public 
works, including those not directly associated with defence.  The most 
important would be “reproductive” – electricity, road, railway, seaport and 
                                                 
162 Ibid. p. 2.  Page also expressed interest here in migration from continental Europe.   
163 Ibid., p. 6. 
164 ‘Memorandum for Cabinet’, 18 October 1938, op. cit. 
165 ‘Financial Problems of Australian Defence and Development’, op. cit. p. 2. 
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167 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 19 October 1938, pp. 905-7.  
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and State Ministers on National Co-operation for Defence and Development, Proceedings of 
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communications projects likely to stimulate production.170  Page was effectively 
recasting the Loan Council as a more powerful version of the DMC with a direct 
say in developmental expenditure.   
 
Page broached his initiative with the convalescent Prime Minister on 10 
October 1938.  In order to overcome “the Loan Council deadlock”, Page sought 
his agreement to a joint meeting of the Commonwealth, states, industry and 
Opposition to “combine in one big progressive programme the Defence 
activities, the investigation of the plan of industrial development that the 
delegation arranged with the British Ministers [and] an enquiry into the location 
of the suggested new industries.”171  He also canvassed an old colleague.  
Page wrote to Stanley Bruce, now Australian High Commissioner in London, 
clearly indicating that defence preparedness provided an opportunity to pursue 
developmental planning.  “It has been quite obvious for some time that the 
Financial Agreement and the Loan Council would break down except 
something is done which would give real priority to worthwhile works,” for which 
“the Defence problem gives us an opportunity of putting this issue on to a plane 
that the general public can understand.”  Hence his proposing to co-opt “a body 
of first class business minds for a year or two.”172 
 
But attracting the interest of business leaders, always Page’s preferred 
collaborators, proved difficult.  He wrote to Essington Lewis, Tim Clapp and to 
Sir Clive McPherson, the pastoralist.  The letter to Lewis of 13 October 1938 is 
one of the most ambitious Page ever wrote.  In order to achieve something “of 
real and enduring value” for the nation he was seeking “the collaboration of the 
captains of industry in Australia, who have real vision”, and asked for 
suggested names.173  Lewis’s reply was cold.  He had spoken with Robert 
Menzies (Minister for Industry and Attorney-General) and T.W. White (Minister 
for Trade and Customs), and thought the government already had access to 
                                                 
170 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 19 October 1938, p. 904.  
171 Page to Lyons, 10 October 1938, EPP, folder 1621. 
172 Page to Bruce, 12 October 1938, EPP, folder 407. 
173 Page to Lewis, 13 October 1938; to McPherson, 14 October 1938; to Clapp, 12 October 
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the “leading men.”174  Clapp and McPherson replied jointly that they would 
participate only if satisfied that the Commonwealth and states would endorse 
the recommendations of the “Board of Control” – a near impossible 
precondition.175    
 
The bureaucracy showed more enthusiasm.  Page had a detailed 
memorandum prepared by three senior officials – Murphy of his Department of 
Commerce, Stuart McFarlane, Secretary of the Treasury, and Roland Wilson, 
now Commonwealth Statistician.176  At the AIPS summer school four years 
earlier, Wilson had called for indicative planning which maintained private 
property and the profit motive, but with a “central thinking agency” supervising 
the private sector.177  The three public servants now proposed a ten-year plan 
of co-operative action by the Commonwealth and the states, starting by 
determining which industries to expand and their locations.  The memorandum 
was sent to all states for consideration.   
 
It says much about Page’s influence in Cabinet that he secured support for his 
ill-defined and overstretched proposal.  He was even confident that public 
opinion could force the states to co-operate.178  Page dismissed likely criticism: 
the CSIR, the Loan Council, and the NHMRC, he said, were all once “ridiculed 
as impossible.”179  Page proceeded with two concerted attempts to secure the 
co-operation of the states.  The first was the Conference of Commonwealth and 
state Ministers on National Co-operation for Defence and Development, 
convened in the House of Representatives chamber on 21 October 1938.  All 
six state governments attended, including four Premiers.  Discussions were 
hampered by hurried preparation and a concurrent Loan Council meeting.  
Page’s immediate aim was to have the states agree to participate in the 
advisory committee to the Loan Council.  The results fell far short of his hopes. 
                                                 
174 Lewis to Page, 17 October 1938, EPP, folder 407.  Lewis did briefly list candidate industries 
for expansion, ranging from cotton and canned vegetables, to aluminium and shipbuilding.  He 
added that extra protection would be required for them to be decentralised. 
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The conference presented a stark contrast between the energetic Page and a 
Prime Minister in terminal decline.  Lyons, “tired, dispirited and ill,” was flown in 
from his sickbed in Devonport.180  Even as he arrived in Canberra he knew the 
proposal in broad outline only: Page briefed him on the details during the drive 
from the airport.  Lyons’s opening speech was only half ready as he began to 
deliver it, obliging him to speak slowly while it was typed up and handed to him 
leaf by leaf.181  The assembled state ministers would surely have been 
unimpressed.  Even worse, a list of priority projects prepared by the Defence 
Department was not ready for presentation.182  Lyons instead broadly outlined 
how the advisory committee would draft a program “of future industrial 
development” and “an order of priority of public works.”  Commonwealth and 
state experts could begin by meeting at defence headquarters in Melbourne.183   
 
The reaction of the states demonstrated that their fear of loss of authority 
crossed party lines and outweighed any interest in planning.  Dunstan of 
Victoria was Page’s Country Party colleague but argued that the advisory 
committee should be denied substantive powers and exclude industrialists.  
Richard Butler of South Australia had similar concerns, despite being willing to 
countenance decentralisation “if that can be done economically.”184  Page 
himself was widely mistrusted.  Initially he kept uncharacteristically quiet and 
later wrote that discussions were well advanced before the Premiers 
“recognised me as the author.”  Two advisers, Douglas Copland from Victoria 
and Colin Clark of Queensland, wanted to know why his role hadn’t been made 
clear at the outset.185  William Forgan Smith, the Labor Premier of Queensland, 
thought that the states risked coercion reminiscent of Page’s abolition when 
Treasurer of their per capita grants.  (This drew an indignant reply from Page 
that the states had been glad of the Loan Council ever since).186  Page’s sole 
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181 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 302-3. 
182 Defence Minister Thorby had just a week before asked his department to prepare a report 
on public works of defence value.  Cabinet only considered the resultant schedule on the day of 
the conference, and directed that it be revised to list projects in priority order.  See Hasluck, op. 
cit., p. 127. 
183 Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers, op. cit., p. 3. 
184 See ibid. pp. 6-7 and 9-11 for comments by Dunstan and Butler. 
185 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 303. 
186 Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers, op. cit., p. 9. 
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supporter was Bertram Stevens, who had already advocated Page’s plan in a 
radio speech ten days earlier.  But even he was concerned by the proposed 
advisory committee and wanted an assurance of additional finance, including 
Commonwealth measures to secure the co-operation of the banks.187    
 
The conference floundered its way to a non-committal agreement by the states 
to “examine the possibility of undertaking, within the limits of the local allocation 
of that state, any work of defence submitted by the Commonwealth.”188  The 
whole meeting had lasted two hours, despite allowance for two days.  
“Received cautiously by some Premiers” was the understated summary in the 
Commonwealth’s press release of the next day.  This reported that the advisory 
committee had been deferred rather than rejected and that the Commonwealth 
would seek “a Committee with abridged powers” at the next meeting with the 
Premiers.189  Press coverage was blunter.  The Sydney Morning Herald 
editorialised on Page’s “disposition to obscure the substance of his proposals in 
a cloud of idealistic generalities.”190  The Melbourne Argus reported a 
“sometimes acrimonious discussion” that was a “setback to Sir Earle Page.”  (It 
later added that one Premier had been anxious to leave for Melbourne to 
attend a race meeting – Dunstan, no doubt).191  But Stevens wrote to Lyons 
promising manpower and appointing a committee to examine “the organisation 
that would be set up to give effect to these proposals.”192  In parliament Page 
was reduced to attacking “lying stories of intrigue.”193       
 
Page was not one to give up on something he had sought for so long.  An 
unsigned and evidently draft Cabinet memo, probably prepared by Page or at 
least for his use, stated a determination to appoint an expert committee 
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“forthwith.”  It warned that “the Commonwealth Government has determined 
that with the co-operation of the states, if it can get it, or without that co-
operation, if it cannot, it will endeavour to make a national effort commensurate 
with our needs and resources.”194  The incorrigible Page wrote to Giblin 
insisting that the timing for planned development was still “never better.”  
Although the government “seemed to be falling apart”, it was “ready to make a 
fresh start.”195  Page also assured his departmental secretary that “I am quite 
sure that now we will really get a first class chance to secure co-ordination and 
planned development.”196  He also kept pressing Lyons, who agreed to Cabinet 
reconsidering the whole idea.  Page complained to the Prime Minister that a 
report by the Military Board on state co-operation was “uninspiring”, making it 
“obvious that the whole question of future industrial development and location 
of industries and their strategic value does not enter into their thoughts.”197  
 
Preparation for the second bout with the Premiers was more thorough.  On 25 
October Cabinet finally approved a list of works for construction by the 
states.198  Page directed Wilson to develop a new planning proposal.  Wilson 
suggested a central co-ordinating committee of officials and industrialists to be 
called the Council of Industrial Development and Defence, headed by a Chief 
Executive Officer attached to the Prime Minister’s office and supported by 
specialist advisory committees.  The Council would recommend projects to 
Commonwealth and state ministers, including when they met as the Loan 
Council.  “Planless development”, warned Wilson, is “possibly national suicide”.  
He described this as so generous a proposal that “the Commonwealth 
government does not entertain the least doubt that the Premiers will find it 
acceptable.”199  But when the Defence Minister provided Page with a revised 
list of priority works, he imparted a sense of the difficulties faced by adding that 
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Tasmania and Western Australia were reluctant to make supplies available to 
the Defence Department on Sundays.200   
 
Then Page reconsidered the implications of the October conference for his 
need to allay state suspicions.  A committee of officials and industrialists would 
overwhelm the Loan Council with requests for ministerial guidance.  Page and 
his departmental secretary now proposed that “the developmental and public 
works activity of Australia should be a ministerial body” – a National Council, 
supported by a fulltime Chief Industrial Adviser and an advisory committee of 
officials and experts.201  Page was increasingly impatient.  In a February 1939 
memorandum to Cabinet he floated the idea of appointing an (unspecified) 
individual “with status and authority to get right on with the consideration of the 
problems”, thus “leaving the lines of co-operation with the states to be traced as 
opportunity offers.”202    
 
The conference with the Premiers of 31 March 1939 was barely an advance on 
that of the previous October.  It met in the shadow of Germany’s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia on 15 March and so Lyons opened with a warning to be ready 
for war.  The National Council was still expected to extend well beyond defence 
needs to produce “an ordered programme of national development, both 
primary and secondary.”  Lyons tried to pacify the states by stressing the 
inclusion of their ministers in the Council, but the Premiers were also told to 
rearrange their own expenditures to cover the revised public works schedule as 
the Commonwealth now faced too great a burden of defence responsibilities.203  
Although a National Council of the Prime Minister and the Premiers was at last 
endorsed, it was saddled with a debilitatingly obscure brief – “to consider 
matters of concern as occasion arises and to bring about all the necessary co-
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ordination of the related activities of the Commonwealth and the states.”204  
The schedule of projects was consigned to discussion between Commonwealth 
and state officials.205  
 
Even the Commonwealth doubted its own creation.  The Secretary of the 
Department of Defence thought the National Council “should be confined to 
those problems which grow out of the Defence plans in relation to the national 
economic structure and primary and secondary industry”: otherwise it would 
constitute “an obvious duplication.”  The Chairman of the Defence Committee 
warned that “the National Council must be divorced from all strategical 
considerations.”  Essington Lewis simply declared the Council best left to 
politicians, not business.206  Nor did the proposed public works progress well.  
The only concrete Commonwealth offer was extended in December 1938 to 
“co-operate with the states in works suitable for unemployment relief on the 
understanding that the state concerned would meet one fifth of costs and the 
works would have defence or civil aviation value.”  Six months later the State 
Co-operation Liaison Officer in the Department of Defence reported that the 
only works of defence value actually undertaken were a few road construction 
and repair works.207  In June 1939 the National Council met at the end of a 
Premiers’ Conference, for the second and last time.  (There had been a brief 
inaugural meeting just after the March Premiers’ conference).  Hasluck later 
concluded that since he could not find a record of discussions and participants 
could not recall any significant outcomes, it “could not have had any marked 
consequences.”208  Australia’s best-placed attempt to institute national 
economic planning had already faded.   
   
                                                 
204 Hasluck, op. cit., p. 133. 
205 ‘National Security – Co-operation with the States and Co-ordination of Commonwealth 
Activities’, 4 April 1938, EPP, folder 589.  This memo, evidently prepared for Cabinet, added 
agreement to “close and continuous consultation concerning public works which are of value 
from the defence point of view” and to “confer concerning ways and means of developing new 
industries needed for defence and supply.”   
206 Frederick Shedden, ‘The National Council – its Functions in Their Relation to Defence’, 5 
April 1939; Vice Admiral Colvin to Shedden, ‘Functions of National Council – Minute by 
Chairman, Defence Committee’, 6 April 1939; Essington Lewis to Shedden 12 April 1939; all 
EPP, folder 588, part 2.  
207 Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 132, 135.   
208 Ibid., p. 136.  The press produced accounts of the Council’s inaugural meeting, such as the 
Argus, 3 April 1939, p. 8, and the Age, 3 April 1939, p. 12. 
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The National Council episode is consistent with the assessment by some 
historians that the later 1930s in Australia was a time of pessimism and 
absence of policy innovation.209  Far from economic recovery opening the way 
for a resurgence of developmentalism, few policy-makers saw a need for 
radical change.  Planning served no particular sectoral interest: apart from 
Page, support was limited to some economists and intellectuals.  Page stood 
out as a developmentalist visionary in a relatively unambitious government 
focused on austerity-led recovery, but could not spark a renewed Bruce-Page 
style commitment to development.  The Depression era had so deadened the 
Australian sense of possibilities that its main additions to the nation’s political 
imagination were some avowedly anti-political movements.      
 
The National Council also recalls Bruce’s comment that one of his tasks as 
Prime Minister was to restrain the many enthusiasms of Earle Page.  Page 
unfettered was indeed prone to sudden bold moves when he spied an 
opportunity, instead of the slow process of building support by demonstrating 
his ideas would work.  Even as he rode high politically in the late 1930s, 
defence concerns and support from figures of the standing of Wilson and Giblin 
gave Page a starting point only.  He had few close political confidants and did 
not habitually work with his political colleagues as policy equals.  As the sense 
of economic urgency faded, Page’s appeals to idealism attracted only already 
committed developmentalist thinkers like Stevens and Casey.  (It is perhaps 
significant that Casey trained as an engineer and had worked in mining and 
manufacturing).  Nor was the federal system as malleable as Page had hoped: 
state mistrust of the Commonwealth, and of Page himself, was strong.   
 
The overall implication is that Page’s power, although deep, was narrow.  It 
encompassed only a federal Cabinet in which he headed the junior coalition 
party under a Prime Minister so ill that he complied with a proposal he does not 
appear to have fully understood.  Page was much stronger in Lyons’s Cabinet 
than in the business world or even the wider Country Party.  It highlights also 
                                                 
209 See for example J.R. Robertson, ‘1930-39’ in Crowley, op. cit., pp. 434-5, 448.  But the 
Canberra-based Australian National Review did at least editorialize in favour of national 
planning and Page’s ideas in its April 1939 issue, pp. 2-4. 
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how he had drifted from the Country Party: few party colleagues supported his 
National Council and some, notably Dunstan, were openly hostile. 
 
The end result was that he overstretched himself badly.  A telling indicator of 
his self-perception as a rationalist, not the emotive dreamer he really was, is 
that he rarely fully considered the practical implementation of ideas such as 
planning.  Planning was to Page self-evidently logical and thus assuredly 
workable.  He was ultimately defeated by the difficulty of embedding 
comprehensive planning in a federal system, by sceptical political colleagues 
and the indifference of private industry.  Yet Page never forgot his 1938-39 
planning proposal.  As early as a December 1940 speech on the war effort he 
again called for “a National Council of all the governments of Australia” that 
used “the best brains of the community with all the necessary powers to deal 
with both defence and developmental problems.”210  National economic 
planning is an important part of Page’s vision, but did not give rise to a lasting 
personal legacy. 
 
Page’s personal political crisis, 1939 
 
As a major failure in full view of his political peers, the National Council episode 
probably contributed to the decline in Page’s policy influence.  He remained a 
formidable advocate, well capable in the years that followed of pushing his 
ideas (including planning) into national political debate.  But from the late 1930s 
onwards, Page was never again entrusted with a major leadership role in 
development policy.  Political colleagues largely lost faith in his grand visions 
and sense of the special status of the leader.  This is important context for the 
following chapters on Page in the post-war era.  
 
Page’s loss of the Country Party leadership in September 1939 is usually 
attributed to the events of his caretaker Prime Ministership five months earlier, 
primarily his infamous attempt to block the ascension of Robert Menzies.  But 
Page’s fall from the leadership had been brewing for some years.  Press 
                                                 
210 Untitled speech, 16 December 1940, EPP, folder 591. 
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reports appeared as early as 1932 of Country Party MPs being open to a 
change of leadership in favour of Thomas Paterson so as to clear the way for 
the formation of a coalition with the UAP.  Reportedly, Page was saved by the 
unacceptability of the terms that Lyons offered.211  John McEwen later said that 
when he entered federal parliament in 1934, “Page had already lost the support 
of a good section – not the majority, but a pretty important section – of his 
party.”  He said that for all Page’s industry and imagination, he “was 
determined to do what he wanted to do” and “did not, except in a most passing 
way, consult his party members.”212  Others have attested to a personal 
antipathy between Page and McEwen.  This was partly the consequence of 
Page having campaigned against McEwen in the seat of Echuca in 1934 in 
favour of independent Country Party candidates, but also had much to do with 
very different respective backgrounds and policy priorities.213   
 
In the wake of Lyons’s death on 7 April 1939, the parliamentary Country Party 
passed a resolution that it was not prepared to remain in a coalition should 
Menzies accede to the Prime Ministership.  This was partly as Menzies – 
comparatively young, determined and inclined to arrogance – insisted on 
choosing all ministers himself, including those from the Country Party.  There is 
no firm evidence that Page sought to extend his brief caretaker Prime 
Ministership, despite reported encouragement from Opposition Leader 
Curtin.214  On the contrary, Page approached Bruce to return from London to 
resume the Prime Ministership, even offering up his own seat of Cowper as a 
base.  Bruce effectively refused by stipulating that he would only do so should 
                                                 
211 Such reports are quoted in The Life and Times of Thomas Paterson (1882-1952): A 
Biography and History by his Elder Son George Paterson, privately published, Caulfield East, 
1987, p. 42.  Fred Alexander refers on unspecified grounds to Page by the mid-1930s “having 
no longer commanded the undivided support of the Country Party MPs.”; see From Curtin to 
Menzies and After: Continuity or Confrontation?, Thomas Nelson (Australia), Melbourne, 1973, 
p. 3.   
212 McEwen, op. cit., p. 11. 
213 See Davey, Ninety Not Out, op. cit., pp. 19, 55 and 61.  Ian Robinson, much later Country 
Party MP for the eponymous seat of Page (and who admired Page as “an incredible man”), is 
quoted by Davey as saying that this mutual disdain was “so great that I don’t think it could ever 
be properly or fully described.”  This may be an overstatement – Robinson himself added that 
such antipathy did not harm the Country Party, so evidently they were still able to work 
together.  
214 Page claimed that at Lyons’s funeral Curtin offered to support his continuation as Prime 
Minister until the next federal election, due in eighteen months; see Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 
310.  
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he be able to serve as Prime Minister without belonging to any political party, 
which Page took to mean at the head of an all-party national government.  
Page strongly supported the idea of such a government, but Menzies did not.  
More personally, Page also disdained Menzies for the pressure he placed on 
the ailing Lyons by his March 1939 resignation from the ministry and deputy 
leadership of the UAP over the shelving of national insurance (a decision the 
Country Party supported).215  
 
The collapse of relations between Page and Menzies culminated in the incident 
for which Page became notorious in later decades, his parliamentary attack of 
20 April 1939 on Menzies’ failure to join the first AIF: 
 
When, 24 years ago, Australia was in the midst of the Gallipoli 
campaign, Mr Menzies was a member of the Australian Military Forces, 
and held the King’s Commission.  In 1915, after being in the service for 
some years, he resigned his commission and did not go overseas.  I am 
not questioning the reasons why anyone did not go to the war.  All I say 
is that if the right honourable gentleman cannot satisfactorily and publicly 
explain to a very great body of people in Australia who did participate in 
the war his failure to do so, he will not be able to get that maximum effort 
out of the people in the event of war.216   
 
Page had raised the great unmentionable of who had and had not volunteered 
for active service in the Great War.  Newspapers across the country reported 
that Page’s comments “staggered members of all parties” and had MPs 
“interjecting in defence of Mr Menzies.”  The Sydney Morning Herald called it “a 
despicable attack.”217  Menzies himself pointed to a binding family decision that 
he would stay in Australia and two of his brothers would enlist.218   
 
                                                 
215 Enid Lyons is reported to have attested to Page’s anger being related to this perception; see 
Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘Young Menzies’, in Hazlehurst, op. cit., pp. 11, 25. 
216 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 1939, pp. 11-2.  The text in this press report is identical to 
that in the Argus but slightly different from the text provided in Hansard, and incorporates many 
more interjections.  
217 See for example the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 21 April 1939, p. 9; the Sydney 
Morning Herald editorial is from 21 April 1939, p. 10. 
218 Martin, volume 1, op. cit., pp. 275-6.  Despite reluctance to mention this in public, some 
parliamentarians such as T.W. White remained privately resentful of Menzies for not having 
volunteered; see Martin, ibid., pp. 124, 232.  
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Was the failure of the National Council a further factor in this hostility to 
Menzies?  Page was conscious of a paucity of support from his federal 
colleagues, and in Truant Surgeon made particular mention of Menzies’ 
aloofness from proceedings during the first conference with the Premiers.219  
Witnessing Page assume effective leadership of the government may well have 
been a last straw for Menzies’ confidence in Lyons.  Menzies’ 24 October 1938 
speech to the Sydney Constitutional Club on the need for national leadership 
that was widely interpreted (including by Enid Lyons) as a public attack on the 
Prime Minister was delivered just three days after this conference.220     
Public and parliamentary condemnation of Page’s atypically personal attack 
became the immediate trigger for his loss of the party leadership.  Anger was 
heightened by Page having earlier given party colleagues the impression that 
he would accede to their pleas to moderate his comments.221  He was 
undeterred by references to the relative brevity of his own war service.  (One of 
                                                 
219 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 302-3. 
220 The fullest account of this speech is at Martin, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 241-4.  This touches on the 
context of the speech being preceded by an unhappy meeting with the Premiers, but does not 
draw out Page’s role in this.  Menzies consistently denied that the speech was aimed at Lyons.  
221 Paterson, op. cit., pp. 55-6. 
Figure 7: ‘The Blotted Page’, 
(Argus, 21 April 1939, p. 10). 
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the interjections on 20 April was “How many Germans did you kill, Doc?”)222  
Four Country Party MPs, including Arthur Fadden, at once sat as independent 
Country Party members.  Fadden had endured his own personal attacks for not 
enlisting in the First AIF.223  The coalition with the UAP was suspended.  
Page’s standing in the party was weakened by this incident, but he remained 
leader (perhaps helped by the absence of the four).  He only eventually 
resigned his compromised leadership on 13 September 1939 to help clear the 
way for a wartime Country Party-UAP coalition, Menzies having indicated that 
although he was open to having Country Party ministers in his Cabinet this 
could not include Page himself.   
 
The Country Party elected the South Australian Archie Cameron as its new 
leader and re-joined the coalition in March 1940 after the UAP government had 
been shaken by an unexpected by-election loss.  In late October Page, now 
nominally reconciled with the Prime Minister, returned to Cabinet as Minister for 
Commerce.  Page professed to have become a Menzies admirer after having 
seen him perform as a wartime leader, defending him from personal attacks 
following his return from an extended overseas trip in May 1941 and even 
proffering medical advice that the Prime Minister should rest.224  Yet Menzies 
never fully trusted Page and singled him out in his memoirs for what he recalled 
as “a bitter and entirely false attack upon me.”225   
 
It is significant that Page did not produce a fully like-minded successor as party 
leader to take up his policy vision.  After the temperamental Cameron resigned 
in October 1940, Page and McEwen were deadlocked in a party room ballot to 
succeed him.  The leadership went instead went to Fadden as a compromise 
candidate, now back in the Country Party fold.  This was supposedly a stop-
gap measure but in fact frustrated McEwen’s leadership ambitions until 
Fadden’s retirement in 1958.226  Fadden was a less divisive party leader than 
                                                 
222 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 1939, p. 12. 
223 Tracey Arklay, Arthur Fadden: A Political Silhouette, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North 
Melbourne, 2014, p. 43. 
224 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 340-2. 
225 R.G. Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events, Cassell, Melbourne, 
1967, p. 13. 
226 Davey, Ninety Not Out, op. cit., p. 72. 
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Page and far more conventional in outlook.  Paul Hasluck in his capacity as 
both historian and colleague described him as an “affable, astute, story-telling 
man, untroubled by the deeper significance of problems.”227  Fadden was far 
more malleable on policy than Page, and during the war years and in the post-
war lead-up to the second Menzies government was drawn to conventional 
policies on rural development.  These helped consolidate the shift of the 
Country Party away from Page’s vision of the nation. 
 
Page could look back on the 1930s as his most mixed decade.  His political 
fortunes fell, rose and then suddenly fell again at decade’s end.  Despite the 
closeness of their working relationship, Lyons had not provided the balance of 
opportunity and firm guidance that Bruce had.  His austere priority of recovery 
from the Depression offered Page only limited basis for policy initiatives until he 
asserted himself on planning in 1938-39.  Undeterred, Page adapted only his 
strategies to the greatly changed environment of the Depression, not his 
fundamental aims.  Regionalism and decentralisation remained his ultimate 
goals, with co-operative federalism and planning as means to these grand 
ends.  Pragmatic opportunism became increasingly unavoidable as he had to 
be alert to limited opportunities.  Page’s own use of experts such as Wilson and 
Giblin late in the decade unwittingly marked a step towards the consolidation of 
the role of economists in government.  
 
Yet Page still made important contributions to Australian political discourse in 
these years.  He was the main bridge for developmentalist ideas into politics as 
he tried to harness such energetic business leaders as Gepp and Lewis, and 
established relationships with a select number of more abstract thinkers such 
as Bland.  By seizing upon a succession of infrequent chances to implement 
dearly-held ideas that now sat well outside the policy mainstream, he managed 
to promote most major elements of the vision he set out in 1917, albeit with 
very differing results.  Although Page played leading roles in inserting 
regionalism and planning onto the political agenda, his most substantive 
                                                 
227 Hasluck, op. cit., p. 266. 
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achievement of the 1930s was the Australian Agricultural Council, a lasting 
landmark in co-operative federalism.     
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CHAPTER 7 – POST-WAR PAGE: HOPES AMIDST FRUSTRATIONS 
 
The domestic political outcomes of World War Two should in some ways have 
suited Page.  The war fostered a planning-orientated culture that “gave life to 
the argument promoted by inter-war new liberals that expert knowledge should 
determine resource allocation and social order.”1  It also accelerated the 
centralisation of governmental power, foremostly with the transfer of state 
income taxes to the Commonwealth.  H.C. Coombs, Director-General of Post-
War Reconstruction, wrote in 1944 of the “opportunity to move consciously and 
intelligently towards a new economic and social system,” entirely unlike that of 
the Depression years.2   
 
During the war, political attention began to return to developmentalism, making 
it central to post-war reconstruction.  Many of the ideas for which Page had 
been the pre-eminent national advocate for over two decades finally entered 
the political mainstream such as regionalism, decentralisation and major 
infrastructure, including hydroelectricity.  His wartime service in London and 
participation in the 1942 Constitutional Convention heightened his sense of 
entitlement to a major say in the policy priorities of the forthcoming post-war 
era, reinforced by a conviction that wartime had made his policy prescriptions 
more acceptable to the general public.     
 
But the changed political and policy-making precepts of this intellectually 
exciting period posed major new challenges for Page, and provide a sharp 
contrast to his political peak of the inter-war years.  Much post-war policy 
thinking had troubling implications in such favoured fields of his as co-operative 
federalism.  The economy was developing in directions that he found worrying: 
although post-war farm export prices were high, mechanisation reduced rural 
employment and the wartime boost to manufacturing combined with a housing 
backlog pushed public spending towards the cities.3  Above all, Page faced the 
paradox of his favoured policy themes at last being elevated to the centre of 
                                                             
1 Walter, What Were They Thinking?, op. cit., p. 176. 
2 Quoted in Stuart Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment: War and Reconstruction in the 
1940s, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney, 2015, p. 6. 
3 Bolton, ‘1939-51’ in Crowley, op. cit., pp. 486-90. 
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national policy amidst a new technocratic and expert-oriented environment that 
he found unfamiliar and sometimes hostile.  He responded to exclusion from 
official processes and dwindling personal power within his own party by 
increasingly trying to influence policy agendas through lobbying governments 
and the media.  His championing of the Clarence in preference to the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme provides a study of how he found himself operating in such 
unexpected and unpropitious circumstances.   
 
Page’s post-war expectations: the wartime setting  
 
Page foresaw the looming post-war era as a rare opportunity.  He attached 
great importance to ensuring that full advantage was taken of public tolerance 
of wartime measures as a basis for developmentalist initiatives.  Despite being 
out of ministerial office from October 1941, the war years presented Page with 
two unexpected opportunities to pursue major elements of his policy agenda.  
These raised his expectations, but someone more self-aware might have seen 
them as signs of the difficulties he would face in trying to work with a post-war 
Labor government.  
 
The first opportunity was provided by the short-lived government of Arthur 
Fadden, who was elevated to the prime ministership late in August 1941 
following the resignation of the embattled Robert Menzies. The following 
month, Page was appointed Australian minister resident in London, the 
outcome of four months of debate about Australian representation in the British 
War Cabinet.  Menzies had proposed representation at prime ministerial level, 
but his own Cabinet preferred a minister of less exalted rank.  The Fadden 
government was defeated on the floor of the House while Page was en route, 
but its Labor successor led by John Curtin declined his offer to return.  This 
was ultimately to prove unfortunate for Page.  It is evident from the detailed 
diary that he kept of this wartime service that Churchill initially gave him a 
considerable amount of his time.4  By December Page had secured a position 
                                                             
4 The diary is preserved in typed form at EPP, folder 2787 (iii).  It provides a continuous 
narrative from Page’s departure from Australia in September 1941 to his August 1942 return, 
with extra entries concerning a discussion with Douglas MacArthur on 26 October 1942, the 
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on British War Cabinet committees and in early 1942 he helped to establish the 
Pacific War Council, intended to advise on Allied operations in the Pacific 
theatre.  But Japan’s entry into the war dramatically increased tensions 
between London and Canberra over the defence of Singapore and the sudden 
transformation of the United States into a full combatant greatly diminished 
Australia’s relative importance as a British ally.   
 
Page’s personal standing with the Curtin government was seriously damaged 
in February 1942 when he misinterpreted its instructions and gave Churchill the 
impression that Australia was agreeable to the diversion to Burma of the 7th 
Australian Division, then at sea returning from the Middle East.  Curtin and 
Evatt, the External Affairs Minister, rebuked Page in an angry exchange 
conducted by cable.  Page (along with Stanley Bruce as High Commissioner) 
also bore the brunt of Churchill’s ire over strategy for Singapore.5  These 
tensions placed Page under great stress.  He later told Curtin that “I went 
through since January the worst period of acute mental distress of my whole 
life.”6  A near-fatal bout of pneumonia prompted his departure from London in 
June 1942.  Page remained defensive about his London experience, claiming 
to have helped contain the damage to bilateral relations.7  This episode has 
been much-publicised and his conduct frequently criticised: along with the April 
1939 attack on Menzies, it has distorted wider impressions of Page.  The harm 
to his relations with the Labor government almost certainly had implications for 
his hopes of a direct role in post-war reconstruction.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Constitutional Convention of November-December 1942 and a War Council meeting of 8 
December 1942.   
5 Page’s long diary entry on the War Cabinet meeting of 26 January 1942 records that “Ch. 
then went off the deep end about the Austns. generally”; EPP, folder 2787 (iii).  The relevant 
cables between Page and Canberra are also at EPP, folder 2788 (ii).  For a fuller account of 
this episode concerning the return of Australian troops see David Horner, Inside the War 
Cabinet: Directing Australia’s War Effort 1939-45, Allen & Unwin in association with the 
Australian Archives, St Leonards, 1996, pp. 97-108. 
6 Page to Curtin, April 1942, quoted in Page’s Australian Dictionary of Biography entry, op. cit.  
7 Page later produced a curious (and undated) short typed statement reflecting on his personal 
role in the Singapore crisis.  He wrote of persuading Churchill and Curtin to moderate their 
dispute, of Churchill agreeing that Page could vet all his future cables to the Australians, and of 
the King personally honouring him for these efforts by making him a Companion of Honour.  
See EPP, folder 2577; Page refers to this very briefly also in Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 419.  
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Page in London was an inexperienced and unconventional diplomat who 
remained incorrigibly alert to opportunities to pursue his own agenda.  Although 
he considered himself an economic and social innovator, his continuing 
attachment to the possibilities of the Imperial connection attracted criticism at a 
time of rising bilateral tension between Britain and Australia over divergent 
strategic and economic interests.8  He had long seen the Empire not just as a 
vehicle for Australian trade policy but also for the management of international 
trade, including “Empire rationalisation.”  In May 1936, for example, he had 
drafted an article for the Farmers Weekly proposing to organise Australia’s 
trade in primary products via producer-controlled but government-backed 
national boards that would work with Empire Boards for each product.  
Together, these would set production amounts, influence prices and manage 
imports from outside the Empire.9  Use of the Empire to manage international 
trade had numerous other eminent pre-war advocates such as Lionel Curtis, 
the Anglo-Canadian media baron Lord Beaverbrook, and the London-based 
Australian historian W.K. Hancock.10  But the policy and political opportunities 
of the 1930s were in many respects very different from those of the 1940s. 
 
In wartime, Page’s vision went much further to propose harnessing the Empire 
to manage the post-war production and pricing of major traded commodities 
and of manufactures such as steel.  He seems to have been thinking of 
extending wartime supply arrangements into peacetime as the starting point for 
a process that would eventually reinvigorate the entire Empire.  Page used his 
wartime travels to promote this extraordinarily ambitious but ill-defined vision 
with an assortment of well-placed figures, including British civil servants, New 
                                                             
8 These tensions arose from such issues as conservation of foreign exchange, expansion of 
Australian manufacturing at the expense of British exports and, prior to December 1941, 
whether to deter or seek compromise with Japan: see Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Dedominionization: 
The Anglo-Australian Experience, 1939-1945’, The Historical Journal, vol. 37, no. 4, December 
1994, pp. 861-83. 
9 See EPP, folder 1802.  The Australian government’s perspective on international discussions 
concerning institutional arrangements for management of the post-war world economy is 
outlined by Macintyre in Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., pp. 241-53.  Its foremost 
interest was in the implications for full employment.  Although these international discussions 
did include trade in primary products, notably at the May 1943 Hot Springs Conference in the 
United States, their overall emphasis was on free trade and international financial stability 
rather than Page’s proposed production and price controls.  
10 See for example a summary of Hancock’s views on the Empire in Jim Davidson, A Three-
Cornered Life: The Historian W.K. Hancock, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010, pp.183, 200-3.  
Page’s wartime diary refers to meeting Curtis, 15 January 1942, op. cit.  
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York financiers and Oxford dons.  In London in January 1942 he spoke publicly 
of how “the methods of co-ordination that are adopted for wartime action should 
be such as can be used for peacetime purposes and post-war planning”, and 
“not just vanish into thin air as they did after the last war.”11  Soon after, as 
Singapore was about to fall to the Japanese, he spoke at All Souls College, 
Oxford, on the co-ordination of wartime supplies and the “rationalisation of 
industry” between the Empire and other allied countries through “continuous 
and permanent machinery I have outlined for England & Australia.”  Such 
machinery would at war’s end “overcome fierce competition that will bring trade 
dislocation and depressions.”12  Just before his departure for home, he told the 
British Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, of his hopes for a Commonwealth 
Council of Agriculture that would emulate the work of the Empire Marketing 
Board of 1926-33 in the orderly marketing of agricultural goods.13  In 
Washington, en route back to Australia, he prepared a press statement adding 
that “pool controls” set up by Allied governments jointly to control production 
should be used after the war to “automatically plan to meet the problems of 
peace”, with “international collaboration proceeding item by item.”14  There 
were signs here, perhaps, of the reasons for Field Marshal Alan Brooke’s 
exasperated (and essentially unfair) comment that Page had in the War 
Cabinet displayed “the mentality of a greengrocer.”15   
 
The emphasis on global rationalisation, organisation and planning makes all 
this less a typical Australian conception of Empire than a distinctively Page 
view, incorporating old reciprocal understandings that scarcely recognised the 
likely dynamics of post-war agreements.  He even speculated about a link to 
the possible return of the United States to the Imperial fold.  He wrote in his 
diary of sending plans to Curtin, “the symmetry of which was perfect and which 
                                                             
11 ‘Speech by Sir Earle Page at Second Wednesday Club, London, 7th January 1942’, EPP, 
folder 1902 (2).  
12 See EPP, folder 1819, for a summary outline of this 31 January 1942 speech; also his 
wartime diary entries for 31 January-1 February 1942, op. cit.      
13  Page’s wartime diary, op.cit., entry for 25 June 1942. 
14 ‘Statement by Sir Earle Page at Press Conference at Washington D.C. July 10th, 1942’, 
EPP, folder 1902 (2). 
15 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939-1945, edited by Alex Danchev and Daniel 
Todman, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2001, p. 212.  Brooke was then Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff. 
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would provide an insoluble bond of unity between Empire for good.”  Page was 
also preparing a statement on production and supply on an Empire basis, but 
feared “that they may be so stupid as not to be able to understand without the 
actual practical operation of the system that I have had, how indispensible this 
system is and how permanent and indissoluble it will make the union.”16  This 
all came to little, having far exceeded Page’s personal influence and being 
contrary to the reality of a British Empire facing decline as the United States 
assumed leadership of the post-war world.  There is no more striking instance 
of the extent of Page’s policy ambitions and willingness to pursue these 
whenever an opportunity presented itself.17   
 
    
 
When Page returned to Australia in August 1942, he was greeted personally by 
Prime Minster Curtin shortly after his arrival.  He resumed his place in a 
parliamentary Country Party still led by Arthur Fadden.  Page remained 
undeterred by his decidedly mixed experiences overseas and at once sought a 
major say in guiding post-war reconstruction.  He reported to parliament that in 
London he had been “intimately associated” with “the system of inter-
                                                             
16 Page’s wartime diary, op.cit., entry for 28 January 1942.  An annex to the diary, ‘Note of 
Discussion at Balliol College, 31.1.42’, touches on a federal union involving the Empire and the 
United States.  Other relevant diary entries include those for 29 January 1942 and 24 June 
1942.     
17 Page retained faith in the potential of the Empire, writing in his memoirs that if it had 
“developed the same common feeling as the United States,” then it would have become a great 
zone for trade and development, a “Commonwealth market” that the rest of world would have 
wished to join; see Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 440-1. 
Figure 8: Earle Page with  
Ethel Page on his return to  
Australia, August 1942.   
(Australian War Memorial,  
150400). 
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governmental contacts” and was even “largely instrumental in creating the 
Empire machinery associated with it” (a reference to the Commonwealth 
Supply Council and other means of Allied collaboration on wartime supplies, 
especially food).  On this basis, Page considered that he “could be of use not 
only in the consideration of current problems, but also in planning for the post-
war period, so that Australia shall be able to take its proper place in the affairs 
of the world.”18  Although Page overstated his influence in London, he was 
nonetheless one of the few Australians to have operated at high levels in Allied 
capitals, and had a longstanding claim to expertise in prospective post-war 
issues of regionalism, planning and infrastructure.   
 
Page’s second big wartime opportunity came when the Curtin government 
appointed him a delegate to the Constitutional Convention held in Canberra 
late in 1942.  The government was already looking towards realising its 
anticipated post-war reconstruction programme and gave Evatt (also Attorney-
General) the task of securing the greater constitutional powers this required.  
Page still had a good personal relationship with Curtin, but the appointment had 
more to do with the need for a balanced party representation at the convention 
than any intended signal of a substantive role in post-war reconstruction.19   Yet 
it both raised his hopes and came to demonstrate the extent to which his views 
had drifted from those of his political peers.   
 
The convention arose from a bill introduced into parliament in early October 
1941 proposing an entirely new section of the Constitution expanding the 
Commonwealth’s powers over industry, employment, health, transport and 
housing, while debarring the High Court from interfering with legislation 
considered necessary for “economic security and social justice.”20  Faced with 
the unlikelihood of such radical alterations getting past the Senate let alone 
succeeding at a referendum, the Curtin government resorted to convening a 
special Constitutional Convention of Commonwealth and state parliamentarians 
                                                             
18 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 9 September 1942, p. 109.  Page devoted all of 
chapter 19 of his memoirs to international arrangements for wartime production and supply, 
including his fear that these could weaken Australia’s ties with Britain.  
19 Page’s short (one and a half page) ‘Diary of Constitutional Convention’, notes simply that “I 
was chosen to represent the Country Party”; EPP, folder 2787 (iii). 
20 Macintyre, op. cit., pp. 137-8. 
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from all parties in the hope of securing broad-based political support.  
Membership was accordingly wide – eight members of the House of 
Representatives, four of the Senate, and the Premier and the Opposition leader 
from each state, adding up to a total of twenty-four delegates evenly divided 
between the ALP and the non-Labor parties.21   
 
Delegates convened in Parliament House Canberra from 24 November to 4 
December 1942.  Proceedings soon made it clear that a referendum on greater 
Commonwealth powers lacked bipartisan support.  Fadden, then also Leader of 
the Opposition, accused the Curtin government of trying to insert the Labor 
Party’s platform into the Constitution.22  But Page by way of contrast treated the 
convention as an opportunity to present an ambitious and original policy plan.  
His main concerns were that the government had both misjudged its strategy 
and was missing an opportunity to achieve major reform. 
 
Unlike other non-Labor delegates, Page was not overly concerned by the 
dangers of a powerful central government.  Instead, he proposed that for 
development projects “the Commonwealth should plan and finance and…the 
states should administer and construct through their own agencies or through 
that of their local governments,” making them “the hands and fingers of the 
planning body.”  He evoked past co-operative successes such as tied road 
grants, the Sydney-Brisbane railway and the Hume Dam on the Murray.  If “the 
states could have some voice in the arrangement of the plan and of the general 
lines of policy, then there could be little objection to ample legal powers being 
in the hands of the Commonwealth.”23  A National Council of the 
Commonwealth and the states should be appointed with a permanent 
secretariat “to see what powers could be best handled co-operatively, which 
could be best handled by the Commonwealth or by states, and also should look 
                                                             
21 The extended proceedings that followed were dubbed a Constitutional Convention, but Paul 
Hasluck, writing later as an official war historian, severely doubted that they deserved such an 
elevated title.  See Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, a volume in the 
official history of Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 4 Civil, volume 2, Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, 1970, pp. 524-8.  
22 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 139. 
23 ‘Sir Earle Page – Constitutional Convention, Canberra, 1/12/42’, EPP, folder 888.   
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at the changes necessary if any drastic reform of the Constitution in the 
direction of unification were found to be indispensable.”24   
 
Page was clearly seeking acceptance as a major contributor to post-war 
reconstruction.  He was undeterred by the partisanship on display during and 
after the Convention, instead indicating his readiness to work across party 
lines.  Although the Convention concluded with delegates unanimously 
supporting the states using section 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution to voluntarily 
refer powers to the Commonwealth on a strictly temporary basis, in the event 
only two Labor states, New South Wales and Queensland, passed the requisite 
legislation.  This resulted in a referendum in August 1944 for the direct 
acquisition of powers by the Commonwealth for a five year period after the 
cessation of hostilities, including over the production and distribution of goods.  
(In parliament, the Country Party initially voted with the government on the 
referendum legislation but later switched after failing to secure an amendment 
to strengthen powers over the marketing of commodities).25  
 
Page’s hopes and fears for post-war reconstruction were as much about means 
as ends, making him one of the first major public figures to articulate a 
comprehensive co-operative path to constitutional change.  He had long 
experience of failed referendums thwarting constitutional reform, and saw the 
nation’s wartime exigencies as presenting a chance to alter this pattern.  In the 
parliamentary debate of March 1944 on the forthcoming referendum, he said 
that experience had convinced him that major reforms “cannot be rammed 
down the throats of the states by a referendum”, and wryly recalled that the 
only major referendum carried since Federation was the 1928 enshrinement of 
the Financial Agreement.26  Although he thought that the states accepted much 
of what the Constitutional Convention and 1944 referendum proposed, Page 
saw the Commonwealth as courting failure by also seeking certain more 
controversial wider powers, such as over prices and company legislation.  He 
                                                             
24 ‘Diary of Constitutional Convention’, op. cit. 
25 Hasluck, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 534-5; Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 257.  
26 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 8 March 1944, p. 1072.  Up to March 1944, 
Australian governments had conducted referendums on eighteen constitutional amendments 
for only three successes. 
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simultaneously delineated the gap between his wider vision and the more 
immediate aims of the Curtin government by declaring that in other respects 
the proposed referendum was flawed by seeking merely “partial and 
inadequate powers”, particularly by omitting Commonwealth control of primary 
production and failing “to acquire the whole of the railways of Australia.”  If 
Australia were to compete successfully with countries like the Soviet Union, the 
United States and Canada, said Page, it must exercise secure proper national 
control of communications and energy.27  
 
From the mid-1920s onwards, Page had increasingly found that in order to 
advance his developmentalist ideas, he needed to make accommodations with 
a constitution and a federal system that he otherwise disdained.  As a patient 
and principled opportunist, Page was encouraged, even excited, by how 
wartime provided a unique chance to put this approach into practice.  The most 
promising way forward in 1944, he said, was actually “the co-operative method, 
exemplified by the Loan Council.”28  The war had familiarized the states and 
the Australian public with the exercise of central power over railways, 
agriculture, marketing and energy, creating the conditions needed for a 
voluntary temporary transfer of selected responsibilities to the Commonwealth 
by reasoned, patriotic appeals to inter-governmental co-operation.  He 
proposed that instead of a referendum, the Commonwealth should convene a 
special conference with the states to effect this transfer, to be followed only 
much later by a referendum to make the changes permanent.29  Page turned 
out to be essentially right in his fears about strategy: the referendum of August 
1944 succeeded in only two states, an early signal that the public was tiring of 
wartime controls.  This major failure forced the Curtin and Chifley governments 
to turn to reliance on co-operation from the states, a major constraint on their 
post-war reconstruction program.30 
 
 
                                                             
27 Ibid., pp. 1071, 1077.  
28 Ibid., p. 1072. 
29 Speech to Convention by Page, 30 November 1942, EPP, folder 886.  
30 Stuart Macintyre, ‘The Post-War Reconstruction Project’, in Samuel Furphy (ed.), The Seven 
Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins: Australian Government Administration in the Post-War 
Reconstruction Era, ANU Press, Canberra, 2015, p. 36. 
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Page falters in the post-war environment  
 
In the environment of wartime, there developed within the Commonwealth 
government a confidence that post-war reconstruction would be a unique 
opportunity to build a fairer, more prosperous nation.  Coombs much later 
reflected that “we had faith in the intellectual model of the economic system 
and our capacity to manage it; we believed that it could in practice deliver 
benefits to both producer and consumer; we had the ear and the confidence of 
a Prime Minister and a Treasurer who combined vision with executive 
competence; we were conscious that there was in the community generally a 
conviction that a better world could be built.”31  To this end, Curtin, Chifley and 
their intellectual supporters hoped that public acceptance of planning and 
direction as wartime necessities would carry over into a post-war tolerance of 
economic controls.  This official optimism – perhaps more inspired hope – in 
practice ran up against the growing public weariness with government 
regulation that had defeated the 1944 referendum.32  Considering his own taste 
for planning, Page should have prospered amidst such optimism, but soon 
encountered the consequences of shifts in party politics and policy-making. 
 
Page’s vision of national development was outwardly compatible with the 
government’s main strategies for post-war reconstruction of regionalism, 
infrastructure projects, communality and expert-led national policy planning.  
New planning-orientated agencies and inquiries had begun to appear early 
during the war.  In June 1940, under the Menzies government, the Loan 
Council agreed to appoint a Co-ordinator-General of Public Works to assess 
the economic and military significance of works proposed by state 
governments.33  The Curtin government went further by proposing both a 
powerful National Works Commission to evaluate all new major construction 
projects and a reserve programme of projects to be deployed if needed to 
                                                             
31 H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance: Issues of My Working Life, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1981, 
p. 27. 
32 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., pp. 5, 12, 14, 193. 
33 Heather Curtis, ‘Planning for National Development’, Australian Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 3, 
1954, p. 55.  This office lost influence with the return to peace-time conditions.  
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cushion the employment consequences of demobilisation.34  The Commission 
idea fell foul of resistance from the states, but a National Works Council was 
established in 1943 as an adjunct to the Premiers’ Conference to “promote 
development of national resources according to a long-term programme” and 
make recommendations to the Loan Council on proposals submitted by the 
states.35  The Commonwealth Housing Commission, also formed in 1943, 
described planning as “a conscious effort to guide the development of the 
resources of the nation” and proposed a Commonwealth Planning Authority to 
bring together all agencies dealing with public works, industry and housing.36   
 
Post-war reconstruction’s similarity to Page’s vision needs to be qualified in one 
important respect.  Despite the strong economic growth of the war years – real 
GDP rose by 26 per cent between 1939 and 1946 – much of the Labor 
government’s planning for peacetime was motivated by an overarching fear of 
large scale unemployment reminiscent of the Great Depression.37  David 
Rivett, chief executive officer of the CSIR, had for example warned in 1941 that 
“the only completely satisfactory method of dealing with unemployment devised 
by man seems to be war.”38  Developmentalist policy of this time was frequently 
presented as a means of avoiding the economic disaster of the previous 
decade, hence an early post-war emphasis on direct public investment in 
growth.  The Chifley government’s 1945 White Paper on Full Employment 
opened with the proclamation that “full employment is a fundamental aim of the 
Commonwealth government.”39  The crucially important concept of full 
employment rarely appears in Page’s own pronouncements on national 
development. 
 
                                                             
34 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 191. 
35 Quote from the 1945 Commonwealth White Paper Full Employment in Australia, Australian 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1945; see A.J. Davies, ‘National Development’, Australian 
Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 4, December 1965, p. 47.  The National Works Council lapsed after the 
war.  See also Coombs, op. cit., pp. 65-7, and Macintyre, ibid., p. 182. 
36 Macintyre, ibid., p. 182.    
37 Yule in Connor, Stanley and Yule, op. cit., p. 77. 
38 Quoted in Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 66. 
39 Commonwealth of Australia, White Paper Full Employment in Australia, op. cit.  See also 
Alex Millmow, ‘Australia and the Keynesian Revolution’, in Furphy, op. cit., pp. 61-2. 
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To his chagrin, Page was never given any formal role by the post-war Chifley 
government.  His invitation to the 1942 Constitutional Convention and service 
on the Advisory War Council in 1942-43 and 1944-45 remained temporary 
aberrations attributable to the necessities of war and politics, and to recognition 
of the expertise he had gained in London.40  Page did not even earn a mention 
in Regional Development Magazine produced by the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction.  He came to resent this exclusion from issues on which he felt 
past contributions gave him a rightful role transcending the party divide.  There 
emerged a discernible bitterness in his speeches in which he goaded 
government figures with whom he had formerly worked well, including Chifley 
himself.  But the government simply did not consider it needed Page’s 
guidance.    
 
Amid strident debates over whether post-war development should be led by 
government planning or private enterprise, Page, as so often, also diverged 
from his political peers.  Harold Holt spoke in 1944 of the danger of “a 
regimented Australia, a drab grey world in which every human being is pushed 
around.”  Fellow Liberal Eric Spooner warned of “some outdated theology 
which tried to make people come to heel by the threat of hell fire.”41  Page did 
not place such stress on the rights of the individual and was less suspicious of 
extending government-led planning into peacetime.  Herbert Gepp (Page’s old 
DMC contact), Charles Kemp of the Institute of Public Affairs and most other 
business progressives of the time tended to be more assertively individualist, 
perhaps in reaction to the socialist associations of a Labor government.  
Despite newly acquired Keynesian sympathies, they tolerated government-led 
planning only to the extent that it was a public-private collaboration that allowed 
private enterprise freedom of action, such as the very selective use of public 
works.42  Page agreed that private enterprise was critically important and 
fiercely opposed the Chifley government’s bank nationalisation, but remained 
more comfortable with government playing a central role in planning 
regionalisation and electrification to harness the power of the private sector.  At 
                                                             
40 Page’s own account stresses the latter motivation; see Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 420. 
41 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 261. 
42 Walter, What Were They Thinking?, op. cit., pp. 189, 194-7.  
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a 1945 celebration of his twenty-five years in parliament, he spoke of how “the 
real challenge to Australian progress is fear and timidity in undertaking full 
tasks necessary to the fulfilment of our destiny”: evidence of faith in the nation’s 
future “lies in a big, constructive plan of development.”43   
 
Nor did Page have a particularly strong personal standing amongst the 
intellectuals who proliferated in the post-war policy environment.  James Walter 
writes of diverse new groups of applied thinkers that included economists, 
bankers, academics, theologians, unionists, public servants and others, and 
divides them into “bureaucratic reconstructionists” who favoured collective and 
state-directed action, and more technocratic business progressives.44  Although 
Page’s ideas overlapped with those held by many of these thinkers, he did not 
fit neatly into either intellectual current.  He retained a strong rural bias, and the 
National Council episode of a few years earlier showed that his interaction with 
more thoughtful business leaders did not guarantee support for his brand of 
developmentalism.   
 
Page’s divergence from new post-war intellectual trends was a factor in his 
difficulty in coping with changes in the conduct of government, especially the 
role of the Commonwealth public service.  The first post-1945 annual report of 
the Commonwealth Public Service Board recognised a wartime shift in the 
functions of government from “regulation” to more “positive and constructive 
responsibilities.”45  Stuart Macintyre, the foremost historian of post-war 
reconstruction, sees the wartime increase in central direction as having 
required stronger economic and other policy skills in the federal bureaucracy, 
leading to “an influx of younger, university-trained officers drawn from the 
networks in which the schemes of social meliorism and rational improvement 
were nurtured.”46  Stephen Alomes similarly notes that the war brought into 
government intellectual figures from business and the professions who were 
                                                             
43 Reported in the Daily Examiner, 1 November 1945, p. 3. 
44 Walter in Head and Walter, op. cit., especially pp. 244-63. 
45 Quoted in Nicholas Brown, ‘The Seven Dwarfs: A Team of Rivals’, in Furphy, op. cit., p. 20.   
46 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 471.  On the pre-war public service, 
see L.F. Crisp, ‘Politics and the Commonwealth Public Service” in R.N. Spann and G.R. 
Curnow, Public Policy and Administration in Australia: A Reader, Wiley, Sydney, 1975, pp. 187-
8.    
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associated with the Australian Institute of Political Science and the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, but that in the post-war years they were largely 
surpassed by the rise of a more skilled public service, including a powerful 
Treasury Department.47   
 
These changes resulted in a government with a very different way of analysing 
issues than Page’s instinctive approach.  Major departments now boasted an 
intelligentsia of economics-trained staff committed not only to Keynesian theory 
and a planning-orientated world view, but also the rigorous assessment of 
project proposals.  Even before the war, outspoken young Australian academic 
economists were ahead of most of their international counterparts in taking a 
close interest in macroeconomic demand management.48  The new post-war 
cohort of young economists had backgrounds quite unlike that of Page.  
Coombs himself had studied at the London School of Economics, and in post-
war Canberra he built a powerful personal network of university-trained 
economists, bankers and policy-orientated public servants, including R.C. Mills, 
Douglas Copland, Leslie Melville, John Crawford, L.F. Giblin and Trevor 
Swan.49   
 
Page had little empathy with this style of public service: he preferred advisors 
who validated his own predispositions.  He supported a certain efficiency in 
resource allocation, as reflected in his cautious approach to tariffs, but 
repeatedly rejected discouraging findings about the likely returns on 
hydroelectric projects and doubts about the planned decentralisation of 
industry.  Page favoured expenditure on public works but mainly to provide 
rural infrastructure and advance his vision of decentralisation.  He was 
attracted only to those economists, such as Roland Wilson, with a strong 
interest in development and long-term growth.  (Wilson was Commonwealth 
Statistician for most of this immediate post-war period, during which he 
continued to support planning but in a limited sense of co-ordinating the many 
                                                             
47 See Steven Alomes, ‘Intellectuals and Publicists 1920s to 1940s’ in Head and Walter, op. cit., 
pp. 70-87.  
48 Millmow in Furphy, op. cit., p. 53. 
49 Walter, What Were They Thinking?, op. cit., pp. 181, 183-4. 
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forms of government policy intervention now in play).50  Page remained driven 
by his deep emotional commitment to regionalism and decentralisation, rather 
than openness to new intellectual trends that placed these goals within 
inclusive social policies and over-arching economic management.  His wartime 
diary details many meetings with important public figures in Britain but makes 
no mention of Keynes or his acolytes.   
 
Changes in the conduct of government were also given an institutional basis by 
Australia being one of the few nations to draw together all the pressing policy 
challenges of these years – issues as diverse as demobilisation, conversion of 
munitions production, housing shortages, immigration, new social welfare and 
education – under the one label of post-war reconstruction.51  The Department 
of Post-War Reconstruction was established in December 1942 to provide 
policy oversight, with Chifley as minister.  It initially oversaw the planning of a 
more productive and equitable economy through an array of special expert 
commissions of inquiry, notably the Rural Reconstruction Commission, the 
Commonwealth Housing Commission and the Secondary Industries 
Commission.  The Department was to guide and co-ordinate these 
investigations and then draw on their findings in formulating policy for 
implementation by line agencies.  As these various planning and policy 
commissions progressively completed their work, they were replaced by 
divisions of the Department, including regional and rural divisions.  This all 
made Post-War Reconstruction a small but powerfully placed agency, and the 
foremost target of Page’s lobbying.  (Coombs failed to establish instead an 
outright Department of Economic Planning).52   
 
Page was frustrated but undeterred by his exclusion from a formal role in post-
war reconstruction.  As will be seen, he was still successful in pushing issues 
onto the Commonwealth government’s agenda by his persistent lobbying.  He 
also appealed to public and elite opinion through non-governmental forums and 
the media, and maintained an occasional presence amongst elements of the 
                                                             
50 Selwyn Cornish, ‘Sir Roland Wilson – Primus Inter Pares’, in Furphy, op. cit., pp. 135-6. 
51 Macintyre, ‘The Post-War Reconstruction Project’, op. cit., p. 32.  
52 Ibid., pp. 36, 46-7; Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 142. 
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diverse milieu of post-war developmentalist thinkers.  Page provided among the 
broadest of visions for the post-war nation by linking co-operative federalism, 
decentralisation, higher education, hydroelectricity, planning and regionalism, 
and by proposing emulation of the famed Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 
which had assumed “totemic significance” in the post-war world.53   
 
Page’s attempt to engage with the open policy process of the Rural 
Reconstruction Commission proved an early instance of his difficulties with 
post-war expert studies.  Wartime broadened direct Commonwealth regulation 
of primary industry, often by drawing on special powers that would have been 
politically unacceptable in peacetime.  Persistently low prices for primary 
products throughout the preceding decade had encouraged an array of debt 
relief, financial assistance and dual pricing schemes that delayed adjustments 
and modernisation by propping up small, non-mechanised producers.54  The 
Rural Reconstruction Commission was established in 1942 amidst the wartime 
loss of markets and shortages of essential materials and labour that suggested 
a bleak outlook for rural industries.  Page appears to have assumed that the 
Commission would empathise with his views.  In practice, it proved to be an 
independent-minded inquiry dominated by the banker C.R. Lambert and the 
agricultural scientist Samuel Wadham, with less input from fellow 
commissioners who included Page’s former departmental head, J.F. Murphy.   
 
The Commission drew on economic advice and made many compromises.   
The Bureau of Agricultural Research, under the direction of John Crawford, 
drafted its submissions to Cabinet and the AAC vetted Commission reports 
prior to their publication.55  The Commission approached agriculture as 
essentially an industry like any other, and so should also be subject to 
considerations of scale and efficiency.  Government support should not be 
based on subsidisation that made farmers mendicants, but rather should stress 
aiding skilled and enterprising producers such as by offering technical advice 
                                                             
53 Cullather, op. cit., p. 120.  
54 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., pp. 161-2. 
55 Troy Whitford and Don Boadle, ‘Australia's Rural Reconstruction Commission, 1943-46: A 
Reassessment’, Australian Journal of History and Politics, vol. 54, issue 4, December 2008, pp. 
532-3.  
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and social amenities.56  Most of the Commission’s recommendations required 
action by the states, not the Commonwealth.57  Amongst the numerous 
underscored passages in Page’s personal copy of the Commission’s third 
report, on land utilisation and farm settlement, is a glowing assessment of the 
DMC as “a most beneficial influence by curbing the exuberance of many 
proposals.”58  But he would have been gravely disappointed by the 
Commission’s failure to call unambiguously for revival of a similar such body.  It 
instead vaguely recommended “detailed machinery for co-ordination of public 
works” to “ensure that productive capacity is correlated to prospective market 
demands.”59  This evident compromise matches comments about differences 
between the commissioners and with the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction on how to implement Commonwealth-state co-operation on 
long-term policy planning.  Wadham, critic of the AAC’s Standing Committee, 
thought that rural people would reject expert planners and instead proposed 
leadership by selected progressive famers.60   
 
Page’s bids to lead post-war co-operative federalism, regionalism and 
higher education 
 
Page’s efforts to influence the Commonwealth government’s post-war 
reconstruction strategies focussed on federalism, regionalism, higher education 
and the Clarence River.  His ideas had enough overlap with the government’s 
post-war vision for it at least to understand and formally respond to his many 
entreaties, but through a veil of refusal to share power with him.  
 
Changes in modes of policy formulation and the rise of nationally-led planning 
had significant implications for attitudes to federalism.  A majority view emerged 
favouring centralism, which left Page playing an important contrary role as 
advocate of a co-operative federalism that institutionalised Commonwealth and 
                                                             
56 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., pp. 149-50, 168-73. 
57 A.W. Martin and Janet Penny, ‘The Rural Reconstruction Commission, 1943-47’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 29, 2, 1983, pp. 219, 222.      
58 Rural Reconstruction Commission, Third Report, Land Utilisation and Farm Settlement, The 
Commission, Canberra, 1944, p. 93.   
59 Ibid., pp. 93, 97.   
60 Whitford and Boadle, op. cit., pp. 531-4. 
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state policy collaboration.  The dominant intellectual attitude to federalism was 
that total Commonwealth ascendancy over the states was inevitable and 
desirable, as set out in the fullest contemporary study, the historian Gordon 
Greenwood’s 1946 The Future of Australian Federalism.61  Greenwood 
considered federalism merely a stage on the way to a concentration of political 
power that matched the nation’s growing economic unification, albeit with 
scope remaining to delegate policy implementation to the local level.  
Reminiscent as this was of Page’s own national policy-regional implementation 
split, Greenwood otherwise assailed co-operative federalism as “dilatory and 
ineffective” despite having been given a “fair trial.”62   
 
Active support for co-operative federalism did not extend much beyond Page 
and his confirmed admirers, such as Drummond.63  At the 1942 Constitutional 
Convention Page had proposed Commonwealth-state co-ordinating councils 
that would elevate development to a national imperative, and “the whole 
administration of this huge business organisation could be withdrawn from 
politics altogether.”64  These would “either induce the states to place definite 
agreed-on powers in the Constitution into the hands of the Commonwealth, or 
some agreement as to what parts of each of these subjects should be handled 
by the Commonwealth would be arrived at.”  Page even suggested “a 
permanent organisation” for determining state and Commonwealth powers, and 
harked back to his National Council idea of 1938-39.65   
 
After the 1944 referendum, Page increasingly turned to public appeals via the 
popular press.  He portrayed successful co-operative mechanisms ranging from 
the Loan Council down to the River Murray Commission as collectively 
establishing an unanswerable case for institutionalised co-operation across 
                                                             
61 Galligan, op. cit., p. 59. 
62 Gordon Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism: A Commentary on the Working of 
the Constitution, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1946, pp. 298-9, 303-4. 
63 Drummond had long concurred with Page on this and other issues.  In his 1933 lectures 
collectively entitled Australian Problems of Government: Federation vs. Unification, Drummond 
called the Loan Council “a striking indication of what can be achieved by this type of machinery” 
and proposed a national planning council of education ministers.  See David Drummond, 
Australian Problems of Government: Federation vs. Unification, Armidale, c. 1934, pp. 15-6; 
and Drummond, The Future of Education in Australia, Armidale, 1954, pp. 9-11. 
64 ‘Sir Earle Page – Constitutional Convention, Canberra, 1/12/42’, EPP, folder 888.   
65 Speech by Page to Constitutional Convention, 26 November 1942, EPP, folder 888. 
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finance, industrial policy, transport and power generation: effectively “a Cabinet 
of governments.”66  (Page in one post-war speech even made a Wellsian 
reference to federalism as a basis for eventual “world government”).67  Coombs 
noted a pattern of the Commonwealth using its financial powers to set post-war 
policy and then leaving implementation to state governments, but considered 
this a regrettable necessity following the Commonwealth’s failure to secure the 
necessary constitutional authority for itself.68 
 
Two other great Page passions proved more central than co-operative 
federalism to Commonwealth post-war reconstruction policy – regionalism and 
decentralisation.  The mid-forties marked the high point of official and 
intellectual interest in these concepts.  The policies of the Chifley government 
bore distinct similarities to Page’s views of a generation earlier, albeit amid 
differences on whether regional entities should have sovereign status.  In the 
1920s and 1930s such causes had mainly been driven by new statism, with 
Page the main figure to look further towards nationwide change.  As the post-
war period loomed, support for regionalism and decentralisation broadened 
beyond the Country Party-linked elite Page knew so well.  It attracted not just 
the policy-orientated intellectuals with which Australia now abounded such as 
Bland (now a convert to new states) and MacDonald Holmes, but increasingly 
also more technocratic government-based supporters such as Coombs.   
 
Page’s sense of personally owning regionalism and decentralisation led him to 
expect a commensurately major role in their implementation.  He used the 
press to help spread the widespread perception in Australia that the TVA stood 
for regional planning at its best, drawing credibility from actually having visited 
the TVA, including when en route home in July 1942.  After his return, he called 
for intermediate level regional bodies to sit between the Commonwealth and 
the states, “unifying the principles of local knowledge and initiative with those of 
                                                             
66 Page, ‘Federal State Conflict – Co-operation Needed for Effective Government,’ in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1945, p. 2; also speech to Constitutional Association of 
New South Wales, Sydney, 13 September 1948, copy at EPP, folder 1033.  Bland was the 
Association’s Vice-President. 
67 Page speech to Constitutional Association of New South Wales, Sydney, ibid.  H.G. Wells 
had long been the foremost advocate of a united world government.  
68 Coombs, op. cit., pp. 59-60, 62. 
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central supervision and assistance.”69  The TVA was the model by which 
Australia could “follow the American example of establishing regional 
organisations which control physical and geographical units which often may 
involve handling parts of different states”, such as northern New South Wales 
and southern Queensland, and the Murray and Snowy region.  Regional 
authorities would implement national policies determined by a Federal Power 
Commission, a Federal Water Commission and a Ministry of Food.70  Page 
also wanted greatly expanded tied Commonwealth grants to finance big 
projects that the states could not implement alone, such as airports and rural 
electrification, as “federal aid unites skilfully the principles of local initiative and 
central supervision.”71  His enthusiasm evinced his not infrequent unawareness 
of how others might not be quite so moved by his visions: in December 1944 he 
made an international radio broadcast to the people of wartime Britain and the 
US on water and power issues on the north coast of New South Wales.72   
 
Page’s expectation of receptiveness to his ideas on decentralisation and 
regionalism ignored fundamental differences between his world view and that 
of the Commonwealth government.  He thought that decentralisation had been 
encouraged by the wartime siting of munitions factories in country towns and 
the application of “an Australian uniform rate book” to the transport of 
government goods by rail that overcame the centralised focus of rail systems.  
(Page had long argued that differential rail freight rates channelled trade to 
capital cities rather than “natural outlets”.73)  But contemporary official accounts 
instead attributed the elevation of decentralisation and regional planning into 
the policy mainstream to the federal government’s conduct of the war effort.  In 
its 1949 monograph Regional Planning in Australia, the Department of Post-
War Reconstruction pointed to the precedent of the wartime regional 
organisation of government administration.74  It also credited Curtin with being 
                                                             
69 Page in the Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1945, p. 2. 
70 Page speech ‘Australian Power and Water Development,’ 16 June 1945, EPP, folder 1205. 
71 Page in the Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1945, p. 2. 
72 EPP, folder 1077.  
73 ‘History of Decentralisation: Speech by Sir Earle Page’, in Decentralisation and New State 
Movement, Decentralisation and New State Movement Convention, Armidale, 1948, pp. 27, 34. 
74 Department of Post-War Reconstruction, Regional Planning in Australia: A History of 
Progress and Review of Regional Planning Activities Through the Commonwealth, Canberra 
1949, pp. vii, 1. Regionally-based structures were thought capable of continuing to function 
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impressed by a “marked tendency” for local councils to propose projects for 
their respective regions.  The Department’s enthusiasm for community as a 
basis for a new social order took further inspiration from the co-operative efforts 
of the South Australian town Nuriootpa to provide local facilities to help retain 
its young residents.75  Coombs recalled other influences, including the TVA, 
writers such as Lewis Mumford and the Rural Reconstruction Commission’s 
stress on the local provision of rural amenities.  “It is difficult in retrospect”, he 
wrote, “to recapture the intellectual excitement which these ideas generated.”76  
Coombs’s Department reissued an Army Education Service Current Affairs 
Bulletin that condemned centralism as contributing to every social ill from 
housing shortages to “weakening of citizenship.”77 
 
In October 1944 Curtin proposed to all six Premiers an ambitious programme of 
co-operative regionalisation to promote decentralisation and national security.  
The states would define regional boundaries and survey local resources, then 
form “representative regional advisory bodies.”78  These were to collectively 
create a national network of 97 Regional Development Committees, through 
each of which state and local government representatives and other nominees 
would prepare local development plans.  Curtin identified the Murray Valley, 
Newcastle and the Northern Territory as deserving particular attention – not the 
Clarence Valley.79  His government was claiming the decentralisation-
regionalisation concept as its own: its public pronouncements ignored Page, 
the Country Party and new state movements.  (Nor was there reference, it 
appears, to antecedents in the ALP’s pre-war platform).  Curtin’s regionalism, 
however, gained only limited political traction.  Committees were formed in just 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
following the disruption of central command.  Michael Howard adds that the first use of regional 
planning in a post-war context was at the inaugural meeting of the Reconstruction Sub-
Committee on Public Works in May 1942; see his Advocacy and Resistance: The Question of a 
Post-war Commonwealth Government Role in Community Facilities, Town Planning and 
Regional Planning, 1939-52, Urban Research Unit Working Paper No. 9, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1988, p. 21.  The concept also received support from the Commonwealth 
Housing Commission in its 1944 Final Report, see Howard, pp. 22-3.  
75 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., pp. 195-8; see also Coombs, op. cit., p. 
61. 
76 Coombs, ibid., pp. 59-60, 62. 
77 Australian Army Education Service, Current Affairs Bulletin, Regionalism, no date but c. 
1945; copy in Ellis papers NLA, MS 1006, Box 13, folder 35. 
78 Regional Planning in Australia, op. cit., pp. viii, 13. 
79 Ibid., p. 1.  
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Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania, and remained strictly advisory 
bodies that failed to gain the full commitment of state governments or local 
councils.80   
 
Another problem for Page was that widening interest in regionalism and 
decentralisation presented him with a far more diverse range of motivators and 
goals to navigate than had the Country Party-dominated agitation of the inter-
war years.  He would have applauded the call by F.K. Maher and J.I. Sullivan in 
a 1946 booklet for “vigorous, self-governing regions”, “severe limitations” on 
construction in the big cities and the harnessing of river systems (which noted 
Page’s efforts concerning the Clarence.81)  But the Methodist Page was not 
part of the lively strand of Catholic regionalist thought with which Maher was 
closely associated through the National Secretariat for Catholic Action that he 
headed with B.A. Santamaria.  Catholic social theorists were attracted by the 
religiosity of rural communities, hence the National Catholic Rural Movement 
advocating “the spiritual restoration of the country” through rural settlement.82  
 
More secular intellectual support for decentralisation appeared in such journals 
as Current Affairs Bulletin and Australian Quarterly.83  The diversity of interest 
was reflected in the range of speakers at a string of major conferences that 
addressed decentralisation, notably a January 1948 AIPS conference at 
Armidale, a New South Wales Local Government Association “Local 
Government School” of August 1948 and an All-Australian Federal Convention 
on constitutional change held in Sydney in July 1949.  Participants included 
Bland, Harold Nicholas (the same of the Boundaries Royal Commission), Alex 
Gibson, Richard Windeyer, MacDonald Holmes, H.L. Harris, Drummond and 
Bruxner.  Page spoke on new states at the All-Australian Federal Convention.  
Most intellectual supporters of decentralisation linked regionalism to national 
                                                             
80 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., pp. 414-5. 
81 F.K. Maher and J.I. Sullivan, Regionalism in Australia, Araluen Publishing Company, 
Melbourne 1946, pp. 3, 45, 46. 
82 Gerard Henderson, Mr. Santamaria and the Bishops, St Patrick's College, Manly, 1982, p. 
57; for Maher see the website of the Australian Catholic Historical Society, 
www.australiancatholichistoricalsociety.com.au/timeline/timeline3.html 
83 See for example ‘Industries for the Country’ in Current Affairs Bulletin, 11 April 1949; and E.J. 
Tapp, ‘Decentralisation and the Individual’ in Australian Quarterly, June 1948, pp. 82-90.  
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and regional planning but some, including Bland and Gibson, saw it as a 
counter to centralised political control.  Page’s packaging of federal units with 
strong national government made it hard for him to use this increasingly Cold 
War-influenced argument.84  Interest in decentralisation also contributed to a 
modest revival in new statism.  The New England movement reappeared in 
June 1948 when a new organisation was established at Armidale presided over 
by Phillip Wright, a local grazier and prominent Country Party member.  In 
March 1949 Premier Ned Hanlon of Queensland raised the subdivision of his 
home state, and a new local movement appeared at Townsville.  Soon after, 
Premier Thomas Hollway of Victoria suggested a new state based on 
Gippsland and south-eastern NSW.85   
 
Page contributed at least indirectly to this renewed interest in regionalism and 
decentralisation by having helped maintain such ideas in political discourse 
since the last revival in the early 1930s.  Although most 1940s proponents 
worked to community-oriented agendas more directly orientated to addressing 
rural poverty than Page’s grander nation-wide vision, some nonetheless 
matched particular ideas he had publicised nationally over decades.  At the 
AIPS conference, Harris was conceptually closest to Page’s ideas about the 
potential of decentralisation to draw out the best social qualities.  It would, he 
said, lead to “a heightened social consciousness and a quickening of the 
community spirit with new standards and values and richer personalities.”86  A 
1944 booklet published by the Institution of Engineers echoed Page’s National 
                                                             
84 Bland, now well-established as Australia’s leading scholar of public administration, became 
especially outspoken on inserting regional administrative entities between local and state 
governments so as to counter centralism.  Gibson saw strong state and regional authorities as 
“sure means by which the effect of centralised power and industrial concentration can be 
obviated.”  See F.A. Bland, ‘Post-War Constitutional Reconstruction’, The Institute of Public 
Administration, vol. 2, no. 3, September-December 1940, pp. 136-55; ‘Towards Regionalism’, 
The Institute of Public Administration, vol. 4, no. 8, December 1943, pp. 379-85; and 
‘Decentralization – the Machinery of Government’ in H.L. Harris, H.S. Nicholas, F.A. Bland, A. 
Mainerd and T. Hytten, Decentralization, Angus and Robertson in conjunction with the 
Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, 1948, pp. 67-120.  For Gibson, see ‘The 
Implications of Decentralisation,’ in Decentralisation and New State Movement Convention, 
Decentralisation and New State Movement, Armidale Convention, June 1948, op. cit., pp. 7, 10. 
85 See Farrell, ‘Opting Out and Opting In’, op. cit., p. 148, and Ellis, A History of the Australian 
Country Party, op. cit., p. 277. 
86 Harris added that decentralisation was “essentially a population policy directed to the 
preservation of the race and to the improvement of its quality”, a racial cast that Page did not 
employ: H.L. Harris et al., Decentralization, op. cit., pp. 18, 20.     
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Council by proposing the nation’s division into six regions, all overseen by a 
National Planning Authority working with regional planning commissions.87  
Even Maher and Sullivan upheld the link between decentralisation and planning 
by recommending the use of freight schemes, tariffs and electrification as 
planning tools, much as Page had proposed.88   
 
By the immediate post-war period, three decades of disappointment had made 
Page alert to opportunities to broaden his case for decentralisation and 
regionalisation.  His major statements reflected the post-war interest in regional 
equity in social amenities.  In his foremost speech of this period on new states, 
delivered in June 1948 to a convention in Armidale, Page declared that 
decentralisation would “give equal opportunity to all Australian citizens in 
facilities of education, culture and health, in security of work for their families, in 
professional and business careers and in the provision of domestic amenities.”  
Page became increasingly prone to quoting selectively from major intellectual 
figures: his Armidale speech drew on Mumford’s writings on self-governing 
political units large enough (as Page put it) to “embrace a sufficient range of 
interests and small enough to keep these interests in focus and make them a 
subject of direct collective concern.”89  With the advent of the Cold War, Page 
again employed defence-related arguments.  “Australia’s great need,” he told 
the All-Australian Federal Convention (convened by Bland’s New South Wales 
Constitutional League), “is to get enough people quickly to develop her latent 
resources and thus ensure the defence of our Continent,” for which “local self-
government by the creation of new states with consequent acceleration of local 
development is the real answer.”90 
 
The higher quality debate on regionalism helped develop Page’s own ideas.  
He had long been neither clear nor consistent about how he defined a viable 
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region for a new state or federal unit.  But in speeches during 1945 he referred 
their being defined by common farming conditions and similar “agricultural, 
scientific and research problems” of water, irrigation and fodder conservation.91  
His new federal units were also to include those parts of large states that were 
too distant to be governed effectively from an existing state capital.  Page 
specified several regions as particularly suited for regional development, 
namely the Murray Valley, southern, central and northern Queensland, and 
northern and central New South Wales.92  In 1949 he spoke of a prospective 
eighteen new states as the beginning of a process of national subdivision into 
smaller units.  He made clearer than ever his disdain for the “boa-contractor” of 
the big city, beset by “all sorts of social diseases,” and proposed towns of from 
30,000 up to 250,000 inhabitants.93   
 
Decentralisation and regionalisation still struggled to be actually implemented 
even in this post-war period when the political portents had initially seemed 
good.  The dwindling of fears of a post-war slump removed the sense of 
urgency: gradually policy debate shifted away from regionalism and planning 
towards the politically popular dismantling of government controls.  One 
casualty was enthusiasm for the TVA, an example of Page’s tendency to leave 
drawbacks to be pointed out by others.  William McKell, Labor Premier of New 
South Wales since 1941 and a decentralisation enthusiast, visited the TVA in 
1945 and publicly pronounced it “not generally adaptable to Australian 
conditions.”  Far from being the strong sovereign body of legend, the TVA 
received considerable federal funding and its regional powers were limited 
essentially to planning and research.94  Significantly for Page’s post-war role, 
McKell’s findings were quoted at length in the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction’s Regional Planning in Australia.95  Coombs himself later 
admitted that wartime interest in community-led regionalisation eventually 
                                                             
91 Speech entitled ‘Australian power and water development’, 1945, EPP, folder 1994 (i).   
92 Speech of 19 June 1945 to the House, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, p. 3270.  
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dwindled to a more prosaic emphasis on local administrative efficiency and the 
delivery of specific projects.  Regional planning, he said, “flew in the face of the 
logic of the developing world economic system”, which was “destroying the 
economic cohesion of regional economies.”96  
      
Another post-war policy field in which Page similarly attempted to engage with 
a surge in interest but then encountered an unfavourable political environment 
was higher education.  Post-war reconstruction saw Australia’s first extensive 
public debates on the role of universities.  Attitudes to tertiary education 
changed greatly during the 1940s as the Commonwealth began funding 
universities as a national investment.97  Commonwealth grants for universities 
dated from 1936, but it was Curtin who in 1943 signalled a major commitment 
to widening access to tertiary education by establishing the Universities 
Commission to supervise the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme 
for returned servicemen and women.   
 
The wider – and lively – post-war debate on universities is a further instance of 
Page’s views being so strongly tied to decentralisation and regionalism that 
they veered far from the mainstream.  During the war, Australian universities for 
the first time played a major practical public role by providing technical support 
for the war effort, such as in controlling malaria and manufacturing gun sights.98  
Tension developed between casting universities as bastions of civilising 
knowledge, or whether they should be reorientated towards a vocational role 
that addressed the goals of post-war reconstruction, as encouraged by 
Coombs.99  Page sought to influence this emerging debate by proposing a 
unique alternative to the expansion of existing metropolitan universities.  He 
does not appear to have been drawn to the view, common today, that the main 
merit of rural universities was the direct boosting of economic prospects in their 
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immediate regions.100  Instead, he drew on his ideals of decentralisation and 
institutional scale to stretch narrower agendas by proposing that universities 
serve as tools of social construction.  This was a fine example of how widely he 
could apply his basic views to produce a coherent alternative to the mainstream 
of opinion.   
 
Page set out his vision of higher education in his May 1945 contribution to the 
parliamentary debate on the Re-establishment and Employment Bill to support 
the education of returned servicemen and women.  Returnees should not be 
relegated “to large universities or big technical colleges, where they are 
regarded more or less as ciphers or numbers instead of personalities, [which] 
may wreck their whole future individual life and their value to the nation.”  They 
should instead be directed to small institutions such as the New England and 
Canberra University Colleges, “where much more personal and intimate 
contact is made with the teachers.”  (Page recalled here how during his medical 
studies he was one of only nineteen students).  He joined calls for the 
Commonwealth to take a firmer lead on funding universities and other levels of 
education via a central controlling body.101  An adjunct here was Page’s 
interest in a proposed national university in Canberra.  This should also be cast 
as a small residential institution, which could train diplomats and “make certain 
that boys and girls shall be able to obtain a first-class knowledge of 
international affairs.”102     
 
Page’s perception of education as a means of social engineering implies a 
certain faith in human malleability.  No more effusive statement of this exists 
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than the prescription for secondary schooling he presented to the June 1947 
Macleay River Teachers’ Association Educational Conference.  To Page, “a 
district high school is a wonderful instrument” to “mould the lives of students, 
influence the destiny of districts and, thereby, control the fate of the nation.”  
His ideal school would have “noble buildings and grounds of ample proportion.”  
Curricula must create the “groundwork of understanding” via rural, technical 
and cultural strands.  The school library should impart “a love of books that will 
carry on to adult life.”  All country high schools should offer free 
accommodation to help “build a community spirit and interest in the school and 
the industries of the district.”  Young men and women would “get to know one 
another in a way that is not possible at present.”  Children from local towns 
would experience “a year or two of practical life on the land.”103  As he recorded 
in notes for another speech on education, “I have thought of everything and 
everything fits in its place.”104    
 
Some support for Page’s vision came mainly from that hotbed of decentralism, 
New England.  In 1948 the Warden of New England University College, J.P. 
Belshaw, wrote in favour of residential institutions that used the tutorial system 
and reached out to local regions.  A.J. Greenhalgh of Armidale Teachers 
College called for state-run boarding schools where rural students could 
overcome the population dispersal that otherwise rendered rural area schools 
impractical.105  But more prominent in national debate were a series of eleven 
widely read booklets issued by the influential Australian Council for Educational 
Research over 1943 to 1946. These were collectively entitled The Future of 
Education and reflect how singular Page’s views on decentralised education 
were.  Authors included such city-based academic figures as John Medley, 
Vice-Chancellor of Melbourne University, the historian John La Nauze and Eric 
Ashby of Sydney University Botany Department, who would become a prolific 
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author on higher education.106  Despite touching on many fundamental 
educational issues, they only fleetingly addressed Page’s agenda.  Ashby’s 
Universities in Australia was an articulate defence of the traditional concept of a 
university which just passingly referred to founding junior colleges in country 
towns to teach matriculation.  He was lukewarm about the practicality of rural 
universities, and rejected residential universities outright.107  Page would also 
have been disappointed by the Rural Reconstruction Commission’s coverage 
of education.  It offered only qualified support for rural high schools and said 
little about tertiary education beyond concluding that more than one university 
in each state was “unrealistic”, while conceding some scope for rural university 
colleges.108   
 
Page again champions hydroelectricity: the Snowy versus the Clarence  
 
In the latter half of the 1940s, Page’s interaction with the Chifley government 
narrowed to focus on hydroelectricity and the damming of the Clarence River.  
This drew out his vision of post-war reconstruction to the fullest, but also his 
frustration that the Clarence did not feature centrally in Commonwealth policy.  
It nonetheless became the post-war reconstruction issue on which he had the 
most influence on government.  Page’s success in keeping this project under 
Commonwealth consideration and, to a lesser extent, that of two states is a 
case study of his undaunted persistence and tactical flexibility.  Without Page, 
the Clarence would almost certainly have faded entirely in the face of criticisms 
by engineers and rivalry from the more glamorous and promising Snowy 
proposal.  Post-war reconstruction presented Page with his best ever chance of 
getting this treasured project up and running, aided by the Commonwealth’s 
fear that it needed major public works projects on hand to create employment 
should the post-war economic boom falter.     
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Page foresaw early that post-war reconstruction could create an opportunity for 
the Clarence region.  In October 1943 he convened a meeting of state and 
federal parliamentarians, including Drummond and Bruxner, at Parliament 
House Sydney to discuss northern electrification.109  They were especially 
interested in having a new transmission line link Newcastle, the Nymboida and 
Brisbane, and in August 1944 McKell agreed to have the Railways 
Department’s power station at Newcastle connected to the Nymboida facility by 
a 66,000 volt transmission line.110  This marks Page’s only major practical 
success in rural electrification other than the establishment of the Nymboida 
station in 1923.   
 
Page had many obstacles to overcome before the Clarence River could be 
exploited.  Proposals to harness the Snowy had a longer provenance, dating 
back to an irrigation proposal of 1884.111  Debate during the 1930s indicates 
that although Page’s ideas about hydroelectricity had gained some acceptance 
in the Country Party, much of this was channelled into support for the Snowy.  
His parliamentary deputy Thomas Paterson told the Snowy River Hydroelectric 
Scheme Conference of November 1936 that electricity was “perhaps the most 
important factor in your civilisation,” and attributed the success of the Nymboida 
to a flat rate “for farm and factory alike.”  But he spoke primarily of the Snowy, 
stressing its potential to encourage industrial development east of the Great 
Dividing Range (encompassing his electorate of Gippsland.112)  The Snowy 
also had a clear edge amongst professional engineers.  Gibson wrote in his 
1929 report on power development that the Clarence had the disadvantage of 
requiring the construction of large storage reservoirs.113  The president of the 
Institution of Engineers reported that the Clarence and the Nymboida were 
estimated to be capable of generating only a tenth of the hydroelectric power 
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available in the Australian Alps.114  Most media reports from the 1930s and 
early 1940s on Australia’s water resources failed even to mention the 
Clarence.115   
 
To-day, the Snowy Mountains Scheme is commonly presented as the prime 
contrast between post-war nation building and a latter-day absence of national 
foresight.  Page became very aware of a growing possibility that this project 
would leave no room for the Clarence, and fought accordingly.  Although he 
only occasionally directly criticised the Snowy – it was still a regional 
hydroelectric initiative, after all – what support he proffered was always highly 
qualified, especially as he doubted its breadth of regional and national vision.  
He asserted that the Clarence could provide a starting point for a national grid 
by linking Sydney, Newcastle and Brisbane.  The Clarence would be focussed 
on power generation, whereas there was division over whether the Snowy 
would be primarily for irrigation or for electricity.116  In 1958, by which time the 
Snowy had long been under way, he told the House that the project “will lose its 
true significance if the water and power is not used to achieve that 
decentralised development in adjoining districts which is vital to the survival of 
the Australian nation.”117   
 
Page’s post-war vision of hydroelectricity came to incorporate three main 
strategies – local oversight by powerful regional authorities, national planning, 
and using The Gorge project on the Clarence as the start point for a nationwide 
network of hydroelectric dams.  This national synthesis readily distinguished 
him from innumerable other boosters of local projects.  He spoke of how better 
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for a nationwide power scheme and that the Clarence would not be forgotten; see 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 22 June 1949, pp. 1351-8. 
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land use via the utilisation of water and electricity could support a national 
population of 20 million, leading to the “stabilisation of the land industries on a 
reproductive basis.”  A unified national electricity grid would also have a 
fundamental social value, by “giving the whole of the north of New South Wales 
and southern Queensland and, in time, the whole of Australia, a high common 
factor of mutual interest that must bind us together and help us all to 
appreciate, understand and sympathise with each other’s local problems.”118  
Page again tied such ideas to the wider imperatives of the times by exploiting 
fears of war and famine, observing that development of the Clarence under a 
regional authority “would aid that essential factor to permanent world peace – 
good food, and plenty of it.”119  Since his time in London, Page had frequently 
dwelt on how food security could contribute to international stability, linking this 
to guaranteed prices for producers and surveys of nutritional needs.  Such 
ideas had wide support, including from two figures well known to Page, Stanley 
Bruce and the Australian trade adviser in London, F.L. McDougall.120   
 
On local oversight, Page foresaw that development of the Clarence “should be 
undertaken by a governmental partnership consisting of the Commonwealth, 
New South Wales and Queensland Governments, combined with a regional 
authority” that was “clothed with sufficient power to handle effectively all the 
powers that this huge development would involve.”121  As the Australian federal 
system had a “blind spot” where no clear state or federal powers applied, a 
Clarence Valley Authority was needed, “on all fours with the Tennessee 
authority.”  Australia should emulate American initiative to “annihilate the 
distances of space and time, and to bring the amenities of modern civilisation to 
the most remotely situated peoples in our land.”122  Page complemented his 
appeals to governments with public proselytising, an increasingly common 
practice of his during this politically-challenged stage of his career.  He detailed 
                                                             
118 ‘Dr. Earle Page’s Prescription for National Health & Development’, op. cit.  
119 Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, op. cit., introduction and p. 1. 
120 See for example Page’s speech to the House recorded in Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, 14 September 1944, pp. 836-7.  On Bruce and McDougall as advocates of food’s role 
in post-war peace see Lee, op. cit., pp. 168-70, 174-7.   
121 Earle Page, Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, op. cit., quotes from introduction.  
122 Broadcast by Page on 2NR (the ABC’s Grafton station), 17 December 1944, text at EPP 
folder 1077.  Page slightly earlier proposed a Clarence Valley Authority in a speech of June 
1944 to the Grafton Chamber of Commerce; see EPP, folder 1877 (ii).  
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this vision of a regionally-managed Clarence in his short but lavish 1944 book 
Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, replete with diagrams, 
photographs and maps.123  Page personally arranged its production and the 
distribution of scores of copies to ministers, government agencies, private 
companies, Australian embassies, libraries and Curtin himself.124   
 
On national planning, Page in 1944 foresaw a planned future Australia with a 
more densely settled countryside that required “a well-organised agricultural 
industry” supported by electricity, ample water and “a guaranteed payable price 
for their products.”  This necessitated guidance by planning authorities – his 
proposed Federal Power Commission, Federal Water Commission and Ministry 
of Food – but with electricity providing the catalyst.  Implementation of this 
planning-based strategy was to be carried out through an array of TVA-style 
regional authorities with full executive powers.125  The new national grid would 
encompass both hydro and thermal sources in exploiting “hitherto neglected, 
isolated power possibilities.”126   
 
Page’s vision for an Australia-wide network of hydroelectric dams was set out 
in separate but essentially consistent statements over the next few years.  The 
harnessing of the Nymboida back in 1923 had just been a stage one for the 
Clarence region, “to make the surrounding district electricity conscious.”  The 
second stage would be a 220 foot dam at The Gorge that could generate “over 
42,000 kilowatts continuously.”  To enable this, “an agreement for Clarence 
development with such wide regional and inter-state implications should be 
made between the Commonwealth, state and local governing authorities”, 
using “the pattern of the Migration Agreement between Australia and Britain.”127  
Damming the Clarence could be followed by a “nationwide drive” to develop the 
continent, starting with deploying army surveyors to assess regional water 
resources before constructing new dams and hydroelectric stations tied to a 
                                                             
123 Earle Page, Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, op. cit.  A map from this booklet 
showing Page’s proposed dam network is provided in chapter 1 of this thesis, figure 4.  
124 See for example Page to Curtin, 24 August 1944, NAA, A461; AK 423/1/1, Water and 
Electricity – General – Clarence River Hydro-Electric Development. 
125 Page speech ‘Australian Power and Water Development,’ 16 June 1945, EPP, folder 1205. 
126 Page, Clarence River Hydro-Electric Gorge Scheme, op. cit., p. 1. 
127 Public address by Page at Lismore, 6 June 1947, EPP, folder 874.   
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national grid.  All along the east coast, new railways would link inland power 
centres to deep sea ports, including one at the mouth of the Clarence.128  The 
spread of Page’s Clarence model was to be funded by profits from the sale of 
electricity generated by each new dam, helped by a federal levy to fund grants 
that covered fifty per cent of the construction costs of expanding rural 
transmission.129     
 
But persuading governments and experts posed a challenge for Page.  In 
1944-45 he had good grounds for hope, as the Commonwealth was beginning 
to cast around for public works projects to counteract the anticipated post-war 
slump.  He had no hesitation in approaching the highest levels of government, 
including the Prime Minister.  Curtin in March 1944 replied to Page 
noncommittally that the Clarence proposal was subject to prioritisation by the 
National Works Council and required state government support.130  In 
December, Page switched his attention to Chifley as Minister for Post-War 
Reconstruction, suggesting a joint expert study of the Clarence by the 
Commonwealth and state governments.131  Harry Brown, Commonwealth Co-
ordinator-General of Works, was so keen that his main concern was that a 
study undertaken by the states alone could delay “vitally urgent post-war public 
works programs”: perhaps the Commonwealth could instil momentum by 
offering to act as an impartial chair.132  Following Page’s approaches, Chifley 
wrote to the acting Premiers of New South Wales and of Queensland in May 
1945 proposing a joint study by the three governments.  He mentioned Page’s 
support and described the project as possibly “one of the most important in 
Australia,” relevant to the regional planning then being discussed with 
Premiers.133  Page simultaneously pursued the engineering profession.  In a 
rather technical speech to the Institution of Engineers, he predicted that the 
                                                             
128 ‘Dr. Earle Page’s Prescription for National Health & Development,’ op. cit.   
129 Press release ‘Full Development of the North Coast Rivers,’ August 1946, EPP, folder 1724.   
130 Curtin to Page, 15 March 1944; also ‘Collings’ to Page on behalf of the Prime Minister, 11 
July 1944, both EPP, folder 2086.  (Probably Senator Joseph Collings, Minister for the Interior). 
131 Page to Chifley, 2 December 1944, NAA, A9816; 1944/487 Part 1; Clarence River Hydro-
Electric Scheme by Sir Earle Page; see also Coombs to Harry Brown, Co-ordinator-General of 
Works, 19 January 1945, op. cit.   
132 Harry Brown to Coombs, 9 April 1945, ibid.; see also Coombs to Chifley, 12 April 1945, ibid.  
133 The acting Premiers were J.M. Baddeley of New South Wales and E.M. Hanlon of 
Queensland; Chifley letters of 18 May 1945, EPP, folder 1702.  
294 
 
problem of limited local demand of only about 20-25,000 kWh would be 
overcome by linking the Clarence to a national grid, under which it would sell 
50,000 kWh to Brisbane “at less than half a penny a unit.”134 
 
The federal system in practice proved a drag on Page’s national 
developmentalism.  Significantly for the Clarence’s prospects, he attracted 
more interest from Queensland, which stood to benefit most from the electricity 
generated, than from the river’s host state of New South Wales.135  Chifley’s 
appeal to the states elicited only rejection by both of Commonwealth 
involvement and a half-hearted commitment to conduct a short joint study of 
their own.136  This study in December 1945 merely concluded that a fuller 
technical assessment was needed.  The New South Wales-led inquiry that 
followed – the Clarence River Water Resources Investigation Committee, 
commonly called the Technical Committee – dragged on into 1951 as one of no 
less than seven expert post-war studies of the Clarence Valley in general or 
The Gorge in particular.  Each was properly cautious about consumer demand 
for a project of such scale: none provided the decisive endorsement Page 
sought.   
 
Yet it is also clear that Page’s persistence was keeping the Clarence at the 
forefront of high-level official attention, albeit amidst persistent doubts.  In May 
1946 Chifley’s successor as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, John 
Dedman, wrote to Page stating bluntly that a TVA-style authority was 
“undesirable” but adding that the Commonwealth remained interested in the 
Clarence.137  Dedman did not elaborate, but opposition from McKell would 
alone have rendered the TVA concept impractical.  The paradox now facing 
Page was that the unexpected persistence of the post-war boom was working 
against big new projects.  Far from unemployment being a problem, there were 
                                                             
134 Page speech to Institution of Engineers, April 1944, EPP, folder 2090 (day not given). 
135 The Chairman of the Queensland State Electricity Commission, S.F. Cochran, told Coombs 
in early 1945 that his state was “most interested” in Page’s Clarence proposal; letter to 
Coombs, 8 January 1945, NAA, A9816, 1944/487 Part 1, Clarence River Hydro-Electric 
Scheme by Sir Earle Page.     
136 See for example letters to Chifley from acting Premier Baddeley of 12 June 1945 and from 
Premier McKell of 20 November 1946 to Chifley, NAA, A461, AK 423/1/1, Water and Electricity 
– General – Clarence River Hydro-Electric Development.  
137 Dedman to Page, 23 May 1946 (writing on behalf of the Prime Minister), EPP, folder 2090. 
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shortages of labour and materials.  A year later the Commonwealth’s Controller 
of Electricity Supply, H.P. Moss, advised his departmental head in the Ministry 
of Munitions, John Jensen, that the Clarence proposal was still of interest but 
should be delayed until there was a need to alleviate unemployment or to cope 
with coal shortages.138  When “the feared unemployment following close on the 
transition did not eventuate,” Commonwealth interest in public works-based 
developmentalism dwindled, especially that which involved large, longer range 
projects.139       
 
Nor would Page have liked the Rural Reconstruction Commission’s mixed 
findings on electrification.  In its first report it had agreed that to help raise 
country living standards it “should be a national objective to give every farm 
which if not too remote an opportunity to use electricity at a cost which is 
comparable with that which prevails in the cities.”140  But in its seventh report, 
the Commission directly challenged the assumption that hydroelectricity would 
be cheaper than thermal generation.  It rejected uniform electricity tariffs as 
inequitable and also the extension of electricity to all farms, some of which 
were simply too isolated.141  In a continent as dry as Australia, human and 
animal consumption should have first claim on water use, followed by irrigation 
and only thirdly hydroelectricity.  As for the Clarence, the Commission paid far 
more attention to the Snowy and Ord Rivers.142  So disappointed was Page 
with the Rural Reconstruction Commission’s fleeting coverage of northern 
rivers that early in 1947 he invited the editors of 18 newspapers to join him on a 
grand tour of east coast rivers from the Brisbane to the Hunter.143  As they set 
off, Page assured the seven who accepted that “with your help, I am confident 
that wide public interest can be aroused in the vast scope of development 
which is possible in this richly endowed coastal area.”144  Four hailed from local 
                                                             
138 T. Murdoch on behalf of the Controller, Electricity Supply to Secretary, Ministry of Munitions, 
28 May 1947, NAA, MP61/1, 2/3/422, Clarence River Water Power Development.    
139 Coombs, op. cit., pp. 66-7.   
140 Rural Reconstruction Commission, First Report, A General Rural Survey, The Commission, 
Canberra, 1944, p. 46. 
141 Rural Reconstruction Commission, Seventh Report, op. cit., pp. 67, 73. 
142 Rural Reconstruction Commission, Eighth Report, Irrigation, Water Conservation and Land 
Drainage, The Commission, Canberra, 1945, pp. 24, 76. 
143 Page letters of 22 November 1946, EPP, folder 2105. 
144 Page in the Daily Examiner, 31 January 1947, p. 3, clipping in EPP, folder 2106.    
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newspapers in Page’s native northern New South Wales: only three joined from 
publications in other regions, the Courier-Mail and Telegraph from Brisbane, 
and the Newcastle Herald.   
 
As enthusiastic as ever, Page led his little band up and down the coast.  His 
Grafton Daily Examiner reported delegation members having “rowed, rode, 
slithered and slashed their way up to the seat of the proposed dam and 
hydroelectric station.”145  Social goals were still forefront: Page told the seven 
that “it would be impossible to keep the people of the country in the country 
unless they had the amenities offering in the cities, and this has been shown by 
the Nymboida.”146  One editor afterwards politely complained to Page about 
“the sustained pressure of our tour.”147  The Queensland press gave Page 
good publicity with such headlines as “Surveys Prove Value of Scheme.”  But 
even the sympathetic Brisbane Telegraph concluded that along the coastal belt 
from Newcastle to the Queensland border “no market exists there for anywhere 
near 300,000 kilowatts of electricity, the planned output of the completed Gorge 
scheme”, making Queensland’s involvement crucial.148   
 
Page remained so hopeful that he produced yet another booklet, Clarence 
Water-Power Development, its cover graced with a specially-commissioned 
stylised map of proposed dam sites.  This detailed his plan for a 220 foot dam 
at The Gorge, to be followed by the construction of supplementary storages so 
that the whole Clarence system generated at least “125,000 kilowatts 
continuously” and irrigated 100,000 acres.  As so often before, Page thought he 
had chosen his timing well: “At this psychological moment, which might never 
recur, an early decision could launch this outstanding development on a most 
auspicious and sound basis.”149   
 
                                                             
145 Daily Examiner, 4 February 1947, p. 2, clipping in EPP, folder 2106. 
146 Macleay Argus, 14 February 1947, clipping at EPP, folder 1075. 
147 Lyne Young of the Lismore Northern Star to Page, 25 February 1947, EPP, folder 2106.  
148 Brisbane Telegraph, 14 February 1947, clipping at EPP, folder 2106. 
149 Earle Page, Clarence Water-Power Development, The Bulletin Newspaper, Sydney, 1947, 
pp. 3, 23. 
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Figure 9: cover of Page’s 1947 booklet, Clarence Water-Power Development. 
 
As official interest shifted towards the Snowy, Page demonstrated his tactical 
flexibility by returning to the level of government and place where he had the 
most influence.  Over 1948-9, he sought to reorganise local councils in the 
Clarence Valley into regional authorities based on the TVA model.  He exhorted 
them to join forces so “a united North could have a definite voice in the extent 
and manner of that [Gorge dam] development and the disposal and the 
distribution of the product.”  Page proclaimed himself specially qualified to lead 
this effort, as he had been personally responsible for both “the inauguration of 
the Clarence County Council Scheme” and “developing the Nymboida Power 
Station.”  If the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland 
governments were not interested, then they should leave the way open for 
private investors.150  During 1949, Page succeeded in having councils form a 
‘Federation of all Electrical Supply and Distribution Bodies of the North Coast 
                                                             
150 Page to ‘Council Clerk’ (evidently an identical letter to all relevant councils), 14 July 1948, 
EPP, folder 2099.  
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and Tablelands’ to “do everything” for electrification.151  “A combined 
organisation, fully representative of the north”, he said, could prevent the 
Commonwealth from using defence powers to by-pass local government, as it 
had with the Snowy.152  Yet lack of local government unity was impeding 
progress: councils failed to grasp that investment ought to be “well ahead of 
immediate consumption demand” and that “the economics of water power 
development schemes tend to improve with larger schemes.”153 
 
Page continued his efforts at the national level.  In 1949, he began openly 
criticising the Snowy, predicting that its steep slopes would cause such 
complications that the Clarence or even the Burdekin would be quicker to start 
generating power.154  Page also continued to harry the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction to the point that its Director of Regional Development proposed 
formally asking him to desist from public statements suggesting the 
Commonwealth was an active participant in the Technical Committee.155  The 
Director-General of the Department, now Allen Brown, commented that New 
South Wales “has never appeared to be over-enthusiastic about pressing on 
with the investigations”, especially as much of the project’s benefit would go to 
Queensland.  Another member of the Department concluded that there was an 
assured market only for 50,000 kW for Queensland and about 5,000-10,000 
kW for northern New South Wales, well short of Page’s claimed 125,000 kW.156  
The President of the Institution of Engineers assailed misconceptions about the 
TVA and the availability of water in Australia as the ideas of “ill-informed 
visionaries.”157   
                                                             
151 ‘Northern Rivers Association of Municipalities & Shires Minutes of Conference Held at 
Lismore on Friday the 22nd April 1949, to Discuss and Consider Means of Expediting 
Completion of Survey, Investigation and Design of Proposed Clarence Gorge Hydro-Electric 
Scheme’, EPP, folder 2099. 
152 See ‘Statement by Sir Earle Page at Conference of North Coast Local Governing Bodies 
Held at Lismore 22nd April 1949,’ EPP, folder 2102. 
153 Statement by Page, 24 April 1949, EPP, folder 2083.  
154 Statement by Page, 1 July 1949, reported in the Canberra Letter of The Associated 
Chambers of Manufacturers of Australia, EPP, folder 401.  
155 C.R. Lambert, minute of 6 May 1949, NAA, A9816, 1944/487 Part 1, op. cit.  On 
Commonwealth inquiries with NSW, see for example Premier McGirr to Chifley of 24 November 
1949, NAA, A9816, 1944/487 Part 2, op. cit.    
156 A.S. Brown, minute ‘Clarence River Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme’ of 3 June 1949, NAA, 
A461, AK 423/1/1 op. cit.; T. Langford-Smith, 26 May 1949, ibid.   
157 William Nimmo in the Journal of the Institution of Engineers, Australia, no. 3, 1949, p. 29, 
copy in EPP, folder 1758.  
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Amidst this widespread scepticism and state government indifference, the fact 
that the Chifley government never decisively rejected The Gorge proposal 
constitutes a success of sorts for Page.  The Prime Minister continued to 
correspond with him well into 1949, reminding Page that state government 
support was essential and also asking New South Wales about the progress of 
the Technical Committee.158  As late as July 1949 the Director-General of Post-
War Reconstruction wrote to his counterpart at Works and Housing recounting 
how earlier Commonwealth interest in the Clarence had been dampened by 
preference for the Snowy and “the usual Treasury influence.”  He suggested it 
be revived, partly as it might produce far more power than even Page thought 
and as water power was “so limited in Australia we should be concerned to see 
that the maximum use is made of it.”159  This led to a one week field study in 
August 1949 by a Works and Housing engineer who, despite having been 
accompanied by Page throughout, produced another inconclusive report duly 
noting the Clarence’s “very large power potential” and calling for further 
investigation.160   
 
Page’s doggedness in promoting the Clarence reflects the difficulties he faced 
in a policy climate that favoured so many precepts he had long nurtured but in 
political circumstances that stood in the way of the major role he craved.  He 
was pushed out to the margins by the irresistible pressures of party politics, a 
changed policy-making culture and a growing isolation from colleagues in 
conservative politics that had been discernable in the 1930s and became more 
obvious post-war.  Yet he remained the most outspoken non-Labor advocate of 
the possibilities of post-war reconstruction and of the spatial and rural-
orientated perspectives he had long added to so many issues.  His lobbying for 
causes by whatever means came to hand – via state governments, the press, 
intellectual policy groups and directly to federal ministers – gave him a 
continued major public and political profile.  Although unable directly to 
determine policy, his tireless efforts to guide post-war reconstruction’s 
engagement with federalism, regionalism, education and particularly 
                                                             
158 Chifley to Page, 24 June 1949 and 18 July 1949, EPP, folder 2087. 
159 A.S. Brown to L.F. Loder, 1 July 1949, NAA, A9816, 1944/487 Part 2, Clarence River Hydro-
electric Scheme by Sir Earle Page Part 2. 
160 Report by E.F. Rowntree, finalised October 1949, copy at EPP, folder 1077. 
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hydroelectricity marked his distinctiveness and could at times still induce 
governments to respond to such sheer persistence.  At the end of the 1940s, 
and of the life of the federal Labor government, Page remained undeterred and 
looked forward to the advent of a new conservative regime as a chance to 
restore his own fortunes and advance those of his country.   
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CHAPTER 8 – PAGE INDEFATIGABLE: HIS LAST YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE  
 
When Page became Minister for Health in the second Menzies government, he 
saw himself as also becoming its leading advocate of developmentalism.  In 
practice, he struggled to exert influence in a political environment that 
continued to evolve in ways he found uncongenial.  Signs of the difficulties he 
would face were evident well before the government’s election in December 
1949.  The alliance between the Country Party and the new Liberal Party 
differed from coalitions Page had previously experienced, and a highly charged 
political contest between public sector-led development and private enterprise 
left less space for his brand of ambitious developmentalism. 
 
Relations between the two conservative parties had reached a low point during 
the 1943 federal election campaign, when Menzies disowned part of the Joint 
Opposition policy speech delivered by Fadden as Opposition Leader.  But the 
following year, after resuming the leadership of the UAP, Menzies invited the 
Country Party to attend the talks that led to the formation of the new Liberal 
Party, raising the possibility of merger.1  A merger did not eventuate, but 
collaboration between the two parties grew as each saw the other as an 
increasingly likely partner in a future coalition.2 
 
Page intervened strongly and early when the Country Party resumed its internal 
debate on coalition, a clear sign that he was hoping to again play a major role 
in government.  As Australian Country Party Association chair he assured his 
Liberal counterpart in January 1946 that the Country Party would collaborate in 
“securing the maximum goodwill between the parties,” especially by managing 
how they contested seats.3  The parties co-operated informally at the 
September 1946 federal election but their respective leaders still delivered 
separate policy speeches, with the result that Fadden was seen to be 
                                                             
1 Brian Costar, ‘The Politics of Coalition’, in Prasser et al., pp. 94-5.  
2 Casey as President of the Liberal Party over 1947-9 had doubts about amalgamation.  The 
issue was complicated by proposals of varying degrees of good-will put forth at the state level, 
especially in New South Wales; see Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 
275, and Ian Hancock, National and Permanent?: The Federal Organisation of the Liberal Party 
of Australia 1944-1965, Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, 2000, pp. 78-80.  
3 Ellis, ibid., p. 266.  The Liberal Party president concerned was T.M. Ritchie. 
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outbidding the Liberals on tax cuts.  Resumption of a coalition became an even 
higher priority after the unexpectedly severe loss at this election, leading the 
two parties to form a Joint Opposition Executive to guide policy and tactics.4   
 
Page had temporary success during this immediate post-war period in injecting 
his ideas into the federal Country Party’s policy commitments.  Fadden’s 1946 
policy speech included some ambitious developmentalist concepts that Page 
had long advocated – a National Development and Defence Council, set prices 
for primary products, a flat national electricity rate, and inviting the chair of the 
TVA to visit to advise on the Clarence, the Snowy, the Murray Valley and even 
the Bradfield Plan to irrigate the interior.5  These promises were made from the 
freedom of Opposition: their expansiveness is suggestive of a rhetorical riposte 
to the Chifley government’s avowed nation-building agenda.   
 
Nor did they last.  By 1948 Page felt compelled to produce his own press 
release on ‘The Need of a Strong, Vigorous and Numerous Country Party’ in an 
attempt to reaffirm the Party’s commitment to decentralisation.6  Country Party-
Liberal relations continued to improve over 1948-49, despite lingering discord 
at state level over competition for lower house seats.7  At a January 1949 
meeting to plan for the forthcoming election, the federal Country Party 
proposed an electoral pact with the Liberals and offered to confer on policy.8  
Page was heartened by the revival of a coalition but also faced a shift in public 
opinion against government-led planning, not a good sign for this inveterate 
planner.  The public increasingly wanted to be rid of irksome wartime controls 
and the Cold War context added unsavoury connotations to government 
intervention.  “The word ‘plan’ was a dirty word then” recalled the political 
journalist Frank Chamberlain.9  This had been signalled as early as 1944 by 
                                                             
4 Ian Hancock, op. cit., pp. 76-8. 
5 The text of this speech of 3 September 1946 is at EPP, folder 2618.  The TVA Chair, David 
Lilienthal, appears not to have visited Australia.  
6 ‘The Need of a Strong, Vigorous and Numerous Country Party’, EPP, folder 1994 (i).  
Undated, but data used suggests 1948 or 1949. 
7 Ian Hancock, op. cit., pp. 101-5. 
8 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 271. 
9 National Library of Australia Oral History Section, Recorded Interview with Frank 
Chamberlain, interviewer Mel Pratt, TRC 121/39, recorded 4 August 1972 and 19 January 
1973, FC:1:2/3. 
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the defeat of the post-war reconstruction referendum and was underscored by 
the even heavier defeat of the May 1948 referendum on Commonwealth control 
of rents and prices, conducted in the shadow of the Chifley government’s 
attempts to nationalise the private banks.  Debate on the role of the state 
helped give the new Liberal Party a strong platform based on a commitment to 
individualism and private enterprise, tempered by its qualified acceptance of a 
place for government in economic management and social welfare.  The 
federal Country Party agreed: at the same January 1949 meeting it declared 
that “to defeat communism, to preserve freedom in Australia and the driving 
force of individual initiative, it is most important to remove the Chifley socialistic 
government from power.”10   
  
Improving relations between the Liberals and the Country Party imposed 
disciplines that left less space for Page’s vision.  For the December 1949 
election, Menzies and Fadden affirmed a renewed coalition by delivering a 
combined Opposition policy speech.  Their “joint policy” covered the banning of 
the Communist Party, combatting industrial unrest, the repeal of bank 
nationalisation, a new national health scheme, stabilisation schemes for the 
wheat and dairy industries, and the raising of loans to be managed by what 
became the Department of National Development.11  In his own campaign 
speeches Fadden now gave priority to conventional priorities of country roads, 
stabilisation of rural industries and an end to rationing – not planning or 
overtures to the TVA.  He was especially vocal on petrol rationing, which the 
government had reintroduced to help conserve the sterling bloc’s pool of US 
dollars – “empty out the Chifley socialists and fill the bowsers.”12   
 
Page did not play a major national role in the 1949 campaign.  His foremost 
contributions were attacks on the Chifley government’s plans for 
comprehensive medical and pharmaceutical benefits schemes.  A High Court 
decision striking down compulsory clauses in its legislation on pharmaceutical 
benefits opened the way, said Page, for a “sane approach” based on the willing 
                                                             
10 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 271. 
11 Ibid., pp. 271-2. 
12 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 435; quote from Arklay, Arthur Fadden, 
op. cit., p. 136.  
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co-operation of health providers.13  Chifley attributed his unexpectedly severe 
loss in the election – the ALP won just 47 seats in an enlarged House of 
Representatives of 121 members – to public resentment of petrol rationing and 
bank nationalisation.  Page’s primary vote in his seat of Cowper shot up to its 
post-war peak of nearly 62 per cent.   
 
The eternally optimistic Page welcomed the defeat of the Chifley government 
not merely as a party political triumph.  After the baffling frustrations of post-war 
reconstruction under Chifley, Dedman and Coombs, he was again a 
Commonwealth minister in a government with a commitment to 
developmentalism.  One of its first significant acts was to create a new portfolio 
of National Development, with Page’s old friend Richard Casey as minister.  He 
even saw the election as offering hope at last for The Gorge project.14  But in 
practice, Page was only a nominal insider in the new government and over the 
next six years failed to spark a resurgence of his style of developmentalism.  
Menzies’ political dominance from 1949 was alone sufficient to constrict Page’s 
influence beyond his portfolio.  The government did engage with issues of 
interest to Page, notably planning, power generation and higher education.  But 
the nation-changing goals of decentralisation, regionalism and hydroelectricity 
that Page wanted these to ultimately address diverged too much from the 
government’s more immediate objectives for him to greatly influence its policy 
mainstream. 
  
The 1949 election was also challenging for Page by marking a major 
generational change in parliamentary membership.  It is widely appreciated that 
this was so for the Liberal Party, with the average age of its 38 first-timers in 
the House of Representatives (out of a total of 55 Liberal MPs) being a 
comparatively youthful 43.  Most were imbued with a conscious sense of 
having been elected at a pivotal time to oppose socialism.15  Less widely 
known is that there was also an influx of new Country Party MPs.  Of the 
                                                             
13 Page’s comments as reported in the Sydney Morning Herald of 8 October 1949, p. 1.     
14 See for example his articles on this in the Daily Examiner of 29 October 1949, p. 9. 
15 Ian Hancock, op. cit., pp. 106-7. 
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Party’s 19 members in the House, 8 were entirely new to parliament.16  Page, 
approaching 70 years of age when the election was held, was the only survivor 
from the Bruce-Page days: no doubt he took solace from David Drummond’s 
transfer to federal politics as member for New England.  Page’s views on 
Australian development were to diverge more than ever from all but a few of his 
party colleagues.   
 
Page returns to government: success in the health portfolio but planning 
falters  
 
Robert Menzies did not incur lasting damage from Page’s 1939 attack.  Ten 
years later he returned to government at the head of a revitalised new party 
with a clearer philosophy and stronger national organisation than its UAP 
predecessor.  As Menzies accepted an important role for government in both 
economy and society, provided this “seemed to us to be the best answer to a 
practical problem”, the new Prime Minister upheld the Snowy Scheme, social 
welfare, increased public funding of universities and the policy-advising role of 
the public service.  But this was within a wider context in which, as he reflected 
towards the end of his reign, his government’s “first impulse” was “always to 
seek the private enterprise answer, to help the individual to help himself, to 
create a climate, economic, social, industrial, favourable to his activity and 
growth.”17 
 
Helping to consolidate this was a significant intellectual and governmental shift 
during the early 1950s from the social-democratic Keynesianism of the Chifley 
era to a more technocratic Keynesianism.  Under the latter, “maintaining 
continuous economic growth became the new goal of economic management, 
which was redefined as a matter for bureaucratic administration based on 
economic ‘science’ rather than political contest.”  Unexpectedly strong private 
sector demand had stabilised the economy at full employment, and so “the idea 
of planning, of setting social goals and directing the economy accordingly, had 
                                                             
16 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 281-2. 
17 Menzies speaking to the Liberal Party Federal Council, 6 April 1964, quoted in Walter, What 
Were They Thinking?, op. cit., pp. 207.  
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given way to the lessor aims of management.”18  John Crawford, now Secretary 
of the Commonwealth Department of Commerce and Agriculture, encapsulated 
this major shift in a 1952 public lecture on agricultural policy.  Crawford, who 
also now chaired the Standing Committee of the AAC and had the increasingly 
influential John McEwen as his minister, began by explaining that he would “not 
be concerned to examine in any detail the relation between agricultural policy 
objectives and programmes and wider objectives of economic and social policy 
for the economy as a whole.”  Instead, “the 1952 policy is really one which 
makes enhanced agricultural production a matter of urgency because it is a 
principal means to the wider ends of national interest.”19  Page found during 
this decade that such narrowing of perspective worked against willingness to 
indulge his developmentalist vision of the nation. 
 
Menzies’ markedly improved relations with the Country Party did not extend 
personally to Page.  Page’s role in the Cabinet remained strictly limited to his 
own portfolio.  He was not, for example, part of a March 1952 meeting of senior 
ministers with the visiting president of the World Bank, Eugene Black, despite 
discussion of matters as dear to him as water and electrification.20  His fraught 
relationships with Menzies and Fadden were not aided by a practice of 
peppering both with missives proposing new initiatives, only some of which 
concerned health policy.  Menzies typically responded with icy formality.21  
Page had mentored the young Fadden in the 1930s, but did not remain close to 
him personally or politically.  Fadden, habitually a hearty friend to all, as 
Treasurer took little interest in Page’s vision and schemes.  He referred some 
of Page’s correspondence to his Departmental Secretary Roland Wilson who 
was, for example, dismissive of Page’s hope of attracting private investment to 
infrastructure projects.22  Page’s public pronouncements on this elicited a livid 
                                                             
18 Paul Smyth, Australian Social Policy: The Keynesian Chapter, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1994, 
pp. 4, 127.  
19 J.G. Crawford, op. cit., p. 8. 
20 See record of meeting of 12 March 1952, EPP, folder 2508.  The Minister for Public Works, 
William Kent Hughes, raised during this meeting foreign investment in power projects.    
21 Such as a 1951 letter from Menzies to Page rejecting a proposal to implement the new 
medical benefits scheme at once as “half-cocked”; see EPP, folder 2366. 
22 See for example Page to Fadden and Menzies, 3 November 1955, EPP, folder 1750 (i).  
Page’s model for private investment in infrastructure involved granting a private corporation a 
franchise or charter to construct a dam at its own expense, after which it would reap revenues 
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telegram from Fadden in August 1956 – it was strictly a matter for the states, 
said the Treasurer.23  Nor would relations have been improved by a Daily 
Telegraph editorial of the following year contrasting the “elder statesman” Page 
with “sit-on-your-hands” Fadden.24  Page was trying to operate in political 
circumstances that relied more on cautious but assertive public service 
advisors than the rural activists and visionary industrialists with whom he 
empathised.  Unintentionally, he became a contrarian in the government. 
 
The nuances and ultimate objectives of economic policy of the 1950s had only 
a coincidental focus on elements of Page’s own agenda. His concepts of 
national development were not as central to the new government as he had 
initially hoped.  Page nominally conformed to most precepts of the Menzies 
government, and drew on these opportunistically to provide new arguments for 
old ideas.  He used the language of the Cold Warrior in linking the “the growing, 
sinister and secret influence of Communism” to the growth of cities.25  
Economic policy early in these Menzies years was dominated by short-term 
goals, firstly by carrying out the promise to scale back government regulation 
and then by managing the inflation associated with the Korean War wool boom 
via the ‘Horror Budget’ of 1951-52.  A 1953 Cabinet submission on Queensland 
proposals to develop the Burdekin River and Tully Falls showed no trace of 
Page’s electrophilia in recommending Commonwealth support for their 
irrigation components but declaring their hydroelectric elements uneconomic.26   
 
Ellis’s summary of what most exercised the wider Country Party in these years 
emphasises such issues as the appreciation of the pound, fiscal policy, 
responses to the wool boom, and tax averaging for primary producers prone to 
fluctuating incomes.27  State governments gave priority to managing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
for a set period before the facility would “become the property of the Authority giving the 
charter, debt free and fully functioning.”  See ‘Local Government Enquiry Commencing at 
Grafton on 10th September 1956, on Proposed Redivision of Local Government Boundaries – 
Evidence of Sir Earle Page, MP’, EPP, folder 1798, pp. 7-8. 
23 Telegram Fadden to Page, 1 August 1956, EPP, folder 2049.  Page continued to seek 
private investment in the Clarence. 
24 Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1956. 
25 ‘The Need of a Strong, Vigorous and Numerous Country Party’, op. cit. 
26 See EPP, folder 2509. 
27 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., pp. 285-91.  
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pressures that urban growth imposed on education, transport and other 
services.  Page’s determination to improve rural living standards did not extend 
to applauding the consumerism that had burst forth from the pent-up demand of 
the war years and manifested itself in new household products and climbing 
rates of car and home ownership.  Generally stable economic growth of over 4 
per cent per annum during the 1950s made developmentalism, Page-style, 
seem less urgent.28  Menzies’ chapter on development policy in his second 
volume of memoirs, prosaically entitled ‘Stability, Capital and Development’, 
limits itself to the wool boom, overseas investment and new mining ventures in 
the continent’s far northwest.29  
 
 
 
Page in this second Menzies government is today best known for his role as 
Health Minister in creating Australia’s first national public health benefits 
scheme.  His return to this portfolio (which he had previously held in 1937-38) 
elicited little public surprise: the Sydney Morning Herald editorialised that his 
“personal claims to the portfolio can hardly be contested.”30  The offer of Health 
to Page suggests that Menzies judged that his personal standing in the medical 
fraternity would be valuable in negotiating a scheme acceptable to the British 
Medical Association (Australia), the profession’s peak body.   
                                                             
28 Growth figure from Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, op. cit., p. 203. 
29 Robert Menzies, The Measure of the Years, Cassell, London, 1970, pp. 98-108. 
30 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 December 1949, p. 2.  
Figure 10: the new Menzies  
Ministry 1949, with Earle Page as 
Minister for Health.  Page is  
standing immediately behind 
Governor-General William McKell, 
former Premier of New South  
Wales and TVA sceptic.  Richard 
Casey is standing third from left, 
Enid Lyons sixth from left and  
John McEwen second from the  
right.  Arthur Fadden is seated in  
the front row to the immediate  
right of McKell.  (NAA M4297, 10).  
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When Page assumed the Health portfolio, the public funding of medical 
services already had a long history as an unresolved issue.  As long before as 
1925-6, the Bruce-Page government’s Royal Commission on Health had failed 
to lead to a public health scheme. The Curtin and Chifley governments over 
1944-49 pursued a non-contributory scheme that took inspiration from Britain’s 
National Health Service and would have imposed a high degree of public 
control over health services.  Extended attempts to negotiate an agreement 
with the BMA foundered over doctors’ insistence on freedom to set their own 
fees.  Menzies gave Page, himself a BMA member with a long personal history 
of resisting salaried medicine, a free hand in negotiations.  Amidst the 
challenges posed by the political environment of these years, this freedom 
played to Page’s strengths of empathy with his original profession and tenacity 
in negotiation.  Political contemporaries soon found that the new Health 
Minister could still be a capable political operator.  Paul Hasluck, a fellow 
minister, recalled him as a “benign and shrewd old fox.”31  Page seized the 
opportunity with typical alacrity, in what Ellis later described as “a series of 
coups d’état.”32  
 
Page commenced with telegrammed overtures to the BMA and other 
professional associations on the very day he was sworn in.  He produced a 
Cabinet submission as early as 9 January 1950 proposing a program to “help 
those who helped themselves” and “strengthen the working of existing, 
voluntary insurance organisations” that would “provide a real nursery for 
democracy.”33  Despite considerable difficulties, Page showed skill and 
creativity as he put a scheme into place step by step over 1950-53, carefully 
designed around what the BMA would accept.  This was quite unlike the 
comprehensive national health service the Chifley government had tried to 
impose over the objections of the medical profession, but rather was based on 
taxpayer-funded subsidisation of voluntary private insurance without the direct 
regulation of doctors’ fees.  Only pensioners would receive fully free medical 
                                                             
31 Paul Hasluck, The Chance of Politics, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 1997, p. 41. 
32 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 292. 
33 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 430-1.   
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services.34  Even Menzies later described Page’s speech introducing the 
National Health Act in 1953 as “an extraordinarily able and well-informed 
exposition of our philosophic approach” that “the individual doctor-patient 
relationship should be preserved and the disadvantages of a fully nationalized 
and Government-conducted scheme averted.”  Menzies declared health policy 
“one of the high spots of my period as Prime Minister.”35  
 
Although Page remained proud of what is widely seen as one of his foremost 
achievements, in long, discursive speeches reviewing his career he portrayed 
his public health scheme as just one success alongside an array of 
developmentalist initiatives.  Page still hankered for a major say in development 
policies.  As he told the Cowper Federal Electorate Council in November 1956, 
ten months after finally retiring from the frontbench, “my special position and 
knowledge made me of more value outside the Cabinet, although always ready 
and willing and available to give advice when needed.”36  Even from the 
margins of political power, Page worked hard to draw the Menzies government 
into considering his ideas.   
 
One example is national economic planning.  In the early 1950s, Page 
continued to bemoan the abolition of the DMC.  He wrote to Bruce that ever 
                                                             
34 This subsidization was provided on a claims basis as a refund for part of actual expenditure 
by patients for approved health care, not a more general subsidization of private health 
insurance providers.  The scheme also involved a free list of certain essential drugs, a means-
tested pensioners’ list for all drugs and increased Commonwealth grants to hospitals.  The 
fullest account of early public health insurance in Australia is Gillespie’s The Price of Health: 
Australian Governments and Medical Politics 1910-1960, op. cit.  Although the Page scheme 
(as it is sometimes called) was the forerunner of subsequent public health benefits schemes, 
Gillespie is critical of Page’s efforts as “a pragmatic, unplanned set of benefit programmes 
cobbled together in the face of intense suspicion from the BMA”, op. cit., p. 278.  Other critics 
felt it was insufficiently targeted to the lowest income groups; see for example Gwen Gray, 
‘Social Policy’ in Prasser et al., p. 217.  Page’s wider views may have influenced this pioneering 
program, in that he wanted its administration highly decentralised.  In a 1950 speech he told 
state Health Ministers he would leave management of national health policy to existing state 
machinery and that “there should be an even further decentralisation of authority and 
administration”; 15 August 1950, EPP, folder 2501.  In a letter of 9 March that year to Bruce, he 
expressed a fear that a more generous scheme would degrade community independence, 
resulting in “cynical indifference”; EPP, folder 1821.   
35 Menzies, The Measure of the Years, op. cit., pp. 120, 123.  
36 Speech by Page to Cowper Federal Electorate Council, 9 November 1956, EPP, folder 1805.  
For an example of praise of the scheme, see comments by Colin A. Hughes describing this 
“comprehensive health scheme” as “the last major project” of Page’s “inventive brain” in Mr 
Prime Minister: Australian Prime Ministers 1901-1972, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
1976, p. 101.   
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since there had been “no fact-finding nor comprehensive planning organisation 
in Australia adequate to deal with the problems facing us”, and pondered “the 
folly of Scullin’s destruction of the organisation that was co-ordinating Federal 
and state policy as regards development and collecting invaluable data.”37  
Despite public disdain, planning remained a sufficiently persistent concept 
amongst policy-makers to nominally survive the advent of the second Menzies 
government.  Although Menzies abolished the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction, many of its functions were shifted to other departments, with 
the Industrial Development and Regional Resources Divisions going to the 
newly created Department of National Development.38  This new agency raised 
Page’s hopes.  His sense of personal ownership of planning remained so 
strong that he entered the new government telling Casey as the Minister for 
National Development how to organise his department so as to hoist 
development and planning atop the government’s agenda.  
 
Page’s relationship with Casey was important to him.  They had worked 
together on the National Council proposal in 1938-39 and shared an interest in 
the TVA.39  Days after the 1949 election, Ulrich Ellis produced a written 
proposal, almost certainly in consultation with Page, entitled ‘A General 
Approach to the Organisation of a National Development Scheme.’  This 
effectively proposed reviving the National Council concept.  It called for a 
hierarchy of planning agencies headed by a National Development Council 
supported by advisers from industry, state councils and regional or zone 
councils.40  Both Page and Casey as new ministers were provided with a draft 
Cabinet paper on the Department of National Development prepared by the 
Chair of the Public Service Commission, W.E. Dunk.  This recommended very 
wide policy responsibilities for the Department, including closer settlement, 
transport, water conservation, regional development, secondary industry and 
minerals.  It would survey, plan and then enter into implementation agreements 
                                                             
37 Page to Bruce, 9 March 1950 and 11 July 1951, EPP, folder 1821. 
38 Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, op. cit., p. 465.  
39 See Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 236; and Walter in Head and 
Walter, op. cit., p. 264. 
40 Ellis, ‘A General Approach to the Organisation of a National Development Scheme,’ 24 
December 1949, EPP, folder 2076.   
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with state governments, also reminiscent of what Page had previously 
sought.41  
 
Page himself wrote to Casey at length about the Department in terms that 
recycled ideas from 1938-39.  He wanted a powerful central agency that guided 
the rest of government and advanced his own agenda – “the immediate 
objective of the Department of Development [sic] must be to provide a plan to 
halt the appalling drift from the countryside.”42  It should be headed by 
someone the calibre of Essington Lewis, Tim Clapp or Charles Kemp.  Like 
Dunk, he foresaw it co-ordinating policy with the states, including by surveying 
national resources and in promoting rural electrification.  It would set long-term 
output targets for such key industries as power, coal and steel.  New sectoral 
planning authorities such as a Joint Coal Board would bring governments 
together to “carry out big schemes”, while the Tariff Board extended assistance 
to industries selected by the Department.43   
 
In practice, however, the Department of National Development was subject to 
complaints from state governments and soon lost staff and powers in a 
government elsewhere focused.44  Casey moved on to the External Affairs 
portfolio in 1951, but maintained a personal interest in development.  In June 
1952 he suggested to Cabinet a near-revival of Page’s 1938-39 proposal – 
“consideration should be given as to what pressure can be brought to bear in 
the Loan Council on the state governments, to oblige them to agree to the 
setting up of a non-political body to screen and to create a list of priorities in 
respect of state, semi-governmental and local governing body works.”45  The 
two corresponded throughout the 1950s, marking Casey as perhaps the only 
                                                             
41 Draft Cabinet paper, with covering letter by W.E. Dunk, 12 January 1950 (earlier draft dated 
27 December 1949), EPP, folder 2074.  
42 Page to Casey, 9 January 1950, EPP, folder 2074.   
43 Undated document, ‘Functions of the Department of Development’, EPP, folder 2322.  
44 A.J. Davies, ‘National Development Under Australian Federalism: Politics or Economics’, a 
paper presented to the Australasian Political Science Association conference, August 1965; 
A.J. Davies ‘National Development’, Australian Quarterly, op. cit.; and W.J. Hudson, Casey, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986, pp. 208-11.  The Department was also weakened 
by the transfer in 1950 of the Economic Policy Division of the old Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; see David Lee, ‘Cabinet’ 
in Prasser et al. p. 127; and also David Lowe, ‘Menzies’ National Security State, 1950-53’, in 
Frank Cain (ed.), Menzies in War and Peace, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997. 
45 Submission by Casey to Cabinet, 24 June 1952, EPP, folder 2508.  
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minister of the time to engage gladly with Page beyond his responsibilities as 
Health Minister.  It was significant for Page that Casey was not a major 
influence in Menzies’ Cabinet, and so was more friend and sounding-board 
than effective ally.46   
 
Other recurrences of political interest in planning also bore similarities to 
Page’s National Council, but sometimes incorporated an emphasis on defence 
planning that overshadowed traces of his developmentalist vision.  A National 
Security Resources Board modelled on an American agency of the same name 
was established late in 1950 as a response to the Korean War.  It was chaired 
by Menzies himself and had a mixed mandate to advise on the “balanced 
allocation of the nation’s resources as between defence, development, export 
production and the maintenance of the civilian economy.”  Despite Casey’s 
urging, it never attained an executive role before ceasing to function three 
years later.47  The Country Party’s November 1953 Federal Platform and Policy 
called for “Commonwealth-state machinery to determine the priority” of 
developmental projects.48  In May 1954 Menzies proposed in his election policy 
speech a National Development Commission as “a small advisory body of 
highly expert persons” which would report to the Commonwealth and the 
states, and depoliticise development policy – “in the absence of such a body, 
Australian development may be actually hindered by election promises about 
specific local projects, made without regard to any Australian pattern.”49  The 
Commission was not formed as the states declined to be involved.50  Such 
attempts to institute planning in whatever muted form were also echoes of a 
receding sense that the nation was underperforming, and perhaps also owed 
                                                             
46 “Casey was ineffective in Cabinet.  I doubt whether there any other minister during the time 
he was in Cabinet with me who lost so many submissions”; Hasluck, The Chance of Politics, 
op. cit., p. 86.  
47 Executive Member of the Board, economist E.R. Walker, quoted in Davies, ‘National 
Development’, Australian Quarterly, op. cit., p. 49; and in ‘National Development Under 
Australian Federalism’, op. cit., pp. 19-26.  See also Lee in Prasser, op. cit., pp. 128-30; and 
Heather Curtis, op. cit., pp. 52-3. 
48 Earle Page Papers, UNE Archives, A0180, box 4, folder 41 (a).   
49 Menzies quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 1954, p. 4.      
50 Davies, ‘National Development’, Australian Quarterly, op. cit., p. 51. 
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something to the interest of economic and intellectual figures in the indicative 
planning then popular in western Europe.51   
 
The planning concept that Page had long nurtured still lingered, but wider 
political opinion held that the economy was doing well enough without 
comprehensive guidance from government.  As its most important political 
advocate in the 1950s, he helped to keep the concept under government 
consideration, albeit intermittently.  Page was far from being Australia’s only 
advocate of planning.  S.J. Butlin wrote in 1955 that “part of the general 
thinking of all Australians on economic affairs is a not very coherent prejudice 
in favour of an increase in total “production”, specially the introduction of new 
industries, coupled with the assumption that the natural way to promote such 
new industries is government aid.”52  But no other Australian federal politician 
of senior standing had pursued economy-wide planning with anything like 
Page’s tenacity or scale of conception.   
 
Page’s lack of traction on such nation-changing issues as planning was also 
attributable to his increasing distance from the new generation of Country Party 
MPs.  Aitkin later wrote of a fundamental change in the organisation of the 
Country Party from its founding as “little more than an extra-parliamentary 
committee formed by two primary producer organisations” into a post-war 
“mass political party of familiar type.”53  The Country Party’s policy ambitions 
also changed, narrowing as the very worst privations of rural life were eased by 
such improved amenities as the road, phone and radio services that Page had 
championed.  Mainstream rural politics gradually hardened into a focus on 
managing such priorities as price stabilisation schemes for wheat, dairy, dried 
                                                             
51 On Australian interest in planning in the latter 1950s, see the memoirs of the Canberra-based 
economist Heinz Arndt, A Course Through Life: Memoirs of an Australian Economist, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1985, pp. 49-50; and Peter Coleman, Selwyn Cornish and 
Peter Drake, Arndt’s Story: The Life of an Australian Economist, ANU E Press and Asia Pacific 
Press, Canberra, 2007, pp. 201-2.  Note also comments by John Crawford at the end of the 
decade that “we are all planners now” but which reflected a very expansive conception of 
planning, including by government establishing “shared belief” in attainable objectives; quoted 
in Smyth, op. cit., p. 194. 
52 S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942, a volume in the official history of Australia in the War 
of 1939-1945, Series 4 Civil, volume 3, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1955, p. 9.     
53 Aitkin, The Country Party in New South Wales, op. cit., p. 21.  This reference was primarily to 
the New South Wales Country Party; hence the two organisations are the FSA of New South 
Wales and the Graziers’ Association of New South Wales.  
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fruits, cotton and tobacco, tax concessions for new investment, and subsidies 
on inputs.54  This overtook the sense of exclusion that had helped motivate the 
pre-war Country Party to now give it a strong stake in extracting benefits from 
systems embedded into government practice.  Geoffrey Blainey adds that rural 
protest declined after 1945 due to generally good weather and high prices: “in 
the Menzies years the big country towns oozed prosperity” and “the Australian 
countryside lived on clover.”55  This is an overstatement – the Korean War wool 
boom did not last and some rural industries sought protection from imports – 
but it remains that there was far less sense of rural crisis than in the inter-war 
years.  Page seemed a man out of time.  Australia was a more settled and 
prosperous nation, and his style of developmentalism became ill-fitted to a 
party increasingly sceptical of grand visions.   
 
There is no better illustration of Page’s divergence from the rest of the Country 
Party than the contrasting world views presented in his speech of 28 July 1956 
to its Executive Council in Perth and that on the same day in the same city by 
McEwen as Minister for Trade to the annual general meeting of the Country 
Party of Western Australia.  Page called for a national population of 30 million, 
new states and the emulation of the development of the US, especially 
decentralisation, mass migration, foreign capital and hydroelectricity.  A 
National Council of Defence and Development was needed to “determine a 
pattern of development taking into account the economic and strategy factors 
associated with the size and locations of towns and cities.”  McEwen’s speech 
reported on recent economic growth, factory construction, exports and how 
stable commodity prices could encourage development in South East Asia.  His 
primary goal was stated simply and bluntly as “fast and balanced growth.”56  
Page’s post-war career draws out such changes in developmentalist thought.  
                                                             
54 Lloyd in Williams provides a succinct summary of agricultural policy in the 1950s, op. cit., pp. 
362-3.  He adds that in 1952 the Commonwealth government with AAC endorsement 
announced production targets for 1957-58, “Australian agriculture’s nearest approach in 
peacetime to indicative planning.”  
55 Geoffrey Blainey, This Land is All Horizons: Australian Fears and Visions, Boyer Lectures 
2001, Australian Broadcasting Commission, Sydney, 2001, pp. 37-8.  Sinclair attributes much 
of the post-war upturn in the rural economy to improvements in land use management and 
technology; see Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia, op. cit., pp. 212-
3. 
56 Transcripts of both speeches are in the National Party Papers, NLA, MS 7507, series 1, box 
1.  
316 
 
In the 1950s, developmentalism based on rural development was both 
challenged and supplemented by the nurturing of manufacturing (including 
outside the major cities) using protection from import competition, tax 
concessions and subsidised energy.  Major enthusiasts for this approach 
included not only McEwen but also such prominent figures as Premier Thomas 
Playford of South Australia.57  Development led by mining also began to gain 
prominence during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in Western Australia.58  
 
Page’s persistence: higher education, new states and hydroelectricity 
 
One of the main fields where Page tried to influence the agenda of the second 
Menzies government outside his health portfolio was higher education.  Unlike 
planning, the development of universities had the government’s committed 
attention, but Page’s interventions served more to illustrate how different his 
views were.  They also marked him as one of the few senior political figures – 
including Menzies himself – who looked beyond the vocational dimension of 
universities to their role in shaping society.  Page’s longstanding involvement 
with the New England University College gave him a firm platform for public 
pronouncements.  This institution finally became the fully autonomous 
University of New England in 1954 with Page installed as its first Chancellor, a 
personal career highlight.  At the 1956 speech to a dinner marking his 
retirement from the ministry he described providing “equal opportunities to the 
country student” as one of his major lifetime objectives.59 
 
In retirement, Menzies recalled that during these years “the numbers of young 
men and women anxious to avail themselves of university training had 
increased beyond all anticipation.”60  Student enrolments almost doubled 
                                                             
57 See David C. Rich, ‘Tom’s Vision?’ in Bernard O’Neil, Judith Raftery and Kerrie Round 
(eds.), Playford’s South Australia: Essays on the History of South Australia, 1933-1968, 
Association of Professional Historians Inc., Adelaide, 1996, pp. 91-116.  
58 Lenore Layman, ‘Development Ideology in Western Australia 1933-1965’, Historical Studies, 
vol. 20, no. 79, October 1982, pp. 234-260.  Layman is one of the few Australian historians to 
approach developmentalism as an ideology; she charted a shift in Western Australian 
developmentalism from fostering manufacturing to the use of state incentives to attract private 
investment for the exploitation of mineral resources.  
59 ‘Australian Country Party Complimentary Dinner to Sir Earle Page’, op. cit. 
60 Menzies, The Measure of the Years, op. cit., p. 82. 
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between 1945 and 1956 to reach 31,000.61  Most political and educational 
commentators did not envisage a total re-engineering of universities but simply 
supported their expansion to cope with this burgeoning demand.  Following 
promoting from the Vice-Chancellors of Australia’s then nine universities, 
Menzies agreed that there should be a more thorough inquiry into their needs 
than hitherto, and in December 1956 appointed the Murray Committee on 
Australian Universities.  Although Page’s hope of reconfiguring higher 
education according to his ideas on decentralisation and the scale of 
institutions distanced him from the educational mainstream, his interest in 
education was sufficiently appreciated to earn him such invitations as to 
address the 1950 Canberra University College commencement ceremony on 
‘The Value of Decentralisation of University Education.’  His public statements 
of this time are some of his most strident attacks on city life and among the 
most passionate declarations of the importance of higher education by any 
Australian politician.   
 
For Page, the central problem was not that existing universities were too small, 
but rather that they were too large to respond to rising demand.  Their scale 
already imposed problems of the co-ordination of research and teaching which 
would only worsen should they continue to grow.  Page concluded that “very 
large Universities in capital cities can now do little more than provide technical 
or professional vocational training.”  To “train good citizens in the true liberal 
tradition as well as good technicians” required small institutions of about 300 to 
750 students offering residential and tutorial-based learning.  The result would 
make each student “an active partner in a teacher-learner association rather 
than a passive recipient of pre-digested knowledge.”62  
 
Such small universities were not feasible in big cities with their high costs and 
petty distractions “so great that it would be very difficult to build up a corporate 
spirit upon which maximum success would depend.”  So Page called for “a 
number of small universities placed at strategic points throughout the country 
                                                             
61 A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, 1944-78, Melbourne University Press, 
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62 ‘Speech by Sir Earle Page at the Graduation Ceremony of the University of New England, 
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districts.”  These would be critically important in reversing population drift by 
conducting regional research and nurturing community leaders – “a united and 
properly balanced community must have available within itself all those factors 
which bind the region together and develop within it a community of interest.”63  
Ultimately, a national network of small universities would contribute to shaping 
the nation along Page’s favoured regionalised lines.  The University of New 
England would serve “by example to inspire the launching of other similar 
enterprises in other parts of the Commonwealth to restore the balance in 
Australian development, to decentralise university education.”64   
 
Page’s speeches on education contain some of his most metaphysical and 
hyperbolic comments on decentralisation.  “Nature had taught the country 
dweller the need for balance” he said, and “if the machine is out of balance the 
harder it works, the sooner it destroys itself.”  Restoring such balance was “my 
own lifetime ambition.”65  He told the University of Queensland in May 1960 
that its university college at Townsville would help “prevent the growth of the 
mind and culture of both teachers and students being overlaid by mercantile or 
industrial factors which may destroy them unwittingly like a child can be 
suffocated by its drunken parents in bed.”66  Such statements reflect the depth 
of Page’s habitual drawing together of disparate concepts into a reinforcing 
whole – in this case, decentralisation, balance on a national scale, institutions 
small enough to nurture individuality and an exemplar institution to guide the 
entire nation.  
 
Page’s promulgated views on education carried too much extraneous baggage 
to win wider acceptance during the post-war growth of universities.  The Murray 
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Report pondered how universities could provide “a full and true education”, but 
reached conclusions that diverged from Page’s ideas in their orientation to 
meeting growing demand for workforce skills.  It recommended concentrating 
future university expansion in population centres, with only passing reference to 
small rural universities.  Its canvassing of university residences failed to 
incorporate Page’s ideas about tutorial-based education.67  There were more 
influential individual players in the 1950s on university issues such as A.P. 
Rowe, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Adelaide, whose memoirs mention 
neither rural universities nor Page.68  Although Page’s specific ideas were 
bypassed, A.W. Martin erred in stating that apart from Menzies it is “hard to 
think of another federal politician at the time – with the very important exception 
of H.V. Evatt – who more revered, understood and often in an old-fashioned 
way romanticised, the ideal of a university.”69 
 
By contrast with his involvement in planning and higher education – two fields 
with some basis in the government’s policies – Page as Health Minister largely 
suspended his public campaigning on new states.  As in the Bruce-Page days, 
it would have been difficult to reconcile such activity with his status as a 
Commonwealth minister.  His public comments on this topic became sporadic, 
such as his pondering in 1951 “some biological reason” why cities over 50,000 
cannot maintain themselves without absorbing rural migrants “into their 
vortex.”70  Page’s absence from active campaigning is one reason why there 
was little effective political support for new states and decentralisation in the 
1950s.  Country Party and community interest dwindled: the Party’s 1953 
platform made only vague references to new states, decentralisation and “local 
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control of local affairs.”71  Governments were only politely sympathetic.  In 1957 
the Country Party Premier of Queensland, Frank Nicklin, declared himself 
willing to test public opinion formally on dividing the state should he receive 
sufficiently large petitions: that this offer came to nothing was often remarked 
upon by remaining new staters.72  There was more interest in intellectual 
quarters.  Current Affairs Bulletin devoted an issue to new states in 1950 and 
four years later the Institute of Public Affairs produced a booklet advocating a 
petition-referendum formula for their creation.73  
 
Ulrich Ellis temporarily assumed Page’s role as the public face of new statism.  
From 1946 he effectively personally constituted the Canberra-based Office of 
Rural Research from which he issued a stream of publications before resigning 
in 1960 to concentrate on the New England separation campaign.  Ellis was 
prominent at a major joint conference convened at Corowa in July-August 1951 
of the New England New State Movement, the Murray Valley Development 
League and the Murrumbidgee Valley Water Users’ Association.  Visible as 
Ellis was, there are signs that Page was an influence behind the scenes.  In 
October 1955, for instance, Ellis sought Page’s comments concerning a draft 
bill on the division of assets and liabilities between parent states and their new 
state offspring.74  A few stalwarts of the old Country Party-new state network 
remained active.  Drummond now chaired the Australian Decentralisation and 
Development Committee (secretary, Ulrich Ellis) which lobbied Premiers and 
federal ministers on the outcomes of the Corowa conference.75   
 
Page was far less inhibited in publicly promoting the Clarence hydroelectricity 
project, evidently judging that his role as local member made this compatible 
with his ministerial status.  In the early 1950s the Clarence issue was driven by 
a series of expert reports.  Repeatedly disappointed but never deterred, Page 
kept seeking one that delivered the conclusively positive findings he needed.  
                                                             
71 Country Party 1953 Platform, copy in EPP, folder 1685.  
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73 Current Affairs Bulletin, ‘New States’, 28 August 1950; Safeguard Your Rights by Review of 
the Constitution, IPA New South Wales, Sydney, October 1954, p. 18.  
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That these studies were undertaken at all owed much to his persistence.  In 
1951 the New South Wales government’s Technical Committee, appointed 
following Page’s post-war lobbying, finally recommended a dual purpose flood 
mitigation and hydroelectricity dam, and the fuller investigation of the wider 
Clarence catchment.76  The New South Wales Director of Public Works, J.M. 
Main, much later wrote to Page criticising these recommendations as having 
been “of a preliminary nature particularly in regard to the economics of 
hydroelectric power generation.”77  Main himself chaired the most substantive 
of all the Clarence reports, the 1951-55 ‘Clarence Advisory Committee on the 
Development of the Resources of the Clarence Valley’.  This report dismissed 
the Technical Committee’s findings and recommended that state electricity 
authorities be left to make their own decisions in the wider context of thermal 
and Snowy Scheme developments.78  As the decade dragged on with little to 
show, Page was by 1954 floating a much smaller proposal to further develop 
the Nymboida.79  
 
It is remarkable that Page managed to keep hydroelectricity on the agenda of 
governments at all given the results of these studies and further shifts in 
professional interest towards nuclear and thermal power.  The Snowy Scheme 
did not spark wider support for hydroelectricity.  Even William Hudson, 
manager of the Snowy, publicly conceded that hydroelectricity was limited by 
geography and high initial capital costs.80  Local government also began to 
have doubts.  Joe Cahill, as New South Wales Minister for Local Government a 
longstanding Page target, claimed in January 1952 that the Clarence River 
County Council actually preferred a number of smaller schemes to The Gorge 
and pointed out that the state’s Electricity Authority opposed reliance on 
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hydroelectricity given “the hydrological and field work which is required.”81  
Perhaps worst of all for Page, the Commonwealth Minister for National 
Development, Bill Spooner, estimated in 1955 that coal reserves in the three 
mainland eastern states would meet power requirements for the next fifty 
years.82  
 
The British social historian Bill Luckin has concluded that the British Electrical 
Development Association was most successful when it appealed to wider rural 
sentiment by drawing on “existing cultural repertoires while simultaneously 
generating novel images of technological superiority, cultural modernity and 
near-universal access.”83  There is some parallel here with Page's hydroelectric 
activism, which was limited by failure to attract the interest of his various allies 
on other causes, even the new staters.  That Page never entirely swallowed his 
disappointment at the choice of the Snowy over the Clarence further isolated 
him as the former became a national showcase.  His efforts on electrification 
also affirmed that his political influence remained greatest in local and federal 
government, not the state level which was responsible for most power projects.  
The locally-run Nymboida power station remained his foremost success. 
 
Page resigns from the ministry to pursue his vision  
 
Page announced his resignation from the Menzies ministry immediately after 
the government was re-elected in December 1955.  His last official policy 
initiative before retiring to the backbenches the following month was legislation 
to amend his National Health Act of 1953.  In announcing his retirement, Page 
listed the issues he would henceforth pursue – water conservation, 
hydroelectricity, new states and decentralisation.84  He also lamented that “the 
only way Federation can continue to exist is through a series of co-operative 
partners”; but that “city people don’t know about the country.”  Page now 
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thought that what the nation needed was “cities of 200,000 people every 50 
miles throughout this country, not just a few monster cities on the coast”.85   
 
As Page had expected in the immediate aftermath of the 1949 election, the 
second Menzies government presided over a nation undergoing rapid change – 
high population growth, a younger population, rising material affluence and 
greater cultural diversity than ever before.  But not so foreseeable to him was 
that the 1950s would not be an era of major innovation in development policy.  
In the second half of the decade there was an emerging perception that the 
Menzies government was disengaged from many of the transformations over 
which it presided. This included articulate criticism of a seemingly 
unimaginative national leadership inspired by such figures as John Douglas 
Pringle, the British expatriate editor of the Sydney Morning Herald.86   
 
Page became the somewhat fortuitous beneficiary of this.  Immediately he was 
free of the strictures of public office, Page campaigned as an effectively 
autonomous MP dedicated to realising what he saw as the missed 
opportunities of the post-war and Menzies eras.  The reaction to his urging had 
two distinct dimensions.  One suggests that political interest in interventionist-
based national development was now at one of its lowest ebbs in twentieth-
century Australian history.87  But against this, there remained a distinct popular 
and cultural interest in grand visions that was reflected in press coverage 
lauding Page for presenting an appealing contrast as the elder statesman of 
national development.  Page tapped into this. 
 
Page resumed trying to persuade the Country Party to make a practical rather 
than nominal commitment to new states and other causes, and did not hesitate 
to berate the government of which he was nominally still a member.  He spoke 
only occasionally in the House, but when he did it was often at length to 
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reassert an entire vision of the nation’s future.  A typical effort was his response 
to the 1957-58 budget.  This speech ranged across northern development, 
regional self-government, public debt, the incidence of tuberculosis, mental 
health, decentralisation, foreign investment, new states, national productivity, 
the dairy industry, water use, marketing of Australian exports and 
hydroelectricity.88  Page tied most of his late career ideas together more 
coherently when he spoke to the Australian Provincial Press Association 
Conference in October 1956 – the very same forum he had addressed in 1917.  
Nearly four decades on, his goals for the nation’s economy and society 
remained essentially unchanged, but for a clearer stress on planning.  
Decentralisation would be “greatly assisted by a system of priorities for 
government expenditure taking into account both defence and development 
projects along planned lines.”  Councils should be empowered to enter into 
franchise agreements with the private sector on development projects.  The 
local press had a positive duty to “force the hands of government along the 
proper course of action that will give the best results.”89   
 
One of the new backbencher’s first initiatives was an attempt to revive national 
planning.  Page had retained his curiosity about the wider world that dated back 
to his early travels in New Zealand and North America.  In retirement, he 
scanned the constitutions and policy statements of recently independent former 
British colonies for ideas on planned development.  After visiting the Indian 
sub-continent in March 1956 he told the House of the deep impression made 
on him by India’s and Pakistan’s planned use of rivers and by the Indian 
National Development Council.  This Council demonstrated that it was possible 
to resolve “the eternal wrangling between the states and the Commonwealth 
over the disposal of revenue, and fix priorities for the undertakings necessary in 
Australia.”90  It appears to have helped inspire his last concerted effort on 
planning.  As in 1938, Page began by approaching a powerful business figure.  
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In April 1956 he contacted the stockbroker and grazier Samuel Hordern, 
seeking to discuss “the leadership that might be given to the business and 
financial world in Australia by some one with your reputation, influence and 
contacts to make possible the earliest change in our long-range planning that 
would put in [sic] a position similar to that of the United States in its period of 
very active growth.”91  But this 1956 effort seems have come to nothing. 
 
Page also resumed public campaigning for new states for the first time since 
1949.  His speech on the 1957-58 budget praised Victoria as the most 
economically balanced of the six states: “I believe that if we could have a 
number of states of the size of Victoria in this continent of ours we would see 
very rapid development.”92  He corresponded with the Capricornia movement in 
central Queensland on their lack of success, attributed simply by Page to public 
apathy.  Notwithstanding the disappointing Cohen experience of over thirty 
years earlier, he suggested they seek a Royal Commission.93  In an October 
1961 speech to the New England New State Annual Convention he proposed a 
fresh formula for his federal units: “about 5 degrees of latitude of coastline and 
their capital cities no more than 200 miles from practically all parts of the state.”  
Page reminded the convention that he had been “the leader of this movement 
in the Federal Parliament for over 40 years.”94   
 
But the issue that attracted the greatest share of the elderly Page’s still 
formidable energy was that which retained the greatest emotional resonance 
for him – the harnessing of the Clarence River.  In a May 1956 speech to the 
House he complained of how the Department of National Development still 
lacked a strategy for the national integration of electricity systems.  By contrast, 
the old DMC had worked well with the states so that “magnificent projects were 
put into effect with complete amity and accord” (a considerable exaggeration, 
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but with some basis).95  Page even dealt with yet another report on the 
Clarence, commissioned by the Electricity Commission of New South Wales 
from the American consulting company Ebasco.  Contrary to his idealisation of 
the private sector as broader minded than government, Ebasco cautiously 
concluded that The Gorge could best be developed after about 1980.  For the 
present, local demand was just too small.  This assessment attracted Page’s 
bitter attacks for ignoring the potential stimulus to local development and how 
linking the Clarence and southern Queensland regions could make the project 
viable.96  
 
Page responded to continued frustrations with his habitual fall-back strategy of 
trying to harness local councils.  In 1956 he issued a new booklet reviving the 
Clarence Valley Authority idea, but now tied this to the restructure of local 
government.  The Authority would provide “a ray of hope thrown out for our 
general future overseas financial relationships” and could even arrange 
international loans linked to migration (again reminiscent of the Migration 
Agreement of the 1920s).97  The Daily Examiner dutifully supported a proposal 
to group shires into a new County Council that could “control the whole river.”98  
Despite such enthusiasm, Page took care to present his plans as measured 
and realistic.  He scorned an intermittently appearing variant of 
developmentalism, proposals for gargantuan engineering projects to exploit 
water resources.  The most famed of these are the Bradfield and Idriess plans 
to irrigate Australia’s interior by such means as by diverting water from 
Queensland rivers.  These received much post-war press publicity, to which 
Page responded by collecting critical  material, including obtaining an 
assessment from the civil engineer John R. Burton that such proposals were 
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“physically impossible.”  “Facts and not mere surmises” were needed, agreed 
Page.99  
 
Page also engaged with two late and unexpected forums for his 
developmentalist agenda.  These were novel in nature for him and each 
provided further confirmation of how the policy environment had changed.  One 
was a major inquiry by a parliamentary committee into constitutional reform, the 
most comprehensive such review of the Constitution since the Peden Royal 
Commission.  The other was an expert inquiry into the dairy industry which 
signalled the extension of market-orientated economic analysis to the rural 
sector.  The results of both exercises underlined the decline in political appetite 
for major developmentalist-orientated change.  But they also showed that Page 
remained well capable of presenting his ideas with force and clarity, and adept 
at capturing attention.  
 
The Joint Committee on Constitutional Review established in May 1956 
attracted Page’s last concerted attempts to amend section 124 on the creation 
of new states and to redesign Australian federalism.  New state activists had 
been lobbying for a constitutional review since the early 1950s.100  It was 
potentially a very influential inquiry, with membership that included Arthur 
Calwell, David Drummond, Alexander Downer and Gough Whitlam.101  Page’s 
fulsome evidence to the Committee was perhaps the most comprehensive call 
for constitutional change by a senior political figure of this time.  In his January 
1957 submission, Page reflected that he had been pursuing constitutional 
reform for decades “like Sisyphus”, with the 1928 referendum his sole success.  
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With typical optimism (and overstatement), he asserted that there was now 
“universal agreement that decentralisation of local administration and a balance 
in the Commonwealth Parliament are essential to efficient and satisfactory 
government.”102  Page also identified himself as the creator of four major co-
operative bodies – the Loan Council, the AAC, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council and the Federal Transport Council.103 
 
Page detailed in his evidence several variations on the theme that authority to 
create a new state be shifted away from state parliaments and towards a 
formula based on local petitions, referenda within the state and the area 
concerned, and the Commonwealth parliament.104  His fundamental arguments 
for new states were increasingly ingenious but continued to reflect faith that a 
simple adjustment or two in governance would ensure the desired outcome.  
He told the Committee that new states would hasten constitutional reform by 
making it easier to satisfy the requirement for a majority of states to support a 
yes vote at referendum.  New states, he seemed to assume, would surely be 
more open-minded on constitutional change.  They would also, he said, 
improve consistency in national regulation of the economy by increasing the 
proportion of commerce crossing state borders and hence falling under 
nationally consistent federal law.105   
 
Page also proposed that national government now be radically reordered along 
co-operative lines using federal-state councils, akin to what he had called for in 
1942 – “Cabinets of the governments of Australia” that would take the Loan 
Council and the AAC as exemplars.  They would operate initially on a voluntary 
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basis “that accustoms the public to their existence”, prior to being put to 
referendum for elevation to constitutional status.  He proposed a 
supplementary Loan Council to co-ordinate semi-governmental and local 
government finances; a new Federal Transport Council that would also cover 
hydroelectricity and flood control; and a Council of Taxation to collect revenue 
for all governments.  Education was also “eminently suited to a combined 
Federal-state approach”: perhaps the two levels of government could share 
tertiary or technical education, or the Commonwealth take responsibility for a 
particular subject.106  Page additionally wanted a new Interstate Commission to 
deal with cross-border issues such as water use, and to investigate 
discrimination in interstate commerce and assistance to the states.107   
 
He was also thinking about how to simplify amendment of the Constitution.  
Having long seen the Constitution as an obstacle to policy innovation (placing 
him increasingly closer to the ALP on constitutional reform than to his Liberal 
and Country Party colleagues), Page told the committee that parliament should 
be able to amend basic “machinery of government” provisions itself.  Only 
wider “principles of government” changes should require a referendum, an idea 
borrowed from the Indian constitution.  Eventually, he hoped, “we can obtain 
amendment without referendum” by agreeing changes with the state 
parliaments alone.108  
 
Page was rarely one to advocate cautious incremental change, especially if he 
judged the time right for a realignment.  His evidence to the Committee is a 
good example.  The committee’s interim report handed down in 1958 (the final 
appeared the following year) included amongst its many recommendations the 
amendment of section 124 to enable creation of a new state if supported by 
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referendum both in the area concerned and in the whole state affected.109  
Although Page in his memoirs contrived to hail its recommendation to liberalise 
section 124 as finally signalling that “the acceptance of the new states idea is 
no longer in doubt,” this was almost the only Page proposal the Committee 
adopted.110  (It also called for new Commonwealth powers to overcome section 
92’s inhibiting of primary product marketing).111  As a multiparty entity, the 
Committee was prone to compromise.  Co-operative federalism was effectively 
ignored, and on constitutional amendment the committee merely recommended 
a limited watering down of the referendum formula by requiring approval by 
only three states.112  The Joint Committee on Constitutional Review was 
Page’s last major engagement with issues of constitutional reform and co-
operative federalism, and it effectively rejected his vision of radical change.   
 
The other inquiry with which Page grappled at this very end of his career 
presented an even greater challenge, an encounter with rigorous economic 
analysis.  The Commonwealth’s 1960 Dairy Industry Committee of Enquiry was 
a pioneering study of the economic and social outcomes of rural industry 
assistance.113  It arose from concerns that long-term subsidisation of the dairy 
industry was inefficient and had effectively institutionalised low-income small-
scale farming.  Page could not ignore this important review, especially given 
dairy’s importance in the Grafton area.  In typical style, his evidence went far 
beyond the subsidisation that industry lobbyists so vigorously defended to 
instead propose nationwide action on such “production side” issues as fodder 
conservation, water conservation, hydroelectricity, soft loans to fund irrigation, 
research and transport co-ordination.  He opposed any restriction of production 
but his defence of subsidisation was lukewarm: this could “scale down” in the 
long-term once production issues had been deal with.114  
                                                             
109 Report from the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, Canberra, 1958, p. 21. 
110 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., pp. 438-40.  The New England New State Movement’s 
submission to the committee called for a 60 per cent plus yes vote in the area in question as 
sole requirement; see ‘Submission by the New England New State Movements’ to Joint 
Committee of Constitutional Review, EPP, folder 2138 (2). 
111 Report from the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, op. cit., p. 19. 
112 Ibid., pp. 170-2. 
113 Report of the Dairy Industry Committee of Enquiry on the Australian Dairy Industry, 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1960; a copy of this report is at EPP, folder 2023.  
114 Page’s evidence of 1 March 1960, EPP, folders 1157, 2023.    
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Significantly, the Committee sought advice from two professors of economics, 
Richard Downing and Peter Karmel.  They proved highly critical of the extent of 
assistance provided to the industry in reaching their conclusion that some of 
the capital and labour it employed “could be more productively employed 
elsewhere.”115  The Committee in its final report accorded Page’s evidence a 
three paragraph summary and analysis of its own, a clear and somewhat 
flattering nod to his special prominence.  It professed to recognise “the value of 
national schemes of such importance” and went on to recommend that financial 
assistance to increase the productivity of eligible famers cover (amongst much 
else) fodder conservation, irrigation and water conservation.   
 
But the Committee was otherwise deterred by the sheer scale of Page’s 
proposals, concluding that “they are of such magnitude and would be so costly 
as to require examination and evaluation by experts.”  Its main findings were 
“that the industry should be re-formed on a sounder economic basis”, that 
“direct financial assistance should be dispensed with as soon as possible” and 
“the direction of assistance should be gradually changed from income-
increasing to cost-reducing.”  A small number of farms that could never be 
viable “will need to be eased out of the industry.”116  Although such conclusions 
were effectively dismissed by the government, this inquiry was a clear sign of a 
new preparedness to apply economic analysis to rural industries which was to 
grow and continue beyond Page’s time.   
 
 
 
                                                             
115 A summary of Downing and Karmel’s findings is provided in the report, pp. 77-8; see also 
Nicholas Brown, Richard Downing: Economics, Advocacy and Social Reform in Australia, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, 2001, p. 207, on the wider precepts of economic 
reform influencing these economists.  
116 The text on Page’s evidence is at pp. 101-2 of the report: the Committee’s findings and 
recommendations are at pp. 115-7.  The Federal government’s response to the final report was 
classically dismissive.  It committed itself only “to discuss with the state governments and the 
industry the question of the reconstruction of the industry, taking into consideration the views of 
the industry”, EPP, folder 2127.  The reaction of the Australian Dairy Industry Council was one 
of studied horror: “this enquiry was conceived with the objective of terminating the dairy 
subsidy”; submission to Minister for Primary Industry, 1 March 1961, EPP, folder 2128.  The 
findings were nonetheless judged by Samuel Wadham to be broadly an “ill-balanced 
compromise” between expert advice to the committee and political acceptability; see Samuel 
Wadham, R. Kent Wilson and Joyce Wood, Land Utilization in Australia, fourth edition, 
Melbourne University Press, Parkville, 1964 (first published 1939), pp. 153-4.  
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Page’s final campaigns: “I want to see the work completed before I die”  
 
Page remained as active as ever to the end, both on policy and personal fronts.  
Ethel Page died in May 1958 and a year later he married his long-serving 
secretary, Jean Thomas, with Stanley Bruce best man at the ceremony at 
London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral.  (The second Lady Page died in 2011).  Ann 
Moyal, a young historian who worked with the elderly Page on his memoirs, 
recalls fondly his “merriment and verve” even in this late stage of his life.  
Though Page was a “fiery particle”, she noted that he forgave political 
enemies.117  Ellis agreed, himself recalling Page’s longstanding tendency to 
separate policy disputes from personalities and his generally “happy view of 
life”.118  
 
But privately, Page in these final years remained baffled by his continuing 
failure to make substantive policy progress.  With time and repeated 
disappointment, a sense of stridency entered his pronouncements as he sought 
to reverse declining interest in his brand of developmentalism.  Ever one to 
seek out topical new arguments, he warned that by developing the coalfields 
stretching from the Hunter Valley to Port Kembla, the New South Wales 
government was merely creating “a neat target for atomic bombs.”119  Page 
noted the ideas of physicist Marcus Oliphant on how decentralisation could limit 
the effects of nuclear attack.120   
 
Continued lack of progress on the Clarence now loomed as his foremost 
anxiety.  He professed himself “amazed that no proper analysis has been made 
of what is called the ancillary benefits that would be gained from the harnessing 
of these waters.”121  Page turned increasingly to appeals via the press.  His 
now well-established persona as the elder statesman of national development 
provided a ready basis for articles ridiculing governments, most spectacularly a 
piece in Australian Country Magazine of September 1959 entitled ‘Our Second 
                                                             
117 Ann Moyal, Breakfast with Beaverbrook: Memoirs of an Independent Woman, Hale & 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1995, p. 150. 
118 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 240. 
119 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 12 September 1957, p. 604.  
120 Undated notes titled ‘Marcus Oliphant,’ possibly a record of discussion, EPP, folder 2035.  
121 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 12 September 1957, p. 604. 
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Snowy – Wasted.’  This presented a suite of photos of Page gazing out over 
the Clarence River and even drinking its waters.  The accompanying text 
highlighted his “all Australian, non-political standpoint” and called Page 
“energetic, nimble-minded”, envisaging that perhaps the end result of his 
campaigning would be dubbed the Earle Page Dam.122  Even Gough Whitlam, 
Labor Deputy Leader and rising political star, applied the elder statesman tag to 
Page during the parliamentary debate on the report of the constitutional 
committee, without evident irony.123    
 
Page had by the late 1950s also firmly grasped the mantle of party elder: no 
doubt this helped colleagues tolerate his hectoring on regionalism and 
planning.  He was respected more for his longevity and role in the Country 
Party’s early success than for his current policy views.  At the Party’s April 1957 
Annual Conference held at Rockhampton he reminded colleagues what the 
Party had once stood for and listed its past “many great reforms which stand 
out as bulwarks and milestones of national progress.”124  Page presented a 
slide show to encourage delegates to take new states and the TVA 
seriously.125  But while the party’s 1958 Federal Platform provided for a 
Commonwealth-state Commission to undertake the “economic analysis of river 
basin projects”, and for a Commonwealth-state planning authority 
“accompanied by machinery to determine the priority of projects,” neither was 
implemented.126   
 
Not that Page admitted defeat – that would not have been the man.  One of his 
last efforts on planning was a September 1960 speech to the House in which 
                                                             
122 Australian Country Magazine, September 1959, pp. 14-7, 91, copy at EPP, folder 2589.  
Another example of Page using the popular press is an article in Pix magazine, ‘Wasted wealth 
of the Clarence’, 13 November 1948, Sydney, pp. 20-3, copy at EPP, folder 2553. 
123 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 13 April 1961, pp. 820, 822. 
124 These included “the co-operation of the sugar industry”; organised marketing of butter, 
wheat and canned fruit; the tariffs needed to “sustain the system” of organised marketing; co-
ordination of state and federal borrowing; a central bank; the rural credits system; the 
independence of the Commonwealth Savings Bank; tax concessions for rural development; the 
Federal Aid Roads system; the “National Health Insurance Scheme”; TB eradication; the CSIR; 
free school milk; the Wool Research Organisation; and the Meat Board.  Page speech to 
Country Party Annual Conference, 12 April 1957, EPP, folder 2607.   
125 A list of the slides is at EPP, folder 2622, but not the slides themselves.  
126 Country Party Federal Platform and Policy, July 1958, Earle Page Papers, UNE Archives, 
A0180, Box 3, folder 29, p. 7.   
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he again called for “a permanent body” of experts to cover “all the various 
forms of development and such matters as education”, using “the Loan Council 
machinery.”127  Two months later, the now 80 year-old Page returned to the 
fray at the Country Party Federal Council by pointing out that as the early Party 
had faced an “inelastic Australian Federal System, which limited combined 
national effort,” it “at once specialised on devising practical machinery for such 
fruitful governmental co-operation.”  But he also regretted his own continued 
failure to harness the nation’s water resources and so called on the Council to 
endorse a permanent organisation of all three tiers of government to develop a 
“control programme of all the waters of Australia.”128   
 
Right up to the very end of his life, Page remained the main parliamentary 
spokesman for new statism.  Indeed, his last major parliamentary speech – 
effectively the end of his public career – was part of the 12 October 1961 
debate on the Constitutional Committee’s findings on new states.  (His very last 
speech to the House was a shorter statement of 19 October on rail gauge 
standardization: typically, he noted that the Bruce-Page government had 
proposed this nearly forty years earlier).  This debate was a final reminder of 
the difficulties he still faced.  Page described the Committee’s report as the first 
ever unanimity in the Federal Parliament on constitutional reform.  He 
recounted the Commonwealth’s 1926 offer to take over Western Australia’s 
north – wistfully, he invited his audience to “imagine the vast development that 
would have occurred under such a plan as this.”129  But Page’s hopes of 
elevating development policy above party politics received a last blow.  In 
supporting the amendment of section 124, Whitlam added that although the 
ALP “is not averse to new states” it was “averse to sovereign states.”130  
Labor’s Clyde Cameron added a well-researched yet still fundamentally unfair 
personal attack on Page for failing to push new states while a minister between 
                                                             
127 EPP, folder 2141; the wording recorded by Hansard is slightly different, see Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, 7 September 1960, pp. 893-4.  
128 Page speech to Country Party Federal Council, 25-26 November 1960, EPP, folder 2021. 
129 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 12 October 1961, pp. 1985.  Page’s interest in 
Northern Australia was more often lukewarm: in June 1961 he pulled out of a parliamentarians’ 
trip to the north so he could instead visit the US at the behest of private insurance companies to 
help the “fight against the nationalisation of medicine”; see Page to C.S. Christian of CSIRO, 9 
June 1961, EPP, folder 2031.    
130 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 12 October 1961, p. 1991. 
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the wars.131  Support from his own Country Party, let alone the Liberals, was 
conspicuously thin: only F.A. Bland, now a Liberal MP, chipped in supporting 
new states and local government as barriers to “administrative centralization 
which would destroy our democratic way of life.”132  
 
Page was ending his public life more politically isolated than ever.  Although 
there was still support for elements of his ideas, few if any MPs other than 
Drummond shared his breadth of synthesis.  The new state movement was by 
this time showing every sign of becoming one of Australia’s greatest lost 
causes.  This bewildered Ellis, Thompson and Page himself.  Ellis wrote of the 
Country Party’s “inexplicable reluctance” to insist on decentralisation.133  Page 
simply pointed to the self-interest of cities and local political ignorance.134  Yet 
creating new states out of old is difficult in any representative democracy.  R.S. 
Parker identified only three notable international instances, all in the United 
States.135  Australia’s own three breakaways came in the nineteenth century 
when boundaries were still formative: by the early 1960s Australians had long 
become accustomed to their existing states and were wary of constitutional 
change.136  Although new state advocates complained vociferously about 
constitutional barriers, section 124 has the merit of clarity.  Constitutions are 
meant to provide certainty, not the instability that would occur if a referendum 
were to be triggered whenever a local grievance arose.  Nor could any 
constitutional formula avoid the immense practical difficulties of dividing old 
states into new.   
                                                             
131 Ibid., pp. 2013-6 
132 Ibid., p. 2001.  
133 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 8. 
134 See for example Page’s speech to the Annual Convention of the New England New State 
Movement, Grafton, 13 October 1961, New England New State Movement Contents of Filing 
Cabinets, UNE Archives, A0547, Box 33.  
135 Kentucky, Maine and West Virginia; see Parker, op. cit., p. 1.  Harman also points to 
Canadian provinces created after confederation in 1867; see Harman, op. cit., p. 26. 
136 There are some more recent new state sympathisers.  Geoffrey Blainey for example feels 
that although federalism is apt for so large a country, too few states were created for it to 
function well; see Hudson and Brown, op. cit., p. 27; also The Cairns Post, 25 November 2009, 
‘Call for North Queensland to Split.’  Former Labor federal minister Chris Hurford proposed in 
2004 a federation of 51 regional entities that would stimulate “community action” and a “more 
civil society”; see Hudson and Brown, p. 49.  Some more recent advocates, such as the late 
Bryan Pape of the UNE School of Law, drew upon their new state sympathies in campaigning 
against constitutionally dubious Commonwealth expenditure; see George Williams, ‘Bryan 
Pape and His Legacy to the Law’, University of Queensland Law Journal, vol. 34, no.1, pp. 29-
46.    
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Page in retirement from office remained unable to answer convincingly Cohen’s 
devastating critique of three-and-a-half decades earlier.  New state movements 
were only effective when by combining widespread public support with political 
leadership from figures like Page they were able to secure additional 
government resources, notably in northern New South Wales.  Popular support 
was far less stable than intellectual interest, hence R.G. Neal’s observation that 
the new state movements were “stronger as means to ends, than as ends in 
themselves”, with the centrality of material concerns resulting in their fluctuating 
with local economic peaks and troughs.137  While such assessments 
underestimate the passions and ideals that the separatist cause was capable of 
raising at times, the rise of the Country Party probably helped head off new 
states by providing more conventional political means of dealing with regional 
grievances.   
 
Page committed himself to leaving a written legacy by completing his memoirs.  
He had mused on this as early as 1939 when he told Drummond that he hoped 
to write a book on “the aspirations, ideals, philosophy and history of our work 
for those who come after us to have a touchstone for their job.”138  A few years 
later, he first discussed producing a major book with Ellis so as “to shed 
important light on post-war problems and the manner of their solution”, but 
decided that an autobiography would carry more weight.  After various false 
starts, the writing process finally began in January 1956 with Page dictating 
much of the text and Ellis making refinements.  By 1958 the draft “was reaching 
alarming proportions.” It was only rendered publishable posthumously in 1963 
following extensive and skilful editing by Ann Moyal (then Mozley).139  The 
result, Truant Surgeon, constitutes both an overt attempt to guide future policy 
and a tacit admission of unfinished business that he hoped others would 
conclude in his absence.  Throughout he stoutly defended his record of policy 
achievement, attributing failures to others being unable to appreciate his vision 
of the nation.  John Latham reviewed it favourably as “a real contribution to 
                                                             
137 Neale, op. cit., pp. 12-3, 23. 
138 Page to Drummond, 15 April 1939, EPP, folio 2706.  
139 Notes by Ellis on the drafting of Truant Surgeon, 16 February 1963, Ellis papers, NLA, MS 
821.  Ellis says that Page first raised the proposed book with him “about 1943.” 
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Australian political history by a highly competent patriotic Australian”, despite 
the drawback that Page “does not say much about any contrary opinions.”140 
 
Page also hoped to produce a separate book on electricity and water.  This 
was to be called Missed Opportunities – Turning Water into Gold and may well 
have been more important to him.141  Although this other volume was never 
completed, his published memoirs concluded with a succinct statement of his 
formula for Australian developmentalism that touched on his continuing 
commitment to regionalism, strong central government, hydroelectricity, co-
operative federalism and planning:  
 
…with a background of over half a century’s study, I am convinced that 
the simple remedy is at hand – one that has been applied in handling 
other major Australian problems, such as finance, marketing and roads – 
through a partnership of Federal, state and local authorities.  In such a 
partnership, the Federal government, as the sole income-tax collector, 
should provide the capital for the headworks free of interest and 
redemption, the state government the water channels, and the local 
authorities, which in each case would be the local river basin authority, 
should advise and assist the water user on the spot.142  
 
He quoted here his speech of 9 March 1961 to the House proclaiming the 
development of water resources to be “the most important point of all”, which 
should harness “all the large rivers from the north to the south.”  Finally, he said 
of the Clarence “I first became interested in this scheme forty years ago, and I 
want to see the work completed before I die.”143   
 
He never did.  Page succumbed to cancer at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in 
Sydney – where he had been a young doctor at the start of the century – on 20 
December 1961, at the age of 81 years and four months.  That same day the 
result for Cowper in the federal election of 9 December was declared: the seat 
that he had held since 1919 returned a Labor member for the first time.  Page 
had been an eminently successful local member, foremostly by winning 16 
                                                             
140 John Latham, ‘Sir Earle Page: Truant Surgeon’, Quadrant, vol. 7, no. 4, Spring 1963, p. 85.  
141 Advice from Page’s granddaughter Helen Snyders indicates that the main text of this no 
longer exists; fragments survive in the EPP, folders 2776, 2777, 2778 and 2785. 
142 Page, Truant Surgeon, op. cit., p. 441.  
143 Ibid., p. 442, quoting a speech in parliament of 9 March 1961.   
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elections in succession.  His achievements for his electors included 
infrastructure such as the long-sought bridge over the Clarence: more recently 
he had bombarded the Postmaster-General with letters on extending television 
to northern New South Wales, entirely undeterred by increasingly terse 
replies.144  Only twice did his primary vote in Cowper fall below 50 per cent, in 
1943 when the ALP recorded its greatest ever national election victory and in 
1961 when the government lost 15 seats in the wake of the credit squeeze.  
Page had earlier considered retirement from parliament but only on the 
condition that Ellis, one of the few people he trusted to uphold his national 
vision, succeed him in Cowper.145  Once cancer had taken a grip Page could 
no longer campaign.  His primary vote in 1961 fell by a massive 15 per cent 
from that recorded at the 1958 election, well above the overall swing against 
the government.  Menzies privately blamed the loss of Cowper on Page’s 
refusal to retire.146 
 
Page’s obituary in the Medical Journal of Australia praised his “invincible 
optimism.” “Page never grew old”, was a great reader, and possessed an 
“orderly mind” that made him precise in thought and action.147  In the 
parliamentary tributes, John McEwen recognised that Page “was responsible 
for many monumental changes in the Australian political structure” and Arthur 
Calwell recalled his “missionary’s zeal.”148  One newspaper obituary entitled 
‘Elder Statesman Colourful Figure’, noted Page’s consistent worldview and 
“leadership in the development of a new form of co-operative federation”, with 
the Loan Council, the AAC and tied road grants his main achievements.149  
 
It was his great confidant, David Drummond, who showed the most empathy 
with Page’s life and vision.  To Drummond, Page’s “outstanding characteristic 
was a wide and far-seeing vision”, which put him “far ahead of any other man in 
                                                             
144 See correspondence in EPP, folders 2129 and 2132.  Page’s Daily Examiner was keen on 
setting up a television company. 
145 Notes by Ellis on the drafting of Truant Surgeon, op. cit.  
146 Heather Henderson (ed.), Letters to my Daughter: Robert Menzies, letters 1955-75, Pier 9, 
Millers Point, 2011, letter Menzies to Henderson of 17 December 1961, p.78.   
147 Obituary by Dr George Bell et al., op. cit.  
148  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 20 February 1962, pp. 15, 16. 
149 The Canberra Times, 21 December 1961, pp. 5, 10. 
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his own party or in most other political parties.”  He recalled Page’s 
commitment to constitutional reform and the harnessing of water power, and 
his role as “the real driving force” in the early new states movement, all of 
which made him “a realistic dreamer” with “a vision and a practical idea of how 
to carry it into effect.”  Drummond accurately told parliament that what Page 
had recently said before the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review was 
“really expressive in very large measure, of the ideas that he had promulgated 
30 or more years before.”150  
 
During the 1950s Page had found little in government policy to which he could 
hitch such visions other than sporadic engagement with national planning and a 
cautious parliamentary venture into constitutional reform.  Increasing isolation 
from his peers suggests that political scepticism about visionary forms of 
developmentalism strengthened considerably during this decade.  A new 
consensus about Australian development emerged based on the steady 
management of national growth, exemplified by the policies of McEwen and 
incorporated into structures of government that made only nominal provision for 
the visionary ventures of Earle Page.  But even if he did not influence official 
priorities to the extent that he hoped, Page still kept some ideas alive by inciting 
reactions and attracting publicity, just as he had under the Chifley government.  
That his final efforts after his retirement from the ministry in 1956 to leave a 
lasting personal legacy struck a distinct chord with the media is indicative of 
lively and continuing popular support for developmentalism. 
                                                             
150 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 20 February 1962, pp. 18, 19. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Earle Page’s vision, longevity and political seniority make him twentieth-century 
Australia’s most important developmentalist.  He was the foremost 
representative of this strand in Australian politics when it peaked in influence, 
especially as Treasurer in the 1920s.  His story shows that Australian 
developmentalism has a far more varied and richer history than implied by 
observers such as Donald Horne and S.J. Butlin.  
 
Page’s determination and capacity for synthesis engaged him with, and so 
helps illuminate, such varied historical currents as regionalism, 
decentralisation, co-operative federalism and the application of seemingly 
transformative technologies.  That he was only partially successful in 
implementing his ambitious synthesis should not obscure his major and 
enduring influence on several of its specific components.  Page’s incessant 
proselytising was instrumental in giving these elements a more lasting place in 
national political culture than they would otherwise have had.  He made 
important contributions to co-operative federalism that are still influential to-day.  
He helped consolidate the Commonwealth’s dominance through the 1928 
Financial Agreement and the early systematisation of tied grants as means of 
extending its fiscal and policy influence.  He gave regionalism lasting 
significance.  And he helped uphold national economic planning over decades, 
including during periods when it was distinctly unfashionable.   
 
Through the establishment of the Loan Council and the Australian Agricultural 
Council, and by promoting them as exemplars of federal co-operation, Page – 
as Ellis observed – “gave this idea orderly and practical expression”.1  His 
initiatives can now be seen as antecedents of to-day’s Council of Australian 
Governments and of other co-operative bodies.  The history of Australian 
federalism is broadly one of growth in central power and nationally-imposed co-
operation, set against a corresponding failure – despite many initiatives – to 
strike an agreed and lasting balance between states and Commonwealth.  
                                                 
1 Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, op. cit., p. 327.  
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Page probably more fuelled this tension than resolved it, but he also 
contributed mightily (perhaps ironically) to shifting the balance of power 
towards the Commonwealth.  State governments were to him obstacles around 
which he had to manoeuvre to implement his national vision.  He was far from 
alone among Australian political leaders in confronting these issues, but has a 
claim to having set some basic strands of the debate via his own distinctive mix 
of centralism and regionalism.  
 
By pioneering the use of tied grants to the states, Page helped usher in the 
Commonwealth’s fiscal dominance and propensity to seek a role in policy fields 
beyond its stated constitutional role.  The wider importance of this only became 
apparent in the 1950s when the Commonwealth significantly broadened tied 
grants to fund university expansion.  Under Gough Whitlam, tied grants 
reached about 40 per cent of total federal grants to the states, but it was Page 
who first gave them a firm place in Australian federalism.2  Of all the policy 
issues Page pursued, his efforts to overcome federalism as a barrier to his 
nationwide agenda and the contribution this made to centralism had the most 
lasting national impact.     
 
By contrast, new statism declined after Page’s death, hastened by the narrow 
but decisive defeat of the 1967 referendum on the separation of northern New 
South Wales.  But political interest in the allied concept of regionalism persists.  
Page did more than any other individual to embed this spatial and community-
based dimension into modern Australian political thought.  No-one else of such 
political stature pursued regionalism and related decentralisation so intensively 
over such a period of time.  Yet post-Page, a continuing sense that local 
government is too weak and state governments are too large has encouraged 
continued – and inconclusive – experiments in applying various advisory and 
administrative structures to regional development, right up to the current 
                                                 
2 Even in the mid-1960s a Canadian federalism scholar described use of such grants in 
Australia as “minor and quite recent.”  In 1964-5 only a sizeable minority of Commonwealth 
grants to the states were tied, £137.8 million out of a total of £494.3 million.  See J.A. Maxwell, 
Commonwealth-State Financial Relations in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 
1967, p. 61.  On the proportion of tied grants out of total federal grants to the states, see Scott 
Bennett and Richard Webb, Specific Purpose Payments and the Australian Federal System, 
Research Paper no. 17 2007-8, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2008, figure 1.  
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Regional Development Australia committees.3  Page’s most distinctive 
contribution here was his challenge to more conventional new staters that 
regionalism ought not just be an expression of local patriotism but should be 
used to spark economic and social vitalism across the nation.  
 
Page also upheld hydroelectricity, rural residential universities and planning as 
public issues during his long career, but left less of a legacy on each.  The 
1960-61 credit squeeze led to the 1965 Vernon Committee of Economic 
Enquiry that raised a flicker of renewed interest in planning by recommending 
“more co-ordinated long-term planning of public investment between the states 
and the Commonwealth.”4  But by the time such findings were handed down, 
the economy had recovered and Vernon’s proposed independent expert 
advisory bodies were summarily dismissed by Prime Minister Menzies.5   
 
What Page did – and did not – achieve helps to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of Australian developmentalism by defining what the nation’s 
political culture would tolerate.  This fell well short of grand national visions and 
was increasingly limited to the fostering of a steady improvement in material 
living standards.  Reactions to his initiatives collectively challenge assumptions 
by some historians and other commentators that the Australian body politic of 
his time was firmly committed to ambitious nation-building.  In a practical 
sense, his career suggests that government and public support for 
developmentalist proposals to shape Australia was usually very mixed.   
                                                 
3 Others include the Whitlam government’s Regional Organisations of Councils and the Keating 
government’s Regional Development Organisations.  For outlines of post-Page regionalism see 
Lyndon Megarrity, ‘Local Government and the Commonwealth: An Evolving Relationship’, 
Parliamentary Library Research Paper no. 10, 2010-11, 31 January 2011; and Andrew H. Kelly, 
Brian Dollery and Bligh Grant, ‘Regional Development and Local Government: Three 
Generations of Federal Intervention,’ Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 
2009, pp. 171-93.  A.J. Brown refers to continuing “conflict around a frozen territorial structure 
which is widely recognised as delivering neither the level of national unity nor the serious 
political decentralization which many Australians have long desired”; ‘Constitutional 
Schizophrenia’, op. cit., p. 53. 
4 Committee of Economic Enquiry, Report, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1965, p. 
17.12.  It was informally named for its chair James Vernon, managing director of Colonial Sugar 
Refining. 
5 See Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, op. cit., p. 531 and Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, 21 September 1965, pp. 1080-7.  In recommending a Special Projects 
Commission, Vernon drew on British and Canadian exemplars, not Page’s admired DMC; see 
Committee of Economic Enquiry, op. cit., pp. 3.16, 17.28. 
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Support most consistently came from applied intellectuals such as Bland, 
Thompson, Holmes and Page himself.  Page’s ideas on national development 
were challenged on several fronts.  Political rivals in the Country Party 
preferred to see its persona settle into protecting an established stake in the 
political mainstream.  Vested interests, particularly among primary producers, 
gave little priority to the nationwide, production-side initiatives that Page 
advocated.  Outright sceptics, such as those press commentators who were 
dismissive of Page’s ill-defined proposals for national planning, ensured these 
schemes received only brief consideration.  Even more tellingly, Page was 
increasingly challenged by a growing body of professional expertise within and 
outside government.  From often hard experience, such experts became 
increasingly aware of the constraints imposed by aridity, soil infertility, a small 
and dispersed population, isolation from international markets, the caution of 
potential overseas investors, an intractably fractious federal system and the 
fundamental limits of government.  Popular accounts of national development 
that refer to such famed projects as the Snowy Mountains Scheme often fail to 
also consider the many development proposals that were rejected, of which 
Page was a fecund generator.  Such rejection reflected the sound technical 
judgement of the times: it also suggests a more cautious political culture than 
Australians frequently see themselves as supporting. 
 
Page’s developmentalism was thus restrained by cautious economists, 
engineers, officials, business leaders and state governments.  The states in 
1923 opposed national planning of electrical power.  The Cohen Royal 
Commission clinically dissected the case for new states.  The DMC and the 
New South Wales government doubted Page’s vision for the Clarence.  
Engineers scorned the practicality of hydroelectricity on most of mainland 
Australia.  National planning proposals attracted the accusation that Page was 
a mere dreamer.  Committees on constitutional review and the dairy industry 
declined to accept his call for nationwide action.  Even an ostensible ally such 
as Herbert Gepp was wary of proposals for unlimited development as talk that 
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“damages our credit abroad and hampers the formation of rational plans for 
development.”6  
 
Page’s incessant campaigning and the responses he elicited unintendedly 
helped to draw out this growing realisation of national limitations.  These were 
(and often still are) so fundamental that they could not be as readily overcome 
by public appeals as Page hoped.  National optimism that Australia could be 
engineered to realise perceptions of a near limitless development potential 
wilted in the face of experience and a growing emphasis on seeking benefits 
from within an increasingly hardened political culture.  Over time, Page had 
fewer and fewer allies in government and business who shared his breadth of 
vision.      
  
Nor was the Australian public practically supportive.  Local demands for 
amenities and a wider sense that Australia was falling short of its potential 
helped Page win attention but were only occasionally sufficient for 
implementation of ambitious development projects.  Popular enthusiasm, such 
as for new states, covered only selected elements of Page’s vision and was 
readily assuaged, leaving him lamenting public indifference.  Big projects like 
the Snowy were government initiatives that the public acquiesced in rather than 
demanded.7  Page’s long career helps show that although developmentalism 
was a major theme in twentieth century Australia, it has been strongest as an 
enduring but abstract national ideal that only occasionally bore fruit.  It has 
persisted at the popular level but increasingly struggled as a vision that policy 
makers were prepared to strive towards.  By mid-century it often manifested as 
a form of nostalgia from which Page at the end of his career gained some 
belated public praise.  This does not appear to have fundamentally changed in 
a nation that now functions through an array of entrenched policy compromises 
and in which policy debate is commonly expressed as an ongoing tension 
between populist and technocratic world views.  
                                                 
6 Gepp, Democracy’s Danger, op. cit., p. 27. 
7 Hirst makes a similar point about policy reforms of the Hawke and Howard governments; see 
John Hirst, Looking for Australia: Historical Essays, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2010, p. 144. 
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What Page was proudest of achieving was not orderly marketing or trade 
agreements, but the University of New England, the Financial Agreement and 
the AAC, each of which constituted a step towards his broader vision.  Tireless 
though he was, Page’s policy passions were not wholly his inventions: major 
policy initiatives are rarely solely the work of an individual.  There are 
antecedents for the Loan Council and Financial Agreement; he pioneered but 
did not invent tied grants; and regionalism and decentralisation predate him.8  
Aitkin’s summation of Page as probably the most inventive federal politician of 
the twentieth century thus needs qualification, but he was entirely accurate that 
Page is Australia’s most under-regarded such figure. 
 
Page’s originality lies more in his capacity for synthesis, which made him a far 
wider visionary than other prominent developmentalists in government.  
Thomas Playford focussed on outbidding rival states to secure manufacturing 
for South Australia.  Queensland’s William Forgan Smith favoured public works 
and primary industry.  In Tasmania, Eric Reece as a minister and later Premier 
considered hydroelectricity to be a basis for decentralisation and industry.  
Page, by contrast, was a more truly national figure who assembled a far wider 
vision of Australia by drawing on regionalism, technology and rational planning 
to animate issues as diverse as new states, higher education and co-operative 
federalism.   
 
Page offered an alternative role for government to W.K. Hancock’s oft-repeated 
description of Australians seeing “the State as a vast public utility.”9  He instead 
saw it as applying triggers of regionalism, planning and electrification to 
catalyse communities and private enterprise into leading development.  Page‘s 
devotion to this nationwide vision has been obscured by the wider Country 
Party’s sectoralism, assumptions that Australian political thought is invariably 
derivative and a focus on the drama of his 1939 clash with Menzies.  Also 
important was biographers’ tendency until recently to conventionalise 
Australian political figures – overlooking Deakin’s spiritualism and Curtin’s 
                                                 
8 Statistician Timothy Coghlan, for example, warned in 1902 of “abnormal aggregation of the 
population”; quoted in Graeme Davison, ‘Decentralisation’ in Davison, Hirst and Macintyre, op. 
cit., p. 176.   
9 W.K. Hancock, Australia, op. cit., p. 55. 
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depressiveness, for example.  To these we can add Page’s ambitious 
imagining of a how the formative Australian nation of the first half of the 
twentieth century should be shaped.   
 
Page’s ideas are hard to classify collectively using traditional concepts of 
liberalism, conservatism and socialism.  He fiercely opposed public ownership 
but wanted government and business to work together.  Primarily, he saw 
himself as an innovator, who only selectively defended established paradigms 
such as the possibilities of harnessing Imperial links.  That he was so distinctive 
a visionary raises the question of why he held high office in a nation of 
supposed pragmatists.  His personal resilience and stable support base around 
Grafton are just part of the explanation.   
 
Despite the increasing divergences between them over time, Page endured 
mainly as the Country Party did.  It gave him public status, aided by allied civic 
movements.  His foremost political achievement of a coalition with the urban-
based conservatives struck a long-term balance between a separate persona 
for the Country Party and its scope to influence the political mainstream, in 
contrast to the mixed fortunes of rural protest parties elsewhere.10  The 
coalition also had indirect value to Page in that the senior partner tempered his 
impetuosity, especially under the leadership of Stanley Bruce.  In the longer 
term, the success of the coalition contributed to a personal prestige that for 
Page largely survived growing policy differences with his peers.11    
 
Also integral to Page’s endurance were his political skills.  He drew on his 
national standing and sense of strategy to defend the coalition and outshine 
potential rivals such as Charles Hardy.  He remained cannily alert to 
opportunities to promote his agenda.  This made Page’s insertion of ideas into 
the political process spasmodic.  Yet such studied opportunism – his attempts 
to seize the psychological moment – is hardly uncommon in politics: the 
                                                 
10 See chapter 1 of Graham, op. cit., for a summary history of early twentieth century agrarian 
political movements, especially in the United States and Canada.    
11 Graham, ibid., also reflects on the importance of the coalition to the Country Party and 
Page’s role in its success, pp. 195, 295.  
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political journalist Henry Fairlie famously wrote of “the patience of politics.”12  
Page could wait for decades, but once set on an outcome was relentless.   
 
Page was active for so long that he was exposed to major changes in political 
culture.  After the relatively ready optimism of his early career and first stint in 
government during the 1920s, the dwindling of policy-makers’ faith in 
developmentalism was compounded by new economic theories and modes of 
governance.  His career thus also contributes to understanding the impact of 
the technical economic and professional expertise that redefined the reach of 
central government.  The optimism of the 1920s faltered as that decade 
progressed and was then sidelined by the search for responses to the 
economic crisis of the Great Depression.  This contributed to the rise of 
economic expertise that became central to the development of national policy 
and was harnessed to the resurgent optimism of the immediate post-war years.  
But as economic prosperity took hold, mainstream policy settings shifted by the 
early 1950s to more limited ambitions of managing steady growth, rather than 
trying to spark the comprehensive economic and social engineering that Page 
continued to advocate. 
 
Nor did Page accept the de-radicalisation of his own Country Party, becoming 
the foremost critic of the narrowing of its focus onto defending rural incomes.  
He clung so tenaciously to his goals that he drifted towards marginalisation, 
something this ever-hopeful individual never accepted.  Although Page held a 
high position in the party’s organisation until his death, from the late 1930s he 
had only a handful of colleagues to whom he could relate on matters of policy.  
Generational change further eroded his personal political standing.   
 
Page also had personal limitations.  Ellis’s descriptions of endearing strengths 
read also as shortcomings, such as his calling Page “a crusader” without also 
noting the crusader’s typical righteous inflexibility.13  Outwardly, Page bears a 
similarity to the “agitator” category in Harold Laswell’s political typology.  
                                                 
12 Henry Fairlie, The Life of Politics, Methuen, London, 1968, p. 84.  Fairlie said that the phrase 
originated with R.A. Butler. 
13 Ellis, A Pen in Politics, op. cit., p. 96.  
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Characteristics include trust in general principles and abstract rationality; 
frustration over administrative detail; provocativeness; self-reliance; 
contentiousness; suspicion that opponents act out of bad faith; outspokenness; 
and idealisation of what social reforms will achieve.14  Such similarities reflect 
Page’s commitment to his vision of the nation and corresponding anger over 
the barriers he encountered. 
 
Page assumed that his policy goals were of themselves so compellingly 
rational that he frequently failed to argue as persuasively as someone of his 
intelligence was capable.  He never convincingly detailed how planning would 
work, why private investors would fund hydroelectric dams, or how regionalism 
could be reconciled with his instinctive centralism.  As Bruce discovered, Page 
was not good at selling an idea, no small problem for someone with so big an 
agenda.  Page was more likely to suddenly impose a goal when the time 
seemed right than slowly build support.  He interacted with civic and political 
groups selectively and had too diverse a range of interests to secure broad 
backing.  Australia in his time was open to incremental change, but less so to 
sudden realignments.  Tellingly, Page became sensitive to accusations of 
achieving less than he ought to have.15   
 
His successes and also his failures suggest how difficult it has been in 
Australian public life to win support for a seemingly abstract vision of the entire 
nation, as against immediately pragmatic answers to specific issues.  State-
Commonwealth relations remain uncertain, with Page’s contribution to the rise 
of Commonwealth power not being matched by an agreed commensurate shift 
in constitutional responsibilities away from the states.  Tensions between 
countryside and city over the allocation of public resources have not been 
resolved by limited experiments in regionalism that reflect Page’s ideas but 
which fall far short of his concept of nation-shaping federal units.  Page’s 
National Council and other planning proposals demonstrate the difficulty of 
                                                 
14 Laswell’s typology is summarized in Graham Little, Politics and Personal Style, Nelson, 
Melbourne, 1973, pp. 77-8.  Page did not, however, share one other agitator trait, that of 
eliciting an emotional public response: he preferred to appeal to reason. 
15 For example, his angry exchange with the Labor Member for Adelaide, Cyril Chambers, 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 22 May 1956, p. 2324.  
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implementing a coherent national economic policy in an unresolved federal 
system.   
 
Yet as Australia’s most significant developmentalist, Page still helps draw out 
currents of thought.  His career supports revisionist arguments by James 
Walter and others that Australian political life was richer in ideas than often 
assumed, especially those promulgated by applied thinkers.  He was a 
powerful exception to the “Australian scepticism” identified by the sociologist 
John Carroll as a national trait, in which “there are no grand visions of the past, 
the present, or the future” and no “convinced belief that mundane 
institutions…can be radically transformed for the better, that idealistic passion 
can be translated into social progress.”16  
 
Page’s developmentalism helps enlarge our understanding of what ideas define 
Australian civilization.  There is a widespread assumption that Australia 
reached a broad political consensus about 1910 based on the Deakinite vision, 
and that subsequent debate predominantly concerned its implementation.17  In 
fact, Page provided a spatially-oriented developmentalist alternative, which 
qualifies perceptions of the Country Party as predominantly a party of 
resistance.18  He affirms the endurance of the tradition created by European 
settlers that they could make much of a continent they saw as bearing no great 
burden of history and as having no previous owners of the land.  Inspired by 
admiration of overseas development experience as he frequently was, Page’s 
efforts to create an Australia according to his national vision amounted to a 
form of national pride. 
  
Page thus shows how assessment of the career of an influential individual and 
the ideas they upheld can help illuminate the wider past and also cast light on 
the present.  He is an example of the historical value of querying assumptions 
that prominent yet little studied national figures were merely reflective of the 
                                                 
16 John Carroll, ‘National Identity’ in Carroll (ed.), Intruders in the Bush, op. cit., pp. 211, 214, 
215. 
17 See for example Geoff Stokes (ed.), Australian Political Ideas, UNSW Press, Kensington, 
1994, p. 6; and Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: the Story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards, 1992, introduction. 
18 See for example W.K. Hancock, Australia, op. cit., chapter 11, especially pp. 198-203.  
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institutions in which they embedded themselves.  An important minority of 
political figures such as Page ranged so widely in thought and vision that the 
study of their interactions with wider public culture can broaden interpretations 
of Australian history.  
 
Page’s strategic place in Australian history is that he offered a full alternative to 
the Deakinite settlement which, as the century progressed, became the 
established mainstream of Australian government policy.  No-one else of his 
political standing provided such a comprehensive alternative for so long.  As 
ready faith in the nation’s development narrowed to a predominantly popular 
ideal that was overshadowed by the management of steady growth, Page was 
increasingly lonely as one of the very few developmentalist optimists left in 
national politics.     
 
In sum, Earle Page is historically important as Australian developmentalism’s 
foremost standard bearer.  He broadened developmentalist thought by 
providing a rare synthesis of ideas that were otherwise typically seen with only 
limited regard for how they could strengthen each other.  This both delineated 
and stretched the breadth of what visions and policies were acceptable in 
Australian politics.  He was instrumental in giving elements of his vision, 
especially regionalism, co-operative federalism and a strong national 
government, greater and more lasting significance in Australian history than 
they would otherwise have had.  Page’s long career confirms that Australia has 
long inspired popular ideals of national development.  Studying his life 
establishes his place in Australian history and, through this, contributes to 
establishing that of Australian developmentalism as a persistent ideal in public 
life but which as a practical concept was increasingly challenged during the 
twentieth-century. 
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